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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the emergence and proliferation of public consultative bodies 
(PCBs) in contemporary Russia. Created by the government and regulated by law, 
PCBs are formal groups of NGO leaders, academics, journalists, entrepreneurs and 
public figures selected by the state, that perform advisory, monitory and support 
functions to government departments and individuals at federal, regional and 
municipal levels. The concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ (public scrutiny) is 
employed by Kremlin to refer to the dual activities of oversight and assistance, which 
PCBs are intended to enact. First appearing ten years ago with the foundation of 
the Federal Public Chamber in 2004, there are now tens of thousands of PCBs in 
operation across the country.  
 
This thesis constitutes the first systematic analysis of PCBs in English. It uses a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach in order to explore the extent to which 
the portrayal of PCBs in government discourse corresponds to the practices 
enacted through these institutions in three regional case studies of Moscow, St 
Petersburg and Samara. It finds that although PCBs are presented by federal and 
regional leaders as means for citizens merely to assist the authorities in the 
performance of tasks decided by the state, in practice PCBs can enable citizens 
modestly to influence policy outcomes and occasionally to shape public agendas. 
They therefore cannot be dismissed as mere ‘window dressing’ for the authorities. 
 
The thesis shows that PCBs were created as part of the market reform of the Soviet-
era public sector, in which processes of privatisation, outsourcing and 
decentralisation reduced the state’s ability to make public policy without input from 
domestic non-state actors. It argues that the limited participation in governance 
afforded to citizens through PCBs exemplifies practices of ‘authoritarian neoliberal 
governance’, a concept that captures the attempts by the state to control policy 
outcomes produced through new public participatory mechanisms arising from the 
marketization of state bureaucracy. Although the thesis focuses on the case of 
Russia, the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’ raises the question of 
the existence of commensurable mechanisms in other non-democratic polities. 
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
In this thesis, I have used the BGN/PCGN romanisation system for Russian, which 
renders ‘я’ as ‘ya’, ‘ю’ as ‘yu’ and ‘e’ as ‘ye’ after vowels, soft signs and at the 
beginning of words. However, I have rendered ‘ë’ as ‘yo’, instead of leaving it 
untransliterated, since it more accurately reflects the intended pronounciation for 
those unfamiliar with the Cyrillic alphabet. Borshchëv thus becomes Borshchyov, 
yeshë becomes yeshyo.  Nonetheless, I have used common anglicised forms of 
popular Russian names, such as Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Khrushchev, Evgeny, Togliatti 
and so on. Regarding the names of Russians who publish in English cited in the 
thesis, I have tried to be faithful to the ways in which they transliterate their own 
names. This means that in some cases, Alexei becomes Alexey, Andrei becomes 
Andrey, and Aleksandr becomes Alexander. Unless otherwise stated, all 
translations from Russian to English are my own. 
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Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War has been interpreted as the ‘global consolidation of 
the neoliberal economic project’ with formerly state controlled economies opening 
up to global markets across the post-Soviet space.1 It is widely perceived that there 
is now ‘no alternative’ to the existing global capitalist order as the former communist 
countries have become embedded (albeit to different extents) within global financial 
and governance networks.2 And yet there is a great deal of regional, national and 
local variety in the forms this order takes and the contentions that arise as it is 
established across the world. The Russian state, of course, has enthusiastically 
embraced market capitalism, particularly in the Putin era, and continues to 
implement administrative reforms that restructure the Soviet-era state bureaucracy 
along market principles.3 The subject of this thesis is the emergence and 
proliferation of institutions created as part of these reforms, which aim to increase 
civic participation in both local and federal level governance through the 
implementation of practices of obschestvennyi kontrol’.  In this introduction, I first 
set out the object of research and present my argument, before describing the 
process I undertook to complete the thesis and addressing methodological issues. 
I end with an outline of the structure of the thesis. 
 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ and the Network of Public Consultative Bodies 
 
Promoted by the Kremlin as a means to reduce corruption, extend civic 
participation and downsize the Soviet-era administration, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
can be literally translated into English as ‘public oversight’, ‘public monitoring’ or 
‘public scrutiny’.4 However, I have chosen to leave it untranslated in this thesis as 
                                                          
1 O. Worth, Hegemony, International Political Economy and Post-Communist Russia (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005), pp. 1; see also B. Jessop, ‘Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Urban 
Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective’, Antipode, Vol. 34, No. 3, (July 2002). 
2 F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, 1989, 
 http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm#source (accessed 26 April 2010); U. Beck, The Reinvention of 
Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 3; R. Sakwa, Postcommunism (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1999), pp. 3; W. Outhwaite and L. Ray, Social Theory and Postcommunism 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp.  2. 
3 S. Prozorov, The Ethics of Post-Communism: History and Social Praxis in Russia (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), pp. 67. 
4 Some English texts have translated it as ‘public control’, but I consider this a grave mistranslation. 
‘Control’ in English means to manage, that is, to make decisions in full possession of relevant facts 
and to steer the course of events. Kontrol’ in Russian means to monitor or check the decisions 
made by others; it thus implies a limitation of sovereignty not present in the English word. This 
distinction is very important for the relationship between state and society inculcated by the 
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the concept has no agreed formal English translation and, as such, those just 
posited either do not refer to a specific set of practices (public oversight, public 
monitoring) or they refer to slightly different ones (public scrutiny). The institutions 
created by the state to operationalise obshchestvennnyi kontrol’ have been termed 
public consultative bodies (hereafter PCBs),5 and comprise public councils 
(obshchestvennyye sovety), public chambers (obshchestvennyye palaty), public 
monitoring commissions (obshchestvennyye nablyudatel’nyye komissii), and 
various derivatives thereof.6 They are advisory bodies, created by federal law or 
decree, often linked to government agencies or individuals and are composed of 
members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks and academia - 
as well as business leaders and public figures from the media and the arts - who do 
not generally hold other formal positions within the government. Their main tasks 
are to provide a mixture of scrutiny of and assistance to the authorities, who are 
often able, directly or indirectly, to select a proportion of their members. In the last 
five years, the number of these bodies has mushroomed, with tens of thousands 
currently in operation at federal, regional and municipal levels and linked to one 
another in a growing network with the Federal Public Chamber at the centre. In July 
2014, legislation was passed that delimited and codified practices of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’, linking it exclusively to the PCB network; until then, its 
legal status was vague, diffused across various legislative acts and contested in 
practice by civic groups. My object of study is thus very much an emergent one. 
 Little has been written in English on the proliferation of PCBs, with most 
studies hitherto focussing on the activities of the first and largest such body, the 
Federal Public Chamber, and its regional incarnations. Here, analyses can be 
divided into two strands, the first of which considers public chambers as 
representative of Putin’s vision for state-society relations and the second of which 
sees them as part of a broader trend towards the evisceration of democratic 
institutions in the country. Conceding that the Chamber has proven to be less of a 
‘puppet’ than initially anticipated, scholars in the first group conclude that the 
                                                          
institutions that enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’. However, when citing directly from sources that 
have translated kontrol’ as ‘control’, I have remained faithful to the source from which the citation 
came. 
5 M. Gorny, ‘Obshchestvennyye konsul’tativnyye struktury pri organakh vlasti: opyt Sankt 
Peterburga’, Teleskop, No. 2, (2011). 
6Gorny, ‘Obshchestvennyye konsul’tativnyye struktury pri organakh vlasti’. 
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Chamber embodies the Kremlin’s stultified and corporatist vision of civil society. 
Alfred Evans states that  
 
The Putin administration speaks of the need for a vigorous civil 
society but interprets civil society as a network of organizations 
that, while remaining technically outside the state, will be co-opted 
to assist the leadership of the political regime in pursuing the 
objectives that it has chosen for society.7 
 
James Richter similarly concludes that, ‘rather than empowering civil society to 
make demands upon the bureaucracy… the Public Chamber’s structures and 
practices instead work to reaffirm the Kremlin’s centrality as the ultimate arbiter of 
Russian politics.’8 Both Evans and Richter see the Public Chamber as a move to 
co-opt Russian civil society as part of a broader strategy to consolidate Putin’s 
‘power vertical’.9 In other words, the Public Chamber represents an attempt to enlist 
the assistance of society in state-determined goals. 
In a later article, James Richter explored the state discourse surrounding the 
proliferation of regional public chambers and situated them in the context of Russian 
state’s attempt to instatiate a new, specifically Russian model of democracy, 
‘sovereign democracy’. While my research confirms the Russian state’s vision of 
civil society presented by Richter as ‘a unified public sphere serving the interests of 
the whole’, I also add to this interpretation on two levels.10 First, I show that 
economic considerations, more than democratic ones, are used to justify the 
emergence and proliferation of PCBs in state discourse, with citizens urged to 
become active in order to improve Russia’s position in the international economy. 
Second, I demonstrate that PCBs do not always produce this unified vision in 
practice, and that PCBs can sometimes influence public policy. This highlights the 
                                                          
7 A. Evans, ‘The First Steps of Russia’s Public Chamber: Representation or Coordination?’, 
Demokratizatsiya, (Fall, 2008). 
8 J. Richter, ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1, (January – March 
2009). 
9 See also J. Richter, ‘The Ministry of Civic Society? The Public Chambers in the Regions’, 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 56, No. 6, (November-December 2009). 
10 J. Richter, ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chamber and the Regions’, Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol.56, No. 6, (November/December, 2009). 
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advantage of the Critical Discourse Analysis approach, which enabled me to explore 
how far the state’s vision is operationalised. 
The second group of scholars situates the Public Chamber within a 
movement towards the evisceration of democratic institutions in Russia. Richard 
Sakwa has posited that the Chamber is one of a number of ‘para-constitutional’ 
intuitions that were ‘designed to enhance efficacy but in practice undermined the 
development of a self-sustaining constitutional order, the emergence of a vibrant 
civic culture and above all denied the supremacy of the normative state.’11 In his 
view, the Public Chamber is a paternalistic body that advances the regime’s own 
preferences and has ‘eclipsed the Duma’s public advocacy role.’12 Similarly, Nikolai 
Petrov, Masha Lipman and Henry Hale argue that the Chamber is one of a number 
of ‘substitute institutions’, which are  
 
Intended to serve some of the positive functions of real democratic 
institutions, such as providing the regime with societal feedback 
on pending legislation—but without holding authorities fully 
accountable before the public and without putting rulers’ hold on 
power at risk in the way that true democratic institutions would.13  
 
They claim that these bodies are symptomatic of Russia’s ‘over-managed 
democracy’, a regime type characterised by highly centralized state authority, the 
formal institutions of democracy and the ‘systematic gutting of these institutions and 
their frequent functional replacement by substitutions—often either outside the 
constitutional framework or in violation of the spirit of the constitution—that are 
created by and highly dependent on central authorities.’14 Likewise, Brian Taylor 
echoes the diagnosis of the Public Chamber as a ‘substitute institution’, claiming 
that although they do not create any direct harm, such formations are designed to 
                                                          
11 R. Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev 
Seccession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 49. 
12 Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, pp. 164. 
13 N. Petrov, M. Lipman, and H. Hale, ‘Over-managed Democracy in Russia: Governance 
Implications of Hybrid Regimes’, Carnegie Papers, Russia and Eurasia Program No. 106, 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).  
14 Petrov, Lipman and Hale, ‘Over-managed Democracy in Russia’. 
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‘take the place of more independent civil society organisations and more publically 
accountable state institutions.’15  
Both these interpretations view the Public Chamber as evidence of the 
erosion or distortion of democratic priniciples in contemporary Russia, the former 
through the corporatisation of the public sphere, the latter through the circumvention 
of constitutional institutions. If we extend these analyses to the expansion of the 
PCB network in toto, the former would likely argue that PCBs represent the 
systematic stifling of a vibrant civil society; the latter would claim that PCBs have 
been created because the unchecked use of the formal institutions of representative 
democracy is perceived too risky by the regime, but that ‘managed democracy’ does 
not give sufficient feedback from society. These are both useful interpretations that 
explain the relationship between the development of PCBs on existing social and 
political institutions. However, they both start from a position of negativity; their main 
argument is that PCBs contribute to the depletion of existing levels of pluralism and 
democracy, rather than the production of a particular set of practices, identities and 
relationships.  
While this thesis shows that the proliferation of PCBs has come alongside 
the erosion of opportunities for electoral participation and the persecution of certain 
independent civic activity, it focusses on the rhetoric employed by the Kremlin and 
regional leaders to legitimate the emergence of PBCs and examines the extent to 
which the practices they inculcate correspond to the Kremlin’s discourse.16 In other 
words, it attempts to take PCBs on their own terms by measuring the extent to which 
they ‘live up to’ the roles assigned to them by their creators. My decision to eschew 
an approach based solely on theories of democratisation is fuelled by a conviction 
that attempts to define mechanisms of authoritarian rule against the institutions of 
liberal democracy lead only to a partial understanding of the rationale for and 
activities of such mechanisms. Instead, the thesis shows that for a fuller picture, it 
is necessary to look not only at the relationship between the PCB network and civil 
society and democracy, but also at the reform of the public sector. 
                                                          
15 B. Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 243. 
16 As this chapter sets out in detail below, by discourse I refer to the representations of the social 
world constructed in language by different social groups. See N. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: 
Textual Analysis for Social Research (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), pp. 207-208. 
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 One exception to the studies discussed here is the work of Elena 
Chebankova, who has employed a Gramscian framework in order to conceptualise 
public chambers as sites in which the dominant order is generally maintained, but 
which can also occasionally be used to advance a civic position.17 The research 
presented in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis confirms that, in certain 
circumstances, PCBs do manage to influence state policy and alter the behaviour 
of authorities. However, it also shows that the ‘society against the state’ perspective 
is only one view advanced by PCB members and that in most instances members 
want to work collaboratively with the authorities.18   
This thesis is empirically, not theoretically, driven. As such, it attempts to 
understand the emergence of PCBs in terms of their relevance to the production of 
new social practices and new social relations in Russian public life. In order to do 
this, it asks the following questions:  
- How does the Kremlin explain and legitimate the emergence of PCBs?  
- What practices are produced through PCBs and how do they correspond to 
those articulated by the Putin regime?  
- What can the development of PCBs tell us about the kind of bureaucracy 
emerging in Russia’s capitalist but non-democratic state?  
- What can the development of PCBs tell us about state-society relations in 
conditions of authoritarian neoliberalism? 
To answer these questions, I begin with a consideration of the domestic political 
context in which these bodies were founded and the narrative employed by the 
Kremlin to legitimate them. I find that PCBs were founded as part of the market 
reform of the Soviet public sector and were legitimated by a narrative that presented 
an active citizenry as a means to increase Russia’s economic competitiveness. This 
sets them apart from Russia’s earlier monitory bodies, created to precipitate the 
‘withering away of the state’ prescribed by Marxist-Leninist theory. I thus situate 
PCBs in the context of a global ‘good governance’ agenda, promoted by various 
intergovernmental organisations to increase levels of public participation in local 
                                                          
17 E. Chebankova, ‘State-sponsored Civic Associations in Russia: Systemic Integration or the “War 
of Position”?’, East European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2012). 
18 For the importance of considering ‘civil society’ not only as a conflictual but also as a co-
operative force see F. Powell, The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? (Bristol: 
The Policy Press, 2007); and, in the case of Russia, S. Henderson, ‘Civil Society in Russia: State-
Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vo. 58, No. 3 (May/June 
2011). 
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governance in countries around the world. As I discuss in Chapter Two, this norm is 
considered to facilitate the changing role of the state bureaucracy in conditions of 
global capitalism from one of direct provider of welfare to citizens to one which 
steers and oversees the relationship between citizen ‘consumers’ of services and 
third party service providers. In other words, mechanisms for civic participation in 
policy-making are by-products of the introduction of market principles into 
government, since the state has lost the monopoly of information necessary to make 
effective public policy as a result of processes of outsourcing, privatisation and 
decentralisation. In this light, then, PCBs become a Russian articulation of global 
neoliberal governance norms. 
An examination of the legislation and state discourse surrounding PCBs 
shows that their main function is to perform obshchestvennyi kontrol’. In Chapters 
Three to Six, I explore the meanings given to this concept in state documentation 
and, through a discussion of the interviews I conducted with PCB members, 
examine the kinds of practices enacted under its banner. I show that the Kremlin 
has advanced a conception that recalls the monitory activities performed in the 
name of narodnyi kontrol’ (people’s oversight/scrutiny) during the later years of the 
Soviet Union,  and expands it to include assistance to the authorities in the carrying 
out of public services. This contrasts with the conception preferred by some civic 
groups, who see it instead as a means to hold authorities accountable before the 
law. While it is, of course, the Kremlin’s conception that has ultimately been 
enshrined in law, some citizens are nonetheless able to influence state policies from 
within PCBs if the following three criteria are present: first, if there are a number of 
confident and critical voices inside a PCB, second, if the topic on which they are 
campaigning is not perceived to threaten the ‘power vertical’, and, third, if the 
particular state authority is willing to engage with their recommendations. Thus, the 
practices that occur inside PCBs do not always correspond to the assumption of 
unity between citizens and local authorities implicit within the Kremlin’s presentation 
of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. Instead, members are sometimes able to exploit the 
limited pluralism in the policy-making process afforded by PCBs to actively help 
shape state policy and alter the behaviour of the authorities. This small gap between 
the discourse advanced by the Kremlin and practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
enacted through PCBs highlights the limits of state control over the policy-making 
process. 
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In light of these findings, the central argument of this thesis is that the 
proliferation of PCBs exemplifies practices of ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’, 
in which the non-democratic state rearticulates global norms of good governance 
by creating institutional mechanisms that incorporate citizens into policy-making 
processes but, at the same time, retains substantial amounts of control over the 
agendas discussed inside them and the kinds of people who may join. ‘Authoritarian 
neoliberal governance’ refers to the state-driven actions and processes through 
which mechanisms of civic engagement that attempt to manage the new role of the 
market state in public administration in non-democratic regimes are created and 
coordinated. Since authoritarian neoliberal governance is a process, it is necessarily 
focussed on institutional change. This change is wrought by the need for neoliberal 
state bureaucracies to access external input in order to create effective policies, 
therefore allowing certain levels of participation by non-state ‘stake-holders’. At the 
same time, authoritarian regimes must retain a high level of control to ensure 
stability and continuity. PCBs are able to provide this input without significantly 
challenging regime stability. In sum, in contrast to the studies of the Public Chamber 
discussed above, I present a substantive analysis of the strengths and limitations of 
civic engagement in Russia’s non-democratic regime through a comparison of the 
discourse and practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted through institutions of 
authoritarian neoliberal governance. This thesis, therefore, contributes to a greater 
understanding of, first, the transformations of the Soviet-era bureaucracy to 
accommodate market principles, second, the institutions created to sustain 
authoritarian rule in an age of global capitalism and, third, the reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens produced by these transformations, 
both as it is envisaged by the Kremlin and as it is operationalised in practice. 
  
Methodology 
 
This study arises from an ethnographic orientation: I sought to embed myself 
in the community I researched over an extended period of time, while taking notes, 
asking questions and collecting materials, refining my research question only 
towards the end of my time in the field.19 While the amount of direct participant 
observation I conducted was limited (chiefly during Pilorama Human Rights Festival 
                                                          
19 M. Hammersley, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, 3rd Edition, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 
3-4. 
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and one meeting of St Petersburg Public Monitoring Commission) and the 
interviews I conducted were relatively formal, my choice of the object of research 
resulted from this embeddedness. In this section, I describe three elements of the 
methodological process. First, I trace the steps I took to settle upon my object of 
research and demonstrate how my nationality, political leanings and academic 
status interacted with cultural and political structures in Russia to provide the 
particular possibilities and constraints that formed the present work. Second, I 
explain how I sourced the empirical materials and selected my regional case 
studies. Third, I present the analytical framework, Critical Discourse Analysis. 
 
Selection of Object of Research 
 
My academic interest in this subject was first aroused when I spent three 
months in the summer of 2009 working with the Research and Information Centre 
Memorial St Petersburg, (Memorial), during which time I became fascinated by the 
question of state-society relations in contemporary Russia.20 Six months earlier, 
masked men armed with police truncheons had raided the premises, and 
temporarily confiscated all their hard-drives containing 20 years of research into the 
Stalinist terror and the GULAG. The official reason for the raid was the publication 
of an anti-Semitic article in the magazine Novyi Peterburg – yet Memorial denied all 
knowledge of both the article and the magazine. Around the same time, the NGO 
had hosted a public screening of the film, ‘Rebellion: The Litvinenko Case’, which 
had been banned by the government.21 Having moved to St. Petersburg from Berlin, 
where the project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past), is 
public, largely state-driven and undisputed, I was shocked at the Russian state’s 
willingness to obstruct this kind of work. I wondered whether this difference in 
behaviour was due to conflictual understandings of basic political concepts as used 
by Russian state and societal actors. My initial research project thus proposed to 
compare the meanings of ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ used by regime-critical 
Russian NGOs, the Russian state and European intergovernmental organisations. 
Beginning in September 2011, I spent a semester at the European University 
at St Petersburg (EUSPB), during which time I attended numerous seminars, 
                                                          
20 See Nauchno-informatsionnyi tsentr Memorial, http://memorial-nic.org/, (accessed 20 January 
2014). 
21See ‘Russia: Raid on Memorial HQ’, openDemocracy Russia, 5 December 2008, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russia-raid-on-memorial-hq (accessed 11 November 
2011). 
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conferences and presentations by Russian scholars and became familiar with their 
work on state-society relations, much of which was focussed on the ‘effectiveness’ 
of PCBs.22 Perturbed by a private comment on my project by one of the University’s 
senior staff, who stated that the popular Western focus on oppositional or Western-
funded NGOs is irrelevant to Russian politics and uninteresting to Russian 
academics, I began to discuss the topic of PCBs with my friends and colleagues in 
Memorial, EUSPB and elsewhere.23 These discussions indicated to me that these 
institutions may be more indicative of the relationship between state and society in 
Russia than the periodic persecution by the state of oppositional NGOs, some of 
whose members also belonged to PCBs. During this time, I also witnessed the 
citizens’ movement to monitor the parliamentary and Presidential elections and the 
mass anti-Putin demonstrations that followed. 
Once back at my desk in Exeter, I returned to the English-language literature 
on state-society relations in Russia, and realized that there were precisely no 
studies that focussed on the PCB network.24 As reviewed in the previous section, 
although several works discuss the Federal Public Chamber in detail and some 
studies mention federal public councils in passing, there has not hitherto been a 
systematic analysis of the emergence of these bodies as part of a single network.25 
I thus decided to change my focus to concentrate on this question. 
                                                          
22 See Gorny, ‘Obshchestvennyye konsul’tativnyye struktury pri orgahakh vlasti’; A. Tarasenko, D. 
Dubrovskii and A. Starodubtsev, Navesti mosty mezhdu obshchestvom i gosudarstvom (St 
Petersburg, Tsentr nezavisimykh sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii, 2011); L. Petrova, and A. 
Sungurov, ‘Instituty-posredniki mezhdu organami vlasti i obshchestvom: sluchai Sankt-Peterburga’, 
Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya, 2012, No. 2; I. Chetverikova, 
'Institutsionalizatsiya obshchestvennogo kontrolya soblyudeniya prav cheloveka v mestakh 
prinuditel'nogo soderzhaniya (v ramkakh nabiudatel'nykh komissii)', Master's Thesis, European 
University at St Petersburg, 2011; A. Sungurov, O. Zakharova, L. Petrova, and N. Raspopov, 
‘Instituty mediatory i ikh razvitiye v sovremennoi Rossii: obshchestvennyye palaty i konsul’tativnyye 
sovety: federal’nyi i regional’nyi opyt’, Politicheskiye issledovaniya: POLIS, 2012, No. 1. 
23 S. Henderson, ‘Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Non-Governmental Organization 
Sector in Russia’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, (March 2002); J. Hemment, ‘The 
Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid and NGOs in Russia’, Anthropological 
Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2, (Spring 2004); A. Evans, L. Henry, and L. Sundstrom, (eds.), Russian 
Civil Society: A Critical Assessment (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006); L. Sundstrom, Funding 
Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006); Human Rights Watch, An Uncivil Approach to Civil Society: Continuing 
State Curbs on Independent NGOs and Activists in Russia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 
2009). 
24 For an in-depth discussion of this literature, please refer to Chapter Two of this thesis. 
25 See, for instance, G. Hahn, ‘Medvedev, Putin and Perestroika 2.0’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 18, 
No. 3, (2010); Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia, pp. 241-244; O. Semukhina and K. 
Reynolds, Understanding the Modern Russian Police (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013), pp. 
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In the summer of 2012, I undertook a three-month research trip, based at an 
activist community in St. Petersburg, in which I met and befriended a large number 
of artists, activists, anti-fascists, journalists and philosophers, many of whom 
introduced me to colleagues, invited me to seminars and exhibitions, helped me 
with places to stay in other cities and passed me relevant materials for my work. 
During this time, I conducted the bulk of my interviews with current and former PCB 
members in three case-study cities of Moscow, St Petersburg and Samara (the 
rationale for which is discussed in the following subsection), and attended the 
Perm’-based human rights festival, Pilorama, where the concept of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ was also a hot topic.26  I began the interview process by 
making attempts to speak to members of the Federal Public Chamber and federal-
level public councils, but with very limited success (I only managed to conduct an 
interview with one member of the Federal Public Chamber). Quickly changing tactic, 
I decided to interview anyone who belonged to a PCB, in the hope that the process 
of 'snowballing' (that is, asking respondents at the end of the interview to provide 
contact details for other relevant individuals) would lead me to more targeted 
participants. It was during this process that I understood the extent to which these 
institutions were proliferating at regional and municipal levels. This confirmed the 
importance of including regional case studies in my research design (fortunately, I 
had considerably more success with regional PCB members than their federal-level 
counterparts) and led to the question of how far federal-level policy was reproduced 
in the regions. 
In November 2012, I returned to Russia for two weeks to conduct further 
interviews. However, my trip was marred by an unfortunate incident in Samara, 
where I was arrested on suspicion of putting up posters in protest of a neo-Nazi 
march. Although I was released without charge after an over-night stay in the cells, 
I have not since returned to Russia out of fear of being denied entry. Although I am 
confident that the empirical research I have undertaken is sufficient to demonstrate 
the relationship between the Kremlin’s discourse of civic engagement and the 
practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in regional PCBs, there are certain individuals 
I would have liked to interview but have consequently been unable to. 
                                                          
26 See Pilorama 2012, http://www.pilorama.perm36.ru/pilorama-2012001.html, (accessed 20 
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 In sum, although this thesis is informed by a broadly inductivist logic, it is 
tempered by an awareness of the limits to this logic posed by my positionality.27 In 
other words, while I have sought to explore my research object in the field before 
returning to my desk to elaborate a framework that best interprets the data collected, 
I recognise that both these steps have been shaped and limited by my background 
and beliefs as a left-leaning, British PhD student. This identity provided both 
opportunities and setbacks: on the one hand, my friends in Memorial St Petersburg 
called their Moscow colleagues on my behalf and helped me to arrange meetings 
with some of Russia's most senior activists; on the other hand, my 'foreign-ness' 
was undoubtedly a factor in the refusal by federal-level PCB members and some 
more orthodox regional PCB members in the regions to participate in my research. 
As a result, there is a slight regime-critical bias in the views expressed by my 
respondents in Chapters Five and Six. However, I do not consider it to impede the 
overall picture presented in this thesis. I have used my interviews for two main 
purposes: first, to acquire information about the foundation, proliferation and 
operations of PCBs, thus filling in gaps in the information available online and, 
second, as a means to build a picture of the practices that occur inside PCBs. I 
therefore mainly asked them factual questions about PCBs’ activities, the process 
and outcomes of meetings, and the relations among PCB members. Indeed, regime 
critical individuals may be more likely to give a more honest picture of PCB 
practices, since they have no desire to whitewash the regime. I now turn to a more 
detailed elaboration of the processes I undertook to collect the empirical materials 
used in this thesis. 
 
Selecting and Collecting Empirical Materials 
 In order to build a picture both of state discourse of civic engagement and of 
the practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ conducted in PCBs, two types of empirical 
materials were necessary. First, I accessed key speeches and articles by the 
Russian President in order to explore the federal-level discourse. These are the 
annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly and Vladimir Putin’s seven 
pre-election articles outlining his domestic and foreign policy agendas in the run up 
to the March 2012 Presidential elections. The Presidential Address has been made 
                                                          
27 D. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective’, Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Autumn, 1988). 
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every year since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution and is considered to deal 
with the ‘state of the nation’; the pre-election articles were published in some of the 
country’s most respected broadsheets and were discussed extensively both in 
Russia and beyond. In both cases, I examine how the President constructs 
processes of change, how he describes the role of the citizen in governance and 
the institutions he envisages to inculcate this new role, and what narrative he uses 
to legitimate the new institutions and the new relationship between citizens and the 
authorities. These are examined in Chapter Three. I then compared the federal 
discourse with that of three regional leaders in Moscow, St Petersburg and Samara 
in order to assess the extent to which the Kremlin’s discourse is rearticulated at the 
regional level. I therefore selected interviews conducted by journalists with each 
leader, archived on the regional government administration website. Again, these 
materials allowed me to gain an understanding of each individual’s vision for the 
role of the citizen in governance, the types of mechanisms they considered would 
operationalise this role and how they legitimised this vision. As discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six, the PCB network was presented as one of the central means 
to enhance civic participation in all three cases, and an active, united citizenry was 
presented as the only way in which to achieve prosperity in nearly all cases. 
In order to understand the practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ produced by 
PCBs, I conducted 36 semi-structured interviews: 15 in Moscow, 11 in St Petersburg 
and 10 in Samara. As mentioned in the previous section, the networks I built up 
through my time with Memorial gave me a significant advantage in contacting and 
securing interviews. I also scoured the websites of relevant PCBs, many of whom 
provided e-mail addresses or telephone numbers for their members, and employed 
the strategy of ‘snowballing’. As St Petersburg was the city I knew best, it made 
sense to make it my first case study, but it also allowed for an insight into civic 
participation in the governance of Russia’s ‘window on the West’.28 However, I was 
also interested to see how city-level PCBs operated in the country’s capital, as 
federal and regional government structures exist side by side and the city possesses 
the highest number of politically active people. Indeed, given that the discourse of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is promulgated from the political centre, it would be 
pertinent to examine the extent to which this discourse is received and rearticulated 
                                                          
28 I. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 11. 
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by local administration in the centre too, compared to that of other more 
geographically distant regions. Of course, St Petersburg and Moscow are 
administrative anomalies since they are Russia’s only two federal cities, that is, 
cities that have the status of a federal subject, such as an oblast or republic. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the choice of two federal cities is justified given the 
political significance of both cities as shapers of national socio-political trends in 
Russia. 
My decision to focus on St Petersburg and Moscow as two case studies 
necessitated a third case study city that would give a perspective from the regions. 
I eventually settled on Samara given that it is a large regional metropolis (the sixth 
largest in Russia) and administrative centre of Samara Oblast, meaning that there 
would most probably be a plethora of PCBs (an assumption which turned out to be 
correct). However, Samara also provides an interesting point of contrast to Moscow 
and St Petersburg: it is considerably less affluent. Its high levels of industry meant 
that the 2008 financial crisis disproportionately affected the region: the average 
income in Samara Oblast is 2,500 roubles lower than the national average,29 and 
the Oblast went from contributing to the national budget to being a subsidized 
Oblast, a fact that also indicates poor levels of governance in the region.30 There 
were, of course, numerous other cities that could have made interesting 
comparisons but Samara was also an obvious choice for practical reasons: a friend 
of mine who worked for Memorial Samara had offered me a place to stay and help 
with arranging interviews. Ideally, I would have liked to extend my study to other 
Russian regions, comparing regional local regimes of governance for greater civic 
participation, but a larger project would have been beyond the scope of a PhD. 
Instead, this is certainly a topic for a future research project.  
I chose to interview individuals with three types of relationship to PCBs: i) 
present and former PCB members; ii), individuals who are not members themselves 
but who work closely with PCBs; and, iii), activists who disagree with such 
institutions on principle. Bearing in mind that one individual can occupy positions in 
several PCBs simultaneously, I interviewed eight current and former members of 
the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, 
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five members of the Human Rights Ombudsman Expert Council, one member of 
the Federal Public Chamber, two activists who had had on-going dealings with the 
Public Chamber but were not members themselves, four regional public chamber 
members, nine current or former members of regional and municipal public councils, 
five regional activists who had never been PCB members but who had repeated 
dealings with them, the Samara human rights ombudsman, a member of the St 
Petersburg human rights ombudsman bureau, a former federal human rights 
ombudsman, six PMC members and a further four individuals who had either helped 
draft the PMC law or co-ordinated NGOs that worked alongside PMCs.31 Most of 
these individuals were also members of NGOs. 
My respondents were highly educated, senior people, used to speaking 
publically on political issues. Most were familiar with research interviews with 
several informing me that they frequently give interviews to Western journalists and 
scholars. This meant that the process of interviewing was itself relatively easy, 
despite my, at times, faltering Russian. At the beginning of each interview, 
respondents read and signed a Russian-language consent form, which included the 
opportunity to request anonymity and receive a transcript of the interview for 
potential editing by the respondent, as well as a copy of the dissertation once 
completed. However, most respondents chose not to request anonymity – indeed 
one even lamented the fact that his comments could not be made public! Despite 
this, because of the ethical imperative to guard against harm wherever possible, I 
have chosen to anonymise all transcripts. 
The interviews themselves were semi-structured, that is, although I prepared 
a list of questions I allowed the interview to take a conversational format, frequently 
abandoning the list. In general, I sought to find out why they had joined a particular 
PCB (or, indeed, why they had left it), what activities were undertaken by the 
institution, how the respondents related to their colleagues, how the PCB related to 
the authorities, why they thought the PCB was founded, how they thought it could 
be improved and what role they saw PCBs as playing in the relationship between 
society at the state. The interviews were recorded with a Dictaphone and, due to 
the length of time this would have taken me, were transcribed by personal 
acquaintances in St Petersburg. I e-mailed the transcripts to my respondents, 
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the place and date of interview, at the end of the bibliography. 
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asking for their confirmation that the entire transcript may be used, but received only 
one or two replies (both of which were affirmative). I thus assumed consent from 
the rest of my respondents.  
 
 
Selection of analytical framework 
I spent a long time searching for an appropriate analytical framework, one 
that would enable a simultaneous consideration of linguistic meanings and the 
practices that are attached to them. Given that my initial project placed the 
meanings of the concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ at the centre of analysis, I 
first looked at Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history). This is an approach 
developed in Germany by historians Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart 
Koselleck, who compiled a seven-volume dictionary of the histories of 130 political 
and social concepts as they were used during the German Enlightenment. For 
conceptual historians, conceptual change interacts symbiotically with social change, 
the one both registering and affecting the other; it recognises that the meanings of 
concepts are embedded within social life and are therefore constantly evolving.32  
Melvin Richter, an American scholar who has sought to bring the German tradition 
to the Anglo-American world, summarises the two principal methods used by 
conceptual historians: first, ‘the application of a number of linguistic techniques to 
the analysis of concepts historically and [second] relating changes in their meaning 
to structural political, social, economic transformations.’33 This approach would 
have allowed me to chart the transformations in the meanings of basic political 
concepts from the Soviet period to the present day, showing the extent to which 
meanings were affected by the collapse of the USSR. However, when my project 
changed direction, the applicability of Begriffsgeschichte diminished since it aims to 
draw connections between linguistic and social change over the longue durée and 
is therefore principally a method for diachronic analyses.34 Although the roots of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ can be found in the revolutionary concept of rabochyi 
kontrol’ (workers’ oversight), which I discuss in Chapter Three, the first PCB was 
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founded only in 2005. I am therefore primarily interested in exploring the discourse 
and practices of contemporary governance. 
 Secondly, I examined the work of Michael Freeden, for whom meanings are 
deducible through a morphological analysis, which views concepts as embedded 
within the broader structure of a particular political ideology, and examines the 
composite particles of each concept and their relative positioning within the 
ideological structure.35 For Freeden, the meaning of a concept is located both inside 
the concept, that is, in the ensemble of smaller components which constitute it, as 
well as outside the concept, that is, in its relative position to other concepts in the 
broader structure of the ideology. In explaining how ideologies are distinguished 
from one another, Freeden writes that we must look to ‘the relative ordering in which 
they deploy similar concepts, on which depend both the precise decontesting of the 
concepts and the overall interpretation of any ideology’s messages.’36 However, 
again, when I switched my focus from the concepts of democracy and civil society 
to the development of PCBs, the necessity of placing the concept at the centre of 
analysis became less salient; instead, I required a methodology that would give 
equal weight to discourse and to actions. I therefore finally decided to employ 
Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, which places ‘social practices’ at 
the centre of analysis and dialectically links them to discourse. I now elaborate this 
approach and its fit with my object of research. 
As the name suggests, Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter CDA) focusses 
predominantly on language. However, it also views linguistic change and social 
change as mutually constitutive. In order to uncover processes of change, CDA 
entails a dual methodological focus: first, on ‘discourse’, understood to comprise the 
linguistic elements of the social world and, second, on the relationship between 
these elements and other elements of the social world, such as institutions and 
social practices, understood as ‘relatively stabilised form[s] of social activity’.37 In 
the words of Fairclough, it is an 'analysis of dialectical relations between discourse 
and other objects, elements or moments, as well as an analysis of the 'internal 
relations' of discourse.'38 It thus throws up questions that explore the extent to which 
the actions of individuals and institutions reproduce, contest or modulate the 
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discourse. Discourse in CDA has two meanings: first – as in the case of the present 
paragraph – it is understood as the broadly semiotic aspects of social practice 
(hence, Fairclough prefers the term ‘semiosis’ in this context); second, discourse is 
understood as representational meaning in texts.39 In other words, this second 
meaning refers to the different construals in language of elements of the social world 
by different actors or groups. For instance, the way in which the Putin government 
imagines civic engagement in governance differs from both the way certain civic 
groups imagine it and the way in which the UN imagines it. These three 
constructions or ‘vision[s]’40 of civic engagement in governance, articulated for 
example in legislation, campaign materials or declarations, can be termed different 
discourses of civic engagement in governance. In the rest of this thesis, I employ 
the second meaning of this word. 
Critical discourse analysts understand the social world to be composed of 
three cognate elements: social structures, social practices and social events, with 
social practices constituting the primary object of research. Norman Fairclough 
defines a 'social structure' as an 'abstract' entity 'defining a potential, a set of 
possibilities', and cites social class or the economic system as examples.41 Social 
events refer to occurrences in the everyday world, the majority of which are 
constituted in part (but not exclusively, of course) in language, for instance, through 
meetings, conversations, newspaper articles, reports, TV shows and so on. He 
states that social practices mediate between social structures and social events, 
and are to be conceived of as 'ways of controlling the selection of certain structural 
possibilities and the exclusion of others, and the retention of these selections over 
time, in particular areas of social life.'42 Teaching can be seen as one such social 
practice. Social practices mutate over time as they become networked with other 
social practices: Fairclough cites the marketization of higher education as a 
combination of practices of teaching and practices of management.43 CDA sees 
language (or semiosis) as an integral part of all social practices, but one that is not 
reducible to them, since they also contain non-semiotic elements such as physical, 
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sociological and psychological elements.44 As such, Fairclough suggests 
undertaking CDA in conjunction with other methodologies such as ethnography or 
institutional analysis; indeed, this is what I have done.45 In this thesis, the social 
event I am concerned with is the emergence and proliferation of PCBs in 
contemporary Russia; the social practice I am examining is the practice of civic 
engagement in governance; the social structure this relates to is the structure of 
state-society relations in contemporary Russia. 
Fairclough distinguishes three analytically separable lenses through which to 
access meaning in language: genres, discourses and styles.46 The first refers to 
what language is doing as part of social relations (for instance, informing the 
authorities about the conditions in prisons, advising them on ways for improvement 
and warning them of the consequences of inaction.) The second, discourse, as 
discussed above, corresponds to what is being represented or talked about in the 
text (for instance, the role of prison inspectors in monitoring prisons). The third refers 
to a value judgement or a commitment to a particular stance that can be seen as 
part of the construction of an identity (for instance that of a human rights activist). 
To relate these to the semiotic aspects of texts discussed above, meanings in 
genres are likely to be actional meanings, meanings in discourse are 
representational meanings, and meanings in style are identificational. The analysis 
presented in this thesis focusses on the second of these: it explores the 
representational meanings produced as discourses of civic engagement in 
governance by different groups of social actors in Russia. In other words, it 
examines the different constructions of civic engagement in governance in 
language. 
The relationship between discourse and social practices can also be termed 
the relationship between rhetoric and reality, or the relationship between discourse 
and action.47 An exploration of this relationship necessarily entails a level of critique 
insofar as it examines the gaps between what the discourse claims to do and what 
it actually does.48 These gaps are explored by building pictures of the discourse and 
the practices and comparing how far the latter corresponds to the former. Fairclough 
argues that this gap provides the starting point for ‘political contestation and 
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resistance’ since leaders may be held to account for the promises they made that 
have not materialised. However, the gap between discourse and action I expose in 
this thesis tells us less about the space for resistance to the practices inculcated by 
PCBs and more about how far their practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
correspond to the vision (discourse) advocated by the Russian government. This 
gap is important for two reasons. First, it defines the perameters of possibility for 
citizens to shape policy outcomes in Russia by suggesting that PCBs are not 
necessarily the consensual, regime-friendly bodies envisaged by the Kremlin and 
that, despite the Kremlin’s discourse, PCBs can enable citizens to provide input into 
public life in their area. Second, it indicates that the presence of limited pluralism in 
public policy-making means that complete control by the regime over policy 
outcomes is impossible.  
Fairclough also distinguishes four frames through which to analyse different 
aspects of discourse as representational meaning.49 The first of these concerns the 
emergence and constitution of discourses. He argues that new discourses are 
composed of elements of other, prior discourses and that to understand how and 
why an actor represents a particular set of practices in a particular way, it is 
necessary to explore the roots of contemporary formulations.50 The second frame 
concerns the ‘relations of contestation between discourses’ and the emerging 
hegemony of a particular discourse.51 The task here is to explore different 
representations advanced by different social groups and the process in which one 
achieves and maintains dominance. The third frame concerns the dissemination of 
the discourses across structures (such as governments and public services) and 
scales (international, national, local) through a process of recontextualisation, and 
entails an examination of the extent to which meanings are simply rearticulated in 
the new context or are adapted for local audiences. The fourth concerns the shift 
from discourse as a political imaginary to having real, transformative effects in the 
social world; it refers to the ways in which the discourse is put into practice, how it 
is operationalised. I have used these four frames to structure the analysis of the 
empirical materials in this thesis. Chapter Three explores the emergence and 
constitution of the Kremlin’s discourse of civic engagement in governance; Chapter 
Four deals with the challenges this discourse has received from civic groups and 
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31 
 
the ways in which it has neutralised these challenges; Chapters Five and Six 
examine how far the federal-level discourse has been reproduced by regional 
leaders and the kind of practices inculcated by this discourse in Moscow, St 
Petersburg and Samara. The below diagram is a visualisation of this structure. 
 
A final note on neoliberalism and language. Scholars have also pointed to 
the importance of language and discourse in the diffusion of neoliberal norms. 
Norman Fairclough has argued that a central component of neoliberal practices is 
a discoursal one. He argues that since these processes have been conducted 
according to an ‘explicit pre-constructed doctrine’, language has been instrumental 
in promoting and manifesting neoliberal practices.52 Jamie Peck, too, has 
highlighted the role that think tanks and other discourse-producing bodies have 
played in the promotion of the neoliberal agenda.53 This ‘pre-constructed doctrine’ 
is then received and re-articulated by a host of diverse actors around the world, and 
is manifested in particular social practices at various levels of socio-political 
organisation. This thesis aims to investigate an aspect of the way in which the 
Russian state is articulating global neoliberal trends relating to the changing nature 
of the state, which are most commonly captured in the epithet, ‘from government to 
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governance’, that is, the emergence and proliferations of mechanisms which allow 
citizen and non-state participation in policy-making processes.54 
To conclude this section, CDA is appropriate for my object of study for three 
reasons. First, it posits a mutually constitutive relationship between discourse and 
social practices in that each ‘internalises’, but is not reducible to, the other.55 This 
conceptualisation reflects the way in which the activities of the PCB network and 
the Kremlin’s promotion of the discourse of civic engagement in governance both 
support and propel one another, despite being separate processes. Second, given 
that my empirical materials are textual – the promotion of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
occurs in speeches, newspaper articles and government reports and my research 
interviews are also text-based – a language-oriented approach seemed most fitting. 
Third, Fairclough employs CDA to analyse various aspects of neoliberalism, 
including neoliberal restructuring in post-communist countries, with researchers 
highlighting the importance of discourse in driving processes of ‘transition’56 in 
Central and Eastern Europe.57 Ultimately, however, the choice of CDA was 
empirically driven: it is a theoretical framework that helps me to interpret my data in 
the context of the shifting relationship between the state and non-state groups after 
the collapse of communism. As such, throughout the thesis, while I utilise the terms 
articulated by Fairclough, I employ CDA as a general guide rather than a strict set 
of rules.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter One places the development of PCBs in the context of 150 years of 
civic participation in governance and shows that limited pluralism has been a feature 
of governance in Russia since the mid-Nineteenth Century. Beginning with the 
zemstvo movement in 1864, the chapter then considers the opportunities for civic 
participation during the Soviet Union before sketching a history of PCBs and other 
forms of engagement in the post-Soviet era. While the chapter highlights the 
                                                          
54 See R. Rhodes, 'Chapter Three: Waves of Governance' in D. Levi-Faur, (ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 33. 
55 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, pp. 205. 
56 I have put this word in quotation marks in order to emphasise the contested nature of the so-called 
‘transition paradigm.’ While I am sceptical of the teleological and neo-imperialist implications in the 
idea of transitioning to democracy, discussed in detail in Chapter Two, there can be little doubt that 
former Soviet states are transitioning from state socialism. I therefore use the concept here to 
indicate the reshaping of the Soviet-era state. 
57 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 505. 
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importance of historical trends in civic participation in governance for the institutional 
development ofPCBs, it also shows that contemporary mechanisms have been 
created as part of a set of market reforms of the public sector. It therefore argues 
that PCBs are a qualitatively new phenomenon. In other words, although the 
concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, central to their codification in law, makes a 
specific link to the monitory bodies of the Krushchev era, the neoliberal imperatives 
of outsourcing, privatisation and decentralisation that guide post-Soviet public 
sector reform have required the creation of bodies that allow the state to harness 
civic activity in the performance of tasks it is no longer able to do. Contemporary 
PCBs thus do not merely enact oversight of government activity but are also often 
expected to assist the authorities in the provision of public services. Thus, while a 
historical assessment of antecedent consultative structures are important, it alone 
cannot account for the development of PCBs because they are, as shown in this 
chapter, a product of the marketization of the state. 
Having described in detail the object of study, Chapter Two then sets out the 
theoretical lens through which I interpret it: ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance.’ I 
argue that this concept allows for an understanding of how global norms relating to 
the opening up of the state to include non-state voices in the process of policy 
formation have interacted with the governing practices of the authoritarian state to 
produce institutions that simultaneously enable and constrain civic participation in 
governance. In this light, PCBs are seen as a mechanism through which non-
democratic states can receive the necessary information to make public policy as 
processes of outsourcing, privatisation and decentralisation of the state 
administration have reduced its capacity to do so without external input.  
Employing the four lenses on representational meaning discussed above, 
Chapters Three to Six interpret the empirical materials using a Critical Discourse 
Analytic Perspective in order to explore the gap between the discourse of civic 
engagement in governance articulated by Russian leaders and the actions (or 
practices) produced through PCBs. As discussed above, this gap reveals how far 
PCBs in fact perform the activities intended for them – do they merely assist the 
state or do they help set its agenda? – and ultimately constitutes the limits to state 
control over PCB practices. With this in mind, Chapter Three traces the emergence 
and constitution of the contemporary discourse of civic engagement in governance. 
It demonstrates that the new Putinist discourse is made up of a combination of 
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elements drawn from Soviet-era discourses of citizen engagement and international 
discourses of ‘good governance’. First, the chapter shows that the roots of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ lie in Leninist conceptions of rabochyi kontrol’ and post-
Stalinist discourses of narodnyi kontrol’, not only because the terms themselves are 
similar, graduating from workers’ to people’s to public scrutiny, but also because 
they each conceptualise the role of the citizen to be one of  monitoring the state’s 
activities. The authorities make decisions; the citizens must either ensure that they 
are properly implemented or implement them themselves. Second, it examines the 
global neoliberal discourses of economic competitiveness and domestic 
restructuring advanced by the UN, international financial institutions and regional 
intergovernmental bodies and shows that civic participation in governance is 
considered part of a broader ‘good governance’ agenda alongside processes of 
decentralisation, privatisation, tackling corruption and increasing public-private 
partnernships, as a central means to increase economic competitiveness. Third, it 
explores Putin’s discourse of civic engagement in governance, and demonstrates 
that his conception of a relationship between the citizen and the authorities that is 
reminiscent of the Soviet era, in which the former is active but obedient, is 
legitimated by a narrative that stresses the importance of Russia succeeding in the 
‘global economic race’. 
Having established the general discourse of civic engagement in governance 
as articulated by the President, Chapter Four explores two examples of the 
contestation of this discourse by citizens’ groups that has occurred as the Kremlin’s 
discourse has consolidated. It considers attempts by experienced prisoners’ rights 
campaigners to enshrine a more confrontational understanding of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ into the legal codex with the foundation of Public Monitoring Commissions 
and by everyday citizens who founded institutions that monitored the 2011 and 2012 
elections. It demonstrates that the civic conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
advanced by these groups resembles a form of contentious politics, in which 
transgressing authorities are held accountable before the law. However, it also 
shows how the Kremlin has systematically co-opted these grassroots movements 
into the growing network of authoritarian neoliberal governance by writing its version 
of the concept into law. The chapter argues that, despite on-going challenges ‘from 
below’, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ understood as a means of assisting the authorities 
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– and thus virtually identical to rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’ – remains a central 
part of the hegemonic discourse. 
Chapters Five and Six consider the lenses of recontextualisation and 
operationalization in, first, the country’s federal centre (Moscow and St Petersburg) 
and, second, in a regional case study (Samara). In other words, they explore the 
extent to which the hegemonic federal level discourse has been rearticulated by 
regional leaders and examine the kinds of practices inculcated by local PBCs, that 
is, the gap between discourse and action. In Chapter Five, I show that federal level 
discourse is reproduced relatively effectively in Moscow, but less so in St 
Petersburg. This is due to the very different attitude towards citizen participation 
held by Moscow’s Mayor and St Petersburg’s Governor, the former actively 
promoting innovative mechanisms that support the Kremlin’s vision of state-society 
relations and the latter almost completely neglecting to engage with the public. As 
a result, PCB respondents in Moscow were generally more optimistic about the 
possibilities for helping to shape local policy than their St Petersburg counterparts. 
However, in neither city did respondents report practices of assisting the state in the 
completion of its tasks. Instead, they tried where possible to use PCBs as a means 
to lobby the interests of their organisations and to represent a ‘civic position’ on key 
issues before the authorities in the hope of influencing policy outcomes (and thus 
recalled the civic understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ discussed in Chapter 
Four). In some limited cases, these activities were successful. In Chapter Six, I show 
that, of all three leaders, the Samara Governor most faithfully presents himself as 
Putin’s hand-picked envoy to the region and ardently advocates the expansion of 
the PCB network. Concomitantly, Samara respondents were the most enthusiastic 
about PCBs, with more people describing practices of assistance and oversight as 
their main tasks. Thus, in Samara, the gap between discourse and action was 
smallest, and was understood to be because there are fewer people willing or able 
to advance a ‘civic position’ vis-à-vis the authorities in the region. 
While the local regimes in each region differed substantially, the analysis in 
these two chapters shows that PCBs in the three case studies do enable members 
to influence state policy in certain policy areas, Samara included, with Moscow 
PCBs unsurprisingly demonstrating the greatest amount of leverage. PBCs, 
therefore, only partially fulfil the functions for which they were intended: instead of 
always merely assisting government figures and departments in the execution of 
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tasks defined behind closed doors, they can occasionally help to set the local 
agenda and produce policy change. However, it also shows that the bodies remain 
highly dependent on the state and are only able to influence a policy already of 
interest to local authorities. This, I argue, is the essence of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance.
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Chapter One:  
Limited Pluralism in Russian Governance 1864-2014 
  
It has been noted that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, postcommunist 
countries faced a ‘triple transition’ of marketization, democratisation and state 
building.1 While the concept of ‘transition’ is problematic (and is critiqued in the 
following chapter), the idea of a ‘triple transition’ is useful insofar as it highlights the 
different institutional areas that required reform: transforming a central command 
economy into a market economy, turning a one-party state into a multiparty state 
with competitive elections and changing the communist administrative system 
managed by the nomenklatura to one based on democratic and market-oriented 
principles. Clearly, these three areas have been transformed to different degrees 
and configurations, but most political and academic interest has been concentrated 
on the first two. The focus of this thesis is on the third area: the transformation of 
the old bureaucracy into a more ‘neoliberal’ public sector with streamlined 
departments that outsources certain state functions, includes multiple voices and 
stakeholders and re-configures the citizen as a consumer of public services. This 
chapter has two purposes. First, it places the emergence of the post-Soviet public 
sector in historical context in order to reveal dyachronic factors that condition and 
shape the possibilities for contemporary institutional design. In order to do this, it 
discusses the zemstvo movement in late Tsarist Russia and the various 
opportunities for public participation in governance during the Soviet Union. Second, 
it gives a thick description of the process of foundation of PCBs (something which 
has not yet been done in existing studies of public sector reform in Russia) in order 
to give the reader a detailed picture of the object of study. 
Zemstvos were local government institutions founded after the emancipation 
of the serfs in 1864. Their elected members were responsible for conducting 
taxation, providing welfare services and maintaining infrastructure in their provinces. 
These activities led to the formation of a critical attitude towards Tsarist policies in 
many members and zemstvos often became hotbeds of liberal and reformist ideas. 
Their growing influence at both local and national levels significantly contributed to 
                                                          
1 C. Offe, ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in 
East Central Europe’, Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Fall 2004).  
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the destabilisation of the Old Regime. In the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, the 
zemstvo network was dissolved and the idea of civic participation in governance lay 
dormant until after Stalin’s death. However, his successor Nikita Khrushchev, as 
part of the dual processes of ‘de-Stalinization’ and the graduation to ‘developed 
socialism’, reformed and revitalized existing participatory mechanisms and founded 
new institutions through which interest groups could petition the government and 
monitor its activities. These were, first, the attempts to conduct direct democracy 
through the system of soviets; second, monitory groups that enacted narodnyi 
kontrol’ (people’s scrutiny/oversight) of the execution of government directives; 
third, trade unions, through which members could petition employers for improved 
working conditions and help shape economic and labour policy; and fourth, state 
sanctioned public associations such as women’s groups and veterans’ 
organisations that lobbied the state for benefits on behalf of their interest group.2  
In the post-Soviet era, particularly during the 2000s, new institutions have 
been founded which allow citizens to participate in the various stages of 
governance, including the formation of public policy, assisting in and monitoring its 
delivery and evaluating the quality of the public services consumed. However, the 
focus is on the extensive development of PCBs, since this constitutes the main 
means through which citizens can influence policy-making and is the major state-
driven operationalization of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. Promoted as a means for 
citizens simultaneously to monitor and assist local authorities through the practice 
of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, their design enables the authorities to conduct a certain 
level of co-operation with ‘civil society’ and the public, while retaining a substantial 
amount of control over both the membership and the activities of these bodies. 
PCBs thus combine the spirit of regional governance born during the zemstvo era, 
the blend of assistance and scrutiny developed during the Soviet period and the 
institutional dependence the state evident in participatory mechanisms throughout 
Russian history. The main difference is, of course, that PCBs are intended to 
respond to administrative issues arising from the creation of a market-based, rather 
than an absolutist or a Communist, public sector. 
The chapter is split into three parts. The first part discusses the history of the 
zemstvo movement and assesses its impact on the formation of state policy; the 
                                                          
2 The most important of these for this thesis are the monitory bodies (as Putin’s discourse draws 
heavily on the ideas and the vocabulary of this movement) and are discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three. 
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second part explores governance mechanisms in the Soviet Union; and the third 
part gives a history of public sector reform after the Soviet Union’s collapse, and 
analyses the development of PCBs within that context. The chapter shows, on the 
one hand, that PCBs are a qualitatively new phenomenon that have emerged as a 
response to the marketization of the Soviet-era public sector. On the other hand, it 
shows that there is a substantial amount of continuity, namely the ongoing presence 
of limited pluralism (albeit in varying degrees) in the development and execution of 
public policy.  In other words, the structures in all three regimes introduced some 
dissenting voices into the tightly controlled area of state policy formation. 
Sometimes involvement in these structures inculcated a critical attitude towards the 
authorities and fuelled desires for greater participation. However, in all three 
regimes, while citizens were able to participate in activities relating to public 
administration, the opportunities for them to determine political power were either 
outright denied or severely controlled. I show below that the expansion of civic 
participation in Tsarist and in Communist Russia is considered one of the major 
causes of the collapse of both regimes. Of course, whether this will also be the case 
in Putin’s Russia remains to be seen. 
 
Zemstvos in Late Imperial Russia 
 
The Russian Imperial polity at the turn of the Nineteenth Century has been 
described as a ‘state without a society,’ an epithet intended to highlight the almost 
total lack of civic initiatives existing independently of the state bureaucracy.3 
Furthermore, the dependent mentality produced by serfdom which, as explained by 
Victor Leontovitsch, ‘deadened the capacity for self-discipline’ and prevented the 
formation of active citizens who could involve themselves in their own self-
governance.4 The zemstvos have been viewed as a forum, which ‘permitted the 
development of a public identity as a result of the civic initiative, independence and 
enterprise shown by the delegates.’5 But when these bodies were set up, they were 
already operating in environments that had had some limited experience of welfare 
                                                          
3 J. Walkin, The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and Social Institutions 
under the Last Three Czars (Westport: Praeger, 1962), pp. 17. 
4 V. Leontovitsch, The History of Liberalism in Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2012), pp. 113. 
5 T. Porter and S. Seregny, ‘The Zemstvo Reconsidered’ in V. Gel’man and A. Evans Jr., (eds.), 
The Politics of Local Government in Russia (Washington, DC: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 
19. 
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provision and civic engagement for there had in fact been welfare-providing 
institutions in Tsarist Russia from as early as 1775. According to S. Frederick Starr, 
Catherine II created Social Welfare Boards (prikazy obshchestvennogo prizreniya) 
in order to reverse ‘the deepening atrophy of provincial life that had set in after the 
death of Peter I.’6 Indeed, Starr even goes so far as to call them ‘proto-zemstvos’ 
and delineates their welfare remit as encompassing ‘hospitals, orphanages, insane 
asylums, reformatories, workhouses, schools and numerous other vital public 
functions.’7 However, financial restrictions on these institutions and their structural 
dependence on the state - not to mention the condition of serfdom as such - meant 
that the Social Welfare Boards were very limited in their abilities to distribute 
resources effectively.8 
The first Zemstvo Statute was enacted on 1 January 1864, three years after 
the serfs were emancipated by Tsar Alexander II. Since the serfs were now de jure 
- if not de facto - in possession of all the rights of free citizens, key administrative 
tasks previously performed by serf-owning landlords had to be fulfilled by other 
means. As such, it became necessary to create an educational and welfare-
providing infrastructure for the peasantry, newly freed from serfdom. This Statute 
set up assemblies with decision-making powers on taxation and resource 
distribution and executive boards to oversee the implementation of decisions made 
by the assemblies at two territorial-administrative units, the province (guberniya) 
and the district (uyezd). In the ten years following the Statute’s publication, 
zemstvos were set up in 33 provinces (increasing to 43 in 1914), and were given 
fourteen areas of responsibility, ranging from securing public food supplies and 
managing the provision of welfare services, such as schools and hospitals, to fixing 
and collecting taxes and overseeing the building of churches.9  
The executive board was the ‘workhorse’ of the zemstvo institution: while the 
assembly convened for a period of a few weeks once a year, the board worked all 
year round to ensure decisions were implemented.10 Among other things, the board 
                                                          
6 S. Starr, ‘Local Initiative before the Zemstvo’ in T. Emmons and W. Vucinich, (eds.), The Zemstvo 
in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), pp. 13. 
7 Starr, ‘Local Initiative before the Zemstvo’ in Emmons and Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 
14. 
8 J. Hartley, ‘The Boards of Social Welfare and the Financing of Catherine II’s State Schools’, The 
Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1989). 
9 K. McKenzie, ‘The Zemstvo and the Administration’ in The Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 45. 
10 McKenzie, ‘The Zemstvo and the Administration’ in The Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 52. 
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was responsible for managing zemstvo properties, paying contractors and 
representing the zemstvo in court when necessary. McKenzie provides an example 
of a particularly active zemstvo in the Tver’ region which had at its disposal a 
chancellery, a library, a book keeping office, a statistical department, a department 
for road maintenance, a drugstore and a book store, as well as many other services. 
Their central office employed over sixty people.11 Such professional employees 
became known as the ‘Third Element’ (as distinguished from the First Element who 
were the state officials in the provinces and the Second Element who were the 
elected zemstvo deputies), and were notoriously critical of the Tsarist regime. Porter 
explains that the Third Element’s  
 
Daily contacts with the people could not but make them aware of 
Russia’s crying need for reform. And this, coupled with the 
bureaucracy’s general inefficiency, led to their becoming 
increasingly radical in their political outlook.12 
  
Conservative estimates place the number of Third Element staff at between 65 and 
70 thousand by the end of the 1890s.13 
The most radical aspect of the zemstvo in terms of political participation was 
the fact that ‘the elective principle had been inaugurated.’14 At assembly meetings, 
voting was conducted openly unless it related to sensitive issues such as salaries 
or wayward deputies, each deputy had only one non-transferrable vote, and 
decisions were made by majority vote.15 Election of candidates to the assembly 
proceeded among rather more complicated lines: according to the 1864 Statute, 
assembly deputies were elected by the local population on the basis not of class, 
but of a three-tiered property-based curia system (however, this was changed in the 
1890 Statute discussed below). McKenzie delineates the three curiae as follows: ‘1. 
rural property held in private ownership; 2. urban property held in private ownership; 
                                                          
11 McKenzie, ‘The Zemstvo and the Administration’ in The Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 55. 
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(New York: Mellen Research University Press, 1991), pp. 52. 
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3. communal property held by village communities.’16 This generally, but not 
exclusively, translated to the three social estates of nobility, merchants and 
townspeople and the rural peasantry, although those peasants who did own 
property were allowed to participate in the first curia together with their former 
owners.17 From these curiae, electoral congresses were selected, who would 
participate in the voting on candidates to the zemstvo assemblies; candidates came 
from within the congress itself. The selection rules to the congresses varied among 
the curiae, as well as the number of deputies to be elected.  
At first, there was almost an equal number of nobility and peasantry: in the 
first zemstvo elections, which saw zemstvos established in 29 provinces, 42% of 
elected district deputies were from the nobility and 38% were from the peasantry.18 
This figure remained unchanged in the district elections of 1883-5 but at the 
province level their representation was only 7%.19 The Second Zemstvo Statute of 
1890 discussed below dramatically exacerbated the exclusion of the peasantry from 
the zemstvo. Overall, during the lifespan of the district zemstvos, peasants made 
up approximately a third of the membership, which, according to Dorothy Atkinson, 
was ‘not an especially impressive figure considering that they constituted over four-
fifths of the population.’20 As such, although the zemstvo on the one hand is 
frequently seen as a ‘proving ground for the training of public initiative,’21 on the 
other it was less an example of ‘self’-government but the government of the majority 
by the privileged minority. This disparity was to play a large part in the eventual 
downfall of the zemstvo movement in 1917. However, despite this, scholars agree 
that the zemstvo did represent an important step towards local democracy within 
the autocratic Tsarist regime.22 
From its outset, there was confusion about the relationship between the 
zemstvo and the authorities. While the state initialised the decentralisation of 
administrative functions in order to save money, it wanted to make sure regional 
                                                          
16 McKenzie, ‘The Zemstvo and the Administration’ in The Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 38. 
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21Walkin, The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia, pp. 156; see also A. Fedyashin, 
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units prioritised national duty over local needs.23 The 1864 Statute’s primary author, 
Interior Minister Peter Valuev, stated that the institution was to be ‘only a special 
organ of one and the same state power and from it receives its rights and 
authority.’24 But zemstvo members believed that ‘local society’s interests should be 
distinguished from the essentially political interests of the state.’25 The zemstvos’ 
raison d’être was to provide welfare services to their constituents and to manage 
local governance issues but many members also had greater political aspirations. 
In the lead up to the inauguration of the zemstvos, large sections of the nobility had 
petitioned the Tsar for a constitution and a representative assembly and perceived 
the zemstvo as a ‘new vehicle for carrying on their fight for national 
representation.’26 Thus, in the years following the creation of the zemstvo, its 
deputies called for an augmentation of the institution’s powers, including the 
creation of an all-zemstvo union that would operate at the national level, as well as 
the creation of a zemstvo at the lowest territorial-administrative level, the volost’. 
These propositions were for a long time ignored by the state as the national union 
was seen to threaten the ‘single integrated system linking ruler to ruled’ intended by 
the authorities,27 while the volost’ level zemstvo was denied out of mistrust of the 
peasantry.28 In other words, the expansion of the principle of self-government was 
perceived as a threat to the autocratic regime. Scholars have outlined the inherently 
conflictual nature of the zemstvo principle: on the one hand, the country was ruled 
in quintessential autocratic style and, at the national level, the Tsar’s will was 
supreme but, on the other hand, societal representatives were delegated to enact 
the will of the people at the local level.29 This conflict led to an increasingly hostile 
relationship between the central state and provincial zemstvo members and after a 
while led to the clamping down of their activities through harsh legislation. 
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The second Zemstvo Statute came into force in 1890 and was ‘designed to 
incorporate the local self-governing institutions into the state apparatus.’30 Among 
other things, it required all members of executive boards at the district level to be 
confirmed by the governors and those at the province level to be confirmed by the 
Interior Minister; inspections of zemstvo executive boards and administrations could 
be undertaken at will by the regional governor; and appeals by individuals or private 
organisations could be lodged against decisions made by the zemstvo. Most 
importantly, however, this regressive Statute removed the non-class nature of voting 
in electoral congresses, thereby removing the peasants’ right to elect zemstvo 
deputies and preventing land-owning peasants from participating in the zemstvo. 
As such, after 1890, peasant numbers in district zemstvos fell to 31% and to under 
2% in provincial zemstvos.31 This remained the case until 1906 when newly 
inaugurated Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin gave peasants the same rights as the 
nobility with respect to state service. 
In the years following the 1890 Statute, there were a couple of national crises 
which served to highlight the inability of the state administration to cope effectively 
in emergency situations without support from societal organisations and to 
demonstrate the utility of national-level zemstvo operations, eventually leading the 
authorities to acquiesce to the existence of an all-zemstvo union. The first of these 
crises was the Great Famine of 1891-92. Reasons for the famine have been cited 
as a combination of poor weather conditions and the government’s badly designed 
economic and agrarian policies.32 When the scale of the disaster became clear, the 
state was forced to recognise its lack of infrastructure and staff in the regions and 
had to depend on the zemstvo as the cornerstone of the relief efforts. However, Tsar 
Nicholas II continued to reject the idea of a national zemstvo union, famously calling 
such requests ‘senseless dreams’ and thereby unwittingly radicalising further 
swathes of zemstvo activists.33 
The second major crisis was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. As with the 
country’s response to the famine, the zemstvos offered support to the government, 
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but their assistance was only accepted when it quickly became clear that the 
authorities were unable to ‘provide even the most rudimentary services for its 
stricken soldiers.’34 Nicholas II finally realised the necessity of national-level co-
operation among the zemstvos in order to deal with the humanitarian crisis caused 
by the War. Porter claims that by this time ‘the organs of local self-government had 
finally developed into a powerful and autonomous apparatus which could operate 
without the regime’s supervision.’35 This union was again mobilised during the First 
World War and became formalised as the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos. Other 
non-governmental humanitarian organisations also sprang up to respond to the 
Great War; indeed, Walkin writes ‘never before in Russian history had society, as 
distinct from the state, exhibited the heights of creative energy reached in 1915-
16.’36 However, this demonstrates perhaps less the strength of the zemstvos as a 
social movement and more the tendency of citizens to rally during crises. 
Zemstvo activity dipped briefly but sharply after the 1905 Revolution. In 1906, 
the introduction of the Fundamental Laws created the first national representative 
assembly and thus ‘shifted the centre of political agitation from the zemstvos to the 
Duma.’37 As a result, many liberals left the zemstvos and were replaced by 
conservative and reactionary nobles. This shift has been termed the ‘Zemstvo 
Reaction’38 which ‘stampeded the zemstvos into an era of self-liquidation’ for the 
two years that followed.39 Yet, with continual increases to the zemstvo budget, the 
local government institutions were able to work their way out of crisis and 
significantly expand their work, including the creation of zemstvos in nine new 
regions.40 As such, the years leading up to World War One are seen by scholars as 
the apex of zemstvo activity.41 
When it became clear that Russia would have to pull out of the War, the fate 
of the zemstvos took a turn for the worse. As Nicholas II abdicated in 1917, it 
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became apparent that the zemstvos were hindering rather than helping local 
governance mainly because ‘the free Russian peasantry regarded them with 
hostility and, perhaps even worse, indifference.’42 While zemstvos were now 
operating at all administrative levels, including at the national and volost’ levels, 
which they had desired for so long, peasants had in fact created alternative 
institutions outside of zemstvo structures and now viewed these Tsarist-era 
institutions as irrelevant. At the same time, however, new legislation was passed 
augmenting their powers and making them responsible for ‘virtually all matters of 
local government and economy’ and replacing peasant institutions in numerous 
matters.43 Furthermore, the zemstvos’ task of providing welfare meant that they 
were required to co-operate with authorities, which, in the increasingly revolutionary 
situation, were viewed by ever larger sections of the population as illegitimate. Thus, 
zemstvos were trapped into inaction and many were simply shut down due to lack 
of peasant support. The zemstvos were eventually formally dissolved in 1918 by 
Bolshevik decree.  
This brief discussion has described the functions of the zemstvos in terms of 
their duties in local governance, their relationship to the Tsarist authorities and the 
role they played in inculcating independent political perspectives within their 
members. It has shown how the movement grew from the modest idea of providing 
services to newly freed peasants to operating on a national scale during 
humanitarian crises. It has shown that the Tsar was eventually forced to acquiesce 
to the movement as it became clear the regime could not provide sufficient public 
welfare without it. It has also shown that the limited participation accorded to certain 
citizens through the zemstvos and the frustration with the government garnered as 
a result translated into a desire to effect social change on a larger scale. Instead of 
becoming bodies that faithfully enacted national policy at the local level, zemstvo 
members increasingly began to want to change or to help formulate the policy. This 
suggests that according citizens certain restricted roles in the local governance of 
an authoritarian regime can be counter-productive for a straightforward 
rearticulation of centrally-formulated policy. I now move on to discuss the ways in 
which Soviet citizens were able to influence policy-making. 
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Governance in the Soviet Union 
 
 For much of its history, the Soviet Union was seen by numerous Western 
scholars at the time as a ‘totalitarian’ state, due to its one-party rule44 and perceived 
total control over its citizens.45 This theory held some currency during the Stalin 
period, during which time public participation amounted to little more than mass 
mobilization. However, under Nikita Khrushchev, participatory mechanisms that had 
been eviscerated under Stalin were revived and reformed and numerous new ones 
were set up. As discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, the 1960s Soviet 
government perceived society to have entered the stage of ‘the withering away of 
the state’ in which the distinction between state and society was considered 
meaningless and where everyone would participate in public administration.46 
Mechanisms were promoted that enabled citizens to influence policy in various 
degrees: citizens could become soviet deputies and act as mediators between local 
party and state cadres and residents; they could become citizen inspectors and 
oversee the implementation of party and state directives; they could join trade 
unions and help shape economic and labour policy; and they could join social 
organisations to lobby government on behalf of their interest group and assist in the 
formation of relevant directives.47 Therefore, while severe restrictions on freedoms 
of expression, assembly and association remained in place during the post-Stalin 
era, numerous approved channels proliferated that directly or indirectly enabled 
citizens to influence state policy. This section discusses these avenues and shows 
that collaborations and lobbying initiatives were successful in cases that related to 
issues that already had support within the government and were not perceived to 
pose a threat to state power. (In Chapters Five and Six, I show that such criteria are 
still relevant today.) 
The primary participatory local government bodies in the Soviet Union were 
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the soviets, the foundation of legitimacy of communist command. They were made 
up of elected deputies who performed both the legislative and executive functions 
of public administration. They began as workers’ councils, co-ordinating strike 
actions during the 1905 Revolution, although their functions frequently extended to 
local government when the regular public administration was paralysed by the 
strikes. According to Geoffrey Hosking, members of workers’ councils ‘gained a brief 
but intense period of self-government, unforgettable to workers who had never 
before been allowed to organise in their own interests.’48 After the February 
Revolution, Councils of Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies were created as 
representative bodies of the working classes to operate alongside governmental 
institutions, peopled mostly by the aristocracy. The most famous of these councils 
was the Petrograd Soviet, which repeatedly vied for legitimacy with the Provisional 
Government until the latter was overthrown during the Bolshevik Revolution that 
October. When that happened, the only remaining local government bodies were 
the soviets and their national-level organisation, the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets (in operation until 1936 when it was replaced by the Supreme Soviet), 
whose governing authority was enshrined in the first Soviet constitution of 1918.49 
However, already before the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks had gained control of the 
majority of these grassroots bodies and, within five years, there were no 
representatives from other parties inside them.50 This began the evisceration of the 
principle of revolutionary direct democracy from which they had sprung and fuelled 
their transformation under Stalin into mere ‘administrative bodies’ directed by the 
Communist Party, in which the idea of public participation was only symbolic.51  
As part of the processes of de-Stalinization and the graduation to ‘developed 
socialism’, Nikita Khrushchev began a revitalization of the system of soviets. 
According to Theodore Friedgut, the aim of this policy was to ‘close the gap between 
the regime and its citizens’ and to restore their functions as ‘popular organs of 
rule.’52 The system of soviets enabled two kinds of civic participation: first, 
intermittent participation that occurred at election time, during which citizens could 
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participate as candidates, campaigners, voters or election officials and, second, 
ongoing participation for those who had become deputies. However, since 
candidates were rigorously vetted by the Communist Party and elections consisted 
of just one candidate, participation as a voter was symbolic and did not enable 
citizens to influence the regime. As a deputy, by contrast, while Party control of the 
soviets had been established ‘from within as well as from above’, it was possible 
modestly to shape local public policy.53 Friedgut has described the role of the local 
deputy in the following way: ‘He [sic] is supposed to represent the regime to the 
citizens and be the vox populi to the soviet executive and apparatus.’54 Thus, while 
on the one hand many duties consisted of assisting citizens with bureaucratic 
activities such as registering for housing, health and educational services, on the 
other hand deputies could raise citizens’ problems relating to welfare with their 
superiors and thereby indirectly bring about policy change.  In order to access public 
opinion, local deputies could organise village meetings (skhody) in order to discuss 
matters directly affecting inhabitants or they could simply gather individual 
complaints regarding a certain issue and present them to the soviet.55 In his 
extensive study of local soviet deputies, Jeffrey Hahn has concluded that ‘the image 
of Soviet citizens as passive recipients of government policies and stoic and 
uncomplaining subjects lacking legitimate opportunities or the inclination to contest 
and shape the decisions that affect their lives is inaccurate, at least at the local 
level.’56 By 1985, there were over 52,000 soviets comprising 2.3 million elected 
deputies.57 
The second avenue for citizens to participate in the regime was via monitory 
organisations, created for citizens to oversee the implementation of government 
directives. There were two main types of such bodies, the standing committees 
inside the soviets and the People’s Control Commission.58 Their work has been 
described as ‘so pervasive that it constituted in essence a silent social explosion 
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affecting all public organisations in the Soviet Union and many areas of social life.’59 
However, monitoring bodies did not generally solve the problems of corruption and 
inefficiency they were founded to address, but rather served to increase the overall 
levels of bureaucracy. Nonetheless, they constituted an important feedback 
mechanism from which officials could learn of failing policies and public mood, 
thereby providing the volunteer inspectors with an albeit weak and indirect means 
of influence. 
Standing committees were bodies operating within the soviets at every 
administrative level, from those in towns and villages to the Supreme Soviet, and 
comprised elected soviet deputies and volunteer non-deputies. According to Hahn, 
they had three functions: reviewing draft legislation, exercising kontrol’ of economic 
and administrative agencies of local government, and assisting the executive 
committee in the implementation of government decisions.60 A summary of their 
discussions was published in the Supreme Soviet’s weekly bulletin. Officials under 
scrutiny were required by law to reply to questions, provide relevant materials 
requested by the commissions, and to comply with the recommendations issued, 
with proof of compliance issued within a specified deadline.61 In 1975, there were 
nearly 330,000 standing committees comprising nearly 2 million deputies and over 
2.5 million volunteer activists.62 How far could standing committees influence 
policy? One study has argued that a lack of effort on the part of committee members 
to hold officials to account meant that the commissions often served as assistants 
to the authorities rather than watchdogs.63  Another has argued that the committees’ 
work was often patchy, with some more critical and conscientious than others.64 
These works suggest that standing commissions did not constitute a major 
opportunity for citizens to influence policy. 
The second monitory body was the People’s Control Committee (Komitet 
Narodnogo Kontrolya, KNK), the major public monitoring institution in the later years 
of the Soviet Union. It mobilised large numbers of volunteer citizens to assist ‘in the 
monitoring the performance of workers and management in enterprises and farms 
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across the country’65 with the aim of ‘securing the compliance of the economic and 
administrative bureaucracy with Party and government directives.’ 66 Its roots can 
be traced back to Lenin’s 1920 organization, Rabkrin, the Workers' and Peasants' 
Inspectorate, which was later merged – then un-merged – with the Party Control 
Commission, a body that monitored discipline within the Party under Stalin and later 
Khrushchev. The possibility for citizen inspectors to influence policy through this 
institution varied with the political climate of the time. Under Stalin, for instance, 
while the declared aims of Rabkrin exhorted citizens to hold party leaders to 
account, in reality the organisation became precisely the opposite. By the early 
1920s, Rabkrin committees had become 'instruments of central authority acting to 
silence complaints from below and to enforce party unity from above.'67 However, 
in the post-Stalin years, the institution was reorganized, expanded and renamed. 
Information gathered by volunteer inspectors was used by the authorities to learn of 
malfunctioning policies and to formulate new ones. For instance, Jan Adams has 
shown how information on production outputs gathered by public inspectors in 
Minsk not only persuaded the Ministry of Local Industry to revise production plans 
but also was used to develop proposals for further mechanization in local factories.68 
Summarizing the role of the People’s Control Committee in policy-making, she 
writes, ‘policy formulation is, in fact, an important and formidable responsibility of 
people’s controllers at all levels. The broad scope of this activity ranges from simple 
offering of advice to direct participation in the policy-making process.’69 By 1979, 
the People’s Control Committee comprised 9.5 million volunteer inspectors.70 
Chapter Three shows how the discourse articulated by Soviet leaders regarding the 
activities of this institution, as well as its successors, has been modified and 
employed by Putin to encourage civic participation in governance mechanisms 
today. 
The third avenue for Soviet citizens to participate in the shaping of public 
policy was via trade unions. Union membership cost workers 1% of their salary, in 
return for which they received an array of social welfare benefits unavailable to their 
non-unionized colleagues. By the end of the 1970s, Soviet trade unions boasted 
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128 million members71, thus making it the most widespread form of public 
participation discussed in this section. Soviet trade union rationale was based on 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, which advanced a principle of inclusion of Soviet citizens 
in the economic management of the state. In theory, this was to be achieved through 
the participation of trade union representatives, elected by the workers of a 
particular enterprise, in seminars, conferences and other decision-making platforms 
regarding labour policy. However, as with the other participatory mechanisms 
discussed above, during the Stalin years Party control tightened over the activities 
of the trade union leadership and its members. Powerful unions were broken up into 
smaller groups, inhumane working practices and obligatory overtime became the 
norm, strikes were denounced as ‘anti-proletarian’ and workers were severely 
punished for ‘truancy’.72 
In the Khrushchev era, while the links between trade union policies and the 
Communist Party remained tight, their organisational structure underwent sweeping 
reforms, enabling greater participation both at the union level in national economic 
policy development and at the rank-and-file level through the establishment of 
regular meetings and societies for workers. From 1957, factory trade union 
committees were given licence to veto managerial decisions regarding the daily 
operation of the plant and to advise on alternative proposals.73 For instance, 
research by Blair Ruble has suggested that the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions wrote large sections of the 1970 Fundamental Principles of Labour 
legislation and that codes of conduct were frequently drawn up jointly by 
management and senior union officials.74 He has also shown that at the rank-and-
file level, local union officials were often able to petition successfully for improved 
conditions at work and secured welfare provisions for workers.75 However, 
successful collaboration between the unions and the authorities can be attributed to 
the fact that most union initiatives chimed with the regime’s policy of increasing 
production; therefore, it was often in the government’s interests to take trade unions’ 
proposals on board. 
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 The fourth avenue for participation in governance existed through 
membership in the various interest groups, the proliferation of which during the post-
Stalin years gave rise, according to H. Gordon Skilling, to ‘an increasingly vigorous 
debate on public policy’.76 Such groups consisted of formal social organisations for 
certain sectors of society perceived to have specific needs, such as war veterans, 
women and people with disabilities, and professional groups based around certain 
influential occupations, such as economists, lawyers, police and the military.77 In the 
absence of formal communication channels between the government and these 
groups, the methods of contact they employed varied widely depending on their 
relationship to the state and party, but most often consisted of writing letters to 
government officials, publishing articles in the media, attending open sessions of 
the soviets or holding spontaneous public gatherings.78 Interest groups became 
extremely numerous in the late Soviet period: the number of people active in formal 
social organisations alone grew from just under a million in the mid-1960s to over 
thirty million by the end of the 1970s.79 As with the other organisations discussed in 
this section, social and professional organisations were driven by communist 
ideology and the party retained control over their internal politics; however, they 
could successfully advance their agenda on issues with existing state interest. Here, 
I briefly discuss two examples of social organisations that have been shown to have 
influenced Soviet policy, albeit modestly: the Soviet Committee of War Veterans and 
the so-called zhensovety, (women’s councils). In both instances, where general 
support for their causes existed inside government, the groups were able to 
campaign successfully for the rights of their members and, at times, alter state policy 
to their favour. 
The Soviet Committee of War Veterans (Sovetskii komitet veteranov voiny) 
was founded in 1956, after many early attempts by World War One and Civil War 
veterans to found organisations that would lobby their interests failed due to the 
refusal of the Soviet government to admit that any social classes existed beyond 
the strict Marxist divisions. The change of heart was inspired by activity both in 
government and among the veterans: first, the Soviet leadership wanted an 
organisation that could join the World Veterans’ Federation in order to advance Cold 
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War propaganda and, second, war veterans had frequently remained in contact 
after the war and had often formed informal groups. Within ten years, local and 
regional Committees were being founded in cities and republics across the Union 
with the aims of lobbying for increased governmental support for veterans at the 
local level and advancing the Socialist agenda internationally. In spite of the fact 
that the Committee had been founded for the advancement of state policy, it quickly 
became more than a mere puppet institution and, according to Mark Edele, ‘local 
enthusiasm had to be curtailed constantly from above’.80 By the 1980s, the 
organisation’s tasks included supporting individual campaigns for entitlement, 
assessing draft legislation for its provisions for veterans, presenting their own 
legislative proposals and organising mass letter-writing campaigns to the 
government.81 At the end of the Soviet Union, veterans had become a respected 
category of citizen, with numerous specially conferred rights, privileges and 
accolades, thanks to the Committee’s lobbying activities.  
Similarly, the zhensovety were successful in advancing both the agendas of 
the government and the interests of Soviet women.  Zhensovety were women-only 
councils founded on government initiative, since women, housewives in particular, 
were perceived to be underexposed to Communist propaganda. With the aim of 
teaching women political skills and thereby raising their overall political awareness, 
these institutions proliferated during the late 1950s and could be found in 
workplaces and apartment blocks, as well as in state structures.82  A large part of 
their work involved helping to fulfil Party directives of increased productivity by 
lobbying for improved conditions in the workplace, such the provision of crèches 
and canteens, facilities that were aimed at allowing women to spend more time at 
work. However, they also developed into ‘pressure groups’ that successfully 
campaigned Communist Party officials for the implementation of rest and holiday 
schemes designed by zhensovet members to give women a break83 and for the 
redistribution of resources from regional budgets to childcare facilities.84  It is 
therefore impossible to dismiss them simply as instruments solely for the fulfilment 
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of state goals. Both the zhensovety and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, 
while both conforming to Soviet ideology and policy in their own way, were used by 
their members to advance agendas that benefited their social group, thereby subtly 
and incrementally influencing state policy. 
Several scholars have argued that a major reason for the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was that the changing nature of civic participation in political 
institutions ultimately led to the disintegration of those institutions.85 Beginning with 
the mechanisms discussed above, the gradual erosion of authoritarian control grew 
to a head during perestroika, of course, as public participation in governance 
erupted across the Union and ultimately precipitated its collapse. In policy terms, 
perestroika was intended as a return to true accountability on the part of Party 
officials by removing Party control of government apparatus and introducing 
elements of marketization into the economic system; as such, it has been 
interpreted as a final attempt to reform communism.86 Thus, while aiming to ‘include 
the people in a real way into all aspects of the administration of the state such as 
Lenin dreamt about,’ the reforms succeeded in redefining public political space and 
as a result allowed at last the system’s contradictions to be openly scrutinised, 
debated and eventually, for the large part, delegitimized.87 In other words, as with 
the development of the zemstvo movement discussed above, the expansion of 
limited pluralism in governance contributed to the Soviet regime’s collapse. 
This section has shown that, in the post-Stalin era, there were numerous 
opportunities for citizens to shape policy; indeed, the Soviet authorities often sought 
the advice and assistance of engaged citizens and public organisations. When civic 
interests conformed to socialist ideology and were not perceived to threaten 
Communist authority, participatory mechanisms could make modest changes to 
policy directions and improve the lives of Soviet citizens. However, it was the 
expansion of such participation that played a major role in the regime’s collapse. 
Like the zemstvo movement, the growing levels of inclusion of citizens in 
governance from the beginning of perestroika weakened the regime’s control over 
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its institutions, allowing the more radical citizens to remould and ultimately 
delegitimise them. The final section discusses the participatory institutions that have 
grown up in their place. 
 
 
Post-Soviet Governance: From Nomenclatura to a Neoliberal Public Sector? 
 
In this section, I detail the numerous participatory opportunities that have 
been created in the post-Soviet era as part of the on-going administrative reforms 
that are transforming the Soviet-era state bureaucracy into one based on market 
principles.  First, citizens can join PCBs in order to participate at the decision-making 
stage; second, they can join ‘socially oriented NGOs’ to assist at the delivery state; 
third, they can make use of ‘electronic government’ portals, which aim to simplify 
the consumption stage. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this thesis is 
on the creation and expansion of the PCB network as it is the most pervasive of all 
three mechanisms and, as I show in chapters Four, Five and Six, is the primary 
subject of the state discourse on civic engagement in governance. In this section, I 
show that the expansion of these opportunities has occurred alongside the market 
reform of the public sector, a reduction in possibilities for citizens to elect local and 
federal authorities and a decentralisation of budget and welfare responsibility to 
governments at regional and municipal levels. Their creation thus attempts to 
respond to the problems of policy-making in a system that possesses a rigid political 
power structure but in which key expertise is now located with new, potentially non-
state actors. This sets them apart from the participatory mechanisms of the Tsarist 
and Soviet eras. 
By the end of the 1980s, Soviet public administration was in a decrepit 
condition, with its bloated and inefficient bureaucracy described by Richard Sakwa 
as ‘polymorphous, with little distinction between political, social or economic 
institutions.’88 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the dire need for 
change, the process of administrative reform stalled for two reasons. Firstly, it was 
neglected by both international and domestic reformers during the 1990s as they 
focussed on economic liberalisation as their primary objective and, secondly, there 
were strong political forces inside the country that resisted any attempts at 
                                                          
88 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 125. 
57 
 
change.89 Linda Cook has delineated three factors specific to postcommunist states 
that produced a very different backdrop to welfare reforms to that of other parts of 
the world. First, under communism, large sections of society had been dependent 
on the state for income, and few citizens had amassed private savings (those that 
did, lost them during the financial crash of 1998). Second, there remained for a long 
time (and, arguably, does to this day) a general sense among the population that 
the state ought to provide goods and services to citizens and, as a result, there has 
been a high level of popular backlash against reforms that were perceived to go too 
far. Third, many corporate structures created during the Soviet era to assist in 
welfare provision (some of which have been discussed above) continued into the 
post-Soviet era, had a vested interest in seeing the old welfare state continue and 
thus were also resistant to change.90 Taken together, these factors meant that the 
population relied on the state for the fulfilment of their most basic needs and 
resistance to change was high both inside and outside of government. As a result, 
administrative reform was blocked by these groups for most of the 1990s and was 
largely forgotten about by policy-makers, despite the on-going financial crisis inside 
the country (which might otherwise have suggested a need to cut public spending). 
Change in this area could only be instigated at the end of the 1990s as the economy 
began to recover.91 
When Vladimir Putin came to power at the turn of the millennium, 
administrative reform was one of his key objectives. He considered the sluggish and 
ineffective state bureaucracy to be one of the major barriers to economic 
development and made the restructuring of the administrative system (in terms of 
scaling back state intervention in business, decentralizing certain administrative 
functions and increasing the efficiency of government bodies) a priority.92 This huge 
task has so far been rolled out in three phases of administrative reforms, under the 
direction of the Ministry of Economic Development and in conjunction with think 
tanks such as German Gref’s Centre for Strategic Planning.93  
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The first phase took place between 2003 and 2005 and entailed a radical 
downsizing of government departments and functions (in 2003 there totaled over 
five thousand departments and agencies, many of whom were expecting their 
jurisdictions to expand in order to cope with the challenges of reform).94 The 
Presidential Decree ushering in the reforms sought to limit state intervention in the 
economy, abolish excessive government regulation, ensure that there was no 
duplication among the activities of government departments, separate government 
agencies responsible for economic activities, service provision to citizens and the 
maintenance of state-owned property, and ensure that a separation of powers 
existed between the federal and regional levels.95 In other words, it sought to ensure 
that government departments had clearly defined and mutually exclusive fields of 
responsibility, in contrast to the Soviet system in which job descriptions were vague 
and lines between departments were blurred. 
The second phase is the most important for the development of platforms for 
civic engagement in the governance process. It took place between 2006 and 2010 
and aimed to build upon the newly demarcated administrative system. These 
reforms had four main objectives: to increase government efficiency, make civil 
servants accountable to the rule of law, improve the quality of public services and 
guarantee the right of citizens to objective information.  The twenty-seven page 
document stipulated eight strategies for the achievement of these goals: first, 
‘governance by results’, that is, formulating a set of performance indicators for 
government bodies; second, ‘standardization and regulation’ of public services 
across the Federation, which would also include feedback mechanisms for service 
users; third, the provision of various types of public service (the issuing of 
certificates, permits etc.) through a single window known as ‘multipurpose centres’; 
fourth, putting information about public services online in a single portal; fifth, 
combatting corruption in government through a continual down-sizing of 
government agencies and by developing ‘institutions of self-regulation’; sixth, 
improving levels of engagement between the executive authorities and civil society; 
seventh, improving regional government bodies’ communications and information 
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systems; and, eighth, ensuring that the administrative reforms actually take place 
by providing the necessary resources and creating the appropriate organisational 
structures.96 
According to the report, one of the main problems with the administrative 
system was its closed nature and the lack of feedback channels between the 
authorities and the citizens. Information held by the authorities was considered 
secret and there were no structural opportunities for consultation with civil society 
groups before decisions were made. Thus, the administrative reforms put forward 
the development of institutional mechanisms that would promote more effective 
engagement between NGOs and the authorities and increase the overall 
transparency of government activity. In order to do this, two systems were proposed. 
The first was a network of public councils, which would encourage public debates 
on policy areas, conduct scrutiny of government decisions, and include ‘civil society’ 
in oversight commissions and working groups. The second was the development of 
e-government, through which citizens could sign up for services, give feedback on 
quality and deal with paperwork online. These two systems are discussed below. 
The third phase of reforms took place between 2011 and 2013 under the 
Framework for Lowering Administrative Barriers and Increasing the Accessibility of 
State and Municipal Services. This phase was less concerned with civic 
engagement, instead seeking to increase self-regulation of government 
departments and improving the accessibility of services to citizens.97 It also stressed 
the need for the further decentralisation of public authority (publichnoi vlast’) to the 
regions in the field of administration. In short, the latest phase of reforms reflected 
the growing understanding among the authorities of the public sector as a diffuse, 
horizontally organised and partnership-based governance network, a key part in 
which was to be played by ‘socially oriented NGOs’, discussed below.  
The creation of these federal-level administrative reforms have also come 
hand in hand with a greater delegation to regional and municipal government of 
budgetary independence and responsibility for policy areas. Beginning in 1991, an 
on-going process of decentralisation of the welfare state has been underway with 
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local expenditure on social provision increasing 5-fold to 1996.98 Putin continued 
this trend, despite recentralising political authority (discussed below); he has 
reformed pensions, benefits, housing and education along neoliberal lines (that is, 
based chiefly on individual need, rather than universal entitlement), and has handed 
their administration to the regional and municipal authorities.99 Indeed, the number 
of regional government officials per 10,000 people has increased by approximately 
a fifth across the board between 2002 and 2012.100 Furthermore, the 
decentralisation of budget responsibility and the cultivation of local government 
remain key policy areas for both central and regional authorities.101 Linda Cook has 
cited the influence of 'models of welfare reform then being promoted by global 
networks' on the public sector reform process.102 Chapter Three discusses the 
international discourse of public sector reform. 
However, alongside the administrative reforms seeking to expand 
opportunities for civic participation in governance, there have been increasing 
restrictions on the opportunity for citizens to elect their representatives at federal, 
regional and municipal levels. At the federal level, the electorate’s inability to alter 
the political fate of the country was confirmed in 2011, when out-going President 
Medvedev stated that he and Putin had agreed ‘a long time ago’ that he would step 
aside for Putin to return to the Presidency.103 The Parliamentary and Presidential 
elections that followed in 2011-2012 were widely seen to be the most fraudulent 
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since the collapse of the USSR104 and sparked the biggest demonstrations of the 
country’s post-Soviet history.105 While the temporary increase in levels of civic 
activism sparked some modest electoral reform, the Kremlin also introduced harsh 
measures clamping down on street protests and foreign-funded NGOs. Overall, the 
legislative changes in the wake of the demonstrations has not affected the balance 
of power in the country. 
At the regional level, direct gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004 
on national security grounds and were replaced by a system of Presidential 
appointment.106  They were re-instated briefly by President Medvedev in response 
to the unrest of 2011-2012, but in 2013 regional parliaments were given the option 
of cancelling elections, removing elected governors and submitting a list of three 
potential candidates for the post to the President, asking him to choose for them. In 
2013, seventy-seven out of eighty-three regional governors were members of 
United Russia.107  
At the municipal level, the ability for citizens to choose their leaders has also 
been undermined. In 2009, the post of ‘city manager’ was introduced, which 
replaced the elected mayor in some cities and worked alongside the mayor in 
others. City managers were generally under the jurisdiction of the governor and 
accountable to the city duma with a view ‘to depoliticise city governments and to 
improve the delivery of municipal services to citizens’, thus undercutting the 
authority of the elected mayor and strengthening the link between the Kremlin and 
the municipal government in the process.108 Governors and their managers were to 
become more attuned to the politics of the centre rather than the region.  
Furthermore, city dumas may now remove a mayor by voting two of his or her 
annual reports in a row ‘unsatisfactory.’ Mayors remain the last genuinely 
competitively elected executive position in Russia, but federal law has continued to 
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undermine them. Since 2005, over one third of Russian cities have abolished 
Mayoral elections altogether.109  
Overall, the possibilities for citizens to engage in electoral politics at all levels 
have gradually declined as the mechanisms for non-electoral public participation 
have expanded. At the same time, as the Soviet-era bureaucracy is streamlined and 
certain functions are privatised, outsourced and decentralised, citizens are needed 
to play a greater role in public administration. Furthermore, as elections become 
less effective as a means to gauge public opinion, other mechanisms must fulfil that 
function. Contemporary participatory mechanisms must therefore respond to the 
demands both of the neoliberal public sector and the authoritarian regime. I now 
take a closer look at these three mechanisms: the PCB network, socially oriented 
NGOs and e-government. 
 
Civic Participation at the Decision-Making Stage: The PCB Network 
The PCB network is the main focus of this thesis. It is government’s flagship 
mechanism to increase civic participation in governance and has been promoted as 
a means of enacting obshchestvennyi kontrol’ over government activities. It has 
been expanding rapidly ever since the foundation of two federal-level bodies in the 
mid-2000s: the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (hereafter 
Presidential Human Rights Council) and the Federal Public Chamber. Created just 
prior to the commencement of the second wave of reforms, these bodies provided 
the blueprint for the extension of PCBs as the main platform for dialogue between 
regional and municipal authorities and the public.110 First, in 2004, the Presidential 
Commission for Human Rights was transformed into the then-named Presidential 
Council for Assistance in the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human 
Rights (and was given its current name in 2011). According to the Presidential 
Decree, the aims of the Council include assisting the President in the protection of 
human rights, developing proposals to improve human rights, informing the 
President of the state of human rights in the country, scrutinizing draft laws to ensure 
they protect citizens’ rights, making suggestions to the President on how to increase 
engagement with NGOs, and developing mechanisms of public scrutiny in the field 
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of rights protection.111 This dual role of assistance and scrutiny ( expanded from the 
monitory activities of a number of the Soviet era bodies discussed above) was later 
reproduced in all the institutions across the PCB network. 
In April the following year, Federal Law No. 32 created the Federal Public 
Chamber. It took the consultative principles of the Presidential Human Rights 
Council and extended them to members of NGOs and other public figures who could 
join the Chamber as ‘public experts’. According to this law, the Chamber was 
founded in order to facilitate co-operation between citizens and the authorities, 
represent citizens’ interests to the authorities, protect the rights of citizens and 
NGOs and monitor the activities of state institutions, with one of its main tasks being 
the implementation of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of government activities.112 This 
was the first time an institution had been legally required to conduct this task, 
although the text did not contain a definition of precisely what it entailed. In the 
numerous modifications to the law that have followed, the concept has remained 
present but undefined.113 In 2013, the Chamber was expanded from 126 to 166 
members and the selection process was reformed. Now the Chamber comprises 
forty members directly selected by the President, eighty-three members of regional 
public chambers chosen by the existing members and forty-three NGO leaders, 
selected from a shortlist by the public through an online voting system.114 Each 
member of the Chamber serves a three-year term and candidates may stand for re-
selection; indeed many do, as membership in the Chamber is clearly associated 
with a status position.115  
In the seven years of the Public Chamber's existence, it has come to play a 
central role in Russian social politics, examining draft legislation, conducting 
studies, distributing grants, processing citizens’ appeals and complaints, and co-
ordinating other corporate bodies in the PCB network, such as public councils, 
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regional chambers and public monitoring commissions, as well as human rights 
ombudsmen across the Federation. It has numerous commissions working on 
topics ranging from science and innovation, regional development and cultural 
heritage to social welfare, media, and public safety, as well as smaller working 
groups focussing on youth, elections, construction, industrial modernization, anti-
corruption initiatives and others. It holds four to five plenary sessions a year and 
over a hundred public events such as public hearings and round tables.116 Elena 
Belokurova has called the Public Chamber ‘the most important body which 
represents the interests of NGOs.’117 
The public chamber model has also been replicated at the regional level, with 
69 (out of a possible 83) regional public chambers listed on the Federal Public 
Chamber website, each with between 21 and 50 members.118 Public chambers 
have also appeared at the municipal level in cities such as Samara, Irkurtsk, Tomsk, 
Chelyabinsk, Ryazan’, Yekaterinburg, Tver, and Yaroslavl’, and dozens, if not 
hundreds, are in operation many in smaller conurbations. The aims of these bodies 
are identical to the Federal Public Chamber in that they attempt to encourage 
citizens and NGOs to carry out the same mix of assistance to and scrutiny of the 
government that characterises the federal body. A reading of their legislation 
suggests that it is these activities that are understood to comprise obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’.  In Chapters Five and Six, I explore regional and municipal PCBs in more 
detail. 
Article twenty of the law on the Public Chamber also permitted the creation 
of public councils alongside government ministries, agencies and other structures. 
These councils were then regulated according to the governmental decrees No. 481 
of 2nd August 2005 and No. 842 of 4th August 2006. The 2005 legislation, 'On the 
Order of Formation of Public Councils attached to Federal Governmental Ministries 
and Services and Agencies Subordinate to these Federal Ministries, as well as 
Federal Governmental Agencies and Services', allowed for the optional creation of 
public councils under federal ministries, but the resolution, aside from confirming 
their voluntary status, did not outline how members were to be chosen or what the 
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councils' tasks should be.119 This Resolution was later modified on 6 June 2013 to 
include the additional amendments outlined in the 2006 Presidential Decree.120 This 
Decree stated that public councils were to be formed jointly by the federal authority 
in question and the Federal Public Chamber and were to comprise independent 
experts, members of the Federal Public Chamber, representatives of NGOs and 
other citizens. However, its membership still had to be confirmed by the relevant 
government authority, meaning that heads of government bodies could chose 
individuals unlikely to challenge their modus operandi.121 Since then, the public 
council model has spread across the entire Federation, with councils set up under 
regional ministries, procurator’s offices, mayors’ offices and other local government 
departments.  
In 2008, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ was made the subject of a law for the first 
time as prison monitoring bodies known as public monitoring commissions 
(Obshchestvennyye nablyudatel’nyye komissii) were created by Law No. 76 ‘On the 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ of the Protection of Human Rights in Places of Detention 
and Assistance to Persons in Places of Detention.’122 However, even here the 
concept is not given a full definition; rather, the law states that obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ is to be performed by public monitoring commissions, and continues with 
an elaboration of PMCs’ activities. These include inspections of detention facilities, 
followed by the preparation of recommendations for improvement to the facility 
authorities, the handling of complaints by inmates and helping prison authorities 
ensure that prisoners’ rights are observed. In short, it is the combination of 
assistance and scrutiny that characterises public chambers. Furthermore, the PMC 
application process is conducted by the Federal Public Chamber and regional 
chambers often provide training sessions and administrative support. With this law, 
then, the network of PBCs began to expand and consolidate, and the concept of 
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obshchestvennyi kontrol’ became a central, legally enshrined component of its 
activities. Chapter 4 discusses the PMC law in more detail. 
The development of public councils proceeded along more diffuse lines. In 
2009, the Federal Public Chamber conducted research into public councils and 
found that many were reducing the number of their meetings, had been created in 
contravention to existing legislation, or had become ‘decorative’ bodies with few, if 
any, critical voices.123 The 2010 Public Chamber annual report on the condition of 
‘civil society’ in the country, presented the results of this research, noting a 'decline 
in public councils’ enthusiasm as well as the irrelevance, narrowness and pettiness 
of the issues they address.'124 The report cites the example of the Public Council 
under the Federal Ministry of Education, which 
 
Held four meetings in 2007, two meetings in 2008, and only one 
meeting in 2009. Despite the on-going reform of educational 
institutions, none of these meetings were devoted to such areas of 
public concern as the Unified State Examination or the shift to the 
two-tier system of Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes. No 
meetings were focused on science despite the urgent need for 
innovation.125 
 
Furthermore, it showed that apolitical celebrities were frequently chosen over 
relevant experts. For instance, the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence 
 
Includes about 60 members among whom there are virtually no 
senior experts, university staff or other people highly qualified in 
the field. Most of the council is made up of entertainers and talk-
show hosts.126 
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At the local level, the situation was revealed to be even more patrimonial: of the 22 
municipal public councils examined, 19 were full of people with close links to the 
city head.127 
However, in a key speech to the Federation Council around this time, 
President Medvedev emphasised the importance of uniting social forces behind his 
programme of modernization.128 In order to resolve the country’s economic, social 
and demographic problems, he called for the foundation of 'modernization 
coalitions' which would create a 'state-society partnership' to improve economic and 
social conditions in the country.129 Public councils were seen as a part of the fabric 
of this partnership alongside human rights ombudsmen, mechanisms for the 
development of small and medium-sized businesses and grants and subsidies for 
NGO work.130 So instead of scrapping the public council idea, legislation was 
introduced to consolidate their relationship both to the authorities and to the public, 
reform their membership process and co-ordinate their activities. 
 The first piece of legislation to outline the rationale for public councils and to 
define their role in interacting with government agencies was Federal Law No. 3 'On 
the Police', signed into law on 7 February 2011, six years after public councils made 
their first entry into the Russian legal codex. Article 2, paragraph 9 states that the 
public councils attached to the Interior Ministry both at federal and regional levels 
are intended to 
 
Ensure the harmonization of the socially relevant interests of 
Russian citizens, federal government, state authorities, local self-
government, NGOs and human rights, religious and other 
organizations, as well as professional bodies, in order to address 
the most important issues of policing. 
 
In other words, the development of the police system was seen as a task to be 
undertaken by all sections of society. It assumed that these sections could be united 
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in a single vision via the public council. The public councils were to be comprised of 
citizens and NGOs willing to work on a voluntary basis in order to monitor police 
activities alongside NGOs, the Federal Public Chamber and public monitoring 
commissions.131 This was a marked distinction from previous legal documents, 
which had stated that public councils were an optional extra for government 
departments: here they were made compulsory and their specific functions were 
outlined, creating a blueprint for their formation in other ministries. These functions 
revealed an understanding of public participation in state policy-making and delivery 
as a means of creating a unified approach to law enforcement: society should assist 
the state in carrying out its tasks. However, it did not specify what should be done 
with the results of the citizens' reviews and public hearings, nor did it state how 
members were to be selected. 
 Following swiftly in the police's footsteps, the Presidential Decree of 23 May 
2011 No. 668 ‘On Public Councils under the Interior Ministry and its Regional 
Offices’ was passed, in which the legal basis for public councils was further 
expanded, giving them a definition as well as legally enshrined rights. According to 
this decree, a public council is an 'advisory body (soveshchatel'nyi organ) whose 
resolutions are non-binding (rekomendatel'nyye).'132 For the first time, the decree 
outlined a series of ‘rights’ available to public councils and their members. Public 
councils and their members, while not possessing any executive authority, were 
given broad legal mandate to observe the work of the Interior Ministry in full. They 
were to be given access to internal ministerial documents, decision-making 
processes and relations with citizens; they could probe areas of work deemed 
substandard and suggest ways to improve; and they could require engagement in 
their work from ministerial officials. The agenda and minutes of their meetings were 
to be posted online immediately after sessions. In other words, they were to conduct 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’. However, the decree still stated that the council's final 
membership was to be approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs, with the federal-
level council then co-ordinating appointments at regional councils. As such, the 
question of ‘loyalty’ remained unresolved. Overall, this decree established public 
councils within the eight major departments of the Interior Ministry, in 82 federal 
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subjects and at 10 transport offices. In all, it founded 102 public councils hosting a 
combined total of 2049 people.133 Furthermore, it prompted the proliferation of 
public councils in the federal and regional offices of virtually all government 
agencies, departments and services: by the end of 2011, there were 52 public 
councils at the federal level alone.134 
Putin has repeatedly expressed support for the idea of public councils, 
considering them an expansion of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. When he returned to 
the Presidency in May 2012, he passed Decree No. 601, ‘On Guidelines for 
Improving State Governance’ which required that all federal ministries conduct 
public discussions of proposals at all stages of a given project’s development and 
stated the necessity of public consultation of draft regulations at national and 
regional levels. Public councils were considered to play a central role in this process 
and the decree finally addressed their method of formation, stating that the Federal 
Public Chamber should be involved in the formation of public councils, though it still 
did not state how. It also reiterated that independent experts and NGOs should form 
part of their membership and called for the creation of a list of activities, which 
cannot be undertaken by government authorities without prior consultation with its 
public council, setting a deadline for these changes as September 2012.135 Thus, 
on 1 September Resolution No. 887 was issued, stating that the list would comprise 
state initiatives and draft bills of various types.136 Government bodies were now 
legally required to consult their public councils on a host of issues. 
Reform of the membership selection process was finally addressed in spring 
2013. From 1 July 2013, federal level public council members were to be selected 
via a combined system of internet voting and Public Chamber involvement. Any 
citizen may put herself forward and then special commissions will prepare a list of 
candidates, which the public will then vote on electronically. According to the 
Kremlin, candidates are now considered on the basis of relevant professional and 
socially-oriented experience in the field of activity of the particular ministry, 
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academic titles, and leadership experience and so on.137 On 12 September 2013, a 
working group was established to draw up criteria for the ‘standardization of the 
work of Public Councils.’138 The effects of this significant reform to the formation 
process of public councils on their critical capacity will become evident over the next 
couple of years.  
It is clear that the PCB network has become a central element of civic 
participation in policy-making in Russia and is likely to continue to expand in the 
future. The Federal Public Chamber has become the centrepiece of the PCB 
network and co-ordinates the work and the selection processes of public councils 
and PMCs. The network’s practices of simultaneous assistance and scrutiny form 
the basis of the concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, and are considered to increase 
civic participation in governance in a consensual and controllable fashion. Overall, 
the PCB network enables the authorities to harness human resources located 
outside formal state structures, receive feedback from the public regarding failing 
policies, and attempt to address endemic corruption inside the state bureaucracy, 
without challenging its legitimacy. 
 
Civic Participation at the Delivery Stage: Socially Oriented NGOs 
Opportunities for civic participation at the delivery stage of public policy have 
been expanded through the development of ‘socially oriented NGOs’. As such, 
many more NGOs have been formed in the last five years, often by target group 
representatives, such as families with disabled children. However, post-Soviet 
government policy has been somewhat ambivalent towards NGOs. Due to the 
virtual non-existence of formal non-state public activity during the Soviet Union, 
post-Soviet policy had to be designed from scratch and, until 2006, there were few 
restrictions on the operation of independent organisations in the country. In 2001, 
an attempt was made to co-ordinate a federal-level policy towards NGOs at the 
Civic Forum, a two-day meeting between President Vladimir Putin, members of his 
cabinet and over 4,000 representatives from more than three hundred NGOs and 
civic groups. The aim was to discuss practical solutions to Russia’s social problems; 
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indeed, it was here that the idea for a consultative body that would bring NGOs and 
government officials together was first mooted. However, the Forum was received 
ambivalently by Western and Russian observers: on the one hand, it was seen by 
liberals as a public articulation of the Russian government’s acknowledgement of 
the importance of civil society;139 but on the other hand, complaints by civil society 
activists which saw the Civic Forum as an attempt by the government to corporatize 
the NGO sphere dissuaded the government following through on plans made during 
the event.140 
Policy towards NGOs changed during the mid-2000s. The wave of the so-
called ‘colour revolutions’, particularly the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, were 
perceived by many in Russia to have been fuelled by Western-funded NGOs; there 
was a widespread fear inside the political establishment that such an upheaval 
could also happen in Russia. Consequently, legislation was introduced to monitor 
the activities of NGOs funded from abroad. In December 2005, a law was passed 
by the Duma allowing the authorities to conduct extensive audits of NGOs, and 
requiring the latter to register with the Federal Registration Service within six months 
or face being closed down and provide detailed annual reports of their financial 
activities. While this law provoked an outcry from international human rights 
organisations and some domestic NGOs, scholars have tended to view the law as 
a step towards making the Russian NGO sector more accountable, transparent and 
professional.141 However, in 2009, President Medvedev reduced the number of 
audits to once every three years and simplified the registration process.142 
In spite of the occasionally contradictory governmental approach to the non-
profit sector, certain NGOs have grown to play an active role in regional governance 
over the last ten years. They are often called upon by regional administrations for 
their expert advice and are frequently considered by authorities to operate more 
efficiently than their own cumbersome state agencies.143  In 2010, amendments to 
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the Law on NGOs formally introduced the category of ‘socially oriented NGOs’ into 
the legal codex.144 According to this law, socially oriented NGOs are non-profit 
organisations that carry out activities aimed at solving social problems such as 
conservation, historical preservation, sports, education and healthcare and are 
entitled to receive various forms of support from regional authorities, ranging from 
tax exemption and training provision to direct financial sponsorship.145 This category 
distinguishes them both from organisations perceived to have a critical or anti-
government agenda, such as election-monitoring organisation, GOLOS, and 
Russian human rights organisation, Memorial, and from national branches of 
international organisations, such as Amnesty Russia, Human Rights Watch or 
Greenpeace.  In 2013, socially oriented NGOs were awarded $75 million in order to 
implement ‘socially beneficial’ projects.146  
In addition, NGOs may compete for government contracts (goszakazy) as 
part of a process of outsourcing public services to third parties.147 From 1 January 
2014, 15% of the annual volume of contracts was to be allocated to small and 
medium businesses and socially oriented NGOs.148 Furthermore, since 2005, the 
Presidential Grants system has been holding annual competitions among NGOs in 
order to distribute state funding: in 2013, over 2 billion roubles were distributed to 
124 organisations in 47 regions149 according to the social value of the projects 
proposed and the ability of the organisations to fulfil them.150 Overall, the amount 
reserved in the state budget for the support of non-profit organisations has been 
growing year on year, almost doubling between 2012 and 2013151 (most likely to 
                                                          
144 E. Chebankova, ‘State-sponsored Civic Associations in Russia: Systemic Integration or the 
“War of Position”?’, East European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2012). 
145 ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 5 aprelya 2010g No. 40 F2: O vnesenii izmenenii v 
otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voprosu podderzhki sotsial’no 
oriyentirovannykh nekommercheskikh organizatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 April 2010, 
http://www.rg.ru/2010/04/07/nko-dok.html (accessed 31 March 2014). 
146 ‘Putin Orders Allocating $75 Mln for Socially-Oriented NGOs’, RIA Novosti, 30 March 2013, 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130330/180346679/Putin-Orders-Allocating-75-Mln-for-Socially-Oriented-
NGOs.html (accessed 31 March 2014). 
147 See ‘Glavnaya Portal Zakupok’, http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public/home.html 
(accessed 1 April 2014). 
148 ‘Monopolii i goskompanii budut otdavat’ malomu biznesu minimum 15% zakazov – Medvedev’, 
Interfax, 27 September 2013, http://www.interfax-
russia.ru/South/special.asp?id=437536&sec=1702 (accessed 28 July 2014). 
149 ‘Obnarodovan spisok NKO, poluchivshikh prezidentskiyye granty’, Radio Svoboda, 5 December 
2013, http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25190550.html (accessed 1 April 2014). 
150 ‘Polozheniye o konkurse’, Grazhdanskoye Dostoinstvo, 25 September 2013, 
http://www.civildignity.ru/ru/info-show/konkurs-2013/polojenie_o_konkurse (accessed 1 April 2014). 
151 ‘Prezidentskiye Granty 2013, 2012, 2011: Obzor’, Portal NKO, http://portal-
nko.ru/finance/konkurs/16500/ (accessed 1 April 2014). 
73 
 
compensate for the lack of international grants in the wake of the ‘foreign agents 
law’  discouraging Russian NGOs from accepting foreign funding, discussed below.) 
In the next five years, NGOs are set to increase their presence in the provision of 
goods and services to Russian citizens: an important state-commissioned report, 
Strategy 2020, which details the programme for social and economic development 
in Russia to 2020, stipulates that NGOs should be one of the key recipients of 
outsourcing contracts for public service provision.152 
 At the same time, government policy has demonised NGOs perceived to 
work against the state. While citing ‘civil society’ as an important factor in the 
country’s modernization programme and overall political development,153 there 
have been on-going raids on NGOs considered by the Kremlin to be antithetical to 
its vision of ‘civil society’, summarised by one scholar as the idea of ‘a coherent, 
ordered space where individuals assist the state in the interests of the whole.’154 
Further, in the wake of the mass protests that spread across the country following 
the December 2011 parliamentary elections, a draconian law on NGOs was 
introduced. The so-called ‘Foreign Agents Law’ came into effect in November 2012 
and requires NGOs that receive funding from foreign governments or international 
bodies which, ‘regardless of the goals and aims set out in their charter, organise 
and conduct political activities which influence government decision-making’155 to 
register with the Justice Ministry as ‘foreign agents’ (a title which many view as a 
euphemism for ‘spy’), to present a financial report to the authorities once a quarter, 
to co-operate with annual audits by Russian authorities, and to state on all online 
and print materials that they are ‘foreign agents’. Failure to comply with the law 
could lead to a suspension of the organisation’s activities for a period of up to six 
months, fines between 300,000 and 500,000 roubles, or up to two years 
imprisonment.  
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In sum, the supportive legislation and funding mechanisms for NGOs 
developed in recent years point to a recognition by the federal authorities of the 
importance of the non-profit sector both as a source of knowledge and resources 
and to an increasing level of reliance on NGOs for service provision at the regional 
level. However, its simultaneous persecution of certain ‘oppositional’ NGOs 
suggests the desire to retain control over which kind of groups can participate in 
service provision. This echoes the logic of the Putin-era reform agenda more 
broadly, which seeks to harness citizens’ participation in an apolitical fashion while 
closing down opportunities to challenge the political authority. 
 
Civic Participation at the Consumption State: e-Government 
As mentioned above, the administrative reforms of 2006-2008 stipulated that 
various administrative functions should be moved online. Since then, e-government 
has developed in two ways: government departments have been asked to transfer 
documents and materials online and citizens have been encouraged to sign up for 
services and complete paperwork through online portals. The main aims of these 
initiatives were to increase the transparency of government activities, reduce 
corruption and allow citizens greater control over the kinds of services they require. 
In February 2009, Law No. 8 “On Access to information about the activities of 
government agencies and local government”, was published, requiring government 
bodies to make information about their activities freely accessible online or in paper 
format and allowed citizens to attend certain meetings of local government 
bodies.156 A website entitled Otkrytoye Pravitel’stvo (Open Government) has been 
set up to co-ordinate these activities.157 
One result of these measures is that a huge amount of information has been 
made publically available on the internet. The various types of information relating 
to the public sector now online are huge and very diverse, with all federal agencies 
required by law since April 2013 to place information regarding draft laws on a 
specially created website.158 Some regions have gone further and have transferred 
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all their administrative data (such as budget spending, and economic and 
demographic data) online.159 However, the process of standardizing the availability 
of government data online is still underway and the accessibility of information is 
patchy, disorganised and confusing.160 In October 2011, Dmitry Medvedev set up a 
platform for interaction between the government and the expert community entitled 
‘Big Government’, which proposed to design an effective system for online 
governance. After a year of consultations, a Minister for Open Government was 
appointed to oversee the process and so far a number of pilot schemes have been 
launched in various regions and municipalities, as well in selected government 
agencies and ministries.161  
 Electronic government also enables citizens to participate in the ordering and 
evaluation of public services online. The Otkrytoye Pravitel’stvo website lists six 
primary benefits that the open data initiative aims to instil in the population: the 
somewhat cryptic ‘social civic self-fulfilment’ (obshchestvennaya grazhdanskaya 
samorealizatsiya), participation in governance, feedback to the authorities, 
influence in decision-making convenient and high-quality public services and 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’.162 However, much of the website is very vague and does 
not explain precisely how citizens can get involved, other than through public 
councils. 
A more concrete development for civic participation in e-governance is the 
Universal Electronic Card. Created in 2010, it allows citizens to pay for services and 
store information regarding their welfare needs electronically. According to the 
website, the card aims to eliminate waiting times, combat corruption and allow 
citizens to receive services in a convenient location (i.e., at home). It can be used 
to access services such as healthcare, social security, transport, as well as pay tax 
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and fines, and aims to encourage a self-governing attitude towards the consumption 
of public services.163 
Finally, the government has encouraged the online public discussion of draft 
laws, although the website created in order to facilitate this has been inactive since 
2012.164 According to the Minister of Open Government, the portal will be 
redesigned in the (unspecified) near future.165 All these initiatives aim to inculcate a 
pro-active citizen who gets involved in local governance and makes intelligent and 
informed choices about their consumption of welfare. Since the mechanisms of 
electronic government are still being rolled out, it is difficult to assess how far they 
contribute to greater transparency and reduced corruption in government and 
whether they simplify the access to state welfare to citizens and encourage them to 
participate in the monitoring and evaluation of public services. 
To conclude the discussion of post-Soviet participatory mechanisms, I have 
shown that as the state bureaucracy shifts away from the Soviet model to 
incorporate logics of streamlining, out-sourcing and consumerism, new modes of 
participation in governance have sprung up. As the public sector downsizes, citizens 
have been incorporated at each stage of the welfare process: policy formation, 
service delivery and service consumption. These new avenues are useful for the 
Russian state for three reasons. First, in a social environment in which increasing 
numbers of specialists now work for private or third-sector organisations instead of 
for the state, government departments no longer always have the expertise to 
develop effective responses to pressing social problems. Second, in an age of 
financial crisis and austerity, the involvement of third-sector organisations and 
citizen volunteers is more cost-efficient than the expensive, unwieldy and 
unresponsive government departments. Third, participatory mechanisms are even 
more important when, on the one hand, other channels of input, such as local 
elections, are being closed down and, on the other, local and regional governments 
have greater responsibility for making welfare decisions. In sum, the expansion of 
these mechanisms indicates an authoritarian response to the challenges of 
neoliberal public sector reform: they allow the state to harness the energy and 
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expertise of citizens and receive feedback on policies while ensuring that the power 
vertical remains unchallenged. The concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ has been 
employed by the authorities to refer to the activities of civic participation in 
governance in an apolitical fashion. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that although there are important similarities 
between the state-driven mechanisms of civic participation in governance discussed 
in this thesis, insofar as they have all allowed a limited level of pluralism in public 
policy-making, contemporary mechanisms are a new phenomenon because they 
have arisen from the marketization of the public sector. The triple processes of 
outsourcing, decentralisation and privatisation have required citizens not only to 
monitor state activity, but also actively to participate in the fulfilment of public policy, 
since the state no longer considers itself the sole actor in this field. In this 
conclusion, I review the points of convergence and divergence between the 
zemstvos, Soviet-era mechanisms and post-Soviet bodies and summarise the 
importance of the concept obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as key to understanding 
Kremlin’s vision for civic participation in governance. 
 To begin with the differences between the  three types of mechanisms of 
civic participation, it was the zemstvos that offered the fullest opportunities for 
participation, since they had powers of taxation and could formulate local welfare 
policy with a relatively free hand. Their powers thus extended far beyond the covert 
influencing of Soviet-era channels and the advisory nature of today’s PCBs. While 
the participatory mechanisms of the Soviet period were heterogeneous – 
comprising the soviets, monitory bodies, trade unions and interest groups – unlike 
the zemstvos and the PCB network, they were required to conform to a strict 
Communist ideology. In both cases, these mechanisms were closely associated 
with the particular regime type in which they were created: the absolutist regime 
could afford citizens a relatively free hand in local governance since it was perceived 
as impossible that such activities could affect the authority of the Tsar; in the Soviet 
Union everyone was expected to help build Communism and opportunities 
proliferated to help them do so.  
The mechanisms of contemporary Russia, while inspired by elements drawn 
from both eras – the zemstvos’ focus on local governance and the Soviet mixture of 
assistance and oversight – are beginning to emerge as an institutionally unique, 
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coherent organisational network that aims to build a consensus between local 
authorities and citizens on public policy and service provision. The discussion in the 
second half of the chapter has shown that this network has been created as part of 
reforms of the Soviet era administrative system along market principles. However, 
its emergence also accompanied the reform of the electoral system, in which public 
participation has decreased, and the reshaping of the environment for NGOs, in 
which welfare-providing groups are given priority. The PCB network is thus a 
product of a regime characterised by the twin processes of marketization and 
growing authoritarianism. In other words, while each Russian governing system was 
characterised by varying shades of authoritarianism, the participatory structures of 
the present era are unique in needing to respond to the authoritarian market state.166 
Thus, while historical contextualisation is important since it allows one to appreciate 
the longer-term trends in institution-building, a historical analysis alone cannot 
account for PCBs. 
However, the chapter has also shown that the autocratic Russian state has 
been designing novel institutions for increasing civic participation in policy formation 
and delivery since the mid-Nineteenth Century. In all three regimes, institutions were 
created because the state considered itself unable to create policy and provide 
welfare without the input of citizens.  I have argued that in the case of the zemstvos 
and the Soviet era bodies, these institutions introduced a limited pluralism into the 
policy-making process, but that this pluralism was not channelled through 
representative democratic structures, such as elections. In the following chapter, I 
argue that limited pluralism is central to understanding the nature of political power 
in authoritarian regimes; chapters Five and Six demonstrate that PCBs continue in 
this tradition. In this light, PCBs represent the continuation of a governance regime 
that extends back 150 years to foundation of the zemstvos insofar as all three 
participatory networks allowed the state to receive input from citizens without 
challenging state power. 
This chapter has also demonstrated the centrality of the concept of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ to practices of governance as conceived by the Kremlin, a 
term I explore in Chapter Four. I have argued that the practices relating to this 
concept combine monitoring of and assistance to the authorities and are enacted 
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chiefly (though not exclusively) through the PCB network. Such practices respond 
to the governing style of the contemporary authoritarian-capitalist regime, by 
allowing the state to harness civic knowledge and resources as the state 
bureaucracy downsizes without challenging political power. I argue that the 
development of institutions that inculcate these practices constitutes a trend 
towards ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance.’ The following chapter explores the 
parameters of this concept, which I have developed in order to conceptualise the 
mechanisms of civic participation governance instituted by an authoritarian regime 
in conditions of global neoliberal capitalism. 
Finally, the chapter has also shown that in both Tsarist and Soviet Russia, 
the expansion of mechanisms for civic participation inside the authoritarian regimes 
began the gradual process of consolidating an independent and sometimes critical 
political consciousness within those who took part. The development of this 
consciousness is considered to have played a major role in the downfall of both 
regimes. As the limited pluralism developed and consolidated inside each regime, 
the legitimacy of the dominant order was gradually undermined, eventually resulting 
in the regime’s demise. Since the PCB network of Putin’s Russia is at only the stage 
of consolidation, the question of whether it can inculcate a similar alternative political 
imaginary is beyond the scope of this thesis and remains to be seen.
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Chapter Two: 
Constructing Authoritarian Neoliberal Governance 
 
The study of the relationship between economic development and political 
regime has a long history. Since the 1950s, modernisation theorists have claimed 
that capitalist development increases chances for democracy (defined as free and 
fair elections, an independent judiciary and free media).1 Yet, when applied to the 
case of Russia, this theory runs into difficulties. From Putin’s rise to power in 2000 
to the 2008 financial crash, Russia’s GDP grew by approximately 7% a year,2 while 
average incomes have doubled over the course of his presidency3 and most 
citizens' living standards had, by the mid-2000s, surpassed that of the Soviet era.4  
According to modernisation theory, Russia should have been concomitantly 
consolidating institutions of representative democracy but, as I have discussed in 
the previous chapter, this has not been occurring.5 Like modernization theory, the 
present chapter starts from the assumption that economic and political regimes 
clearly influence one another; however, it argues that the relationship between them 
is more complex than a simple causal link between capitalist growth and liberal 
democracy. Instead, it claims that as governments increasingly rely on the private 
and non-profit sectors for the provision of previously state-run services, new 
participatory mechanisms for citizens are needed, since the state is no longer the 
main source of expertise in vital public policy fields. In other words, non-electoral 
consultative and participatory mechanisms proliferate as public sectors are 
marketized. 
The previous chapter has shown that in the last ten years, as the Soviet state 
bureaucracy has gradually been reformed, many new participatory mechanisms 
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2 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, pp. 285. 
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have been introduced by the Kremlin. Why have these mechanisms received such 
little scholarly attention in the case of Russia? And why have studies that do mention 
them, mostly derided them as ‘undemocratic’? I argue in this chapter that there has 
been a fixation on questions of democratisation and elections in Western scholarly 
literature on Russia, defined with the institutions of liberal democracy as a normative 
ideal. As a result, new modes of participation in political decision-making and 
governance that depart from this model have either been missed or dismissed. With 
the goal of understanding the substantive institutional architecture through which 
authoritarian rule is sustained in Russia, this thesis explores the conditions of 
emergence of such bodies and examines the kind of practices they inculcate in their 
members. It argues that they are a product of both the marketization of the Soviet-
era public sector and the diminishing opportunity for the state to receive feedback 
from the public through existing mechanisms, such as elections, and demonstrates 
that they cannot be dismissed merely as Potemkin villages or ‘decorative’ bodies as 
they can and do influence state policy. Therefore, instead of using theories of 
democratization – which would simply disregard these mechanisms as anti-
constitutional aberrations – I use the notion of ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’ 
in order to capture the way in which the authorities are attempting to open up the 
burgeoning Soviet state to a limited plurality of voices.  
 In this chapter, I construct the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberal 
governance’ through a discussion of its component parts, which I separate into three 
eponymous sections. I begin with an analysis of the neoliberal conception of the 
state which, despite a proclaimed normative commitment to a ‘small state’, has 
resulted in the growth of state-run bureaucratic structures that guarantee market 
conditions across many areas of public policy formation and delivery. The steering 
of these structures, together with third party providers and citizens themselves, has 
been captured by the concept of ‘governance’, which I discuss in the second 
section. Focussing on the role of citizens in governance, I show that the growth of 
mechanisms enabling their participation in decision-making processes has risen in 
countries around the world; however, most studies have interpreted them using 
various aspects of democratic theory. I argue that, in order to conceptualise the rise 
of such bodies in non-democratic regimes such as contemporary Russia, the 
concept of neoliberal governance must be qualified by the term ‘authoritarian’, which 
indicates the state-controlled and selective fashion in which they operate. Thus, in 
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the final section I give an account of authoritarianism drawn from Juan Linz’s 
pioneering work and argue that the feature of ‘limited pluralism’, central to 
authoritarian regimes, captures the state-managed nature of Russia’s PCBs. The 
chapter aims to demonstrate that the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberal 
governance’ is useful for understanding how global norms relating to the opening 
up of the state to include non-state voices in the process of policy formation have 
been adapted by authoritarian states to produce institutions which simultaneously 
enable and constrain civic participation in governance. 
 
Neoliberalizing the State 
 
 The concept of neoliberalism is divisive and hard to define, being used to 
refer to a panoply of – at times contrasting – practices around the world. Emerging 
during the interwar years in the Universities of Vienna and Cambridge as a political 
‘imaginary’6 promoting a radical form of individualism in response to the perceived 
collectivism behind the rise of Socialism, Fascism and social democracy across 
Europe,7 it was rolled out as policy in the Anglophone world in the 1970s and 1980s 
most notably by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who saw the roots of the 
1973-75 recession in the welfare state and in Keynesian economics.8 Today, the 
word is eschewed by policy-makers and politicians who seek to distance 
themselves from its negative connotations but is used in abundance in critical social 
science.9 Neoliberal policy has acquired a vast army of critics around the world who 
perceive it as the cause of numerous contemporary social and political ills, from 
environmental degradation and economic inequality to erosions in civil liberties and 
the takeover of democratic institutions by corporate lobbying.10 This section defines 
and delimits the area of neoliberal policy that is the focus of this thesis – the 
restructuring of the state bureaucracy to include market principles. It argues that 
practices of neoliberal restructuring manifest themselves differently in different 
                                                          
6 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 13. 
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geographical contexts and, in order to understand them, it is necessary to focus on 
the legitimating discourse of the state implementing them. 
While the concept of neoliberalism has its foundations in the sphere of 
economics, its application has far-reaching ramifications for social and political 
organisation. As I discuss in more detail below, it is in studying its application in 
various contexts that can provide the most insight into its meaning. Nonetheless, 
the concept can be considered from three interlinked perspectives: ideological, 
economic and state-oriented (or political).11 The ideological perspective has been 
characterised by David Harvey as a conviction that the free hand of the market is 
the best mechanism through which to resolve all social problems and consequently 
that state functions should be scaled back to allow markets to form in their place.12 
He has argued that, given its propensity to redistribute wealth from the poor to the 
privileged, neoliberalism is in fact a conscious project to restore class elites (in the 
case of Britain and the US) or to create conditions for the (re-) emergence of class 
(in Russia, China, India and elsewhere).13  
The economic aspect refers to a set of policies that duly seek to embed 
financial principles into areas formerly outside the market. These principles have 
been summarised by Birch and Mykhnenko into five points:  
 
privatization of state-run assets (firms, council housing et cetera); 
liberalization of trade in goods and capital investment; monetarist 
focus on inflation control and supply-side dynamics; deregulation 
of labour and product markets to reduce ‘impediments’ to 
business; and, the marketization of society through public–private 
partnerships and other forms of commodification.14  
 
The requirement to adopt these policies has been attached as a condition to loans 
by global financial institutions to post-colonial, authoritarian and post-socialist 
                                                          
11 K. Birch and V. Mykhnenko, 'Introduction' in K. Birch and V. Mykhnenko, (eds.), The Rise and 
Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order? (London: Z Books, 2010), pp. 2. 
12 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 20; see 
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of Global Trade and Development, (March, 2007).  
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countries and have been implemented with varying degrees of ‘success’ (with Chile, 
Singapore and Poland considered model examples). As such, studies have 
proliferated of the uptake and permutations of these principles in different 
geographical contexts around the world.15 
The political dimension of neoliberalism is the starting point of this thesis and 
highlights the roles of the state as facilitator of domestic conditions amenable to the 
above-mentioned economic principles16 and guarantor of the negative freedoms of 
the individual.17 Such a role implies a transformation of the state’s welfare-providing 
institutions from ones that provide goods and services directly to citizens to ones 
that tender contracts between government agencies and third party service-
providers (be they private companies or not-for-profit NGOs) and oversee their 
delivery. It thus implies a significant reconceptualization of the role of the welfare 
state – that is, the domestic framework of social provision to citizens – from one 
based on the idea that welfare is a public good to one that considers it a private 
responsibility. Characterising the difference between a ‘traditional’ or social 
democratic welfare state and a neoliberal welfare state, Raymond Plant sets out 
two ideal types, stating that ‘in a [traditional] welfare state… the state seeks to 
secure to individuals access to or possession of certain sorts of real resources such 
as health, education, the services of social workers, etc.’18 By contrast, the 
neoliberal welfare state, 
 
Is not inspired by social justice; it is limited in scope; it is not 
designed to change relative positions of individuals and groups 
within society; it embodies a view of negative liberty; it is 
compatible only with a set of negative rights; it does not seek the 
achievement of specific ends such as social justice or social 
solidarity…; it operates with a modest level of bureaucracy; and it 
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is not involved in the direct provision of welfare itself but is limited 
to a funding and a commissioning role.19  
 
In other words, the neoliberal public sector is considered by its advocates both to 
be based on a set of less normative principles (i.e. an absence of destitution rather 
than the pursuit of social justice) and to be smaller, less bureaucratic and therefore 
more efficient. However, these two perceived advantages are frequently 
contradicted in practice, for the broader neoliberal agenda is founded on a belief in 
the superiority of markets in the distribution of social goods (as discussed above) 
and is therefore also highly normative and the substantial institutional framework 
required to produce the neoliberal welfare state contradicts the core stipulation of 
minimal bureaucracy. I now consider this second point in more detail. 
Numerous scholars have pointed out that ensuring the unfettered operation 
of the market requires the development of important state arbitration mechanisms 
and regulatory apparatus and activity.20 This indicates a tension at the heart of the 
neoliberal conception of the state: on the one hand, it claims that the state is 
inefficient, expensive and bureaucratic and, therefore, needs to be ‘rolled back’ to 
allow more flexible, efficient and innovative private companies or non-profits to fill 
the gap. On the other hand, the state’s role remains central in practice as it ‘rolls 
out’ its new functions as guarantor of market conditions, arbiter of partnerships 
between the public and private sectors, and funder of service-providing 
organisations. (Indeed, this has led some to suggest that an ‘authoritarian’ 
government in fact better guarantees market conditions since neoliberal policies of 
social austerity, outsourcing and flexible labour are inherently unpopular with 
electorates.21) Jamie Peck argues that ‘roll back’ is manifested in policies of ‘funding 
cuts, organizational down-sizing, market testing and privatization’ and occurs prior 
to the ‘roll out’ phase which consists of measures that then attempt to control or 
                                                          
19 Plant, The Neo-Liberal State, pp. 250. 
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mitigate the effects of ‘roll back’.22  He highlights the dynamic between policies of 
‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ by listing various examples that are useful to quote in full:  
 
Privatization of public utilities, like water and communications, 
leading to a need to extend regulatory oversight, in the face of 
system failures, private monopoly abuses, and legitimacy 
problems; social service cutbacks in fields such as public housing 
and subsidized food being partially backfilled through new non-
entitlement services, delivered by non-profit or private providers; 
overreach in trade liberalization or financial deregulation, in cases 
of marked economic dislocation or market failure, being followed 
by exceptions-to-the-rule “deals” and regulatory “corrections”.23 
 
Thus, while the predilection for a small state exists very much in ideological 
justifications for advancing neoliberal agendas, the successful implementation of 
neoliberal economic principles requires a substantially altered, but certainly not 
smaller, state apparatus.  
Innovative institutional mechanisms that respond to the consequences of roll 
back have been developed by the governments of countries requiring loans after 
economists in global financial institutions imposed a neoliberal conditionality 
requiring the privatisation and deregulation of their public sectors.24 Such 
mechanisms are produced from pre-existing legal frameworks and political regimes, 
which themselves are deeply culturally specific. Thus, the structure of neoliberal 
state bureaucracy varies substantially in different socio-political contexts and 
produces a large diversity of practices associated with neoliberalism. This means 
that neoliberalism cannot be seen as a single, unified, hegemonic system, but rather 
as a fluid and mutating assemblage of norms, values and policies, which manifests 
itself differently in different cultural and political settings.25  For instance, the 
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Thatcherism of 1980s Britain varies dramatically from contemporary China’s 
articulation of neoliberal principles, though both can be said to combine market logic 
with a strong state.26  
With this in mind, numerous scholars have proposed a revision and 
refinement of the way in which neoliberalism is studied. Peck has argued for an 
understanding of neoliberalisation as process rather than neoliberalism as fixed and 
universalizable doctrine, claiming that ‘concretely grounded accounts of the 
process’ provide greater indication of what neoliberalisation means to diverse 
polities.27  Birch and Mykhnenko have argued for the differentiation between 
‘neoliberal (as ideology), neoliberalism (as state strategy) and neoliberalisation (as 
process).’28 They claim that a global neoliberal ideology committed to an expansion 
of the free market has been reproduced as state strategy in various countries to 
different extents and for different reasons, producing ‘national varieties of 
neoliberalisms.’29 Aihwa Ong has highlighted the ways in which neoliberalism as 
‘techniques of governing’ can be ‘decontextualised’ from its point of origin and 
‘recontextualised’ in networks of unpredictable relationships.30 Numerous others 
have employed the term ‘glocalization’ to refer to the dialectically related processes 
of diversification and homogenization of social practices in specific locales that 
result from the restructuring of financial strategies, governance levels or cultural 
norms both upwards from the national to the supra-national and downwards to the 
local or even individual levels.31 Taken together, this body of research strongly 
suggests that national-level articulations of neoliberal policies are unlikely to be 
straightforward reproductions of those advanced by international financial 
institutions and other transnational bodies. Instead, studies must focus on how 
neoliberal policies are operationalised in local settings. In this vein, Bob Jessop has 
argued,  
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Although neoliberal projects are being pursued on many different 
and often tangled scales, it is in cities and city-regions that the 
various contradictions and tensions of “actually existing 
neoliberalism”… are expressed most saliently in everyday life.32 
 
In Chapters Five and Six, I explore the practices of PCBs as manifestations of 
authoritarian neoliberal governance in three Russian cities. 
In order to understand domestic processes of neoliberalisation and to 
account for the vast cross-country variations in the practices associated with it, the 
task becomes to uncover the factors that condition and shape the ways in which 
these processes are manifested at the domestic level and the extents to which they 
are incorporated, challenged or modulated by local actors. Birch and Mykhnenko 
argue that since neoliberalisation is a state-driven project, individual state strategy 
(understood as a government-designed programme for national development) and 
the motivation and rationale behind it is key to understanding regional variations.  
Their work shows how neoliberal policies are packaged by states in attractive or 
euphemistic legitimating discourses, which tailor policies to their specific socio-
political contexts or cultural narratives. They have examined how the concepts of a 
‘knowledge-based economy’ in Western Europe and ‘de-industrialisation’ in East-
Central Europe have been used to promote the same neoliberal ideas of institutional 
restructuring and flexible labour markets across states with very different domestic 
settings, and producing different outcomes.33 Following their lead, I therefore 
consider Russian processes of neoliberalisation as hybridized reproductions of 
global neoliberal policies rearticulated through the country’s particular state strategy 
and discourses. This thesis considers PCBs as a neoliberal roll out mechanism that 
aims to mitigate the loss of expertise by the state as its monopoly on service 
provision has been rolled back. The following chapter shows how the contemporary 
Russian state-driven discourse of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, which combines 
familiar Soviet-era language with the new language of international 
competitiveness, have been employed to legitimise the emergence. I now consider 
how the neoliberal restructuring of the state necessitates the creation of 
mechanisms that enable civic participation in governance. 
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From Government to Governance? 
 
 Like ‘neoliberalism’, ‘governance’ is a highly contested concept and has been 
criticized as vague and apolitical.34 It can be used both to highlight the new ways in 
which the state asserts and retains control in an increasingly decentralised, post-
Fordist environment35 and to indicate the ways in which communities collectively 
self-organise to resolve common problems outside of the state.36 Further, it is used 
to capture a diverse array of institutional practices at the local, national, regional 
and global levels and thus is often qualified with an adjective to indicate a particular 
level or sphere. For instance, domestic models of public sector management 
advocated by international institutions are known as ‘good governance’; the 
management norms adhered to by big business are referred to as ‘corporate 
governance’; international co-operative problem-solving arrangements are 
conceived as ‘global governance’; and the networks through which domestic public 
policy is formulated and delivered are known as ‘public governance’.37 In this thesis, 
I am concerned with the last of these: this chapter aims to present a model of 
‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’, a form of public governance that responds to 
the neoliberalization of the public sector in authoritarian regimes. This section claims 
that an important feature of the move towards public governance in a neoliberal era 
is the creation of mechanisms that include citizens in policy-making processes and 
argues for a framework that conceptualises this development in non-democratic 
countries. 
R.A.W. Rhodes, one of the key voices in the field, has stated that 
‘governance’ refers to 'the changing boundaries between public, private and 
voluntary sectors, and to the changing role of the state.'38 He applies this 
conceptualisation to governance of the public sector, elaborating four principles that 
define this sphere: first, interdependence between organisations, including state 
and non-state actors, that formulate and deliver policy; second, on-going 
interactions among these networks due to the need to share information and 
resources; third, these interactions are ‘game-like’, since they are based on shared 
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rules; and, fourth, the networks are self-organising and not accountable to the state, 
although they can be indirectly steered by the state.39 The concept of public 
governance thus begins with the assumption that the three administrative trends of, 
first, the devolution of service provision to lower levels of government, second, the 
privatisation, deregulation and outsourcing of public goods and services and, third, 
the formation of state-non-state partnerships, have reduced the state’s monopoly 
on the necessary information to make and deliver public policy. Policy networks and 
other ‘innovations in governing’ have been developed in order to collate the 
information and expertise required for policy decisions that is now distributed among 
third sector organisations and private companies.40 Governance, then, highlights 
new methods of rule that comprise more horizontal networks of diverse 
organisations, thereby eroding more traditional, hierarchical forms of political power. 
It implies increased levels of pluralism and civic participation in decision-making 
processes and service provision.41 To refer to the discussion in the previous section, 
it captures the mechanisms and processes through which the policies of ‘roll out’ 
are developed, executed and managed collaboratively.  
Ideas about public governance have evolved substantially over the past thirty 
years. The concept was introduced into discussions about public sector reform 
during the 1980s as market mechanisms were incorporated into the state 
bureaucracy in some Western countries.42 A particular strategy called New Public 
Management (NPM) was utilised to steer the transformation of the state 
bureaucracy away from the so-called progressive public administration (PPA) of the 
mid-20th Century, a governing strategy that had been characterised by a statist and 
bureaucratic method of welfare delivery (and whose most extreme form was the 
Soviet welfare state).43 By contrast, NPM was based on the assumption that the 
introduction of principles drawn from the private sector would make the public sector 
more efficient. These principles included decentralisation, outsourcing, competition 
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among government agencies, the appointment of high-profile executive managers 
to head government departments and the reconceptualization of the citizen as a 
consumer of welfare services.44 Areas that were formerly seen as the preserve of 
government, such as health and social care, education and public order, were now 
considered broader social problems to be dealt with by a variety of actors, including 
both state and non-state institutions (recall, for instance, the diversity of 
stakeholders mentioned in Russia’s Federal Law ‘On the Police’ discussed on page 
66). In other words, NPM attempted the neoliberalisation of the public sector.45 
Although NPM is seen as a broadly global trend, it has been noted that different 
countries ‘have different starting points, are at different stages of reform and face 
different internal and external constraints.’46 The post-Soviet administrative reforms 
discussed in the previous chapter can be considered as a Russian articulation of 
the broader international trend towards NPM.47 
More recently, scholars have argued that the movement towards NPM is now 
either over or in decline in the countries that lead the trends in global public 
administration reform. On this view, NPM was merely a transitional phase towards 
other forms of public policy implementation that seek to overcome the fragmentation 
in policy formation and delivery wrought by policies of NPM. These new forms have 
been characterised as a ‘whole-of-government’48 approach, ‘digital-era 
governance’49 and ‘New Public Governance’.50 While each focuses on slightly 
different aspects of post-NPM governance, the overall aim is to transcend the 
‘administration versus management’ dichotomy, evidenced in the debate between 
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defenders of PPA and those of NPM and to adopt a more holistic approach to 
governance while maintaining a market logic.51 In other words, it attempts to rectify 
perceived shortcomings of NPM without challenging its neoliberal basis. 
Governance is an important concept in both approaches to public administration: in 
NPM, it refers to the creation of networks of increasing numbers of actors involved 
in policy making and delivery; in the post-NMP conceptions it refers to the reform of 
the governance networks created under NMP. In short, it is virtually impossible to 
consider public administration in the neoliberal era without considering governance 
networks. 
Several scholars have already examined practices of governance in various 
countries through the lens of neoliberalism, though to date these studies have 
focussed on liberal democracies. For instance, in his cross-national study, Mike 
Geddes has delineated three tendencies in the shift from government to governance 
that appear in northern, eastern and southern European countries as well as the 
US, UK, Australia and New Zealand, arguing that a ‘cross-national convergence’ in 
governance practices is taking place.52 These tendencies are, first, the declining 
role of the public sector, both in service provision and in local politics; second, a shift 
from the role of the state in the redistribution of wealth across society to a greater 
emphasis on individual entrepreneurship and responsibility and; third, an increase 
in partnerships between local government and private or voluntary sector 
organisations as sites for government decision-making. He argues that 
‘neoliberalism is the essential context in which to understand the shift towards local 
governance.’53 Similarly, Bas Denters and Lawrence Rose have noted in their study 
of local governance trends in 15 established democracies that a shift from local 
government towards local governance is an ‘international phenomenon’54 which can 
be characterised along three broad lines: first, the growth of public-private 
partnerships; second, the inclusion of non-state actors (business and non-profit) in 
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policy processes; third, the proliferation of new modes of civic engagement, 
although specifics in these instances vary widely across the case studies.55  
Important for the present work is the tendency towards increased 
involvement of citizens in decision-making processes. As indicated by these two 
studies, the shift from government to governance also implies a change in the 
relationship between citizens and the authorities, producing greater levels of 
participation by the former in policy-making and service provision.56 Two primary 
factors have led to this change. First, since citizens are now considered 
‘consumers’, rather than mere recipients, of goods and services, they must be able 
to make rational and informed choices about their needs.57 This requires an 
education or socialisation into the various welfare options on the part of citizens and, 
as citizens become more knowledgeable of their welfare needs, this knowledge has 
to be accessed by policy-makers to ensure welfare options are developed that meet 
those needs. Second, given that the government is no longer the primary source of 
expertise in service delivery – as private companies and/or voluntary sector 
organisations now operate primarily on the front line – the inclusion of citizens and 
non-state service providers in the policy process has become necessary in order to 
fill the inevitable knowledge gap. Taking these factors together, John Pierre and B. 
Guy Peters have argued that, 
 
If they are to be successful in governing, democracies will have to 
devise means of accommodating more continuous forms of 
participation, while still being able to supply the needed direction 
to society.58  
 
And, indeed, new fora have proliferated through which non-state ‘experts’ can 
provide input into areas once the preserve of government in areas which affect 
them, creating new forms of civic engagement.59  
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There have been various attempts to characterise this shift in the nature of 
public participation in recent years. John Keane has labelled the many new ways in 
which citizens can engage in governance as 'monitory democracy', that is, the 
extension of mechanisms of public accountability, scrutiny and contestation to 
increasingly diverse spheres of social life, running parallel to the conventional, 
constitutional democratic institutions such as political parties, elections and 
parliament. According to Keane, after 1945, democracy grew to become globally 
accepted as the standard form of the domestic organisation of political power, but 
its adoption in different cultural contexts facilitated the proliferation of many different 
understandings of what democracy should entail and, thus, many different 
institutions claiming to promote democratic norms.60 In what could be easily applied 
to the Russian case, he writes, ‘In the name of “people”, “the public”, “public 
accountability”, “the people” or “citizens”... power-monitoring institutions spring up 
all over the place.'61 For Keane, the reason for this lies with increasing public 
concern with matters formerly thought to be non-political (such as energy or 
environmental concerns), as well as the rise in communications media, networked 
governance (the delegation of decision-making across numerous, potentially 
conflicting, institutions). Monitory institutions, which range from municipal-level 
forums such as citizens' assemblies and focus groups to global initiatives such as 
online petitions, think tanks and conferences, have three factors in common: first, 
they aim to provide citizens with a 'diversity of viewpoints'62 regarding the exercise 
of power in particular institutions; second, they promote 'public definition, public 
scrutiny and public enforcement of standards and rule'63 in the prevention of 
corruption; third, they give citizens greater opportunities to voice their concerns on 
issues that affect their daily lives.  
 A second attempt to characterise the changing nature of political participation 
has been made by Frank Vibert. He has explored the expansion of 'bodies in society 
that exercise official authority but are not headed by elected politicians and have 
been deliberately set apart, or only loosely tied to the more familiar elected 
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institutions of democracy.'64 Such bodies range from service providers and risk 
assessors to auditors and whistle-blowers, each with the capacity significantly to 
affect decision-making processes.65 Citing globalisation as a general background 
factor in the proliferation of unelected bodies by opening up government to an 
increasing number of external influences, Vibert details three lenses through which 
to view this phenomenon. First, NPM has meant that government has come to be 
seen as a service in itself and thus requires various mediatory institutions in order 
to regulate the delivery of its services. Second, a distinction has formed between 
the development and management of policy and its delivery, the former to be 
performed by government departments and the latter to be delegated to specialised 
third parties. However, his preferred explanation is that the development of these 
bodies signals a 'new separation of powers' consisting of 'a division between the 
empirical judgements underlying a policy and the political judgements.'66 Thus, he 
sees unelected bodies as an intrinsic part of governance, one that can be reconciled 
with democratic theory since informed and critical citizens, mistrustful of 
government information sources, can turn instead to experts 'untainted by the 
machinery of government'.67 
Both of these approaches contain useful insights for the Russian case, 
although their ultimate reliance on aspects of democratic theory led me to search 
elsewhere for an explanatory framework.  In the case of Keane, his characterisation 
of citizen participation as a ‘wholly new era of grass-roots democracy, arriving after 
1945 as the era of representative democracy drew to a close’ certainly chimes with 
Vladimir Putin’s call for a new kind of Russian democracy (narodovlastiye), 
discussed in the following chapter.68 However, I considered his framework 
inappropriate to characterise the type of citizen participation wrought by Russia’s 
PCBs for two reasons. First, he does not include public sector reform as an 
explanatory factor, which, as I have shown in Chapter One, is a central driver for 
the development of PCBs. Second, Keane’s theory explains the desire of citizens 
to participate in local politics, not the desire of the state to harness civic agency, the 
subject of the present thesis.  
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Vibert, by contrast, cited the marketization of the public sector as a background 
factor in the proliferation of participatory mechanisms developing adjacent, and only 
partially accountable, to the state. For him, such bodies comprise a fourth column 
in the separation of powers necessary to hold increasingly complex systems of 
government to account.I show in Chapters Five and Six that many respondents 
envisage this kind of system for PCBs; however, the current reality is that PCBs do 
not hold government accountable for their decisions, since authorities retain 
substantial control over both the membership and the agenda. Rather, they 
occasionally enable citizens to participate in decision-making. They are thus 
considerably less useful for representative democracy than the bodies that are the 
subject of Vibert’s study.  Finally, and most importantly, in my view, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Russia is not ‘democratising’ and to explain PCBs with 
reference to democratic theory  presumes a development trajectory that is simply 
not occurring in practice. , Furthermore, as I show in the following chapter, increased 
civic participation in governance is not legitimated by a discourse of democracy and 
to represent it as such would be to misunderstand its intended functions. Instead it 
is presented in economic terms as a means to increase the country’s international 
competitiveness in the global market. Therefore, a framework that does not rely on 
democratic theory is needed to interpret state-driven mechanisms of civic 
participation in regimes that do not legitimate their policy decisions with reference 
to democracy.  
So far in this chapter I have argued that the marketization of the state 
bureaucracy is a broad, global phenomenon and that the creation of participatory 
mechanisms is a central feature thereof. However, I have also argued that this 
process is enacted differently and for different reasons in different political and 
cultural contexts. In the case of Russia, the government has used a legitimating 
narrative of patriotism and economic competitiveness (discussed in the following 
chapter) in creating participatory mechanisms, and has imposed certain limits to this 
participation in terms of the role that such institutions are intended to play in Russian 
politics and the kinds of groups and individuals who may participate. Therefore, the 
governance framework alone is not enough to capture the distinct nature of citizen 
involvement in governance offered by PCBs in Russia’s non-democratic regime. 
Something more is needed to account for the ways in which governance 
mechanisms are controlled and constrained in non-democratic polities. Therefore, I 
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have chosen to qualify it with the ubiquitous but not unproblematic term, 
‘authoritarian’. This decision warrants some justification. 
 
Authoritarian Neoliberal Governance 
 
Like ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘governance’, the body of literature on non-
democratic regimes is huge and has been approached from many different 
theoretical perspectives. Paul Brooker has grouped them into three categories 
relating to questions of ‘who rules?’, ‘how do they rule?’ and ‘why do they rule?’.69 
The first of these is seen to be the ‘traditional regime-defining question’ and includes 
analyses of the types of institutions or individuals operating at the seat of power, 
such as military regimes, one-party states and monarchical or personal rule.70 The 
second pertains to analyses of the level and methods of control attained by various 
regimes, as well as their specific policies, while the third category – the ‘why’ 
question – includes analyses of the ways in which rulers make claims to legitimacy, 
such as ideologies and the use of elections.71 Here I focus on the second question, 
and draw upon the regime classificatory system in order to answer it. This system 
attempts to characterise political regimes around the world for comparative analysis, 
based on the core concepts of democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism (a 
concept considered by some to have lost analytical purchase72) and modifications 
thereof. On this system, Russia has most frequently been termed not authoritarian, 
but a hybrid regime. In what follows below, I examine three strands of work on 
hybridity and argue that my use of ‘authoritarian’ is compatible with those 
approaches that view hybridity as a product of the interactions between two distinct 
‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ systems operating simultaneously inside a single 
regime. I thus interrogate the nature of Russia’s authoritarian system through an 
elaboration of Juan Linz’s presentation of authoritarianism as limited pluralism. This 
conception, I argue, captures how civic participation in governance is channelled 
and regulated by the state. 
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There are three main strands to work on hybridity. First, there are those who 
view it in residual terms as existing somewhere along a continuum between 
democracy and authoritarianism, where the latter is defined as an absence of the 
former. Second, there are those who view it as a corruption of democratic institutions 
and practices. Third, there are those who view hybridity as a sui generis category, 
produced through ongoing interactions between democratic and authoritarian 
tendencies within a regime, each of which have their own functional logics and 
institutions. Scholars in the first category aim to measure the extent to which 
democratic institutions are present and functional; those in the second category 
focus on elections as key sites in which authoritarian strategies are played out; while 
those in the third category analyse the practices, institutions and policies produced 
by the interactions between the opposing forces.  
Most of the works in the first category initially shared the assumption that, 
after the Soviet regime collapsed, Russia was transitioning towards democracy. 
However, by the mid-2000s, as consensus was reached that this is not in fact the 
case, studies of this type have concluded that it now lies part way between 
democracy and authoritarianism and can thus be termed a ‘hybrid’ regime.73 For 
instance, Thomas Carothers has described such regimes as being located in a 
‘political grey zone,’74 while Marina Ottaway describes hybridity as a regime type 
which ‘occupies the space between authoritarianism at one end and consolidated 
democracy at the other.’75 These authors thus conceptualise hybridity as the mid-
point between democracy and authoritarianism, where the latter is defined as an 
absence of the institutions of the former. Hybrid regimes on this view have the 
potential to either slip ‘up’ the scale towards democracy, or ‘down’ towards 
authoritarianism at any given moment. The concept of hybridity thereby functions 
as a sort of ‘holding category’, that is, another stage through which regimes must 
pass on their way towards the democratic ‘end point’ on the classificatory scale. The 
most obvious operationalization of this scale is employed by the US NGO Freedom 
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House, which grades regimes out of seven according to their commitment to the 
protection of political and civil rights. In the main, Western countries and their allies 
score highest and non-Western countries score lowest and, between the ‘free’ 
countries of the democratic West and the ‘not free’ countries of the authoritarian 
East, lies the nebulous category of ‘partly free’, synonymous, of course, with 
hybridity.76  (This was the spot occupied by Russia until it was controversially down-
graded to ‘not free’ in 2004.)  Underlying the Freedom House system is the 
assumption of a continuum, based on the presence, partial presence or absence of 
liberal democratic institutions. At the root of the continuum is a commitment the 
Western trajectory of socio-political development, the values on which it is based 
and its concomitant normative status as a universalisable ideal.77 
While this approach provides a useful way in which to classify regimes 
according to their take-up of Western democratic praxes, there are three reasons 
why I find it unsuitable for the Russian case. . First, it has clear normative and 
teleological implications: liberal democracy is posited as the ideal end-point to be 
arrived at sooner or later. Therefore, despite claims to have abandoned the 
transitology paradigm, the core implication is that Russia and others have stalled in 
their transitions, and now lie at some uncomfortable place between failed 
democracy and former authoritarianism.78 Thus, the teleology and historicist 
determinism that scholars scorned in the transitology literature remains, albeit in 
slightly more subtle form.79 Second, such studies tend to leave the concept of 
authoritarianism undefined, assuming that the reader understands it in residual 
terms as either a corruption or an absence of democratic institutions, rather than as 
an ensemble of innovative governing mechanisms that support and sustain non-
democratic rule. This restricts the analysis to the (mal)functioning of the institutions 
of democracy, rather than to an exploration of what other mechanisms of power 
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management might be operating. Third, the tendency to use the classificatory 
system on emergent regimes represents, to borrow a phrase from Giovanni Sartori, 
the trend to move away from questions of ‘what is’ towards questions of ‘how 
much’.80 However, it is impossible to answer questions of ‘how much’ before we 
understand ‘what is’. In short, while works in this category  represent a useful means 
to guage how far a regime may be considered democratic, but they tell us little about 
the substantive content of authoritarian or hybrid rule, the focus of the present 
thesis. 
The second category constitutes a mid-way point between the first and third 
categories: while it focusses on the institutional mechanisms of representative 
democracy, it nonetheless seeks to delineate authoritarian strategies of control and 
manipulation of those mechanisms. The key site for these analyses is elections; 
numerous subcategories have been posited that aim to capture the way in which 
democratic and authoritarian tendencies vie for influence over this process.81 For 
instance, Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way have delineated the concept of 
‘competitive authoritarianism’, as a particular type of hybrid regime where, rather 
than openly violating democratic rules (for example, by banning or repressing the 
opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-optation, 
and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant 
judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort 
cooperative behaviour from critics.82 In the context of the Middle East, Stephen 
Heydemann writes of ‘upgrading’ authoritarianism, that is, a ‘hybrid form of 
authoritarianism’ which  
 
Combines tried-and-true strategies of the past—coercion, 
surveillance, patronage, corruption, and personalism—with inno-
vations that reflect the determination of authoritarian elites to 
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respond aggressively to the triple threat of globalization, markets, 
and democratization.83  
 
These works give valuable insights into the ways in which regimes employ 
authoritarian strategies to co-opt representative democratic processes, and are 
certainly of much relevance to the analysis of the Russian electoral system. 
However, their application the case of PCBs is less useful, since, as discussed 
above, PCBs fall outside of the framework of institutional democracy. Chapter Three 
of the present thesis also shows that in the case of Russia, the discouse of 
globalization and markets has been enthusiastically embraced by Putin as a means 
for Russia to rise in the international system and, importantly, as a legitimating 
narrative for PCBs.  
Works in the third category are the most interesting for an understanding how 
non-democratic regimes operate because they attempt to take them on their own 
terms and explore the institutional complexes through which power is maintained. 
In order to do this, they tend to conceive of democracy and authoritarianism as two 
discrete concepts that have their own internal coherence, with the interaction 
between them producing hybridity. For instance, Richard Sakwa has defined 
Russia’s hybrid regime as a ‘dual system’, that is ‘characterised by two system 
logics… combining democratic and authoritarian features.’84 For him, the Russian 
political system should be seen as comprising two subsystems, a legitimate 
‘constitutional state’ and a patronal, arbitrary ‘administrative regime’, both of which 
‘are in a constant interaction, the essence of its hybridity.’85 The ‘administrative 
regime’ is the embodiment of authoritarian tendencies and is defined as a ‘network 
of social relations, in which political and economic power are entwined in a shifting 
landscape of factional politics, and also an actor in the political process.’86 He writes, 
‘the tragedy of Russian post-communism is that these two blocs have become 
locked into stalemate, preventing a radical move towards a more genuinely open 
and competitive political system and a de-bureaucratised economy.’87 Moving 
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further away from the framework of democracy, Jayasuriya and Rodan’s 2007 study 
of Southeast Asian political regimes focuses not on the institutional requisites of 
liberal democracy, but rather on varying ‘modes of participation’, defined as ‘the 
institutional structures and ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of 
individuals and groups in the political process’ that a particular regime enables.88 
Arguing that ‘hybrid regimes… should not be seen only as evidence of institutional 
dysfunction,’89 they uncover a variety of such fora that would not be picked up by 
analyses that begin with democratic institutions. They state, ‘rather than dismissing 
some modes of participation as mere artefacts of dysfunctional democratic 
institutions, we seek instead to explain the underlying political dynamics behind 
such participation.’90 Thus, their work constitutes an important contribution to an 
understanding of the ways that enable hybrid regimes to contain conflict and gather 
feedback that do not exist in democracies. Taken together, these two works 
demonstrate that hybrid regimes do not merely consist of an absence or a corruption 
of democratic institutions, but also of innovative governing mechanisms that depart 
from the democratic model. Such an approach to hybridity aims to deepen 
understandings of such mechanisms. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the third body of research. While not 
disputing that there are certain features of Russia’s political system that fall into the 
classificatory category of democracy, I focus on aspects of what Sakwa has termed 
its authoritarian ‘administrative regime.’ In other words, I do not seek to classify the 
Russian political system tout court; rather, I attempt to elaborate some of the 
structures that enable Russia’s authoritarian subsystem to sustain itself as the 
neoliberalisation of the public sector undermines the state’s monopoly on 
information. Like Jayasuriya and Rodan, I attempt to create a framework that takes 
these structures on their own terms, rather than perceiving authoritarianism simply 
as a lack or a corruption of democratic institutions. In order to do this, I follow Juan 
Linz’s conception of authoritarianism as ‘limited pluralism’, which refers to the 
mechanisms through which authoritarian regimes simultaneously allow certain 
groups to participate in public politics and constrain their participation. In this light, 
PCBs represent a means for the authorities to retain high levels of information in 
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light of the privatization of the public sector while allowing controlled and restricted 
participation by the public. I now elaborate his conception in detail. 
Juan Linz is perhaps the most important scholar of authoritarianism, whose 
pioneering work on Franco’s Spain brought the concept into mainstream political 
science usage. In this study, he defined authoritarian regimes as possessing four 
main qualities. These regimes are: 
 
Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, 
without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive 
mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, 
except at some points in their development, and in which a leader 
or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-
defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.91  
 
The first three categories were elaborated further in a later work in which he 
contrasted authoritarian with totalitarian systems, the boundary between which he 
claims is much more fluid than between democracies and non-democracies.92 For 
Linz, a political system is totalitarian when the following three factors are present: 
first, there is political monism, that is, a harmonistic, totalising design for state-
society relations that can be imposed from above; second, there is an exclusive and 
elaborated ideology that guides development; third, there are significant levels of 
citizen participation and mobilisation for social goals as defined by a single party.93 
Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany are considered the two main examples of such 
a regime. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, are not monistic but possess a form of 
limited pluralism, that is, there are certain non-state groups which are able to 
influence politics within the regime; they are not guided by ideologies, but instead 
display evidence of what Linz calls mentalities, that is, ‘ways of thinking and feeling, 
more emotional than rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to different 
situations’94; and instead of the high levels of mobilisation among the citizenry under 
totalitarianism, the public are disengaged from the political process since ‘effective 
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mobilisation, particularly through a single party and its mass organisations, would 
be perceived as a threat by the other components of the limited pluralism, 
particularly the army, the bureaucracy, the churches or interest groups.’95  
 For Linz, the most important of these factors in understanding the various 
types of authoritarian regime is that of limited pluralism: different regimes possess 
different institutional mechanisms for managing this pluralism and co-ordinating 
civic participation. The category of limited pluralism allows the scholar to take into 
account ‘which institutions and groups are allowed to participate and in what way 
and which ones are excluded.’96 He has delineated five subtypes of authoritarian 
regime ‘based fundamentally on the type of participants in the limited pluralism and 
on the way in which they are organised, as well as the level and type of 
participation.’97 These subtypes are: bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes; 
forms of institutionalisation of certain groups that Linz calls ‘organic statist’ (which is 
synonymous with a corporatist understanding of state-society relations); 
mobilisational-authoritarian regimes in post-democratic states; post-independence 
mobilisational authoritarian regimes; and post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes.98  
The most important category for my purposes here is the corporatist ‘organic 
statist’ regime. In such a regime, Linz writes,  
 
We find that a variety of social groups and institutions defined by 
the state are created and allowed to participate to one or another 
degree under the forms we shall call “organic statism” which is 
often ideologically defined as corporatism.99 
 
 Organic statist or corporatist regimes thus aim to institutionalise existing social 
pluralism in a controlled format, thereby allowing citizens access to certain 
mechanisms of participation but excluding them from others (which are typically 
reserved for the elite). Reasons that rulers may choose to implement this mode of 
political organisation consist, Linz claims, of a simultaneous rejection of both the 
typical liberal democratic and the class-based institutional ensembles, while at the 
                                                          
95 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 166. 
96 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 175. 
97 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 54. 
98 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 54. 
99 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 176. 
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same time needing to provide institutional channels for interest representation.100 It 
thus constitutes a third way of sorts between Western and state socialist modes of 
domestic political organisation101; this dual rejection of both ideologies has, 
according to Linz, led to a myriad of diverse ideological justifications for corporatist 
structures.102 However, the inevitable result of the use of such structures is that they 
become just one element of the domestic organisation of political power as elites 
themselves are rarely accountable to them. Despite this, they nonetheless 
represent a limit to the ‘monistic ambitions’ of the political elite who may otherwise 
attempt to move towards a more totalitarian system.103  
Overall, Linz’s insightful exposition of limited pluralism channelled through 
corporatist structures in authoritarian regimes evokes precisely the kind of civic 
participation that the expanding network of PCBs enables. This network represents 
the creation of participatory institutions that run parallel to electoral modes of 
political representation, which themselves are often manipulated to serve the 
interests of elites. PCBs are a means through which a plurality of voices may 
contribute to processes of policy-formation and delivery but this plurality is ultimately 
managed by the state through a tightly controlled selection process and by legal 
subordination of these bodies to state agencies. It also recalls Sakwa’s conception 
of Russia’s administrative regime, in which the Federal Public Chamber is posited 
as a central feature, which ‘indicated once again Putin’s penchant for para-
constitutional solutions to problems of public administration.’104 
Why, then, do I not use Linz’s theory of authoritarianism alone? Why the need 
for added considerations of neoliberal governance? The question I want to answer 
concerns why PCBs are emerging and proliferating, since their intended function 
shapes (but not determines) the kind of participation they engender, as I show in 
Chapters Five and Six. Linz has provided an excellent typology of what PCBs are 
(i.e. a means for an authoritarian government to allow limited interest representation 
in the absence of other mechanisms). However, in order to explain their conditions 
of emergence and their role in the broader architecture of the contemporary Russian 
state, I have chosen instead to begin with the concept of governance, which places 
                                                          
100 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 208. 
101 However, Linz also recognises the body of literature that demonstrates the corporatist 
tendencies in liberal democratic states: see Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 211. 
102 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 209. 
103 Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 213. 
104 Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, pp. 164. 
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the proliferation of participatory mechanisms within an on-going process of market 
reform of the state bureaucracy (indeed, I have shown in the previous chapter that 
this was precisely the context in which PCBs emerged). In this chapter, I have 
argued in the first section that the mechanisms created through the neoliberal 
restructuring of the public sector in specific locales are the products of interaction 
between global norms and domestic political cultures and reform agendas. In the 
second section, I have argued that the shift from government to governance 
wrought by processes of neoliberalisation has necessitated an increase in levels of 
public participation in policy formation and delivery. The present section has claimed 
that public participation in authoritarian regimes has the central feature of limited 
pluralism, which I suggest highlights the ways in which this new participation in 
policy-making is co-ordinated by the regime in order to retain a high level of state 
control. This, I argue, is ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance.’ 
The concept of authoritarian neoliberal governance situates the development 
of citizen participation in governance networks within the context of the 
marketization of the non-democratic state. Recall Rhodes’ conception of 
governance networks above as possessing a high level of autonomy from the state; 
in Russia’s authoritarian regime, these networks possess a very limited level of 
autonomy, as participation is strongly limited and regulated by the authorities(but, 
as I demonstrate in Chapters Five and Six, they do manage modestly to influence 
state policy). Although generalisations at this stage are indicative only, I suggest 
that governance in non-democracies is thus qualitatively different to governance in 
democracies, although both are responses to the neoliberal roll back of the state 
bureaucracy. Authoritarian neoliberal governance captures this difference: it 
highlights the institutional mechanisms through which the requirement for increased 
civic participation is rendered compatible with high levels of state control.  
The concept allows a consideration of PCBs (or other governance 
mechanisms) from three perspectives. First, it enables a deeper understanding of 
the new modes of authoritarian governing that are emerging in the neoliberal era as 
a result of public sector reform. It thus adds to the body of work that explores the 
substantive institutions of authoritarian rule. Second, it enables an appreciation of 
the flexibility and pervasiveness of global neoliberal governing practices by showing 
how they mutate and survive in diverse contexts. It thus adds to those works 
discussed in the first section that explore the variations in neoliberal practices 
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around the world and the factors that shape them. Third, it provides insights into the 
ways in which authoritarian states are managing the new relationship between the 
state and citizens brought about by neoliberal public sector reform and, 
concomitantly, it allows for an examination into the extent to which citizens may 
advance their interests through these mechanisms. The concept of authoritarian 
neoliberal governance throws up such questions as  
- Which institutional mechanisms are being developed by authoritarian states 
in order to respond to the loss of monopoly over the information necessary 
to make public policy? 
- How far do domestic authoritarian productions of global governance norms 
differ from those promoted at the international level? 
- Where are the limits to the pluralism enabled by these governance 
mechanisms? or How far can citizens influence the policy-making process 
through these institutions? 
I have already answered the first question in the previous chapter: PCBs are the 
main public participatory mechanisms through which Russia is seeking to harness 
information and expertise now located outside of the state as a result of 
administrative reforms. The second question is answered in the following chapter, 
in which I compare the international discourse of civic participation in governance 
with Putin’s articulations thereof, and show that the latter remains deeply influenced 
by Soviet-era conceptions of civic participation. I answer the third question in 
Chapters Five and Six, by showing that PCBs enable citizens to exert a modest 
influence over the policy-making process.  
Finally, the concept also enables the possibility for future comparative 
research since it starts with the assumption that authoritarian states are adopting, 
to various extents and in various guises, the new governing techniques that 
accompany processes of neoliberalization. (Indeed, several other post-Soviet 
countries are also developing their own PCB networks.105) Authoritarian neoliberal 
governance presents the possibility of comparisons in terms of the institutional 
                                                          
105 See, for instance, ‘Obshchestvennyye Palaty Kazakhstana i Rossii podpisali memorandum o 
vzaimoponimanii’, Fergana News, 27 May 2008, http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=9267 
(accessed 8 August 2014); ‘Kambin postanovil sozdat’ obshchestvennyye sovety’, RBK Ukraina, 4 
November 2010, http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/kabmin-postanovil-sozdat-obshchestvennye-
sovety-04112010145900 (accessed 8 August 2014); ‘Obshchestvennyi sovet pri MVD Belarus’, 
http://mvd.gov.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=15761 (accessed 8 August 2014); ‘V Azerbaidjane 
uchrezhdeno dvizheniye “Obshchestvennaya Palata”, Kavkazskii Uzel, 28 December 2010, 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/178994/ (accessed 8 August 2014). 
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compositions of participatory mechanisms in authoritarian contexts, how much 
pluralism they allow and how their legitimating discourses differ both from 
international norms and from those of other authoritarian states. I do not pretend to 
answer these questions in this thesis; it is something I wish to explore in further 
research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have constructed the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberal 
governance’, which I argue captures the process of the emergence and proliferation 
of PCBs. I have argued that it refers to state-driven practices by which non-
democratic regimes co-ordinate multiple non-state stakeholders in the public policy-
making process. The first section argued that there has been a global trend towards 
the marketization of public sectors around the world, with governments introducing 
policies of privatisation, decentralisation, outsourcing and public-private 
partnerships into areas that were formerly the preserve of the state. I employed the 
term ‘neoliberalisation’ to capture the process of ‘roll back’ of the state function. 
However, I also argued that this takes place to different extents and for slightly 
different reasons in different social and political contexts and that in order to 
understand the reasons, one must look to the state’s legitimating narrative. The 
second section argued that, in order cope with the loss of information and expertise 
that this ‘roll back’ has wrought, authorities have ‘rolled out’ governance networks 
that include citizens and other non-state actors in policy-related decision-making 
processes. The third section introduced the concept ‘authoritarian’, in order to 
highlight the partial and limited independence of governance networks from the 
state in non-democratic regimes and reinforce that the government is the ultimate 
arbiter of decision-making processes in such states.  
 The previous chapter showed that PCBs emerged as state-dependent public 
participatory bodies in the context of the market reform of Russia’s public sector. 
This chapter has sought to conceptualise their emergence as part of the Russian 
state’s ‘roll out’ mechanisms with which to cope with effects of the ‘roll back’ of 
Soviet-era bureaucracy. The following chapter explores the Putin government’s 
legitimating narrative through an analysis of the discourse of civic participation in 
governance in Russia. It shows how the Kremlin’s contemporary discourse 
combines elements drawn from the Soviet era, which sees citizens as willing 
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assistants to state projects with elements advanced by international norm-
promoting organisations, which promote civic engagement in governance as a 
means for economic development: it is thus a discourse of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance. 
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Chapter Three: 
Emergence 
 
In Chapter One, I argued that the PCB network, although bearing some of 
the hallmarks of Soviet-era monitory bodies, is a qualitatively new innovation in 
governance arising from the marketization of the Soviet-era public sector and  
charted its development over the last ten years I demonstrated that increasing the 
levels of civic engagement in governance has been a key project for the Putin 
government and that the concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in particular has been 
used to legitimate and promote the expansion of the PCB network. In Chapter Two, 
I argued that the proliferation of institutions that aim to foster civic engagement must 
be seen as part of a trend towards ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’, which 
captures the processes by which states limit and control civic participation in policy-
making and delivery. The rest of this thesis considers the emergence of the PCB 
network from a Critical Discourse Analytical perspective in order to distinguish the 
roles assigned to PCBs in state discourse from the social practices they actually 
perform.  
The present chapter begins this process with a consideration of the 
emergence and constitution of Putin’s discourse on civic engagement in 
governance. Critical Discourse Analysis states that new discourses are created by 
combining existing discourses together.1 As discussed in the introduction, a 
discourse is understood as a particular stable linguistic representation or ‘vision’ of 
a set of social practices articulated by a specific social group.2 In this context, 
Norman Fairclough has shown how the construction of the ‘Third Way’ in New 
Labour discourse was a conscious project by the Blair government, which combined 
discourses of social democracy and economic dynamism in an attempt to steer the 
course of social change and thereby inculcate new social practices in British 
citizens. He shows that this new discourse was constantly made and re-made in 
government speeches and documents through the on-going drawing of links 
between the two composite, anterior discourses.3  Appling this approach to the case 
of Russia, I argue that the Kremlin’s discourse of civic engagement is made up of a 
                                                          
1 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, pp. 127. 
2 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language, pp. 21.  
3 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language, pp. 4. 
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blend of elements drawn from Soviet-era and international discourses (that is, the 
publications of norm-promoting transnational organisations) on civic engagement. I 
thus sketch the visions of civic engagement in government in these two prior 
discourses before showing how they have combined in Putin’s discourse.4 
The folding of these two discourses into contemporary articulations has been 
surprisingly easy to achieve, as there is a significant level of overlap in the Soviet 
and international representations of the role of the citizen in governance. In the case 
of the Soviet conceptualisation, active citizens must effectively ‘become’ the state 
as they monitor its activities; in the case of international conceptualisations, citizens 
must act on behalf of the state, performing the tasks it perceives that it either can 
no longer afford or is no longer best suited to do. Thus, both conceive of a 
consensual relationship between society and the state, viewing the citizen as 
helping the authorities perform socially important tasks. In both cases, the state 
makes the decisions and the citizens implement them. This correlation makes it 
easy for the Kremlin to blend elements of both without appearing illogical or 
inconsistent.  
The significant difference between Soviet and contemporary Russian 
discourses is, of course, that the former were justified by references to Marxist-
Leninist theory, while the latter uses elements of neoliberal economics. This 
transition has been easy to make, given the delegitimisation of Marxist-Leninist 
theory embodied in the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of Russia as a 
capitalist economy. Putin’s discourse of civic engagement in governance appeared 
about 14 years after the collapse, at a time when living standards were improving 
and memories of the tumultuous 1990s had begun to fade. It was felt that it was 
time for citizens to shake off their Soviet era passivity and the initial post-Soviet 
introversion and begin to engage in public activities.5 Citizens could now continue 
to enrich themselves and benefit the country by assisting the local authorities in 
matters of governance.  
This chapter is split into three sections. In the first section, I deal with Soviet 
conceptions of kontrol’, discussing first rabochyi (workers’) then narodnyi (people’s) 
kontrol’, concepts I argue were central to the Soviet state’s conception of civic 
                                                          
4 A discourse of civic participation in governance that linked active citizenry to democratisation and 
reform was prevalent during perestroika, and is discussed briefly in Chapter Five. However, it is 
wholly absent from the contemporary discursive terrain due to its associations with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the ensuing decade of instability.  
5 See also E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin’s Russia (Oxford, Routledge, 2013), pp. 31. 
112 
 
engagement in governance. I show that in both instances, citizens were presented 
as assistants to the authorities, a view legitimated by various aspects of Marxist-
Leninist theory. In the second section, I examine international discourses of 
governance, draw out three distinct but related discourses promulgated by three 
different types of institution, namely the United Nations, international financial 
institutions and European intergovernmental bodies, and show that Russia has 
engaged with each, in terms of signing collective agreements, receiving assistance 
(financial and otherwise) and conducting joint projects. These discourses present 
civic engagement in governance as an essential part of the marketization of the 
public sector and a means to increase a nation’s economic competitiveness. In the 
final section, I examine the Kremlin’s own discourse on civic engagement in 
governance through a study of two collections of texts: Putin’s seven pre-election 
articles of 2012 and six Presidential speeches to the Federation Council between 
2008 and 2013. These are paradigmatic exegeses of the Kremlin’s contemporary 
worldview: the pre-election articles articulate Putin’s strategy for national 
development over the coming years to the electorate and the Federation Council 
speeches are annual reflections on the state of the nation given by the incumbent 
President and broadcast on national television. I show that the Kremlin exhorts the 
citizen to become involved in governance, conceived of as assisting the state, in 
order that Russia gains international competitive advantage in the global economy. 
It thus recalls the relationship between citizens and the state advanced in the Soviet 
era, both nominally, through the use of the concept obshchestvennyi kontrol’, and 
substantively, since citizens are presented as handmaidens to state-designed 
projects, but is legitimated by a logic of neoliberal public sector reform reminiscent 
of the international discourse. In showing the roots of Russia’s contemporary 
discourse, the chapter demonstrates that PCBs are presented as a tool for 
harnessing citizens’ expertise and activeness in order to increase economic 
competitiveness, rather than a means to enhance democratic participation. It also 
confirms the salience of Soviet legacies in contemporary Russian political discourse 
and practices. Finally, recalling the stipulation of scholars of neoliberalisation 
discussed in the previous chapter, who state that in order understand how and why 
global neoliberal norms are reproduced at the domestic level, it is necessary to 
examine the narrative promoted by the state to legitimate them, the chapter provides 
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insight into how neoliberal practices of governance are appropriated, rearticulated 
and, moreover, justified by the political establishment in post-Soviet Russia. 
 
From Rabochyi Kontrol’ to Narodnyi Kontrol’ 
 
The concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ has had a long evolution and can 
be traced back to the socialist concept of rabochyi kontrol’ (workers’ control), 
advocated (and later dismissed) by the Bolsheviks in the early days of the 
revolution, and narodnyi kontrol’ (people’s control), devised by Khrushchev in the 
post-Stalin era and developed by Brezhnev into extensive practices of surveillance 
by volunteer inspectors. It would be very interesting to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of how practices diverged from rhetoric in both instances; however, my purpose 
here is to give a briefer sketch of what both concepts meant in relation to the 
evolution of representations of civic engagement in governance during the Soviet 
Union. In this section, I examine both concepts, showing how they were legitimated 
by different aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory and how they were articulated in 
practice through the creation of monitory institutions. I show that, in both cases, 
what initially seemed like a democratic and participatory measure was reduced to 
the mobilisation of citizens in ensuring state policy was properly executed. 
 
Rabochyi kontrol’ 
The idea of rabochyi kontrol’ (workers’ control/oversight) dates back to the 
early days of revolutionary Russia. It was one of the three central demands of the 
Bolshevik Revolution alongside ‘peace’ and ‘land to the peasants’6 and was initially 
understood to be one of the ‘conditions of emancipation’7 of workers from the 
capitalist classes. According to Marxist theory, it was only by altering the relations 
of production, that is, the social relationships that make production possible (in this 
case, the subordinate relationship of workers to managers), that the bourgeois 
capitalist state could be truly overthrown. Rabochyi kontrol’ suggested to factory 
workers that they could also become the factory managers (a position occupied by 
the bourgeoisie under capitalism), that they would be the ones to make the 
decisions that affected their working lives, and thereby create a classless society. 
                                                          
6 J. Reed, ‘The Origins of Workers’ Control of Industry in Russia’, 23 November 1918, Marxists.org, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/1918/origins.htm (accessed 15 April 2014). 
7 V.I. Lenin, ‘Draft Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People’, Lenin: Selected 
Works: Vol. 6 (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1936), pp. 453. 
114 
 
As such, its meaning was initially tied to the economic aspects of the socialist 
agenda, with workers’ political participation to be channelled through the soviets.  
From March 1917, the institutions that emerged to operationalize the concept 
of rabochyi kontrol’ were autonomous factory committees that fulfilled basic 
bargaining functions within a particular factory in relation to questions of hours, 
wages and manufacturing procedures, (and thus were similar to trade unions, which 
had been forbidden under the Tsarist regime and were consequently still nascent).8 
The soviets, by contrast, were intended as sites for the discussion of political issues 
such as the continuation of the war, the direction of the revolution, and so on. 
However, what the two institutions had in common was that both were quickly 
subordinated to the organs of the Party and the state. Thus rabochyi kontrol’ was 
reduced to the task of monitoring the implementation of decisions made by the elite. 
 The concept of rabochyi kontrol’ was something of a slogan in early to mid-
1917,9 becoming, in Lenin’s texts of this period, virtually synonymous with the 
successful construction of socialism.10 The idea appeared briefly in his April Theses, 
and was continually referred to and elaborated on in the months between the two 
revolutions. The three stated aims of this measure were, first, to curb the power of 
factory and business-owners and start the transition towards a socialist economy,11 
second, to educate workers in the management of industry12 and, third, to prevent 
the sabotage of industry by anti-revolutionaries.13 Thus, aside from its historicist 
deterministic implications, typical of Marxist-Leninist theorising at the time, it was 
considered as a practical tool, both as a school in participatory governance and as 
a means for combatting corruption.  
However, Lenin saw rabochyi kontrol’ only as a temporary measure. In his 
view, after the workers had seized control of industry, the next step towards the 
construction of socialism could be accomplished: the creation of a ‘workers’ 
administration of industry’.14 In a key text published shortly before the October 
Revolution, he stated,  
                                                          
8 M. Perrins, ‘Rabkrin and Workers' Control in Russia 1917-34’, European History Quarterly, Vol. 
10, No. 2, (1980). 
9 Lenin, ‘The Anniversary of the Revolution’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 488. 
10 See Lenin, ‘An Alliance Between the Workers and the Toiling Peasants’, Lenin: Selected Works, 
Vol. 6, pp. 426, 427. 
11 See Lenin, ‘Draft Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People’, Lenin: Selected 
Works, Vol. 6, pp. 452. 
12 Lenin, ‘The Anniversary of the Revolution’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 488. 
13 Lenin, ‘To the Population’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 285. 
14 Lenin, ‘The Anniversary of the Revolution’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 487. 
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When we say workers’ control, always associating that slogan with 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, and always putting it after the 
latter, we thereby make plain what state we have in mind… If it is 
a proletarian state we are referring to, i.e. the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, then workers’ control can become a national, all-
embracing, omnipresent, extremely precise and extremely 
scrupulous accounting of the production and distribution of 
goods.15 [Emphasis in original]. 
 
This indicates that workers’ control should not extend to workers’ decision-making 
in the production and distribution processes, only to the accounting or monitoring of 
them. While it is not specified whose work should be monitored, it is clear that it is 
the work of the Bolshevik Party. Defined in this way, the near equating of rabochyi 
kontrol’ with the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ suggests a clear separation between 
the state and party officials, who manage industry, and the workers and masses, 
who monitor their management. The former make the decisions; the latter ensure 
that they are properly implemented.  
This conceptualisation of rabochyi kontrol’ was articulated in full the following 
month in the Draft Statutes on Workers’ Control, November 1917, which formed the 
basis of the Decree on Workers’ Control passed several weeks later.16 The Statutes 
were intended to introduce rabochyi kontrol’ of ‘the production, warehousing, 
purchase and sale of all products and raw materials’, either directly, if the enterprise 
was small enough, or via elected delegates in the case of larger institutions. 17 In 
order to accomplish this task, workers were to be give ‘access to all books and 
documents and to all warehouses and stocks of materials, instruments and 
products, without exception.’18 However, they were not given control of decision-
making. The sixth Statute on Workers’ Control stated that,  
 
In enterprises of state importance all the owners and all the 
delegates of the workers and employees elected for the purpose 
                                                          
15 Lenin, ‘Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 265. 
16 A. Fineberg, (ed.) in Lenin, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 623. 
17 Lenin, ‘Draft Statutes on Workers’ Control’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 410. 
18 Lenin, ‘Draft Statutes on Workers’ Control’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 410. 
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of exercising workers’ control are answerable to the state for the 
maintenance of the strictest order and discipline and for the 
protection of property.19 
 
The seventh Statue outlines virtually all industries as being of state importance:  
 
Enterprises of state importance shall be understood to comprise 
all enterprises working for defence purposes, or in any way 
connected with the production of articles necessary for the 
existence of the masses of the population.20 
 
In other words, the factory committees, some of which were developing as 
independent, popularly controlled mechanisms for managing the workplace, were 
to be brought under the supervision of the centralising state, which would be the 
principal decision-maker in questions relating to industry. ‘Control’ by the workers 
extended only to ensuring that the books were in order and that stock was 
accounted for.  
The ratified version of this text added a further six points, which stipulated 
the establishment of an All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control, whose 
membership was decided by the Party, and which would oversee the activities of 
regional branches, themselves responsible for rabochyi kontrol’ in their territory.21 
This structure did not automatically overturn the factory committees, which for 
several months continued to exist alongside these councils. However, in December 
1917, the All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control was absorbed into the newly-
founded and centralised Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (Vesenkha), 
created to oversee the management of the economy. With the creation of this 
institution, Lenin perceived the transitional phase of rabochyi kontrol’ to be over.22 
After several attempts by the factory committees to assert alternative 
representations of rabochyi kontrol’ (notably in their self-published Practical Manual 
for the Implementation of Workers' Control of Industry), at the First All-Russian 
                                                          
19 Lenin, ‘Draft Statutes on Workers’ Control’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 410. 
20 Lenin, ‘Draft Statutes on Workers’ Control’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 6, pp. 411. 
21 M. Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control: The State and Counter-Revolution, (London: 
Solidarity, 1970), http://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/ (accessed 16 April 
2014). 
22 Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control.  
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Congress of Trade Unions in January 1918, members voted to absorb the factory 
committees into the trade unions.23 
The substitution of the idea of rabochyi kontrol’ for the task of accounting 
gained pace as 1918 approached. As the revolutionary state consolidated itself, 
Lenin declared the most ‘decisive’ task to be the ‘organisation of the strictest and 
nation-wide accounting and control of production and of the distribution of goods.’24 
Accounting should no longer be applied solely to the economic questions of 
production; it should be extended to the social and political questions of distribution 
as well. Maurice Brinton has pointed out that in The State and Revolution, Lenin’s 
famous text on the role of the revolutionary state in society published at the end of 
1917, there is little mention of rabochyi kontrol’. Instead, Lenin expands on his 
conception of kontrol’ as ‘immediate change such that all fulfil the functions of 
control and supervision, that all become “bureaucrats” for a time, and that no one 
therefore can become a “bureaucrat”.’25 On this view, then, the worker is the very 
embodiment of the will of the state: there is no need for a distinction between state 
and non-state workers since everyone works together for the advancement of 
centrally determined goals.  
By the end of 1918, helped along by a sharp drop in industrial productivity, 
the concept of rabochyi kontrol’ was thoroughly delegitimised in Bolshevik 
discourse. Most of the major industries had been nationalised. In the words of one 
government spokesman in August of that year, ‘rabochyi  kontrol’ of industry carried 
out by the Factory and Plant Committees has shown what can be expected if the 
plans of the anarchists are realised.’26 Instead, the idea of gosudarstvennyi kontrol’ 
(state control) was advocated, with a People’s Commissariat of State Control 
(Goskon) performing the functions of monitoring the implementation of state policy 
and weeding out corruption and saboteurs, that had initially been assigned to the 
instruments of workers’ control.27 In 1920, this organ was transformed into the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (Rabkrin) with Joseph Stalin at its head, only 
to merge with the Party Central Control Commission (which monitored Party 
discipline) three years later to become the Central Control Commission-Workers' 
                                                          
23 Perrins, ‘Rabkrin and Workers' Control in Russia 1917-34’. 
24 V.I. Lenin, ‘The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government’, Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 7, 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1937), pp. 319. 
25 Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control. 
26 Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control. 
27 Perrins, ‘Rabkrin and Workers' Control in Russia 1917-34’. 
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and Peasants' Inspectorate (TsKK-RKI). According to Isaac Deutcher, ‘The 
Rabkrin… was set up to control every branch of the administration, from top to 
bottom, with a view to eliminating the two major faults, inefficiency and corruption.’28 
However, its recommendations in the spheres of both agriculture and industry were 
rarely taken on board either by the state bodies that it monitored or the Party officials 
to whom it reported.29 This was the first manifestation of a problem that has 
continued to plague the instruments of kontrol’ throughout the hundred-year history 
of their evolution. 
The monitoring activities of the TsKK-RKI continued into the early Stalin years 
and provided the blue-print for the later development of narodnyi kontrol’ discussed 
below. Of the important role of the TsKK-RKI in establishing norms of surveillance, 
Jan Adams states,  
 
By creating a number of well-defined participatory mechanisms 
within the authoritarian framework of the Soviet compliance 
establishment, the TsKK-RKI provided a later generation of 
reformers with a valuable legacy of techniques and precedents.30  
 
However, the institution quickly became irrelevant to Stalin's centrally organised 
administrative system and it was dissolved in 1934. Until his death, mechanisms of 
control were based on the enactment of the dictator’s will, through institutions such 
as the secret police (NKVD) and the Party Control Commission.31 
In sum, the Leninist conception of rabochyi kontrol’ saw the role of the worker 
not as an independent decision-maker, but someone who should monitor the 
implementation of Party policy. According to the Bolsheviks, it did not signify the 
means by which workers could determine their conditions of labour, but a system of 
monitoring, auditing and accounting of decisions made by the elite.  Although at first 
it seemed a genuine participatory-democratic mechanism and despite initial 
protests by the Factory Commissions and the anarchists who clung to this view, the 
Bolshevik conception became hegemonic in a matter of months, and was 
constituted in practice in the form of Rabkrin, the Central Control Commission and 
                                                          
28 I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 230. 
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their successor organisations. The relationship between citizens and the state 
advanced through this discourse and enacted through these institutions was that all 
citizens should be working towards the goals of the state, exposing corruption and 
inefficiency in the process. Rabochyi kontrol’ was thus replaced by gosudarstvennyi 
kontrol’ in both discourse and practice until destalinization began more than twenty 
years later. 
 
Narodnyi Kontrol’ 
From the post-Stalin era to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the discourse of 
narodnyi kontrol’ was a popular state-promoted representation of civic participation 
in governance that encouraged citizens to monitor the implementation of state policy 
by the state bureaucracy at union, republic, regional and municipal levels. Like 
rabochyi kontrol’, it was legitimized with reference to Marxist-Leninist theory. It was 
first articulated by Nikita Khrushchev in the early 1960s alongside the devolution of 
state responsibilities to ‘public organisations’, as a means to achieve the ‘withering 
away of the state’, perceived to be the next stage of communist development.32 In 
The State and Revolution, Lenin had set out a clear chronology for this process:  
 
Society thus far, operating amid class antagonisms, needed the 
state, that is, an organisation of the particular exploiting class... 
When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of 
society, it renders itself unnecessary… State interference in social 
relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and 
then dies down of itself. The government of persons is replaced by 
the administration of things… The state is not ‘abolished’. It withers 
away.33 [Emphasis in original.] 
 
At the end of the 1950s, post-Stalinist ideologues considered the first stage of this 
process to be complete: the 1961 Party Congress affirmed that ‘the state has 
become the state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and the 
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will of the people as a whole.’34 Now it was time to deal with the second stage. 
According to Khrushchev,  
 
Every worker, every peasant, every member of the intelligentsia 
can say, “we are the state, its policy is our policy, and the task of 
developing it and strengthening it against any and all 
encroachment is our common task.”35 
 
In other words, the withering away of the state meant that the distinction between 
state and society would collapse. The concept of narodnyi kontrol’ thus served both 
ideological and practical purposes: on the one hand, it was intended to help 
inaugurate the withering away of the state, by enlisting citizens in administrative 
affairs. On the other hand, it was a response to increasing dissatisfaction with 
existing methods of state inspection.36 The institutions that were created were thus 
intended simultaneously to increase civic participation and reduce corruption. 
However, like the institutions which practiced the Leninist conception of rabochyi 
kontrol’, People’s Control Committees failed to become the critical watchdogs 
hoped for by their initial creators, instead becoming another bureaucratic arm of the 
state. 
There was much public discussion throughout the mid to late 1950s of the 
appropriate form monitory organisations should take after destalinization and how 
to overcome the atrophied relationship between society and the state.37 The 
deliberative aspect of civic engagement was considered an important part of this 
process; for instance, the Party programme adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in 
1961 declared that, ‘Discussion by the people of draft laws and other decisions of 
both national and local significance must become the rule.’38 The idea of kontrol’ 
was discussed in this context the following year at the Communist Party Central 
Committee plenum in November 1962. In his opening speech, Nikita Khrushchev 
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stated, ‘At this time of large-scale development of communist society, it is necessary 
to give special attention to improving party, state and public control 
[obshchestvennogo kontrolya].’39 (The use of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ here shows 
that the post-Stalinist discourse of civic participation in governance had not yet been 
consolidated; hereafter, such practices are referred to as narodnyi kontrol’.) Not only 
was kontrol’ intended to reduce corruption, Khrushchev also believed that 
‘participation in control activities should inculcate civic values and create a 
responsible citizenry.’40 Citing Lenin’s exhortation constantly to develop new forms 
of social organisation, he called for the introduction of new surveillance institutions 
based in society that would improve the ailing economy by reducing corruption and 
ensure that party and state policies were adequately fulfilled. However, Jan Adams 
also states that an underlying reason for Khrushchev’s preoccupation with 
compliance institutions was a perceived need to fill the void left by the abandonment 
of Stalin’s disciplinary techniques of fear and repression.41 
Created one month later in December 1962, the Party-State Control 
Committee (KPGK) was given a broad mandate. Not only should it expose 
‘bureaucrats, parasites, bribe-takers, thieves, speculators and confidence men’, it 
should also prevent such crimes from occurring in the first place by aiming to 
‘indoctrinate cadres, to guard against failures and short-comings in work.’42 Its 
extensive powers included the right to access state documents and reports and the 
responsibility to 
  
Stop illegal orders and acts… which damage the interests of the 
state; establish periods for the correction of persons who are guilty 
of unsatisfactory fulfilment of party and government decisions; 
…impose cash fines on officials who materially damage state, co-
operative and public organisations; bring culprits to account and 
impose disciplinary penalties; demote culprits and remove them 
from posts; and send material on abuses and other criminal acts 
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to organs of the prosecutors office to bring wrong-doers to criminal 
responsibility.43 
 
In other words, inspectors were tasked with ensuring complicity among state 
workers in the economic sphere of production, the bureaucratic sphere of 
administration and the ideological sphere of adhering to party line via means of spot-
checks, verifying documentation and liaising with law enforcement bodies.  
The organisation was split into two divisions: salaried staff and part-time 
volunteers, with the former responsible for achieving state objectives in the field of 
‘control’ and for expanding the volunteer base, and the latter for carrying out the 
spot-checks. Thus, although not reflected in the new institution’s name, the bulk of 
the actual ‘control’ work was to be performed by the volunteers. By September of 
the following year, committees had been set up in all Soviet republics, territories 
and regions, as well as in over a thousand cities and districts, 348 industrial zones 
and over 1500 collective farms.44  
The use of volunteers in the state governance programme expanded under 
Leonid Brezhnev, with the number of citizen inspectors growing by 40% by 1968.45 
In 1965, the Party-State Control Committee was re-named People’s Control 
Committee (Komitet Narodnogo Kontrolya), indicating a recognition on the part of 
the next Soviet leader that narodnyi kontrol’ was a ‘more accurate description’ of 
the institution’s activities.46 At this time, then, the concept referred to the practices 
of monitoring and assisting the government that the Committee fostered in its 
members. However, the 1968 statute also stipulated an important new function of 
the KNK by elaborating a new role for the citizen inspectors: they were to gather 
details of the public mood and pass them on to relevant state agencies. For 
instance, regional committees were required to set up and operate complaint 
bureaux, which, aside from receiving and processing local grievances, should also 
gather citizens’ suggestions for improvements in state policy and relay them to 
officials higher up the state bureaucracy. Committees were required to ‘bring more 
important questions to the consideration of corresponding party, soviet and 
economic agencies and in necessary instances to the consideration of the central 
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institutions and organisations.’47 This information was then to be analysed by the 
Union-level KNK and presented to the Communist Party Central Committee and the 
USSR Council of Ministers. Thus, by 1968, narodnyi kontrol’ no longer solely 
referred to the monitoring of the implementation of state policy, but also to the 
gathering of feedback from society regarding these policies, in the absence of any 
other channels for assessing popular mood.  
The organisation existed in this form, with a few minor changes, for the next 
twenty-five years, with the number of volunteers growing year on year until 
perestroika. According to a 1975 article by Communist Party paper, Partiinaya 
Zhizn, the main task of people’s controllers was to ‘check the factual fulfilment of 
the directives of party and government in the areas of the economy, of economic 
and cultural construction.’48 The anti-corruption aspect thus remained the KNK’s 
central focus. The Communist Party became an increasingly important influence 
over KNK activities as the number of party-affiliated committee members and 
volunteers soured throughout the seventies, numbering over 50% in 1977.49 In 
1990, it was replaced by the Control Chamber of the USSR, a short-lived body that 
existed for exactly one year to the USSR’s collapse.  
Overall, the concept of narodnyi kontrol’ referred to the practices of on-going 
monitoring by citizens of government activities in all spheres of public life in order to 
ensure complicity with state directives, as well as sustaining a feedback loop 
between citizens and the authorities. It thus built on and extended the Leninist 
concept of rabochyi kontrol’ in three ways. First, the distinction between an 
administrator and a decision-maker that had been implied by Lenin was made 
explicit. The citizen inspector’s main tasks were clearly defined and delimited as 
monitoring the implementation of state policy, a role that, unlike the Factory 
Commissions’ view of rabochyi kontrol’, remained unchallenged by social groups. 
Second, the concept was used to indicate the advent of a higher stage of communist 
development. Whereas rabochyi kontrol’ highlighted the need for a shift away from 
the capitalist relations of productions, narodnyi kontrol’ indicated the increasingly 
blurred line between society and the state, indicative of the ‘withering away of the 
state’. Third, beyond the checking and auditing function instituted by Rabkrin, the 
post-Stalinist authorities recognised that inspectors’ proximity to social life made it 
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logical to institute the second function of providing feedback on poorly received or 
implemented policies in order that decision-makers could amend their approach 
where necessary. Furthermore, although narodnyi kontrol’ seemed to have been 
promoted by Khrushchev as an antidote to Stalinist repressions and a means for 
devolving power to citizens, it quickly became a compliance mechanism not only for 
those being monitored, but also for the inspectors themselves since it served to 
socialise citizens into the goals of the party and the state. This indicates that there 
was a high level of disconnect between the rhetoric and the social practices of 
narodnyi kontrol’.  
 
Conclusion 
This section has explored the evolution of the concepts of rabochyi and 
narodnyi kontrol’ in the context of civic participation in governance during the Soviet 
Union. It has shown that both were central concepts in the authorities’ vision of 
state-society relations under Communism. Although there were other opportunities 
to engage in governance (as discussed in Chapter One), it was the bodies founded 
by the state to enact rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’ that were considered to 
inculcate the ideal relationship between citizens and the authorities. In both 
conceptions, this relationship consisted of citizens freely giving their time to assist 
the state in the execution of its goals and suggested that the state-society distinction 
was somewhat redundant as everyone, regardless of whether or not they were 
formally employed as state officials, worked towards the same ends. The task of 
determining these ends was, crucially, excluded from both practices of kontrol’. As 
I will show in the final section of this chapter, this understanding of the relationship 
between citizens and the authorities remains central to the contemporary state 
discourse of civic participation in governance, captured in the concept 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’. However, the contemporary discourse legitimates itself 
not according to Marxist-Leninist theory, but to norms of international 
competitiveness. I now turn to a discussion of these norms as advanced by 
international organisations with which Russia has co-operated. 
 
International Discourse of ‘Good Governance’ 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become increasingly 
integrated into the global society of states, evidenced by its engagement with 
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numerous intergovernmental bodies.50 This engagement occurs through a shared 
dialogue relating to the advancement of common goals and interests. Indeed, there 
is a central linguistic element to the promotion of governance in the international 
system: an ensemble of ‘best practices’ has been promoted by intergovernmental 
institutions through a variety of genres including reports, guides, seminars, forums, 
conventions and other semiotic events. Russia has been included in many of them, 
as a participant, signatory, member or recipient, and has thus been encouraged 
and, in some cases, required to reflect on and implement recommendations for 
improving governance structures. In other words, it has been encouraged to turn 
the discourse into action. Norman Fairclough has observed that ‘a new language of 
governance appears to be emerging on an international basis and transcending 
boundaries between governmental and other types of organisation.’51 My analysis 
here confirms his assertion; however, there are subtle differences in the discourses 
of governance articulated by different types of intergovernmental institution. In this 
section, I examine three complementary discourses of governance promoted by 
institutions with which Russia frequently engages: the citizen-oriented ‘good 
governance’ agenda of the United Nations, the linking of ‘good governance’ to 
economic development by international financial institutions, and the representation 
of governance through the prism of democracy by European intergovernmental 
institutions. In what follows below, I briefly discuss each of these, highlighting points 
of divergence, illuminating Russia’s engagement with them and tracing an over-
arching neoliberal logic to their recommendations.  
 
United Nations 
The concept of governance, specifically ‘good governance’ is central to the 
UN’s vision of creating a better world. It was a key theme of the United Nations’ 
Millennium Declaration (of which Russia was also a signatory). This Declaration 
stipulated that success in meeting the development objectives outlined in the rest 
of the resolution, such as poverty reduction, environmental protection and the 
promotion of human rights ‘depends, inter alia, on good governance within each 
country’. Furthermore, it resolved ‘to work collectively for more inclusive political 
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processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all our countries.’52 Since 
then, the UN has promoted a discourse that links ‘good governance’ to neoliberal 
practices such as decentralisation, marketization of public services and more civic 
participation, which it claims produce a more just and prosperous world society. 
Here I briefly consider one central means of disseminating this discourse with which 
Russia has engaged: The Global Forums on Reinventing Government.  
  The Global Forums were annual gatherings of ministers, NGO leaders, 
business executives, academics and other stakeholders that aimed to promote a 
set of best practices regarding public sector reform, broadly termed ‘good 
governance’. The first Forum was held in Brasilia in 2000 and was inspired by the 
initial Reinventing Government forum held the previous year in the US, in which 
‘creating a government that works better and costs less’ was the primary goal.53  
Until 2007, a biennial Global Forum took place on various aspects of what the UN 
perceived to be key areas of governance, from e-government54 and innovation and 
quality55 to the role of partnerships in government56 and increasing citizen 
participation.57  
 At the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government held in Seoul in 2005, 
148 states, including Russia, signed the Seoul Declaration on Participatory and 
Transparent Governance. This statement linked good governance directly to 
neoliberal public sector reform and encouraged signatories to adapt domestic 
bureaucracy to facilitate market conditions. For instance, the Declaration’s 
preamble stated that ‘profound changes are underway in the public and private 
sectors of many countries’ and that governments must respond to these changes 
by ‘transform[ing] the scope and conduct of their activities to meet these national, 
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regional and global challenges’. In other words, it presented the shift from 
government to governance as a vague, agent-less, global process of change that is 
somehow occurring of its own accord, rather than the set of state-driven policies 
discussed in the previous chapter. It advanced the assumption that, because this 
change cannot be controlled or stopped, domestic governments must adapt to it by 
adopting a programme neoliberal public sector reform.  
 The reforms listed in the main body of the Declaration were legitimated by 
the assertion that ‘a framework of good governance is necessary for socio-
economic development’. This framework consisted of various neoliberal policies, 
including ‘performance-based management’, ‘results-based budgeting’, the 
development of ‘performance indicators’, easing ‘regulations that restrict 
competition’, and ‘administrative and financial decentralisation.’58 In other words, it 
stated that states could become more prosperous by adopting a neoliberal 
governance agenda.  
 One section of the Declaration was devoted to the role of civil society in 
governance. Civil society should be engaged ‘as a partner’ in decision-making 
processes and at the implementation stage of public policy because signatories 
‘agree that building constructive partnerships between states, businesses and civil 
society is essential for achieving sustainable economic development.’ However, the 
text did not state how such partnerships improve economic performance; the 
assumption is that multi-stakeholder governance networks are inherently good for 
business and do not need legitimation. Further, in presenting the task of government 
reform as one of adaptation to pre-existing conditions, the neoliberal agenda 
appears as the only possible course of action and discussions of why the reforms 
are necessary and of alternative directions are stifled.  In this way, it advanced a 
programme that in fact drives the processes of change outlined in the preamble, 
rather than responds to or mitigates them, although it presented them as a 
response. As such, in signing the declaration, states endorsed some of the key 
components of neoliberal reform of the public sector.   
 The Forums grew to be very popular, with most countries of the world 
represented and thousands of delegates in attendance. The underlying assumption 
behind the programme, of course, was that governments around the world needed 
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to be reinvented. The narrative, though never explicitly laid out, was that a ‘smaller’ 
state, in partnership with businesses, NGOs and active citizens, could deliver public 
services more efficiently than the cumbersome welfare states of the mid-twentieth 
century. In short, it was thus based on the neoliberal belief in the supremacy of the 
free market and sought to universalise the programme of New Public Management 
that had been occurring in the Anglophone world since the 1980s. However, the 
Global Forum on Reinventing Government has convened only once since the 
establishment of the UN Project Office on Governance, thus suggesting that the UN 
considered the reinvention of government as governance to have been achieved. 
 In sum, the discourse of governance advanced in the UN’s Global Forum has 
sought to universalize a core set of ‘best practices’ relating to public sector reform 
by presenting it as the only response to unstoppable global trends. These practices 
are termed ‘good governance’ and closely correspond to a neoliberal restructuring 
of the welfare state along the lines of New Public Management. They have been 
legitimated by the assumption that such reforms – which include decentralisation, 
increasing private-public partnerships, instituting performance-based management 
tools, improving democratic processes such as elections and creating innovative 
channels through which citizens can get involved in governance – will increase 
economic prosperity for all. Civic participation in governance is thus a central 
component of the UN’s ‘good governance’ paradigm. 
 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
 The World Band and the IMF have focussed more explicitly on the economic 
aspects of ‘good governance’ as a normative programme for economic 
development.59 The World Bank has advanced a conception that facilitates cross-
country analysis and allows for a differentiation of ‘good governance’ against poor 
governance. Here, governance is defined as ‘the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised’, which includes  
 
The process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state 
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for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.60  
 
In the mid-1990s, World Bank researchers developed a set of six quantitative 
indicators against which they claim it is possible to ‘measure governance’ 
throughout the world. These are: voice and accountability, political stability and lack 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption.61 The Bank’s researchers claim that the higher the scores on these 
criteria, the more likely a country will be to demonstrate stable economic growth.62 
Representing ‘good governance’ in this way links ideal institutional development to 
a neoliberal, pro-business Anglo-Saxon model and, indeed, the countries that 
perform best on these indicators are precisely these countries.63 Thus, while these 
indicators initially seem less normatively charged than similar indicators measuring 
‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ (such as those of Freedom House discussed in the 
previous chapter), the results are virtually identical as the same countries tend to 
score highest. 
 Like the World Bank, the IMF is active in promoting ‘good governance’, as 
‘key to economic success’.64 Although not explicitly defined, the concept is linked to 
trade liberalisation, accountable policy-making institutions and transparency in 
financial transactions.65 Thus, neoliberal reforms are also central to the 
achievement of the IMF’s vision of ‘good governance’. In 1997, it adopted a more 
pro-active policy on promoting governance that comprised four points: to engage 
more thoroughly in issues of governance during the so-called ‘Article IV 
Consultations’ (that is, the IMF’s annual review of a country’s economic policies); to 
advocate anti-corruption policies more vigorously; to consider issues of governance 
in all countries, not just ‘developing’ ones; and to engage with other 
intergovernmental institutions promoting an agenda of governance (such as the 
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World Bank) in order to share expertise.66 In other words, this policy sought to 
universalise discourses of governance, both in terms of what was being articulated 
by intergovernmental institutions and to which countries it was being promoted. The 
document also links a neoliberal discourse to a discourse of governance, for 
instance by stating that the development of governing institutions should be 
conducive to ‘efficient private sector activities.’67 
One important way in which the creation of a hegemonic international 
discourse was achieved was to link it to ‘best practices’. For instance, World Bank’s 
measurements are used by international donors and financial institutions for 
‘actionable’ purposes: to uncover areas that require reform and assess the results 
of reforms already enacted; to encourage developing countries to put questions of 
governance on their domestic agendas; and as bases on which to distribute 
grants.68 Indeed, some international donors want to ‘reward’ developing countries 
with loans or grants who are shown to be ‘improving’ their governance structures 
according to these indicators.69 Thus, important incentives for countries to alter 
practices of governance are tied into the discourse. Similarly, the IMF also 
encourages the adoption of ‘good governance’ by countries in need of loans. Prior 
to receiving a loan, country authorities must describe their current governance 
practices in a ‘letter of intent’. If these practices are considered by the IMF to be 
substandard, measures to improve governance will be included in loan 
conditionality.  
 It is, of course, well known that Russia had significant dealings with both 
institutions after the fall of the USSR and it is not my purpose to give a detailed 
account of their engagement here. In short, the two bodies implemented a 
coordinated strategy during the 1990s to transform Russia’s centrally planned 
economy into a market economy, with the World Bank negotiating the details of the 
reforms, and the IMF co-ordinating the loan conditionality.70 By the end of the 1990s, 
the IMF had loaned Russia over £20 billion, making the country its largest 
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borrower,71 while the World Bank has financed 70 projects in Russia since 1992, 
distributing over $10.5 billion, with public sector reform a central focus.72 Thus, 
Russia was required to engage with discourses of economic governance and 
develop practices that operationalized the discourse advanced by these global 
financial bodies. In sum, civic engagement in governance is a less explicit 
component in the discourse advanced by the IMF and World Bank; instead, their 
conception of ‘good governance’ presents it as a conducive domestic environment 
for business.  
 
The Council of Europe and the Organisation for Co-operation and Security in 
Europe 
In contrast to the two discourses of good governance discussed, the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE are more explicit in linking governance to democracy. The 
former institution is more value-oriented, providing fora in which member states can 
engage in discussions of best practices and develops recommendations for 
improving levels of civic participation, while the latter is primarily concerned with 
security aspects of governance, such as arms control, corruption and conflict 
resolution. Therefore, while both refer to good governance as a central basis for co-
operation among states, the Council of Europe has developed a more extensive 
discourse in this regard than the OSCE. 
One of the Council of Europe’s stated aims is to establish a common 
‘democratic’ space across the continent of Europe, and considers the promotion of 
a discourse of good governance one of the main means by which to achieve it.73 Its 
Good Governance Division comprises four sectors and discourse is a central aspect 
of each. The first one is an intergovernmental European Committee on Democracy 
and Governance (CDDG), intended as a forum in which governments can exchange 
ideas relating to ‘issues concerning citizens’ democratic participation, democratic 
governance and the modernisation of public administration, in particular at local and 
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regional level.’74 The aim is to produce a set of best practices and guidelines for 
member states concerning governance practices as well as to conduct ‘peer 
reviews’ of member states’ public sector institutions at their request; however, its 
first plenary sessions was in January 2014 so it is too early to assess the precise 
kinds of practices this institution will promote.75  
The second is the Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at the Local 
Level, a twelve-point guide adopted in Valencia in 2007 by member states’ ministers 
responsible for local government (including Russia). The twelve points are: fair 
conduct of elections, representation and participation; responsiveness (in terms of 
how quickly services are provided to citizens); efficiency and effectiveness; 
openness and transparency; rule of law; ethical conduct; competence and capacity 
(of public servants to perform their work); innovation and openness to change; 
sustainability and long-term orientation; sound financial management; human 
rights, cultural diversity and social cohesion; and accountability.76 In contrast to the 
UN’s Project Office on Governance, which mentions ‘electoral and participatory 
democracy’ as fourth on a list of ten points, here ‘fair conduct of elections’ is first on 
the list and is considered separate from ‘participation and representation’, the 
second point. The emphasis on democratic norms, although the concept itself is not 
stated, is the greatest of all the institutional types discussed here. Member states 
are encouraged to adopt these principles and measure their progress against a 
‘European benchmark.’ So far several states including Bulgaria and Ukraine (though 
not yet Russia) have used the strategy as a tool to aid the transformation of local 
governance structures.77  
The third sector is the Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, the 
Council of Europe’s ‘operational arm’ in the field of improving governance structures 
among its member states. It has helped decentralise all Central and East European 
countries, including Russia, as part of their post-communist transformations and is 
the most explicitly ‘neoliberal’ in its articulation of its governance agenda, claiming 
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to ‘pioneer an innovative business model’ for improving the capacity of local 
authorities.78 Finally, the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for 
Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT) brings together representatives of the 47 
member states to discuss the promotion of the territorial dimension of human rights 
and democracy.79 Overall, it is clear that a shared discourse based on values such 
as a commitment to democracy, human rights and the free market is a fundamental 
part of Council of Europe’s strategy of promoting governance: it has created many 
fora in which member states can come together and articulate their experiences, 
understandings and visions in these fields. 
The groundwork for the creation of the OSCE was laid in the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords, which aimed to improve relations between the Communist Bloc and the 
West and in which the Soviet Union had a founding role.  Like the Council of Europe, 
the OSCE has a special division that focusses on questions of governance. The 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was created on the 
behest of the Paris Charter in November 1990, of which the USSR was also a 
signatory. The Charter is a highly normative document, which sought to draw 
eastern European countries emerging from the USSR into the ideological sphere of 
the West. For instance, it states that ‘the free will of the individual, exercised in 
democracy and protected by the rule of law forms the necessary basis for successful 
economic and social development.’80 
Initially called the Office for Free Elections, the ODIHR is structurally 
analogous to the Council of Europe’s Good Governance Division in that it is the 
department responsible for promoting democratic norms. While its mandate was 
initially confined to elections, it was expanded two years later to include all aspects 
of the ‘human dimension’ of security. However, it is more ‘action-orientated’ than 
the Council of Europe in that it conducts specific programmes ‘on the ground’ to 
increase citizen participation in political decision-making, rather than organise 
discussion forums and conventions or draw up strategies and declarations. Thus, 
discourse plays a somewhat less central role in the promotion of its values. As such, 
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the OSCE has not formally adopted a definition of ‘good governance’; however, 
according to its former deputy head, Peter Eicher, ‘human rights, democracy, the 
rule of law and good governance are concepts so intertwined they cannot really be 
separated.’81 Its engagement with Russia has generally been confined to sending 
election observers, something that Russia has never been particularly happy with.82 
Overall, the fact that the OSCE is rooted in an attempt to bring together Eastern and 
Western Europe is likely to play a part in the fact that this organisation less fiercely 
promotes a discourse of good governance and democracy. Nonetheless, its election 
monitoring programme attempts to operationalise norms of representative 
democracy. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section, I have shown that three distinct but related discourses of ‘good 
governance’ are discernible across three types of intergovernmental institution. 
First, the UN understands good governance to include business and NGO groups 
in public sector work as a way of making the economy fairer. Second, the IMF and 
World Bank present good governance as a means to ensure economic growth (and 
a condition for receiving financial assistance). Third, the Council of Europe and (to 
a lesser extent) the OSCE portray good governance as equivalent to the formal 
institutions of democracy. Clearly, these differences stem from the different aims 
and goals of the institutions, with the UN acting as a platform for co-operation 
between an enormous diversity of political regimes, the IMF and World Bank 
regulating the global economy and the Council of Europe and the OSCE promoting 
democracy and stability in Europe. Thus, governance is portrayed as relatively 
apolitical by the UN, IMF and World Bank, while in the regional European institutions 
it is made explicitly political: the Council of Europe and the OSCE are much more 
open about the normative agenda embodied in their recommendations.83 The two 
financial institutions, by contrast, refrain from using an explicit discourse of 
democracy, with the IMF admitting that, ‘although it is difficult to separate economic 
aspects of governance from political aspects,’ their work should be confined to the 
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former.84 The UN mentions democracy as one of many factors in creating good 
governance but, unlike the European institutions, it does not feature centrally in its 
articulations. The subtle differences between the representations of governance 
demonstrate the slippery nature of the concept itself and the possibilities that exist 
for transforming its meaning. 
Despite these differences, the discourses discussed here have a central 
aspect in common. ‘Good governance’ is not represented as an end in itself; rather 
as a means to greater economic prosperity (and, particularly in the case of the 
European institutions, to enhanced democratic development). The policies of ‘good 
governance’ in all cases include increasing levels of private-public partnerships, 
reducing trade barriers, tackling corruption, decentralising government services and 
increasing civic participation. They thus comprise the core neoliberal public sector 
reform agenda discussed in the previous chapter. This suggests that civic 
engagement in governance is primarily considered a means for making the state 
more economically successful. The construction of the neoliberal state is thus 
presented as an end in itself, the good life. 
To conclude this section, the dominant international discourse of good 
governance sees civic engagement in governance as a core component and 
legitimates it according to an assertion that it will increase financial prosperity. 
Russia has been drawn into the discourses advanced by these bodies, as a 
signatory to conventions, a recipient of loans and a member of institutions and, as I 
show below, has also adopted this narrative in order to legitimate the proliferation 
of public consultative bodies. I now discuss the Kremlin’s contemporary discourse 
of civic engagement in governance, and show that in many ways, Russia is doing 
precisely what the intergovernmental institutions have stipulated. 
 
The Kremlin’s Discourse of Civic Engagement in Governance 
 
In this section, through an exposition of the discourse of civic engagement in 
Putin’s seven pre-election articles and six annual Presidential Addresses to the 
Federal Assembly between 2008 and 2013, I present a general picture of the 
Kremlin’s distinctive worldview and the role of civic engagement in governance 
within it. I show that contemporary Russia’s discourse on civic engagement 
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governance is rooted in elements of the two discourses discussed above. The 
Kremlin advances the same subordinate relationship of citizens to the authorities as 
that advanced during the Soviet era, but expands it by calling for citizens not merely 
to monitor state activities, but also to perform socially oriented tasks on its behalf 
and legitimates it according to a discourse of economic competitiveness similar to 
that promoted by the international organisations. This contemporary formulation 
combines the neoliberal idea of an active citizen performing the functions that the 
state no longer does with the Soviet idea of a united citizenry in the service of the 
(Communist) state. Furthermore, the contemporary use of the concept 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ to describe activities similar to those designated by the 
concepts rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’ makes an explicit and intentional link to the 
past.  
  
Putin’s Pre-Election Articles 
These are seven detailed essays published weekly in leading newspapers 
prior to the May 2012 presidential election, which set out Putin’s vision for the 
development of the country over the next several years, should he become 
President. Following an initial overview article, the remaining six provide an 
exposition of Putin’s position in the following policy areas: migration and the ethnic 
make-up of Russia; the economy; democracy and other forms of political 
participation; welfare policy; defence; and foreign policy. A clear argument is 
distinguishable across the seven essays. It is based on the idea promoted by the 
international organisations discussed above, that the changes taking place globally 
require domestic policy change. Like the changes mentioned by the international 
organisations, many of the changes advanced in the articles relate to the neoliberal 
restructuring of the public sector. However, Putin adapts the international discourse 
so that it coincides with his leadership style. He portrays himself as the strong, 
capable leader of a historic nation by emphasising that winning the ‘global race’ will 
not be easy, will require a lot of work and a number of reforms, but will be facilitated 
by the country’s great history, superior culture and unique geopolitical position.  
Importantly, all Russians must work together to achieve this vision: citizens need to 
assist the state in becoming more economically competitive. To do this, they must 
shake off their Soviet-era passivity and involve themselves in local governance. In 
what follows here, I detail his portrayal of the strategy to succeed in what he terms 
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the ‘struggle for leadership in the global competition’85 and show that civic 
participation in governance is a central part of it. 
Putin’s legitimating narrative starts from the assumption that the unstoppable 
forces of globalisation require new policies at home. This recalls the preamble of 
the Seoul Declaration discussed above, which implied that the shifting boundary 
between the state and business is inevitable and that the only option is to make 
policy that facilitates it. However, in his version, Putin extends the description of this 
change by emphasising its dangerous aspects (and thereby implicitly positions 
himself as the most qualified person to navigate it):  
 
By and large, what the world faces today is a serious systemic 
crisis, a tectonic process of global transformation. It is a visible 
manifestation of the transition to a new cultural, economic, 
technological, geopolitical era. The world is entering a zone of 
turbulence. And, naturally, this period will be long and painful.86  
 
The classification of the current era as a unique, pivotal moment in global history 
serves two important rhetorical purposes: first, it authorises the use of drastic 
measures to deal with it and second, it provides a unifying myth for a national 
consensus. For instance, although he does not specify any details of the new era, 
why this period will be long and painful, or what the ‘visible’ evidence of this 
transformation is, the designation of it as ‘natural’ implies that it is also inevitable 
and that Russians will have to pull together and bear policies of austerity for the 
sake of the country. Indeed, this particular extract was used to legitimate a key 
neoliberal public sector reform: cuts to the welfare budget. In extending the narrative 
advanced in the Seoul Declaration, Putin has not only legitimated the need for 
reform (because of the unstoppable forces of change) but has positioned himself as 
the obvious choice to lead the country through these tough times (since he presents 
himself as understanding the nature of these dangers).  
Economic competitiveness is a core aspect of the international governance 
agenda and has also been embraced in Putin’s discourse. The idea that there is a 
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global economic competition between countries is central to his legitimating 
narrative for new governance mechanisms and is elaborated in his article on 
economics, in which he also gives more information on what he understands the 
‘new era’ to consist of. It is useful to quote his introduction to this article in full: 
 
We are living in times of radical economic change across the 
globe. Never before have there been such rapid technological 
advances. Much of what we are used to seeing around us today 
seemed like science fiction 15 to 20 years ago. Never before has 
the struggle for leadership in the global competition been so acute, 
and we are now seeing countries which seemed only yesterday to 
hold unshakable positions starting to give way to those who until 
recently were regarded with condescension and disdain. Never 
before have people faced such a great risk of technological 
disaster and never before have environmental hazards been so 
severe. But neither has human capability been so vast. Those who 
apply new capabilities to the greatest extent are the ones who 
come out on top.87 
 
Although he is unclear on the specifics of the changes he mentions, his argument 
is a clear capitalist one: economic growth is linked to technological innovation, but 
growth is a zero-sum game and is therefore only meaningful when relative to other 
countries, which is why Russia must compete for ideas and people.  Economic 
policy should aim to increase competition both internationally and domestically 
through technological innovation. The uniqueness of the present age is underlined 
by the repetition ‘never before’: a total of four times. Instability and risk are key 
themes but, having delineated the precariousness of the situation, he presents his 
solution: to win the global competition by maximising the nation’s skills and 
capabilities. The assumption is that the integrated nature of the global economy 
requires the Russia economy to be competitive internationally, which provides the 
backdrop for his project of national renewal that requires a united citizenry working 
together to achieve it. This theme runs across all his texts and is his core legitimating 
narrative. 
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The central position of global competition to Putin’s worldview necessitates 
a focus on Russia as a unified entity, a single team with Putin as its captain. This 
position is reinforced by repeated slippages between the use of a ‘we’ that refers to 
Putin and his government and a ‘we’ that refers to Russia as a whole. For instance, 
he states, ‘We are the only ones responsible for the way we respond to today’s 
challenges and how we apply our opportunity to strengthen ourselves and our 
position in the rapidly-changing world.’88 As Fairclough has pointed out, this is 
advantageous for a leader who wants to represent itself as speaking for the entire 
nation.89 Elsewhere, he writes, ‘External challenges and the changing world around 
us affect our economic, cultural, fiscal and investment policies.’90 It is clear that ‘us’ 
refers to everyone, as the ‘changing world’ is inhabited by the entire Russian 
population. The ‘our’, by contrast, seems to refer to the policies of the Putin 
government, but its position next to the all-inclusive ‘us’ indicate that these policies 
belong to everyone as well. This serves to create the impression that Russian 
citizens are united behind Putin’s policies. The same slippage is displayed here too: 
‘This enabled us all to pull our country out of the mire... I would like to stress that 
we achieved all this through democratic, constitutional means.’91 In other words, 
while all citizens helped to restabilise Russia, it was the government, acting 
according to the constitution, which directed them. Again, this presents government 
and citizens as a united force, working together. This particular citation also 
demonstrates another important and frequently employed device in Putin’s texts, a 
juxtaposition of the first person singular and the first person plural, a technique that 
affirms Putin as the leader of a united and obedient government and people. 
Elsewhere, he writes ‘I don’t want to talk about our achievements, even though we 
have achieved something in many areas’92 and ‘I see all of the challenges a number 
of our industries will face with our accession to the WTO’93 – statements that present 
him as speaking on behalf of the government. Taken together, these two techniques 
subtly portray Putin as the competent leader of an obedient and unified nation and 
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create the assumption that consensus exists between the government and the 
citizens of Russia. 
Representations of the past also feature frequently in the texts, and serve 
three rhetorical functions. First, the depiction of Russia as possessing an unrivalled 
history and culture, and thus offering unique (but unspecified) input into the 
international system because of it, is intended to evoke sentiments of patriotism, 
national pride and unity. For instance, he writes,  
 
Russia can and must play a deserving role, dictated by its 
civilizational model, great history, geography, and its cultural 
genome, which seamlessly combines the essential components of 
European civilization and the centuries-old experience of 
cooperation with the East, where new centres of economic power 
and political influence are currently developing rapidly.94 
 
This uniqueness is a key theme in all the articles and represents the basis for his 
claim that Russia is in a strong position to win the ‘global competition.’ Second, he 
is keen to accentuate the turmoil of the 1990s in order to demonstrate how his terms 
as President have brought greater stability and prosperity. Referring frequently to 
statistical data (particularly in his introductory article) that Russians’ lives have 
improved under his watch, he paints a contrastingly dark picture of the early post-
Soviet years. For instance, 
 
In the 1990s, we encountered both anarchy and oligarchy. That 
period saw the extreme shortage of responsible statesmanship… 
Today, our society is very different from what it was in the early 
2000s. Many people have become wealthier, better educated and 
more demanding.95 
 
This indicates that, unlike Yeltsin, he has demonstrated an abundance of 
‘responsible statesmanship’, and thereby brought about the increase in living 
standards. Furthermore, he portrays his work as President as defying all the odds: 
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Few people remember that in the 1990s, the most respected 
experts, and many international leaders, agreed on one prognosis 
for Russia’s future: bankruptcy and decay. The current situation in 
Russia - seen through the eyes of the 1990s – would have simply 
appeared as overoptimistic fiction.96 
 
Such statements are subtle reminders to the reader of Putin’s achievements as 
President thus far and make it appear sensible for him to continue; they are 
important rhetorical tools to persuade voters to choose him. Third, he uses 
constructions of the past as a way of placing the blame for present-day economic 
and social failings beyond his sphere of responsibility. For instance, he writes 
‘Businessmen in our society still do not feel confident. This is largely the legacy of 
the 1990s.’97 Likewise, ‘Our national and immigration problems are directly linked 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, in essence, Greater Russia, whose historic 
foundations were built back in the 18th century.’98 Such statements serve to obscure 
the fact that an inability to overcome rampant corruption and increasing xenophobic 
sentiment among the population can both be viewed as failures of the Putin regime, 
and instead places responsibility on previous governments. Overall, constructions 
of Russian history in Putin’s texts present a strong and unified country with a unique 
contribution to make to international affairs and a leader who has guided the people 
through great tumult to a better life.  
Putin envisages an important task for the citizen in Russia’s attempt to win 
the global competition: post-Soviet citizens must shake off their passive Soviet 
mentality, adapt to the new competitive environment and work hard for the good of 
the country – which includes becoming active in local governance. However, Putin 
states that this will not be easy, as many Russian citizens do not demonstrate an 
interest in public life. He writes, 
 
Behind general statements about cohesion and the benefits of 
kindness hide people’s lack of trust in each other, their reluctance 
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to engage in public affairs, to take care of others, and their inability 
to rise above their personal interests – which is a serious and a 
deep-rooted problem in our society.99     
 
Putin blames the communist legacy for this inactivity:  
 
In the early 1990s, our society consisted of people who were free 
from Communism but had not yet learned to take their lives into 
their own hands. They still expected the state to take care of 
them.100  
 
However, the post-Soviet state is qualitatively different from its Soviet predecessor, 
not least because the era of the welfare state is over. He states, ‘Welfare hand-outs 
without taking responsibility for one’s actions are simply no longer possible in the 
21st century.’101 The implication is that such hand-outs are antithetical to growth 
and that post-Soviet citizens must contribute to society in order to qualify for social 
security. This is a key neoliberal assumption about the welfare state and recalls the 
discourse promoted by international organisations. Furthermore, if citizens do not 
become more active, Russia will lose the global economic competition: ‘But the 
engine of growth must be and will be the people’s initiative…We are sure to lose if 
we rely on the passive position of the population.’102  His position implies the 
wholesale rejection of the logic of Soviet-era welfare state and the desire to 
construct a competitive, market-oriented state in which citizens operate in 
partnership with the authorities to provide services and develop the economy. In 
short, an active citizenry helps to make the state efficient domestically and 
competitive internationally. Again, this is precisely what the UN has advocated. 
However, subtle differences between the Russian and international 
discourses emerge when Putin elaborates on the shape this activity should take. 
When Putin comes to describe his ideas for civic participation in governance, his 
formulations recall the pronouncements by Khrushchev in the early post-Stalin era 
discussed above. Putin states that civic participation should consist of 
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Political involvement, civic self-government and kontrol’. Above all, 
this means wide discussion of bills, decisions, and programs taken 
on every level of state power, and the evaluation of existing laws 
and their efficient application.103 
 
In other words, citizens should be able to provide feedback to the authorities on the 
decisions they make. Thus, the familiar role of the state as decision-maker and 
citizen as watchdog discussed in the first section is preserved. For instance, he 
writes, 
 
Citizens and professional and public organisations must be able to 
'beta-test' all state documents. Even now, constructive criticisms 
from professional communities such as businesspeople, teachers 
and scientists help us avoid poor decisions and find better ones.104 
 
Civic participation, then, is seen to comprise both deliberation and assistance, and 
thus recalls and expands the Soviet-era conception of narodnyi kontrol’. The 
mechanisms that should facilitate these practices are those introduced in the 
administrative reforms: public councils,105 networks of community organisations,106 
internet fora for the discussion of proposed laws,107 online mechanisms for citizens 
to bring initiatives to the government for discussion,108 public hearings on the 
effectiveness of regional and municipal leaders,109 electronic government,110 and 
the on-going support for socially oriented NGOs.111  The following subsection 
discusses this conception of civic engagement in more detail. 
In sum, Putin’s legitimating narrative for mechanisms of civic engagement in 
governance recalls the international discourse of unstoppable forces of change 
necessitating a neoliberal reform of the public sector. However, Putin expands this 
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conception of change by emphasising its dangerous nature. This allows him to make 
patriotic statements about Russia’s ability to overcome adversity and to present 
himself as a strong leader of a unified people. I now move on to discuss the role of 
the citizen as represented in the discourse of the Annual Presidential Address and 
show in more detail its similarities with the Soviet-era discourse.  
 
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 
The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly is an annual speech by 
the President to the Federal Assembly, that is, the national legislature comprising 
the lower house (Duma) and the upper house (Federation Council), normally given 
in November or December. It is a reflection on the government’s achievements and 
significant events of the past year and highlights policy directions for the year to 
come. The status of the Address is enshrined in Article 84 of the Russian 
Constitution, which states that the President of the Russian Federation should 
‘address the Federal Assembly with annual messages on the situation in the 
country, on the guidelines of the internal and foreign policy of the State.’112 While 
contents of the Addresses are not legally binding, instructions are given to various 
government departments and the proposals made within them are often turned into 
policy.  
I have examined all six Addresses whose full transcripts are available on the 
government website, Kremlin.ru, for representations of civic engagement in 
governance, the first four of which were given by then-President Dmitry 
Medvedev.113 The 2012 and 2013 Addresses were given by Vladimir Putin after his 
return to power following the 2012 elections. While there are some small rhetorical 
differences (for instance, Medvedev tends to dwell on Russia’s current failings in 
order to rally listeners behind his programme for improvement), both leaders 
demonstrate the same view of the tasks facing Russia both domestically and 
internationally. Fundamentally, they display the same worldview that Putin 
espoused in his pre-election articles. The speeches contain reflections on the state 
of the economy, welfare, foreign policy, areas that together comprise an extensive 
‘modernisation’ strategy, which is legitimated by a desire to compete in the 
                                                          
112 Chapter Four, The Russian Constitution, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm 
(accessed 30 April 2014). 
113 See Poslaniya Federal’nomy Sobraniyu, Prezident Rossii, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/messages (accessed 30 April 2014). 
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international economic ‘race’, success at which depends in great measure on active 
citizens.  Statements intended to rally listeners around this strategy are ubiquitous 
across the six speeches; however, as I have discussed the ideas of competition in 
the global economy in detail above, in this section I focus on the role of the citizen 
in this process. Excluding references to certain specific events of that year, such as 
the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, the forest fires of 2010, and the civil 
unrest in 2011 and 2012, there is a substantial level of continuity across all 
speeches, particularly with regard to the role of the citizen in governance, and it is 
possible to trace how these ideas are developed into concrete policies over the 
course of the years.  
As already mentioned, the idea of an active citizenry is central to the 
Kremlin’s vision of national renewal; it is presented as a precondition for all other 
reforms. However, there is clear recognition that the current condition of society is 
lacking. In 2009, Medvedev stated, ‘Obviously, the implementation of our strategic 
plans is impossible without a full-scale change in society.’114 As such, policies had 
to be developed which fostered the creation of the active citizen. Three years later, 
Putin claimed, ‘It is precisely in civic responsibility, in patriotism, that I see the basis 
of our policies.’115 The linking of civic engagement to patriotism reinforces the 
assumption of consensus between citizens and the government regarding the 
national development strategy. This strategy conceives of the individual as the 
primary source of energy and ideas who can create innovations that benefit the 
economy and advance Russia internationally. The assumption is that citizens will 
invest their energy into state-designed goals and programmes.  Thus, a vital task 
for the Kremlin was to foster the creation of individuals who would be likely to help 
Russia become competitive.  
 According to the Kremlin, civic engagement in governance should be based 
on Russia’s historic traditions. In a rare discussion of democracy, the on-going 
monitoring of the authorities is seen as part of a uniquely Russian tradition of 
governance, and one that should be developed and extended. In 2012, Putin stated, 
 
Russian democracy is the rule (vlast’) of the Russian people, with 
its own traditions of national government. It is not the 
                                                          
114 Federal Assembly 2009. 
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146 
 
implementation of standards imposed on us from outside… 
Democracy is not only an opportunity to choose the government, 
but the power to constantly monitor (kontrolirovat’) and evaluate 
the results of its work. We should devote more attention to the 
development of direct democracy [priyamoi demokratii], of direct 
rule by the people [neposredstvennogo narodovlastiya]…116  
 
Two formulations of direct democracy are used here, the first utilising a semantic 
translation of the Greek and now global concept, democracy, and the second 
employing a more traditional Russian formulation taken from people (narod) and 
power (vlast’), whose roots lie in the thought of the early democratic slavophiles of 
the Nineteenth Century.117 The first evokes a Western ensemble of democratic 
practices, while the latter evokes the idea of a people unified with the authorities, of 
a consensual operation of power. By listing one after the other, Putin is also 
equating them. This plays down any links between civic participation and 
competitive or electoral democracy and instead places the emphasis on traditional 
Russian governance norms. 
The idea of civic engagement as citizens unified among themselves and with 
the state is developed later in the same speech. Putin states, ‘The norms of civic 
engagement are developing. People are begin to relate their lives and their work to 
caring for others, the aspirations of the people (narod) and the interests of the 
state.’118 Here, Putin presents the interests of state and society as being the same 
and civic engagement means the carrying out of these interests. The implication is 
that the role of the citizens is to join together with the authorities in order to fulfil 
centrally-determined tasks. Crucially, it recalls the consensual relationship 
embodied in the concepts of rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’ discussed in the first 
section – but expands it to include the execution of the will of the state. 
Three reasons are given for the importance of increasing the role of citizens 
in governance. Firstly and most centrally, as mentioned above, citizens are seen as 
a cornerstone of economic development, as the people who will come up with the 
ideas, inventions and discoveries that will help Russia gain its competitive edge 
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Russia and the Idea of Europe (London: Routledge, 1996). 
118 Federal Assembly 2012. 
147 
 
internationally. While they should be autonomous and independent, not waiting for 
‘state tutelage’, they should also realise that if they are successful, the state too will 
be successful.119 Thus, part of their motivation to succeed should come from the 
desire to advance their nation. Secondly, civic participation is also seen as an anti-
corruption measure: ‘Necessary for the effective fight against corruption is active 
civic participation and effective obshchestvennyi kontrol’.’120 Corruption is described 
as a scourge, as a social ill that requires all hands on deck in order to defeat it and 
implies that citizens should be able to monitor state activity, much the same as the 
Soviet citizen inspectors. Thirdly, citizen involvement in governance is considered 
a means for shrinking the Soviet-era bureaucracy and making it more efficient. 
NGOs are seen as important service providers thanks to their high levels of 
expertise: 
 
In modernizing the system of public services, we must pay special 
attention to the provision of social services. I think that we need to 
get NGOs on board here. They often know the situation on the 
ground better than the authorities and have unique experience in 
helping people in difficult situations.121 
 
In order to achieve these three goals, the later speeches call for the introduction of 
numerous measures through which citizens can become involved in governance. 
As discussed in Chapter One, these can be split into three categories: the PCB 
network, socially oriented NGOs and e-government. Each involves a slightly 
different relationship between the authorities and the citizens. The PCB network is 
intended to monitor the authorities and combat corruption; e-government is intended 
to bring the mechanisms of the state closer to its citizens and expose corruption; 
NGOs are intended to perform tasks on behalf of the state, reducing inefficiency 
and state bureaucracy. Taken together they demonstrate a clear role for the citizen 
in governance: to assist the state in the fulfilment of pre-determined tasks. The 
distinction between state decision-maker and citizen assistant remains.  
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Conclusion 
 In this section, I have shown that Putin represents the citizen’s role in 
governance as a patriotic duty to help the state become more globally competitive. 
This role is justified with recourse to the idea that the old welfare regime needs to 
be dismantled and new market mechanisms must be introduced, a narrative that 
directly recalls the discourse of the intergovernmental institutions discussed in 
section two. In both Russian state and international discourses, increasing 
involvement by citizens should decrease corruption, reform the bloated state 
bureaucracy and enhance innovation.  In contrast to the international discourse, 
however, Putin’s discourse has a strong normative understanding of the relationship 
between the citizen and the authorities: the citizen should unite with the state to fulfil 
common tasks which have been decided by the state for the benefit of all. This 
conception has its roots in Soviet discourses of narodnyi kontrol’, which had a 
similar understanding of the citizen’s duty vis-à-vis the state: both contemporary and 
Soviet conceptions saw the citizen as the state’s assistant; however, in Putin’s 
version, the citizen must not merely ensure that state orders are being fulfilled but 
also orient her actions to the interests of the state more broadly. Furthermore, 
Putin’s affirmation of Russia’s great history and unique culture, his use of words and 
phrases that evoke Russia’s own traditions of governance as opposed to Western 
ones, and his authoritative self-positioning as obvious leader in his pre-election 
articles (despite the fact that the elections had not yet occurred) all echo elements 
of Soviet-era governance. This make it easy for Russian listeners to accept the 
slippages between discourses of neoliberal state restructuring and narodnyi’ 
kontrol’. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored the Kremlin’s discourse of civic engagement 
in governance, presented its legitimating narrative for the introduction of new 
participatory mechanisms and have shown that the roots of this discourse lie in 
elements of Soviet-era and international discourses of governance.  
To consider the contemporary discourse, civic engagement in governance is 
portrayed as the duty of patriotic citizens who join forces with the authorities in order 
to produce innovations and perform socially beneficial tasks. It presupposes a 
consensual relationship among citizens as well as between citizens and the 
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authorities. This  builds on the Soviet-era discourse of narodnyi kontrol’, which 
conceived of citizens as volunteer administrators for the authorities, checking the 
implementation of state policy and channelling public opinion regarding policy back 
to the authorities. In both discourses, the relationship between citizens and the state 
is conceived as harmonious and apolitical. Since citizens do not have the 
opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of the authorities or the decisions they make, 
state and society become a single collective directed by the authorities. 
Furthermore, the use of the concept obshchestvennyi kontrol’ to capture the 
practices of civic participation in contemporary Russia makes a direct link with the 
Soviet past, which used concepts of rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’ to refer to 
activities of checking, monitoring and assisting local authorities.  
Considering the legitimating narrative, I have shown that the Kremlin’s vision 
is legitimated according to a rationale of economic competitiveness: citizens are 
encouraged to believe that public activity leads to self-improvement, which in turn 
means that the country will gain a competitive edge internationally. This is what sets 
the contemporary discourse apart from its Soviet predecessor. As such, citizens are 
exhorted to shake off Soviet era passivity and get involved in governance, since 
civic engagement is the cornerstone of a successful state. The proposed 
institutional innovations aimed at increasing civic participation are presented as a 
strategy intended to decrease corruption, down-size the Soviet-era public sector 
and stimulate innovative policy. They thus recall the neoliberal reform agendas 
advanced by the intergovernmental organisations, which presented civic 
participation in governance as a central element of good governance, defined as a 
means to enhance economic development. I argued that Russia has been 
influenced by this discourse through on-going engagement with these 
organisations. The use of this discourse as a legitimating narrative demonstrates 
that the emergence of PCBs should be seen as part of the market reform of the 
Russian public sector: the Kremlin explicitly places the development of PCBs in the 
context of bureaucratic reform. 
This discussion of the combination of Soviet-era and international discourses 
in contemporary Russian discourses of civic engagement highlights two further 
points. First, it draws attention to the lasting legacy of Soviet modes of thinking and 
being on contemporary political actors. The fact that Russia’s leaders encourage 
citizens to abandon their Soviet mentality by engaging in practices that directly recall 
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Soviet-era governance demonstrates that although Marxist-Leninist ideology has 
been discredited, the practices and identities forged through this ideology continue 
to be reproduced in contemporary social life. Second, it demonstrates the enormous 
flexibility and resilience of the neoliberal project. It shows that market principles can 
even be combined with elements of ideas that were once considered their polar 
opposites, Soviet collectivism. As mentioned in the introduction, this suggests that 
there is a certain amount of congruence between the two discourses: both conceive 
of citizens as willing assistants to the state. In the following chapter I give a deeper 
exposition of the concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, as it is understood both by 
the Kremlin and by civic groups. I show that the Kremlin’s conception is consistent 
with its broader discourse of civic engagement discussed in this chapter, but that 
some citizens’ groups have operationalised a considerably more confrontational 
conception in order to challenge the Putin regime. It is, however, the Kremlin’s 
version that has been codified in law.
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Chapter Four: Hegemony 
 
The concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and the discourse of civic 
participation in governance have been operationalised by social groups and 
activists since the collapse of the Soviet Union to campaign for social change, hold 
corrupt authorities to account and encourage other citizens to become politically 
engaged. Similar in many ways to the Factory Commissions in the early days of the 
revolution, activists have been creating their own institutions that enact an 
autonomous understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, one which envisages a 
critical, empowered public, able to constrain state power and hold it accountable 
before the law. However, similar to the response by the Bolsheviks to the Factory 
Commissions, the present-day authorities have mostly succeeded in co-opting this 
grass-roots discourse and gutting the corresponding institutions of their 
independence.  The Kremlin, advocating a harmonious relationship between the 
authorities and citizens with the latter subservient to the former (as discussed in the 
previous chapter), has recently legally enshrined the possible operationalisations of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in order to fix the field of meaning of the discourse, and 
hence the practices, of civic engagement in governance. In this way, despite 
sporadic challenges of various intensities ‘from below’, this conception remains 
hegemonic. 
What is understood by ‘hegemony’ in this context? According to CDA, it is a 
‘struggle for the dominance of political language.'1 In other words, it is the ideological 
work conducted in the public sphere by competing groups who are ‘seeking to 
universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and maintaining 
dominance.’2 This conception draws heavily on Antonio Gramsci who saw 
hegemony as the ongoing manufacture of public consent in the incumbent regime 
by everyday cultural machines. He saw this consent as being forged in the populace 
through their socialisation and participation in orthodox social institutions, such as 
schools, churches and trade unions.3 Thus, part of maintaining the socio-political 
status quo involves practices of ‘cultural and ethical engineering, the reshaping of 
                                                          
1 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? pp. 3. 
2 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, pp. 58. 
3 See J. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary 
Process (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 26. 
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subjectivities or ‘selves’’ to educate citizens in actively upholding the existing order.4 
This desire to ‘reshape subjectivities’ is evident in the Kremlin’s discourse of civic 
participation, which, as shown in the previous chapter, seeks to mould citizens into 
engaged but obedient assistants. In order for alternative representations to 
overthrow the dominant discourse, Gramsci states that ‘a war of position’ must be 
waged in the public sphere; that is, an on-going, organised movement among 
everyday citizens that encourages them to question their consent and to create 
alternative, independent institutions.  
This chapter investigates the struggle between citizens and authorities over 
the meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. It examines both the ‘war of position’ on 
the Kremlin’s usage of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ by activists, social movements and 
NGOs, as well as the ways in which the Kremlin co-opts organic civic movements 
by redefining and codifying the concepts they use. It therefore undertakes two 
parallel tasks: first, it shows how citizen initiatives both represent alternative 
conceptions of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in discourse and operationalise them 
through grass-roots institutions and, second, it traces processes of subordination of 
‘bottom-up’ discourses to the state’s hegemonic conceptions through the 
codification in law of the practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first part, I trace the first 
institutionalisation of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ into the Russian legal codex through 
an examination of Law No. 76 ‘On the Public Scrutiny (Obshchestvennom Kontrole) 
of the Protection of Human Rights in Places of Detention and Assistance to Persons 
in Places of Detention’. I show how what began as a citizens’ initiative to monitor 
conditions in prisons was co-opted into the state-run PCB network. In the second 
part, I examine the mass citizens’ movement to conduct obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
of the December 2010 and March 2011 elections, paying particular attention to civic 
understandings of this concept. I show that these understandings played a key role 
in the mobilisation of citizens in the wake of the elections, which led to a dual-
pronged response by the authorities, on the one hand making modest concessions 
to the movement, on the other passing legislation to deter further protests. In the 
third part, I outline the development of the draft law ‘On the Foundations of 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian Federation’, and argue that it is an attempt 
to fix the meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, and thereby maintain the hegemony 
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of state discourse of civic engagement. The chapter shows how citizens’ attempts 
to put into practice a critical understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ are cop-
opted by the state and re-defined in law to become mechanisms of authoritarian 
neoliberal governance.5 
 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ of Prisons 
 
The first institutionalisation of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in Russian legislation 
sought to codify the practice of monitoring prison conditions, which human rights 
activists (pravozashchitniki) had been conducting informally since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Conceptualised by activists during the liberal, unrestrained 
political atmosphere of the mid 1990s and introduced into the Duma in 1999, the bill 
was passed back and forth between its authors, the Duma and the Federation 
Council for nearly ten years before then-President Dmitry Medvedev eventually 
signed its third incarnation into law in June 2008. Law No. 76 ‘On Obshchestvennyi 
Kontrol’ of the Protection of Human Rights in Places of Detention and Assistance to 
Persons in Places of Detention’ authorised the creation of Public Monitoring 
Commissions (Obshchestvennyye Nabliudatel’nyye Komissii) through which NGO 
members could oversee conditions in prisons and other places of detention. The 
history of the development of this law exemplifies both the tension between state 
and non-state understandings of the practice of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and the 
process of state-driven co-optation of civic initiatives. In this section, I detail this 
history, showing how what began as a project to create an independent institution 
through which civic activists could hold prison authorities accountable to the law 
ended up as another node in the network of authoritarian neoliberal governance. 
The final version of the law has enshrined a conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
which prioritised sodeistviye (assistance) over scrutiny, as well as eviscerated 
PMCs’ independence by allowing the authorities to retain a substantial amount of 
                                                          
5 It is important to remember that the civic operationalisations of obshchestvennnyi kontrol’ I discuss 
below are prominent moments of conceptual struggle that have shaped state discourse surrounding 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and have resulted in federal-level legislative action by the state. The 
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Kontrol’ (Citizens’ Oversight) and Fond “Obshchestvennyi Verdikt” (Public Verdict Foundation). 
They, as well as other NGOs, frequently work together with local, regional and in some cases federal 
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albeit modestly. The examples discussed here I consider to be central to understanding the ‘struggle 
for meaning’ over the concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, not representative of civic engagement 
with the authorities as such. 
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control over membership selection processes and removing some of their critical 
functions.  
Russian prisons are infamously squalid: their appearance has changed little 
since the GULAG was dismantled in 1956.6 Tuberculosis and other infectious 
diseases are rife, a significant number of inmates are living with HIV/AIDS, 
corruption among prison authorities is widespread, and while instances of torture 
are decreasing, it is still 'far from rare.'7 Police arrest almost 2 million people per 
year, with over a quarter of a million held in pre-trial detention centres that are often 
very overcrowded. While a quarter of those are later released, it is not uncommon 
to remain in custody awaiting trial for three years before going to court.8 From an 
international comparative perspective, the number of people behind bars per 
100,000 is higher only in the USA.9 
As discussed in the previous chapter, international discourses of governance 
were important in bolstering domestic institutional development. On 28 February 
1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe and was encouraged to adopt the 
European Prison Rules, which set out a list of recommendations for the humane 
management of prisons. The recommendations began with an acknowledgement of 
the necessity to respect prisoners' human rights and included a clause stating, 'The 
conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners shall be monitored by an 
independent body or bodies whose findings shall be made public.'10 This 
encouraged activists – who had been visiting prisons unofficially throughout the 
1990s – to begin the process of legally instating institutions, which would fulfil this 
criterion.11 
There were four main proponents of the law on Public Monitoring 
Commissions, Andrey Babushkin, Valentin Gefter, Valery Borshchyov and Lev 
Ponomaryov, each of whom were liberal-leaning, pro-democracy activists, and had 
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been involved in progressive politics since the perestroika era, if not earlier. 
Babushkin initiated the development of the bill on prison inspectors and, authored 
the first draft in collaboration with a liberal-minded judge. In 1997, Borshchyov 
introduced it into the State Duma, where it garnered the support of over 300 
members of the various political parties.12 The bill suggested the creation of a 
federal-level prison-monitoring organisation that would be composed of 50 
volunteers from NGOs specialising in prisoners’ rights and appointed by the Federal 
Human Rights Ombudsman. The volunteers were to operationalise 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ by making planned and unplanned inspections of prisons 
and other detention centres, publishing reports based on their findings and making 
recommendations to the authorities for improvement. This conception drew much 
inspiration from the Inspectorate of Prisons for England and Wales, an independent 
body whose Chief Inspector is appointed by and answerable to the UK’s Justice 
Secretary; it was given as an example of good practice by Borshchyov during the 
bill’s first reading.13 
 Government departments were split over the proposals. At first, the Prison 
Service itself was supportive as they saw the volunteers as a means to lessen their 
own workload, initially offering to include the volunteers in discussions about 
parole14 (although this later changed due to conflict between head of the Prison 
Service Yuri Kalinin and several prominent human rights activists including the bill’s 
authors15). President Yeltsin’s view was largely negative, as the law invested a large 
amount of power in the Human Rights Ombudsman, a post that should function 
independently of the government. The Ombudsman at the time was Oleg Mironov, 
a member of the Communist Party, and the President was reluctant to strengthen 
his position.16 The Duma as a whole was sceptical of the role invested by the bill in 
NGOs, believing that non-state institutions did not have the right to interfere with 
                                                          
12 'Pravozashchitniki “probyvayut bresh'” v penitentsiarnoi sisteme: Kogo budut kontrolirovat' 
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government activities.17 Already it was becoming clear that the government saw 
citizen inspectors as valuable only insofar as they could assist them in their work; 
provisions in the law that suggested independence and critical capacity were 
eschewed. 
Various incarnations were debated throughout the end of the 1990s and 
beginning of 2000s but stalled chiefly due to disagreements on the way the 
Commissions should be formed. In response to the government’s concerns 
regarding the Ombudsman, Borshchyov had presented a model that devolved PMC 
formation to the regional level. However, this version was also rejected by the Duma 
as Yeltsin had made it known that he favoured a federal-level institution: devolution 
would have given regional governors, rather than central authorities, influence over 
the formation and activities of the commissions. 
Discussions were eventually put on hold in 2003. In the following years, 
discourses of democracy and human rights were subjected to increasing attacks by 
the political mainstream: regional gubernatorial elections were abolished, members 
of the Federation Council were appointed directly by the President, and the Duma 
was transformed into a ‘rubber stamp’ organisation for the approval of the Kremlin's 
initiatives.18 Furthermore, the attitude towards non-governmental organisations also 
changed, as exemplified in Vladislav Surkov’s so-called ‘Fifth Column’ interview, in 
which he slammed liberals and fascists as ‘having more and more in common with 
each other as time goes by.’19 In 2006, burdensome reporting requirements for 
NGOs with heavy penalties were introduced and a media campaign spearheaded 
by the FSB vilified NGOs associated with Western actors. 
Nonetheless, in 2007, state interest was renewed in the bill as discourses of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and civic engagement in governance were popularised 
through the administrative reforms.20 An important amendment was made to the bill, 
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which linked PMCs to the growing network of PCBs: the recently created Federal 
Public Chamber, a third of whose members are directly chosen by the President, 
was to appoint the PMC volunteers. This amendment was seen by the human rights 
community to have serious potential consequences for the Commissions' 
independence.21 As discussed in Chapter One, the Public Chamber is the first and 
most influential of Russia’s corporatist bodies and aims to unify government and 
non-government interests in a ‘social partnership.’22 According to a member of 
Moscow PMC, 'Public Chambers want to enrol people in the commissions who will 
be peaceful and won’t make a fuss.'23 The Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir 
Lukin, by contrast, is very well-regarded by the human rights community24 and the 
Ombudsman institution is generally seen as more active and independent than the 
Public Chamber and may have encouraged a more critical PMC membership.25 
However, the shift of responsibility from the Ombudsman to the Chamber satisfied 
sceptics in the Duma and Federation Council and the bill became law the following 
year. 
As it stands, Law No. 76 allows members of organisations whose charter 
specifies protecting rights (up to two from each organisation) to submit an 
application to the Public Chamber to join a PMC through which members enact 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of prisons. This involves checking there is adequate food, 
space, medical facilities, and so on, making recommendations to prison authorities 
for improvement, and assisting them in the enforcement of human rights. This is to 
be done via the inspection of detention facilities, followed by the preparation of 
recommendations for improvement to the facility authorities, and the handling of 
complaints from inmates. In these respects, the law does not diverge from the initial 
proposals made by Borshchyov and his colleagues. 
                                                          
21 ‘Kontrol’ Prav Cheloveka v Tyur’me Otdadut pod Ontvestvennost’ Obshchestvennoi Palate’, 
Polit.ru, 16 April 2008,  http://polit.ru/news/2008/04/16/op/ (accessed 23 August 2013). 
22 A. Sungurov, ‘Instituty Mediatory v Sovermennoi Rossii: Sluchai Saratovsoi Oblasti’, Politeks, 
Vol. 8, No. 4 (2012); see also J. Richter, ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chamber and 
the Russian Regions’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 56, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2009); E. 
Belokurova, ‘NGOs and Politics in Russia’s Regions’ in V. Gel’man C. and Ross (eds.) The Politics 
of Subnational Authoritarianism in Russia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) pp. 116. 
23 Interview M12. 
24 Interview M15. 
25 L. Petrova and A. Sungurov, ‘Instituty- Posredniki Mezhdu Organami Vlasti I Obshchestvom: 
Sluchai Sankt-Peterburga’, Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo i Munitsipal’nogo Upravleniya’ (2012) No. 
2; A. Sungurov, O. Zakharova, L. Petrova and N. Raspopov, ‘Instituty Mediatory i ikh Razvitiye v 
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158 
 
However, the law eviscerated the independence of the commissions in six 
ways, and ensured that this operationalisation remained hegemonic by preventing 
activists from performing obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of prisons if they do not belong 
to a PMC. First, it states that, on one hand, PMC members’ main task is to monitor 
Russia’s detention centres and publish recommendations for improvement based 
on their findings, on the other, PMCs are ‘to promote the implementation of the state 
policy in the field of human rights in places of detention.’26 It is not clear how an 
institution intended to promote state policy can independently monitor it at the same 
time. This contradiction reinforces public inspectors as assistants to the state, not 
as the independent watchdogs conceived by the pravozashchitniki. In this sense, it 
recalls the Soviet conceptions of kontrol’ as accounting discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
Second, compounding their status as assistants, the law requires PMC 
members to work closely with a string of government bodies: the prison authorities, 
with whom PMC members must discuss any immediate complaints and 
recommendations, as well as arrange visits; the regional executive authorities, 
which handle more serious complaints by the PMC regarding violations at the 
facility; the regional Public Chamber which organises training seminars and round 
tables and which can be involved in the selection process; and the human rights 
ombudsman, who provides material and other support. This close and often 
integrated work with government bodies means, first, that it is in the Public 
Chamber’s interests to select members with whom they know the authorities can 
work well and, second, that it becomes much more difficult for PMC members to 
take a critical position on conditions inside detention facilities. The risk is that PMCs 
become co-opted into the very institution that they have been created to monitor.  
Third, it does not contain a definition of ‘human rights organisation’ - and most 
organisations claim to protect the rights of their members. As such, organisations 
which have at best a tangential relation to human rights work – and at worst, may 
actively hinder the protection of human rights in prisons – have been accepted into 
the commissions, thereby affecting the capacity for the PMC to act efficiently and 
independently. For instance, during the selection process of the second convocation 
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of PMCs in 2010, human rights activists were rejected in favour of members of 
organisations for veterans of law enforcement agencies, among which is the 
Federal Penitentiary Service, the very institution the PMCs are supposed to be 
monitoring.27  
Fourth, in one paragraph the law states that PMC members can arrive for an 
inspection without prior warning, but in another paragraph it contradicts itself and 
states that prior warning must be given before PMC members arrive at a detention 
centre for a spot check. According to this paragraph, a letter must be sent in 
advance stating the time of the visit, the intended goals and the full names of the 
inspectors. As a result, different practices have developed in different regions, with 
some facilities demanding a whole day's notice, thus giving authorities the chance 
to put things in order before the inspectors arrive.28 It also gives grounds for 
authorities to refuse the inspectors entry to the facility or make life hard for them in 
other ways.29 
Fifth, the final version of the law removed the possibility for PMC members 
to talk to inmates without a member of prison staff present. This has made it very 
difficult for inmates to lodge a complaint without fear of reprisal by prison guards 
afterwards. In the words of one St Petersburg PMC member, 'Whichever inmate 
dares to tell of any crimes will pay for it later.'30 
Sixth, the fact that NGOs must cover the expenses of PMC members from 
their organisation means that those with few funds can take part. The most well-
funded organisations tend to be veterans’ organisations and women's groups from 
the Soviet era with close links to the government and will therefore be less likely to 
enact a critical public scrutiny of detention facilities. 
When the law was passed, Borshchyov called it 'very, very spoilt'.31 
Prominent activist and Russia's first human rights ombudsman, Sergei Kovalyov, 
called it 'emasculated'.32 In autumn 2010, after the second round of PMC members 
were selected with more former officials in the Commissions, a group of activists 
from Memorial wrote a letter to the Public Chamber highlighting the difference 
                                                          
27 Memorial, 'Appeal to the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation', 
http://www.memo.ru/eng/news/2010/11/17/1711103.htm (accessed 13 April 2013). 
28 Interview SPB5. 
29 Interview SPB6. 
30 Interview SPB7.  
31 'Razvorot: Yest' Li Prava Zakliuchyonnykh?' Ekho Moskvy, 23 April 2008, 
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/509516-echo/  (accessed 13 April 2013). 
32 'Pravozashchitniki “probyvayut bresh'”' Informatsionno-politicheskii Biulleten' Partii Yabloko. 
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between state and non-state conceptions of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, asking it to 
remember that  
 
The spirit and meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ consist in 
defending the rights of people deprived of freedom, not in 
guaranteeing membership in public commissions to the power 
structures in order to control these very commissions.33  
 
Overall, there are currently 729 PMC members working in 79 Russian regions,34 of 
whom 20% are considered by human rights activists to be 'independent' – that is, 
not affiliated in some way with the Federal Penitentiary Service.35 Fewer than 20 
commissions have any independent members at all.36 There are three regions that 
do not yet have a commission, and in some regions there are so few people that it 
is impossible to visit all the facilities.37 And the second composition 'is full of very 
conservative people'38; as such, there have been fewer overall recommendations 
by PMC members to the authorities for improvements within prisons since the 
Commissions’ second term began.39 
In sum, the conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ codified in the law differs 
substantially from that campaigned for by human rights activists during the 1990s. 
The ‘bottom-up’ understanding, which envisaged obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
performed by a critical and independent body capable of holding detention centre 
authorities to account, has been undermined by the creation of institutions that 
endorse the status quo. This has been achieved by linking the bodies to the existing 
PCB network, requiring them to work as assistants to the Federal Penitentiary 
Service and enabling former prison officials to stand in the commissions, as well as 
through the vague and contradictory wording of the law. As such, obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’, as enshrined in the law, refers to a set of practices through which citizens 
can support the Federal Penitentiary Service in the operations of Russia’s prisons, 
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35 Interview M10. 
36 Interview M14. 
37 M.  Solopov, ‘Partii Otpravyat v Kolonii’, Gazeta.ru, 15th March 2013, 
http://m.gazeta.ru/social/2013/03/14/5057581.shtml (accessed 15th April 2013). 
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almost as volunteer branches. A PMC’s critical capacity now depends on how far 
individual members have the time and psychological resilience to confront 
negligence, rather than legally enshrined critical capacity (though I show in Chapter 
Five that active members can still influence state practices inside prisons). What 
began as a movement for critical civic engagement in governance ended in the 
creation of another node in the network of authoritarian neoliberal governance. 
Furthermore, this law, as the first inscription of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ into the 
legal codex, set a precedent for the codification of this concept in other spheres of 
governance and the co-optation of other bottom-up initiatives of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ into the PCB network. In the following section, I discuss citizens’ discourse 
and operationalisation of this concept in detail. 
 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ of Elections 
 
The discourse advanced by the citizen-led movement to monitor the 
December 2011 Parliamentary and March 2012 Presidential elections represents a 
second example of a ‘bottom-up’ conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ that 
promoted a critical, rather than co-operative, relationship between citizen monitors 
and the authorities. However, this time, instead of promotion by a group of 
professional experts used to dealing with the state, this discourse was 
operationalised via ‘unprecedented’ numbers of regular citizens who signed up to 
become election observers.40 Alongside other semiotic strategies promoted by the 
anti-systemic opposition in the run-up to the elections (such as the diffusion across 
the internet of the slogans, ‘Vote for any party but United Russia’ and ‘United Russia 
– the Party of Crooks and Thieves’), the promotion of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of 
elections served to engage large numbers of citizens in the political process. The 
dissemination of reports of widespread electoral fraud helped to fuel growing anti-
Putin sentiment across Russian society, particularly among the urban middle 
classes who felt disillusioned with Medvedev’s empty rhetoric on modernization and 
the rule of law and betrayed by the Kremlin’s revelation that Medvedev had agreed 
to step aside for Putin to return to the Presidency.41 Taken together, the opposition-
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led mobilisation of discourses of civic engagement helped to engender the largest 
mass demonstrations since the collapse of the Soviet Union and brought about 
some modest political concessions by the regime (as well as more restrictive 
legislation).42 This contrasts sharply with the Kremlin-led representation that civic 
engagement in politics consists of citizens assisting the authorities. 
In this section, I focus on the discourse of citizen observers of the elections, 
interrogating the meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as they employ it. Since 
citizens’ groups, media outlets and bloggers have produced vast amounts of 
discourse on this subject during this time, I have chosen to examine a single text, 
which I consider to be a paradigmatic example of citizen-led conceptions of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’. The text is a book entitled Razgnevannyye Nablyudateli 
(Angry Observers), a collection of citizen observers’ experiences published by the 
first citizens’ election monitory group, Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ (Citizen Observer).43 
Following Norman Fairclough, I have separated my analysis of its meaning into 
three analytical moments: the production of the text, the text itself and the reception 
of the text.44 This tripartite approach to meaning raises three corresponding 
questions: first, what is known about the authors, i.e., the citizen observers, (and 
other questions of intentionality); second, what meanings are contained within the 
text itself; and, third, how has it been received, i.e., who are the readers, and how 
have they rearticulated these meanings. Such an approach, consistent with CDA 
epistemology, highlights the co-constitutive relationship between discourse and 
action. In other words, it enables me to explore the subaltern meaning of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’, show how it was put into practice by activists, and 
consider the effects these practices had on the both on the governing practices of 
the regime and on its conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. 
In what follows below, I answer these questions in reverse order. With the 
aim of first giving some political context to the text before approaching the meanings 
contained within it, I discuss the political events surrounding its publication, showing 
how the practice of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of elections and the dissemination of 
information about violations led to street protests. I then analyse the chosen text in 
                                                          
42 L. Shevtsova, ‘Putinism Under Siege: Implosion, Atrophy or Revolution?’, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, (July 2012); G. Robertson, ‘Russian Protesters: Not Optimistic But Here to Stay’, 
Russian Analytical Digest, No. 115, 20 June 2012. 
43 D. Antonov, (ed.), Razgnevannyye Nablyudateli: Fal’sifikatsii Parlamentskikh Vyborov Glazami 
Ochevidtsev, (Moscow: Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye, 2012). 
44 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, pp. 10. 
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detail, sketching out the representations of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ contained 
within it.  I finish with reflections on the identities of the citizen observers themselves. 
I show that rather than the consensual relationship between citizens and the 
authorities implicit within the Kremlin’s representation of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, 
here the understanding is critical and antagonistic, with the concept conceived as a 
means for holding the authorities accountable to the law and, if necessary, forcing 
them to alter their behaviour in accordance with it.  Observers who had not 
necessarily been activists prior to the elections in several cases became politicised 
as a result of their experiences. 
The Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ project is situated clearly within the context of 
Russia’s anti-systemic opposition. In August 2011, the liberal, regime-critical 
newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, and Russia’s only domestic independent election-
monitoring organisation, GOLOS, set up Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ through which 
grass-roots, non-party organisations were established across the country with the 
aim of training citizen volunteers to enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of the voting 
process at polling stations that winter. In the run up to the parliamentary elections 
on December 4, the volunteers were provided with training in Russian electoral law, 
how to monitor both ballot casting and vote counting and how to handle perceived 
violations. On the day, observers were sent in groups of three to polling stations, a 
support hotline was set up, and ‘mobile groups’ of volunteers were dispatched to 
provide physical assistance to observers in problem polling stations.45 According to 
the project’s website, more than one thousand citizen observers took part in the 
monitory process with Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ during the December elections.46   
The volunteers recorded numerous violations, including ballot stuffing, 
miscounting of the ballots by polling station staff and ‘carousel voting’ (the practice 
of bussing voters from polling station to polling station in order to cast votes at 
each)47, writing formal complaints to both local electoral commissions and the 
Central Electoral Commission, in some instances notifying the police.48 However, 
such complaints were frequently inconsequential. Much more effectual was the 
dissemination of violations in the media, thereby raising public consciousness and 
eventually forcing the government to respond. Since NGOs are barred from 
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monitoring elections in Russia, observers had to sign up either through political 
parties or as media representatives.49 Thus, numerous volunteers operated through 
Novaya Gazeta, effectively giving the newspaper volunteer correspondents in a 
larger number of polling stations than it would normally have had the resources to 
cover. The findings were published widely, with Novaya Gazeta and other 
opposition-minded publications posting live updates with details of violations on 
their websites50 (and with several shut down for a number of hours on Election Day 
due to a ‘Denial of Service’ attack51). GOLOS set up a crowd-sourcing site to which 
citizens could send details of violations and received 7801 submissions from across 
the Federation.52 Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ encouraged its volunteers to write a 
report of the day’s events, 21 of which were published in Razgnevannyye 
Nablyudateli in January, partly as an attempt to recruit more volunteers for the 
Presidential elections two months later. The Russian blogosphere, already well 
known for being extremely active and highly politicised, was awash with testimonies 
and reports from other observers.53 That there were citizen observers monitoring 
violations and reporting them to independent organisations undoubtedly increased 
the number of violations recorded and fuelled the calls for new elections. The 
discourse they produced was rearticulated through popular media outlets, thus 
helping to throw the legitimacy of the elections into question in the eyes of rapidly 
growing numbers of citizens and was used by opposition groups to encourage 
voters to voice their anger through street protests.54 In other words, the discourse 
translated into action. 
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Less than a week later, on 10 December, mass demonstrations were held in 
99 cities across Russia55 under the banner of ‘Za Chestnyye Vybory’ (For Honest 
Elections), with the central Moscow event attracting up to 150 thousand people.56 
Even the mainstream, state-controlled media, which does not normally report on 
such events, gave the protests primetime coverage.57 More protests followed that 
winter, fuelling an increase in the idea of public scrutiny of elections. In January, 
other groups claiming to enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of the electoral process 
were created by opposition leaders, such as Liga Izbiratelei (Voters’ League) by 
Boris Akunin and Leonid Parfyonov58 and RosVybory (RussElections) by Alexey 
Navalnyi.59 Together with Grazhdanin Nabyuldatel’, they encouraged citizens to sign 
up to monitor the Presidential elections on 4 March. 
The Kremlin sought to harness the activism resulting from this citizen-
articulated discourse of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ by facilitating the establishment of 
pro-Putin monitoring groups with names that mimicked the slogans employed by 
the protest movement, such as ‘Za Chistyye Vybory’ (For Clean Elections).60 It also 
responded to the accusations of electoral manipulation by investing 15 billion 
roubles (more than the election itself cost in total61) in installing two web cameras in 
each of Russia’s 95,000 polling stations before the presidential election, one 
directed towards the places where voters cast their ballots and the other towards 
the place where the vote-counting should take place after voting had closed.62 The 
recordings were then to be live-streamed to YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and to a 
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specially created website, webvybory2012.ru.63 According to Putin, the cameras 
would record all traces of foul play64, although critics claimed that the technology 
was not advanced enough to capture the high-quality images required to prove that 
violations had occurred.65 The introduction of these measures was undoubtedly an 
attempt to mobilise against the perceived resonance of civic conceptions of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’. 
The campaigns to recruit citizen observers were highly successful: according 
Forbes Russia, nearly 690,000 people were registered as observers for one of the 
five candidates standing in the elections. Among this figure, 57,500 people were 
working with the non-systemic opposition, such as liberal party Yabloko and the 
opposition-minded monitory projects66, and 95,000 with the pro-Putin 
organisations.67 The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) recruited 
304,000 citizen observers, the largest number of all parties.68 International 
observers numbered approximately 600.69 However, while GOLOS recorded 6491 
violations during the Presidential elections,70 Za Chistyye Vybory recorded only 
1,821,71 figures that belie the political agendas of both groups. 
The high level of interest in election monitoring and the protests that followed 
caused numerous commentators and social scientists to call this period an 
‘awakening’ of Russian civil society.72 The regime was forced to make certain 
concessions to the opposition, liberalising the registration of new political parties 
                                                          
63 ‘Vybory-2012’, RIA Novosti. 
64 R. Dorokhov, ‘Videonabliudeniye za vyborami oslozhnit slozhnit rabotu runeta’, Vedomosti, 20 
December 2011, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1457576/bolshoj_brat_slishkom_velik 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
65 ‘Ideya Putina o “vyborakh onlain” ozadachila i pravitel’stvo i SMI’, News.ru. 
66 Trofimov, ‘Prezidentskiye vybory-2012 v 10 tsifrakh’. 
67 ‘Assotsiatsiya yuristov RF podgotovit 95 tysyach nabliudatelei na vybory’, RIA Novosti, 22 
February 2012, http://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120222/572096419.html (accessed 18 May 
2014). 
68 ‘Vybory-2012’, RIA Novosti. 
69 Trofimov, ‘Prezidentskiye vybory-2012 v 10 tsifrakh’. 
70 I. Petrov, ‘Prokurory nashli 3 tysyachi narushenii na vyborakh, no ikh rezul’taty ne sporyat’, RBC 
Daily, 2 May 2012, http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949983718914 (accessed 16 May 2014). 
71 ‘V korpus nablyudatelei “Za Chistyye Vybory” postupilo pochti 2 tys. obrashenii’, Rosbalt, 5 
March 2012, http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2012/03/05/953575.html (accessed 18 May 2014). 
72 See, for instance, ‘A Russian Awakening’, The Economist: Eastern Approaches Blog, 11 
December 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/protest-russia-0 
(accessed 17 May 2014); B. Whitmore, ‘Did Russian Civil Society Wake Up in 2011?’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 December 2011, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/the_year_russian_civil_society_woke_up/24437163.html (accessed 16 
May 2014); A. Sysoyev, ‘Put’ Nablyudatelya’, Russkyi Zhurnal, http://russ.ru/Mirovaya-
povestka/Put-nablyudatelya (accessed 16 May 2014); D. Trenin,  ‘Responding to the Russian 
Awakening’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 31 March 2013, http://carnegie.ru/2013/03/31/responding-
to-russian-awakening/fzyu (accessed 16 May 2014). 
167 
 
and reintroducing the direct, though limited, election of regional governors.73 
However, draconian measures were also introduced in order to deter further street 
demonstrations. Among these were huge fines for unsanctioned rallies,74 the 
creation of a blacklist of internet sites allowing any kind of ‘dangerous’ site to be 
blocked by court order,75 and the so-called ‘foreign agents law’ requiring all NGOs 
receiving funding from abroad to declare themselves as such on their print and 
online materials.76 Twenty-seven people were charged with rioting and violence 
against police during one of the demonstrations in the lead up to the Presidential 
elections, in a case that is widely seen as a show trial intended to deter others from 
protesting.77 To return to the question posed above – how was the discourse 
received? – I have shown here that its impact was substantial, partly responsible for 
mass demonstrations and policy change by the authoritarian regime. I now turn to 
a closer examination of the construction of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in the text 
Razgevannyye Nablyudateli in order to show how citizen conceptualisations differ 
from those of the Kremlin. 
The book is made up of 21 first-hand accounts of election monitoring by 
Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’ volunteers. The accounts contain descriptions, in varying 
levels of detail, of the authors’ reasons for joining the movement, the training they 
undertook, the process of monitoring on Election Day, their attempts to hinder 
violations, their attempts to alert polling station staff and police to crimes taking 
place, and their emotional reactions to their work. This book is thus an excellent 
primary resource for analysing how obshchestvennyi kontrol’ fits into activists’ 
broader conceptualisation of civic engagement: as discussed above, Grazhdanin 
Nablyudatel’ was the first independent citizens’ election monitory organisation, and 
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was advocated by opposition figures, human rights activists and NGO leaders.78 It 
can therefore be taken as a paradigmatic example of the discourse of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ ‘from below’. 
The concept of kontrol’ is central to the authors’ descriptions of their role as 
citizen observers. It appears 34 times throughout the book, either as an abstract 
noun (kontrol’), a concrete noun (kontrolyor), a verb (kontrolirovat’, prokontrolirovat’, 
kontrolirovali) or as an adjective (kontrol’nyye). From the start, kontrol’ is presented 
as key to understanding the nature of an election observer’s work. In the first 
sentence of the book, the editor states:  
 
The book you are holding in your hands is a series of stories about 
the elections to the State Duma in 2011, written by observers – by 
people who have decided to take part personally in civic 
(grazhdanskom) kontrol’ of the elections.79  
 
The hyphenated sub clause indicates that the author is defining who observers are: 
dedicated citizens who enact kontrol’. It also suggests that the stories to follow 
should be read as examples of this activity. 
While concepts obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and obshchestvennyi kontrolyor 
appear only five times, there are two reason why the word obshchestvennyi does 
not appear more frequently. First, it only makes grammatical sense to use it when 
referring to the abstract or concrete nouns (the adverb-plus-verb obshchestvenno 
kontrolirovat’ sounds awkward in Russian, just as ‘to scrutinise publically’ does in 
English). Second, in many instances it is clear that the authors take the public (and 
therefore independent) nature of their work as a given and consider a qualifying 
adjective unnecessary in many instances. Since all of the authors present 
themselves as concerned volunteers situated outside of state structures, it is thus 
fair to state that the adjective obshchestvennyi is assumed in virtually all cases.80 
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What do the volunteer observers understand by obshchestvennyi kontrol’? 
The book’s editors define it as a process 'of finding tricky but legal and effective 
ways of protecting the law.'81 The centrality of legal accountability to understanding 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is echoed across many other accounts. One observer 
writes, ‘Our moral position is “Everything has to be in accordance with the law!” And 
to let violations pass without writing complaints was strategically impossible!’82  
Another states, ‘We said that we intended to conduct these elections honestly, and 
that we would do all that we could to observe the law, and proved this through our 
actions.’83 Authors describe how they monitored the processes of dropping ballots 
into the ballot box (to make sure that one, rather than multiple ballots were 
dropped),84 conducted name checking on additional voter lists (to ensure that only 
those registered were voting),85 counted the ballots (to check that votes were 
attributed to the correct parties),86 and filled in the records (protokoly) of the results 
(to confirm that the records corresponded to the number of ballots in each party’s 
pile).87 Observers thus use the state’s pre-existing legislature to highlight the 
illegality of the authorities’ (or their paid assistants’) actions, meaning that 
monitoring and checking becomes a highly contentious, rather than consensual, 
activity.88 So although processes of checking and verifying are central means for 
making sure the law is upheld (and to this extent recall both the Leninist and post-
Stalinist meanings discussed in the previous chapter), monitoring here take on an 
antagonistic quality. 
Indeed, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is presented as an activity that directly 
conflicts with the authorities, with state employees considered to be underhand and 
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deceitful and the job of the observer to ensure they operate fairly. This exhortation 
from one observer to her readers is worth citing in full: 
 
And first and foremost we have to fight these crooks and thieves. 
We have to kontrolirovat' them, unmask them, force them to admit 
the truth. Go and be an observer, it’s not that difficult. You don’t 
have to sit at the polling station all day; come for the end, come for 
a while, but do come. The more kontrol’, the less chance of 
cheating.89 
 
Kontrolirovat’ is thus presented as synonymous with ‘fighting’, ‘unmasking’ and 
‘forcing’ the authorities. This is a complete reversal of the meaning advanced by the 
Kremlin, which bases its conception on assistance to the authorities. This 
antagonistic relationship to the authorities is also borne out in their representations 
of the relationship between citizen observers and electoral commission staff. One 
observer laments:  
 
Psychological pressure is a provocation: you want to rebel against 
it, challenge it, defend your lawful position. But if you lose your 
temper, you risk hearing the fatal words, “he is obstructing us, 
remove him”. But if you don’t assert yourself, how are you 
supposed to observe? Hide in a corner and not be conspicuous?90 
 
Another observer also warns potential observers: ‘You have to be psychologically 
prepared for the fact that members of the commission will see the observer as an 
enemy and will put pressure on him throughout the day.’91 This indicates that 
animosity is evident on both sides, with the authorities at least as mistrustful of the 
observers as the observers are of the authorities. This is, of course, a huge 
divergence from the harmonious relationship between citizens and the state as 
envisaged in the Kremlin’s discourse. 
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There are also a number of synonyms used for observers and their work; 
however, certain words are reserved for the authors’ own critical, independent work, 
while others are used to describe the activities of people sympathetic to the regime. 
For instance, while nablyudatel’ and obshchestvennyi kontrolyor are used 
interchangeably as synonyms when referring to observers perceived to be truly 
independent, observers from United Russia or other groups seen as loyal to the 
regime are not called obshchestvennyye kontrolyory.92 The implication is that such 
people are not working in the interests of obshchestvo (society). Similarly, there 
appears to be a qualified difference between the verbs nablyudat’ and kontrolirovat’: 
the former is considered as passive and potentially partisan, while the latter is active 
and independent. One author writes, ‘With such active kontrol’ of voting and the 
procedure of conducting the results, here is the difference between Grazhdanin 
Nablyudatel and observers organised by the parties taking part in the elections.’93 
This indicates that obshchestvennyi kontrol’ can only be properly performed by 
observers who do not have any connection to the regime and, ideally, are opposed 
to it. 
While the independent and oppositional nature of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
is also translated into the observers’ self-understandings as upholders of the law, 
they are also keen to present themselves as normal, unexceptional citizens. At the 
beginning of each testimony is a brief self-description of the author, with personal 
details such as age, education, occupation and family situations, thus giving the 
impression that the typical observer is an average Russian citizen. The likely reason 
for this is to convince other ‘average’ readers that they too could become observers. 
Throughout the text, numerous exhortations are made for the reader to join the 
movement: ‘Soon there will be new elections and the project needs observers. Look 
in the mirror: who, if not you?’94 However, what is required of an obshchestvennyi 
kontrolyor is not merely to be average, they also have to be ‘like-minded’95, to be 
‘concerned’96 about justice, and to be able to provide support to fellow observers.97 
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An observer must also be sufficiently trained and able to remain resilient in the face 
of pressure from the authorities,98 as well as happy to work for free and to undertake 
sufficient training.99 In sum, while the authors of these texts present themselves as 
ordinary, concerned citizens on one hand, on the other, they see themselves as 
tough, morally righteous and self-sacrificing. There is also a clear sense of an ‘us 
versus them’ mentality, both in terms of their relationship to the authorities and to 
observers loyal to the regime.  
To conclude this section, I return to the three questions mentioned at the 
beginning. First, I have shown that citizen observers consider themselves to be a 
‘certain kind’ of normal citizen; that is people who, on the face of it, are just like 
anyone else, but who also possess a social conscience and a strong sense of civic 
virtue and are prepared to put themselves into physically and psychologically 
challenging situations for the sake of a higher moral good. Importantly, they are 
sympathetic to the opposition movement. This contrasts with the kind of people who 
have come to fill the PMCs, discussed in the previous section, who are former state 
officials and do not have oppositional politics. Like the rest of the protest movement 
more generally, citizen inspectors tended to be relatively young, well-educated, 
urban individuals,100 with several authors keeping online blogs. In writing the texts, 
authors hoped to attract more observers for the Presidential elections; writing 
election reports was a discursive form of activism that sought to swell the ranks of 
the citizen observer movement.  
To address the second question – what meanings of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ are contained within the text itself – I have shown that the authors of 
Razgnevannyi Nablyudatel’ advance a conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ that 
associates it with a form of legal activism that directly confronts the authorities and 
attempts to hold them accountable to electoral law. It is fundamentally a contentious 
activity. While it is similar to the conception advanced by the Kremlin, discussed in 
the following section, insofar as it requires a process of checking and verifying, the 
citizen observers link obshchestvennyi kontrol’ directly to the law. It thus recalls a 
set of practices that others have termed ‘rightful resistance’101 or ‘consentful 
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contention’,102 in which citizens use official means to demand goods or rights 
sanctioned by law but not enforced by local authorities or to contest state decisions 
that contradict its existing legal code. Thus, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is seen as 
radical and oppositional with the power to effect social change, rather than a 
consensual activity with subordinate citizens uniting to follow a state-defined 
trajectory of social development. 
In terms of reception, it is clear that this book alone is not likely to have had 
much impact either on the opposition movement or on the struggle for meaning of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’. However, the impact of the citizens’ movement to monitor 
elections, of which this book is a part, had significant effects on state policy. I 
discerned two strands: on the one hand, a liberalising strand loosened restrictions 
on political parties and re-introduced regional gubernatorial elections (as discussed 
above); on the other hand, an authoritarian strand increased fines for participating 
in unsanction rallies, sought to curb internet freedom and restricted the activities of 
certain NGOs. I also argue that a further effect was the state’s attempt to colonise 
meanings of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ through the development of the draft law ‘On 
the Foundations of Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian Federation.’ It is to a 
discussion of this law that I now turn. 
  
 ‘On the Foundations of Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian Federation’ 
 
In this final section, I show how the meaning of the concept obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ has been fixed by the Russian state through its attachment in law to a 
specific set of social practices. This is exemplified in the new law ‘On the Framework 
for Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian Federation’, signed into the legal codex 
by Putin on 21nd July 2014, which defines the basis on which citizens may interact 
with authorities and stipulates that such interaction can only be conducted through 
state-sanctioned bodies.103 This interaction may take five possible forms, all of 
which are linked to the network of PCBs. The unique legislation, the only one of its 
kind in the world, evoked strong views in its favour and in opposition during the 
process of its development, with representatives of both the authorities and the 
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NGO community sitting on either side of the fence.104 Thus, an analysis of these 
views goes to the heart of the conflict around what civic participation in governance 
should look like in contemporary Russia. However, the fixing of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ in law represents the blanket co-optation of the ‘bottom-up’ discourses 
discussed above.  In what follows here, I begin with a summary of the law, before 
tracing its development and summarising reactions to it. I conclude with a discussion 
of how this version of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ contrasts with that advanced by the 
citizen election observers. 
The law defines obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as the activities conducted by the 
existing PCB network, which are described as the monitoring (nablyudenie) of state 
officials as well as review (proverki), analysis (analiza) and evaluation (otsenka) of 
decisions taken and legislation drafted by them.105 This definition is strikingly similar 
to the activities of the late Soviet-era public inspectors who enacted narodnyi 
kontrol’ by ‘check[ing] the factual fulfilment of the directives of party and government 
in the areas of the economy, of economic and cultural construction.’106 It recalls the 
consensual relationship between society and the state advanced in Soviet times, 
where the former was presented as an assistant to the latter. One difference in the 
present definition, however, is that the Soviet activities state the benchmark against 
which state activities should be measured: the party and government directives. The 
contemporary formulation does not state principles or criteria against which 
government decisions should be measured.107 
According to the new law, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ serves three main 
purposes: to ensure that the rights of citizens and public organisations are 
protected; to provide feedback from citizens to the authorities; and to provide a 
public evaluation of the work of the authorities. The suggestion is that such activities 
are not already occurring, for instance through courts, elections and the media; the 
law thus represents an attempt to develop new institutions that fulfil the functions 
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performed by those in democracies, and thus recalls Putin’s exhortation to develop 
a Russian form of democracy, discussed in the previous chapter.  
A further stated aim is to ‘regulate’ the existing legislation on 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’, which up to now has appeared haphazardly in various 
laws (discussed in Chapter One), and bring it together under a single legal 
framework. Alluding to the development of Putin’s ‘power vertical’ (vertikal’ vlasti), 
commentary on the bill by the Presidential Human Rights Council, one of the bodies 
that developed the bill, states, 
 
This in no way to be interpreted as an attempt to create a ‘social 
vertical’; on the contrary, it is about creating the legal framework 
for the functioning of the ‘social horizontal’, which can ensure 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ at each level and each part of the state 
machine.108 
 
Indeed, the attempt to create a single framework for this activity recalls the 
governance practices of the Soviet Union, in which the widespread practices of 
narodnyi kontrol’ were co-ordinated through centrally controlled monitory bodies 
(and frequently resulted in the co-optation of the so-called people’s inspectors into 
the corrupt system they were supposed to be monitoring). The implication is that 
the contemporary law is an attempt to re-introduce these Soviet-era practices in 
post-Soviet Russia; indeed, the Soviet-era law on narodnyi kontrol’ was made 
available on Presidential Human Rights Council website along with other 
documents considered relevant to the new draft law.109 
While the law states that obshchestvennyi kontrol’ may take any form that 
does not contradict the principles set out in the document, it nonetheless delineates 
five examples of what such activities should consist of, what their outputs should be 
and how government departments should respond. First, a public examination 
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(obshchestvennaya ekspertiza) requires ‘public experts’, that is local academics, 
researchers or NGO leaders, to study draft laws and existing legislation and assess 
their social impact and whether they comply with the ‘public interest’. Second, public 
discussions (obshchestvennyye obshuzhdeniya) consist of public meetings 
between public monitory bodies and local government, which aim ‘to include the 
widest range of views of different social groups’ in the development of legislation.  
Third, public hearings (obshchestvennye slushaniya) are similar to public 
discussions, but allow any concerned citizen to take part. Forth, public monitoring 
(obshchestvennyi monitoring) is an on-going form of surveillance of local 
government activities. Fifth, public inspections (obshchestvennyye proverki) are 
auditing processes of government bodies or official perceived to be failing in the 
work, which involve public monitory bodies collecting information and developing 
proposals to remedy the situation. Each of these five should produce an output, 
such as a final report or statement of findings, details of which should be placed 
online. The organisation or individual under scrutiny is required to respond to the 
output and, if in agreement with the recommendations, make the necessary 
changes. If it is not in agreement, a public hearing or debate should be organised 
on the subject.  
Importantly, in order to enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’, interested parties 
must join the existing PCB network. Individual citizens and NGOs cannot take part 
independently. While the law states that the organisations conducting 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ should be based on a relationship of independence 
(nezavisimost’) from state bodies, it is difficult to understand how this can occur in 
practice when, for instance, a third of Public Chambers’ membership are chosen by 
the head of the regional or national executive. Since the authorities have a hand in 
the make-up and activities of PCBs, the question arises as to whether independent 
monitoring can be performed at all.  
In sum, the new law delimits the possible forms in which all civic engagement 
in governance should take and links them to the PCB network, thereby making 
practices of kontrol’ controllable by the state. Its definition of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ strongly echoes the concept of narodnyi kontrol’ advanced in the Soviet 
period, in which citizens conducted processes of accounting to ensure that state 
policy was fulfilled. Both conceptions conceive of the relationship between the 
citizens and the authorities as a consensual one, in which the former assists the 
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latter in the execution of centrally-determined tasks. However, the contemporary 
formulation is more ambiguous, since it does not contain guidelines regarding what 
the bodies should be looking for. It expands the network of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance, in which a limited amount of pluralism is ceded to civic groups in order 
to harness civic activism. I now turn to a discussion of the development of the law.  
The idea for the law has its roots in the growing trend to include citizens in 
governance processes, stipulated in the administrative reforms discussed in 
Chapter One; however, it was a regional legislature which began the concrete 
development of the legal framework. In February 2010, the Public Council under the 
Samara regional Duma requested the organisation Lawyers for Civil Society 
(Yuristy za Grazhdanskoe Obshchestva) to assist in the development of proposals 
to enhance public participation in the examination and monitoring of legislation.110 
Regional lawmakers felt that existing legislation did not always correspond to 
societal interests and that involving citizens in the legislative process would ensure 
that their needs were catered for in the final document.111 Thus, the initial desire to 
see a codification of civic participation in governance was visible on the part of both 
the authorities and the NGO sector. 
Later that year, one of the members of Lawyers for Civil Society, Dar’ya 
Miloslavskaya, was asked to join a working group on the expansion of civil society 
as part of the Strategy-2020 project, a government initiative that aimed to formulate 
the country’s social and economy development strategy for the coming decade. The 
working group was headed by Human Rights Council chairman, Mikhail Fedotov 
and the director of the Agency of Social Information, Elena Topoleva, and was given 
the task of developing legislation that would encourage a ‘drastic increase’ 
(kardinal’noye uvelicheniye) in the activities of the NGO sector.112 Using the 
proposals developed in Samara as a starting point, the group began the process of 
drawing up other forms of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. They noted that the concept 
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appears in numerous other laws (some of which have been discussed in Chapter 
1) as a means for encouraging civic participation in various spheres of state activity, 
and decided to create a piece of legislation that would extend it across the 
government apparatus.113 In 2011, the project was passed to the Federal Public 
Chamber to handle, and a special working group was created in the Presidential 
Human Rights Council, which would also add their expertise.114 
 Meanwhile, other legislation was advancing slowing in that direction: in 
February 2011, Putin signed a decree instituting ‘public discussion’ (obschestvennyi 
obsuzhdeniye) of draft federal laws, which allowed citizens to post comments on 
proposals posted on the internet.115  In November of that year, a session on 
combating corruption was held in the Public Chamber, during which was presented 
a draft report on anti-corruption mechanisms. Among other things, the report 
recommended the extension of mechanisms of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as widely 
as possible and delineated the various forms it could take.116 The meeting also 
discussed the draft law on obshchestvennyi kontrol’. At this time, the proposals 
guaranteed the right for citizens to engage in ‘direct action’ in order to identify state 
bodies or individuals who break the law. To do this, citizens could join NGOs, public 
organisations or PCBs.117 The initial idea was thus that every citizen could sign up 
to become a public inspector and that performing obshchestvennyi kontrol’ would 
not be restricted to PCBs.  
Over the next few years, the concept of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ became 
increasingly common in Kremlin discourse, and was presented as a means for 
citizens to engage in the monitoring of various areas of public life: for instance, the 
                                                          
113 D. Miloslavskaya, ‘“Noveishaya Istoriya” sozdaniya proyekta Zakona “Ob Obshchestvennom 
Kontrole”’, ‘Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’: Nepoliticheskaya Uchastiye Grazhdan v Publichnoye 
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Prezidente RF, http://president-sovet.ru/structure/group_14/ (accessed 27 May 2014).  
115 ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Fevralya 2011 g. N 167’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 11 
February 2011, http://www.rg.ru/2011/02/11/obsuzhdenie-dok.html (accessed 27 May 2014). 
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117 ‘Korruptsiya pod pritselom’, Press Sluzhba Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 3 November 2011, 
http://oprf.ru/1449/1471/newsitem/15857 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
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armed forces,118 state purchases over a billion dollars,119 orphanages,120 the 
building of roads,121 Unified State Exam required for entry into university,122 and all 
public officials.123 Vladimir Putin championed the concept in his own speeches and 
articles to the nation. As discussed in the previous chapter, in his February 2012 
pre-election article entitled ‘Democracy and the Quality of the State, Putin made it 
clear that the extension of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ would be a key feature of 
developing civic participation in governance in his coming term. ‘Above all,’ he 
stated, 
 
It is an all-citizens’ (obshchegrazhdanskoye) discussion of the 
draft laws, decisions and programmes adopted at all levels of 
government, as well as the evaluation of existing laws and their 
application.124 
 
Later that year, in his 2012 speech to the Federal Assembly, he linked it to the 
development of democracy, the provision of social services and the reduction of 
corruption.125 Similarly, in his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 2013, 
Putin reiterated his desire to see more discussion and collaboration between the 
authorities and citizens: 
 
Modern Russia needs a broad public debate, moreover, with 
practical results, when public initiatives are part of public policy 
and society monitors (kontroliruyet) their execution.126 
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He went on to ask the Public Chamber and Presidential Council to work hard on the 
preparation of the law.  
In January 2014, the proposals were sent to the Presidential Administration 
for further development. Here, the proposals underwent numerous alterations. Most 
importantly, it changed the provisions on who could conduct public scrutiny: instead 
of every citizen being able to sign up as a public inspector, public scrutiny must now 
be enacted through the existing PCB network of public councils, public chambers 
and public monitoring commissions. It also deleted the clause that stipulated the 
creation of a single unified portal through which the results of scrutiny exercises 
would be published, citing a lack of funding and stating that it would be more efficient 
to use the Federal Public Chamber website.127 On 12 March 2014, Putin introduced 
the revised law into the Duma.128 On 25 March 2014, during a Duma debate, it was 
noted that the passing of the law would require more than 25 changes to existing 
legislation.129 However, the Federation Council indicated their support of the project 
and their desire to see the bill passed quickly.130 In May 2014, the bill received prime 
airtime on Russian state-controlled TV channel.131 On 2nd July, it was passed by the 
Duma and sent to the Federation Council, who passed it on 9th.132 Putin then signed 
it into law on 21st and it became active on 2nd August.133 
The proposals were hotly debated by the academic and NGO communities 
and had initially received a significant level of support from civic groups and human 
rights activists (before they were amended by the Presidential Administration). Two 
contrasting positions emerged: one camp supported the idea, believing that 
codification would give a legal basis for the greater development of scrutiny 
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mechanisms and force the authorities to engage with civic initiatives; the other camp 
believed that the law would hinder the development of new ‘bottom-up’ forms of 
scrutiny. In the first camp, Andrey Babushkin, author of the law on Public Monitoring 
Commissions discussed above, stated on his blog, ‘I praised the law for its 
consistency, good conceptual apparatus, the comprehensive range of subjects of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’, its versatility, its applicability to the laws connected with 
prison monitoring.’134 In the second camp, researchers at the Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow who examined the bill were more sceptical. Political scientist 
Alexey Titkov called it an attempt ‘to establish the rules of the game’ regarding 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and to turn it into ‘prescribed and textbook (shablonnyye)’ 
forms of participation, which will act as a barrier to genuine participation of citizens 
in governance.135 Scholar of law, Yurii Tikhomirov, stated that the law was not a 
‘constructive’ solution to the problem of civic participation due its many ‘ambiguities’. 
In his view, ‘at this stage, yet another federal law will only exacerbate the burgeoning 
legal codex.’136 
The amendments made by the Presidential Administration brought further 
criticism. Even the Presidential Council, under whose auspices the law was 
developed has detailed a number of weaknesses in the law and have expressed 
dismay at the trajectory the law has taken. First, they have spoken out against the 
lack of provision of citizens and NGOs to make independent checks without having 
to access the PCB network. Second, they were also unhappy with the refusal by the 
government to create a single online portal through which the results of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and reactions by the authorities could be posted. Third, 
they stated that although the President has expressed the desire that PCBs should 
not be ‘decorative’ and include only ‘loyal’ people, and although new rules for the 
formation of PCBs have been developed, comprising competition organised by the 
Public Chamber, the President has invalidated these rules by stating that they are 
only valid if other methods of formation have not been selected by the President or 
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by Ministry heads. Finally, they stated that the full contents of the draft law have not 
been made public, so a full debate on the implications of the law has not been 
possible. They conclude their analysis with the comment, ‘it is not worth hoping that 
after the passing of the law on obshchestvennyi kontrol’, officials will immediately 
change their bureaucratic habits and traditions.’137 It is too early to state whether 
the Presidential Council is right or whether the practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
stipulated in the law have changed government behaviour; this is a subject for future 
research. However, I show in the following two chapters that existing practices of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ conducted through the PCB network do make modest 
changes to state policy. 
In sum, this version of the law has codified a conception of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ that sees it as a means for enlisting citizen assistance in the execution of 
the national development programme. It is understood as a generalised form of 
monitoring in order to provide the authorities with important feedback on policy from 
society and to reduce social conflicts. Ironically obshchestvennyi kontrol’ was one 
of the factors that led directly to huge ‘social conflicts’ after the elections, here it is 
presented as a means to reduce them. Despite both state and society wanting to 
increase civic participation in governance, and an initial high level of support from 
civic activists for the proposals, many were very disappointed with what was 
eventually enshrined in law. The trajectory of this law thus echoes that of the PMC 
law discussed in the first section and advances the same consensual model of 
interaction. The state’s conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ explored in this 
chapter thus dovetails with the Kremlin’s discourse of civic engagement in 
governance elucidated in the previous chapter: active citizens should assist the 
state in its predetermined goals so that the country as a whole may progress.  
   
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have shown that the authorities have co-opted citizens’ 
attempts to enact alternative practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ by including 
activists in intial discussions but ultimately disregarding their input and enshrining a 
conception into law which fits with the unified and apolitical relationship between 
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citizens and the authorities discussed in the previous chapter. In order to establish 
this, I have elucidated both civic and state conceptions of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, 
demonstrating that the former understands the concept to mean the practice of 
holding authorities accountable before the law, while the latter views it as a means 
for citizens to review the activities and decisions of the authorities. Citizens conduct 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ with the aim of changing state behaviour, while the 
authorities intend citizens to assist them in the execution of centrally determined 
goals. I have shown that the Kremlin has ensured that its conception remains 
hegemonic by co-opting civic initiatives into the network of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance and fixing the state-driven meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in law. 
This builds upon the previous chapter by giving a more in-depth account of the 
meaning of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ and showing how mechanisms for civic 
engagement in governance are developed and expanded. 
I have also shown that the impetus for civic engagement frequently comes 
from citizens themselves rather than from above, and that citizens and authorities 
have often worked together to develop legislation. Hence, the state is often ‘catching 
up’ with both discourse and social practices in society; the development of laws 
relating to obchshestvennyi kontrol’ is evidence of this process of catching up. The 
enlistment of citizens in the maintenance of hegemony over the discourse of civic 
engagement in governance demonstrates limited nature of political participation in 
Russia, since citizens are able to collaborate with the authorities insofar as they 
assist them in the fulfilment of state-defined ends. This, as I argued in Chapter Two, 
is the essence of authoritarian neoliberal governance. The following two chapters 
explore the ways in which obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is enacted through the 
authoritarian neoliberal governance network, that is, through PCBs, in three case 
regions, and show that citizens have frequently founded PCBs in order to engage 
with the authorities but that most of them have not inculcated the civic practices of 
kontrol’.  
Finally, the struggle for dominance of political language between various groups 
is, of course, ongoing, even in an authoritarian state. While the law on 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ can be seen as an attempt by the Kremlin to end this 
struggle by permanently fixing the meaning of this concept in law, authoritarian 
neoliberal governance is characterised by a limited but nonetheless extant plurality 
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of voices. It thus represents the latest contribution to this dialogue, not the end of 
the dialogue.  
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Chapter Five: 
Recontextualisation and Operationalisation in the Centre: 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ from Discourse to Action 
Moscow and St Petersburg 
 
The final two chapters explore the relationship between the discourse and 
practice of civic engagement in governance in, first, Moscow and St Petersburg and, 
second, Samara. Each chapter considers two questions: first, how faithfully is 
national-level discourse rearticulated by local authorities and, second, to what 
extent is this discourse put into practice by the institutions created to foster civic 
engagement? To rephrase these questions using CDA terminology, they explore 
how the central, hegemonic discourse is recontextualised by regional leaders for 
local audiences and examine how far this discourse is operationalised in social 
practices. A consideration of these questions is based on an assumption that 
discourse and social practices mutually influence but are not reducible to one 
another and leads to an exploration of the gap between rhetoric and reality, that is, 
to an analysis of the extent to which the discourse on civic participation in 
governance articulated by regional authorities differs from the practices of the 
institutions that claim to enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’. The present chapter 
considers these questions in relation to Moscow and St Petersburg; the following 
chapter considers them in relation to Samara. Both in Russia’s centre and in my 
regional case study, there is a definite gap between the discourse and action on 
civic engagement in Russia. The gap indicates that it is short-sighted to dismiss 
PCBs as mere tools for the manipulation of ‘civil society’ by the state, as analysis of 
state discourse alone would suggest. Despite the presentation of PCBs by local 
leaders as a means to create a harmonious relationship between citizens and 
authorities, in which the former is subordinate to the latter, PCBs can become sites 
in which critical opinions are aired and can occasionally influence decision-making.  
In order to answer the first question, I have examined mayoral and 
gubernatorial discourses on civic engagement in government through an analysis 
of interviews with the leader listed on each regional government website.1 I have 
                                                          
1 The titles of the regional heads of the executive all vary slightly in my case studies: Moscow has 
a mayor (mer), Samara has a governor (gubernator) and in 1996, the official title of St Petersburg’s 
chief executive was changed from Mayor to governor. 
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chosen these texts because they are first-person articulations by the heads of the 
executive branch of regional governments and, as the most public and most 
powerful political actors in the region, they are likely to articulate regional policy on 
civic engagement in governance most coherently and most frequently. Moscow and 
St Petersburg are administratively unique since they are the only two cities to have 
the status of ‘federal subject’, the political territorial entities that make up the 
country.2 Therefore, unlike Samara, they do not possess regional and municipal 
government structures; however, Moscow, of course, also houses federal-level 
institutions. This means that in the case of Moscow and St Petersburg, regional 
leaders’ discourse relates only to the city, but in the case of Samara, to the whole 
of the oblast.  
 In order to answer the second question, I have conducted between 10 and 
15 semi-structured interviews with PCB members in each city. I chose to focus on 
PCBs as representative of this discourse for three reasons. Firstly, these institutions 
were the first state-driven operationalization of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, as 
discussed in Chapter One, and many of the other mechanisms discussed in this 
thesis were instituted after I conducted my fieldwork. Secondly, the local leaders all 
cite PCBs as a means for increasing civic engagement in governance and, in 
choosing this particular operationalization, I have ensured a level of comparability 
across the case studies. Thirdly and most importantly, their centrality to the conduct 
of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ has been enshrined in the law ‘On the Foundations of 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian Federation’, discussed in the previous 
chapter, which means that all forms of participation must now be conducted through 
them. They thus constitute the quintessential operationalization of the discourse of 
civic engagement in governance. The remainder of this introduction discusses the 
research agendas of recontextualisation and operationalisation before explaining 
the structure of the chapter. 
Recontextualisation refers to a discursive process of meaning transfer from 
one social, political or geographical context to another; it thus implies a shift in a 
discourse’s original meaning as it is reproduced in the new environment. Following 
Fairclough, recontexualisation entails a comparison between the original and 
                                                          
2 On 11 March 2014 Sevastopol’ voted to become a federal city, although its status has not been 
recognised by the international community. See ‘Parlament Kryma prinyal Deklaratsiyu o 
nezavisimosti ARK i g. Sevastopolya’, Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Krym, 11 March 2014, 
http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_03_2014_1 (accessed 14 August 2014). 
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modified discourses, as well as a consideration of the factors that influenced and 
shaped the new discourse, that is, the particular environment in which the 
recontextualisation occurs.3 According to Fairclough, recontextualisation can occur 
‘across structural (e.g. between education and healthcare) and social boundaries 
(between local and national scales).4 These final two chapters deal with the second 
of these boundaries: they examine the differences and continuities between federal-
level discourse on civic engagement and the discourses articulated by three 
regional leaders in Moscow, St Petersburg and Samara through a discussion of the 
regional discourses and their socio-political contexts.   
Regional contexts in Russia are widely recognised to vary substantially.5 In 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the central state lost control over 
regional institution-building processes, leading to ‘great variation in the degree of 
autonomy that has been permitted for local governments and in the degree of 
democracy that has been attained at the local level.’6 Furthermore, the makeup of 
Russia’s 89 federal subjects is extremely heterogeneous: some are defined 
ethnically, others territorially; some are densely populated, others sparsely; wealth 
is concentrated in the metropolises while rural subjects are mostly deprived; and 
the Constitution accords ethnic republics more powers than to territorially defined 
subjects.7 In order to conceptualise this variation, I refer to what Vladimir Gel'man 
and Sergei Ryzhenkov have called the 'local regime', a concept they define as,  
 
A complex of political institutions, actors, and the resources and 
strategies available to them, which determine the conduct of local 
politics, local policy and local governance.8  
 
They claim that local regimes are produced by three factors: first, political 
opportunity, which refers to gaps or vulnerabilities in the constellation of regional 
state power-holders; second, regional structural characteristics such as 
                                                          
3 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 20. 
4 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 20. 
5 V. Gel’man and C. Ross, (eds.) The Politics of Sub-National Authoritarianism in Russia 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. xv. 
6 V. Gel’man in V.Gel’man and A. Evans Jr., (eds.), The Politics of Local Government in Russia 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 10. 
7 C. Ross, Local Politics and Democratization in Russia (Oxford: Routledge 2009), pp. 13. 
8 V. Gel'man and S. Ryzhenkov, 'Local Regimes, Subnational Governance and the 'Power Vertical' 
in Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3, (May 2011). 
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geographical location and socio-economic profiles; and third, national-level 
governance patterns and their implementation at the regional level.9 However, while 
it may be tempting to expect significant variations among regional discourses on 
civic engagement, all three regional leaders were appointed by the President 
(although Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin was subsequently re-elected in 2013) 
and are United Russia supporters. Thus, the discourse of each leader attempts, to 
various extents, to balance Kremlin-level policy with the specificities of the region 
he has been charged to govern. My analysis shows that each leader rearticulates 
the central aspects of federal-level discourse on civic engagement in governance 
by calling for citizens to take part in governance, claiming to support and develop 
the devolution of powers to local government, and advocating the PCB network. 
Differences become apparent in each leader’s governing style, with the Moscow 
mayor presenting the most innovative ideas for urban citizens with high levels of 
internet activity, the St Petersburg governor displaying the least interest in 
increasing civic participation and the Samara governor most ardently advocating 
the Putinist discourse.  
 Regarding the second question, operationalization is defined by Fairclough 
as the ‘putting into practice, “translating”’ of discourse into both discursive and non-
discursive elements.10 As a research agenda, it examines the extent to which the 
practices imagined in the discourse become substantive. There are three ways in 
which a discourse might be operationalized: it may be enacted as a mode of social 
relations through new ways of interacting (such citizens assisting the authorities); it 
may be inculcated through the production new identities (such as the ‘public 
inspector’); or it may be materialized in new mechanisms of production or spatial 
organisation (such as the production of PCB reports).11 My interest in these final 
two chapters relates to the first of these: how far is the discourse of the active but 
obedient citizen reproduced in state-society relations at the regional level?  
In order to answer this question, I have asked 36 PCB members in Moscow, 
St Petersburg and Samara about their experiences inside these bodies and have 
compared their responses with the mayoral/gubernatorial discourse. In each case 
study, I have, first, summarised the diverse views members hold of PCBs and, 
                                                          
9 Gel'man and Ryzhenkov, 'Local Regimes, Subnational Governance and the 'Power Vertical' in 
Contemporary Russia'. 
10 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 504. 
11 N. Fairclough, ‘Discourse in processes of social change: “Transition” in Central and Eastern 
Europe’, available at www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/paper1.doc (accessed 24 June 2014). 
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second, given thick descriptions of the activities of one or two contrasting PCBs. It 
is important the note that these practices are at the very early stages of 
consolidation and there was a wide range of views regarding the role and purpose 
of PCBs. Thus, I have used the categories of ‘supporter’, ‘reformer’ and ‘abolitionist’ 
to explore respondents’ attitudes towards PCBs. Supporters are in favour of the 
PCB phenomenon and discuss the institutions’ merits and possibilities for 
expansion. Reformers feel that, in principle, PCBs are a useful tool for engaging 
with the authorities but that they should be reformed so that they operationalise a 
more critical form of obshchestvennyi kontrol’. For the abolitionists, PCBs are 
unnecessary and unworkable and should therefore be dissolved. Across all three 
case studies, the biggest group was the reformers, who tended to call for a reform 
of the selection process to PCBs. Abolitionists were the second biggest group, who 
either believed that cooperation with the regime was a form of collusion or that the 
development of PCBs inhibited the growth of other democratic institutions such as 
elections. Only two respondents, both located in Samara and discussed in the 
following chapter, could be classified as supporters and used the PCB network 
successfully to advance the agendas of the NGOs to which they were affiliated. 
Moscow hosted the largest number of reformers; in St Petersburg, respondents 
were largely dismissive of PCBs; in Samara, critical and anti-government views 
were expressed most rarely.  
I explore the social practices produced by PCBs through an in-depth 
discussion of two or three contrasting PCBs in each region. The analysis shows that 
while the views of PCBs vary among my case studies, the practices that occur inside 
them are similar. The extent to which citizens may engage in the political process 
through PCBs depends on the following three factors: the number of forthright and 
enthusiastic citizens there are inside a particular PCB, the extent to which the topic 
discussed by the PCB is a priority for the authorities, and the authorities’ openness 
to its recommendations.  PCBs are likely to be most active when they deal with 
themes that are not perceived by the authorities to threaten political stability, such 
as welfare reform, or when they are charged with clear, legally defined mandates, 
such as prison inspection or regional budget monitoring. In many cases, they do 
introduce a limited amount of pluralism into political decision-making and therefore 
cannot always be dismissed as mere ‘Potemkin Villages’. This means that there is 
a small but significant gap between the discourse of civic engagement in 
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governance articulated by the authorities and the actual practices that occur inside 
PCBs. The practices occasionally enacted by citizens recall not the consensual 
relationship between society and the state advanced by the Kremlin in its 
conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, but the contentious activities of citizens’ 
groups discussed in the previous chapter. 
This chapter deals with recontextualisation and operationalization in Moscow 
and St Petersburg. The two most populous cities in Russia share many similarities: 
both cities have served as Russia’s capital city during the country’s history, are 
considered its cultural, educational and economic centres, and play host the highest 
number of Western tourists, businesses and students as well as the largest number 
of migrants from the former Soviet Union.12 Further, average wages are 
substantially higher than elsewhere and more people identify as ‘middle class’,13 
more people are connected to the internet and thus able to access alternative news 
sources, and there is a higher number of politically active and opposition-minded 
people.14 In short, they are the wealthiest and most cosmopolitan cities in the 
country. This leads one to assume that they would share similar governance 
patterns and opportunities for civic participation. This, however, is not the case: 
Moscow’s mayor has actively sought to engage citizens in governance and 
respondents were generally more positive about the possibilities for PCBs to 
influence the authorities, while the St Petersburg’s governor was highly disengaged 
and respondents viewed PCBs with disdain. This demonstrates the importance of 
the local regime and mayoral discourse in the kinds of practices that are produced 
by these bodies. 
The chapter is split into two case study sections that deal first with Moscow, 
then St Petersburg, each of which comprise three subsections. The first of these 
gives an overview of the local regime; the second addresses the recontextualisation 
of federal-level representations of civic engagement in governance through an 
examination of the discourse of regional governors; the third, exploring the social 
practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, examines citizens’ views and experiences of 
                                                          
12 N. Zubarevich, ‘Four Russias: Re-thinking the Post-Soviet Map’, openDemocracy Russia, 29 
March 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/natalia-zubarevich/four-russias-rethinking-
post-soviet-map (accessed 15 August 2014). 
13 A. Auzan and S. Bobylev, National Human Development Report for the Russian Federation: 
Modernization and Human Development (Moscow, 2011), pp. 9. 
14 E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin’s Russia (Oxford: Routledge 2013), pp. 65. 
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PCBs. The conclusion of each section highlights the gap between discourse and 
action in each case study city. 
 
Moscow 
 
In this section, I discuss Moscow’s local regime, the discourse on public 
participation in governance articulated by the Moscow mayor, and the practices of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted through PCBs as described to me by 15 current 
or former members. Since Sergei Sobyanin assumed the post of mayor, discourse 
on the relationship between citizens and the authorities in the capital has changed 
markedly from the Soviet-era conception perpetuated by the previous incumbent, 
Yurii Luzhkov, from one that advocated a passive citizenry to one that seeks to 
increase civic participation in government. The mayor’s straightforward 
rearticulation of the federal-level discourse is enhanced by practical and innovative 
ways to operationalise the representation of citizens as assistants to the authorities, 
thus revealing the simultaneous need to balance his compliant relationship to the 
President with the need to harness the particularities of civic life in the capital, 
characterised by relative wealth and high levels of activism. However, I also show 
that PCB members engage with the state-driven mechanisms for civic participation, 
attempting to use them to challenge the conception of citizens as subservient to the 
state, occasionally rendering them spaces that operationalise a more conflictual 
understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ that recalls that articulated by the citizen 
observers in the previous chapter. Although they fall short of what many members 
wish for in terms of political participation, some of Moscow’s PCBs nonetheless 
have a limited effect on decision-making and policy outcomes. 
 
Local Regime 
 
Aside from a two-hundred year hiatus, Moscow has always been the most 
politically important city in Russia, if not Eastern Europe too. Indeed, following the 
collapse of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, it was considered by some to be the 
‘third Rome’.15 Richard Pipes claims that the century and a half of Mongol rule, 
which lasted from the mid-thirteenth century until 1480 ‘set the stage for the peculiar 
type of political authority, blending native and Mongol elements, which arose in 
                                                          
15 I. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 7. 
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Moscow once the Golden Horde began to loosen its grip on Russia.’16 In other 
words, it combined a strict authoritarian leadership with grassroots practices of 
‘narodovlastiye’ [people power] embodied in the veche.17  
The city grew up around the Kremlin from the Fourteenth Century onwards 
and, thanks to good relations between princes of Moscow and the khanate, became 
an area of relative peace in an otherwise very violent regime. This facilitated the re-
seating of the centre of Russian Orthodox Church from Vladimir to Moscow and 
allowed trade to develop rapidly. Moscow began to occupy a commanding place in 
Russian political and economic life, and many nobles arrived in the capital after their 
emancipation from state service in 1762.18 As for industry, at this time the city 
contained over a third of all Russia’s factories and attracted a continual stream of 
migrant workers from the provinces. Manufacturing, particularly of textiles, rapidly 
increased throughout the nineteenth century. Russia’s first railway joined Moscow 
with St Petersburg in 1851, and a further nine lines were laid during the rest of the 
century.19 While St Petersburg was considered the country’s ‘window on Europe’, 
Moscow by this time had assumed the epithet of the ‘barometer of [Russia’s] inner 
self…. Its quotidian affairs were the microcosm of the nation’s.’20 This has remained 
a popular characterisation of Moscow to this day. 
In 1918, the Bolsheviks moved the seat of government from St Petersburg 
(then Petrograd) back to Moscow. It became the capital city of the Soviet Union and 
a focal point for many Soviet projects: it was the testing ground for Soviet forced 
labour camps and the site of the enormous Palace of the Soviets, which was 
designed but never built. Stalin proclaimed the city ‘the standard bearer of the new 
epoch,’21 and officials began to call Moscow the ‘centre’ and the rest of the Union 
the ‘periphery’ or ‘localities.’22 It quickly became the hub for the Soviet middle class, 
characterised by its complete dependency on state social security on one hand and 
its ‘frustration with ideological repression on the other.’23 
                                                          
16 R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), pp. 57. 
17 The veche was a medieval popular assembly common in Slavic countries, including Russia. 
18 A. Schmidt, ‘The Restoration of Moscow after 1812’, Slavic Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, (Spring 
1981). 
19 T. Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995) pp. 36-37. 
20 Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis, pp. 2. 
21 Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis, pp. 2. 
22 Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, pp. 110-111. 
23 M. Brie, ‘The Moscow Political Regime: The Emergence of a New Urban Political Machine’ in 
Gel’man and Evans Jr. (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, pp. 208. 
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Perestroika, of course, was launched in Moscow and a big part of it entailed 
‘demokratizatsiya’, that is, a ‘liberalisation’ of the polity, whereby active citizens were 
encouraged to make informed choices about governance.24 During this time, 
popular desire to engage with political and social issues skyrocketed and a plethora 
of public-spirited independent groups was founded. For instance, the Club for Social 
Initiatives was a grass-roots project intended to help people put ideas for social work 
into action. Similar groups were soon formed across the Union. According to its 
charter, the Club’s aim was to ‘involve broad strata of the population in the process 
of self-government’ and it facilitated numerous projects from the conservation of 
historic buildings to the provision of welfare to vulnerable people and advising 
citizens on legal issues.25 Similarly, the Perestroika Club grew out of the Moscow 
Central Economic-Mathematical Institute in 1987 and became a centre for 
discussions among the city’s intelligentsia; indeed, it was here that the famous 
Russia NGO Memorial was born.26 
Such discourses were also prevalent inside the government: shortly before 
assuming the post of General Secretary, Gorbachev specifically highlighted the 
need for more self-government and for ‘more space to be opened up for the initiative 
of individual people.’27 As the political centre of the Soviet Union, Moscow was also 
the breeding ground for projects that eventually induced the collapse of the 
Communist regime, such as the introduction of multi-party candidates for regional 
and municipal legislatures. Gorbachev founded the Congress of People’s Deputies 
in 1989, a competitively elected supreme legislative body intended to divide the 
Communist Party and the state. One of his critics, Boris Yeltsin, was elected 
Moscow’s delegate; of course, Yeltsin went on to become the third competitively 
elected ruler of Russia in history, following Gorbachev’s resignation in the aftermath 
of the August 1991 coup. 
However, like elsewhere in Russia, the explosion in civic participation in 
governance in Moscow receded sharply during the 1990s and the open atmosphere 
                                                          
24 A. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 155. 
25 G. Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991), pp. 72. 
26 ‘24th Anniversary of Founding of Memorial Society’, Rights in Russia, 28 January 2013, 
http://hro.rightsinrussia.info/archive/ngos/ngos/memorial/24th-anniversary (accessed 14 August 
2014). 
27 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 79. 
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in government also began to fade.28 The city’s post-Soviet political regime has been 
described by Michael Brie as a re-creation of the highly personalised system of rule 
reminiscent of Soviet times and earlier.29 This system was built by then mayor, Yurii 
Luzhkov, a former high-ranking communist functionary (and later one of the 
founders of United Russia party), who, having been appointed city mayor in 1993, 
quickly filled the city Duma with loyal deputies. After re-election in 1996, in which he 
received over 89% of the popular vote, Luzhkov continued the project of centralising 
local government apparatus, appointing his representatives in the city’s 
administrative districts.30 According to Brie, he created a ‘party of power’, which 
could ‘command the entire city administration, distribute the budget and buy 
influential persons or groups.’31 At the same time, Luzhkov managed to retain the 
Soviet-era levels of social welfare, ensuring that he remained popular among the 
city’s inhabitants.32 Due to his close connections to Yeltsin, he wielded considerable 
influence at the federal level, thus ensuring favourable outcomes in the inevitable 
conflicts that arose as a result of federal and municipal bureaucrats squabbling over 
resource allocation. He thus fostered passive approval among city residents while 
simultaneously attempting to ensure that his power remained unchallenged at the 
elite level. Mobilising citizens in city governance was not a priority for the mayor. 
Luzhkov began a campaign to run for President in the 2000 elections, 
standing against Vladimir Putin, but withdrew when it became clear that the Kremlin 
favoured the latter as Yeltsin’s successor, and eventually gave Putin his blessing.33 
During that time, he was implicated in numerous corruption scandals and his 
popularity steadily declined, with a mere 36% of Moscow residents professing a 
positive attitude towards him in 2009.34 He remained Mayor of Moscow until 2010 
when he was ousted by Dmitry Medvedev for criticising Medvedev’s decision to 
freeze construction of the highly controversial Moscow-St Petersburg motorway 
                                                          
28 See M. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
29 M. Brie, ‘The Moscow Political Regime: The Emergence of a New Urban Political Machine’ in 
Gel’man and Evans Jr. (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, pp. 210. 
30 Brie ‘The Moscow Political Regime: The Emergence of a New Urban Political Machine’ in 
Gel’man and Evans Jr. (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, pp. 205. 
31 Brie, ‘The Moscow Political Regime: The Emergence of a New Urban Political Machine’ in 
Gel’man and Evans Jr. (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, pp. 211. 
32 Brie, ‘The Moscow Political Regime: The Emergence of a New Urban Political Machine’ in 
Gel’man and Evans Jr. (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, pp. 215. 
33 R. Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, 2nd Edition, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 30. 
34  R. Oliphant, ‘Last Man Standing’, Russia Profile.org, 14 September 2010, 
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/a1284487040.html (accessed 17 July 2013). 
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through Khimki Forest.35 Luzhkov's removal has been interpreted as a typical 
authoritarian ‘divide and conquer’ strategy for the prevention of open intra-elite 
conflicts and reinforces the fact that governance in the capital is ultimately 
adjudicated by the President.36   
In October 2010, Medvedev appointed the chief of Kremlin staff and Putin’s 
‘right hand man’ Sergei Sobyanin to replace Luzhkov.37 However, Sobyanin, another 
top official in United Russia and an oft-speculated successor to Putin as Russian 
President,38 resigned suddenly in June 2013, two years before his term expired.39 
Gubernatorial elections had been re-instated the previous year and Sobyanin 
decided to re-run for the post, holding snap elections that autumn. While he stated 
that this was because he required a ‘minimum consensus’ from the Muscovites in 
order to manage the city legitimately,40 critics argued that opposition candidates 
would have barely any time to prepare their own campaign.41 The decision is 
indicative of Sobyanin’s approach to civic engagement, which appears to recognise 
citizens as important allies in the running of the city (and is discussed in detail in the 
following sub-section). Duly, of a list of 39 candidates that included opposition 
figures Alexey Naval’nyi and Mikhail Prokhorov, he was re-elected Mayor of Moscow 
in September 2013 with 51.3% of the vote, thus narrowly avoiding a second round 
of elections.42 Since re-election, he has sought actively to encourage citizens to 
become involved in certain areas of governance, devising innovative schemes to 
harness society’s capacity to monitor the local environment. Such an approach 
appears to be popular with Muscovites: according to an October 2013 survey by the 
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independent polling organisation Levada Centre, 79% of respondents rated 
Sobyanin’s work as mayor ‘average’ or higher.43  
Today, Moscow is the easily the most populous city in Europe, with 11.5 
million inhabitants according to the 2010 census.44 It is the wealthiest city in Russia 
and has the highest human development index in the country45 as well as the 
highest GDP:46 the average salary in Moscow is just under 17,500 USD per 
annum,47 much higher than the national average of nearly 11,000 USD.48 Thus, as 
one would expect, there is a high level of public activity and a diverse spectrum of 
social groups operate in the capital. NGOs receive a relatively large amount of 
support from the Moscow government: grant competitions for NGOs who execute 
‘socially meaningful’ projects have been held since 1996, although the objectivity of 
the selection process has been questioned.49 Until the law on Foreign Agents came 
into force50, Moscow hosted the largest number of foreign-financed NGOs, with 
many donor organisations and other transnational actors situating their Russia 
branches in Moscow.51 Thus, a larger number of professionalised, well-funded 
groups exist in the capital than elsewhere. Similarly, formal mechanisms for co-
operation between local authorities and NGOs are much more developed than 
elsewhere in Russia; however, the sheer magnitude of the city also means that 
NGOs can more easily go unnoticed.52 The capital, therefore, is likely to display the 
most developed practices of civic participation in governance, given the relative 
wealth, the high number of socially active groups, the mayor’s enthusiasm for 
engaging citizens and the fact that it hosts both federal and regional political 
institutions. 
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 This brief discussion has given a flavour of Moscow’s socio-political 
environment and has identified some trends and influencing factors in governance 
and public participation the capital. The city has both a history of top-down 
leadership and the highest concentration of active citizens and civic groups in the 
country. Managing these competing structural factors constitutes the mayor’s main 
task. Furthermore, in the wake of Luzhkov’s decline in popularity, Sobyanin has the 
difficult job of regaining the public trust in regional government and providing 
avenues for civic engagement that do not threaten the power vertical. For while the 
mayor is a highly powerful figure at the regional level, his actions are ultimately 
guided by the President and failure to implement dictates from the top can result in 
removal. We may therefore expect the most innovative mechanisms for 
authoritarian neoliberal governance to exist in the capital in an attempt to harness 
its high levels of activism in non-confrontational ways. I now turn to a discussion of 
Sobyanin’s discourse of civic engagement. 
 
Recontextualisation 
 
In this section, I examine the extent to which the Moscow regional authorities 
adapt federal-level discourse to suit the social and political realities in their 
jurisdiction. As discussed above, Yuri Luzhkov operationalised a ‘Soviet-style’ 
approach to governing the city: a highly personalised and centralised system with 
few state-sanctioned opportunities for citizens to engage with the authorities. Sergei 
Sobyanin, in contrast, considered himself to have changed the ideology of 
governance in the city: according to the mayor, his administration has become more 
open and responsive to the needs of citizens than his predecessor.53 Given 
Sobyanin’s close connections to President Putin, as well as the unique status of 
Moscow as housing both federal and city-level administrations, it is unsurprising that 
his discourse on one hand displays a high level of conformity with the federal level 
but, on the other, attempts to reach out to citizens by presenting concrete ways in 
which they can get involved. He thus presents numerous new mechanisms intended 
to operationalise the Putinist conception of civic engagement in governance.54 
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 Firstly, there are echoes of Putin’s legitimating narrative of the ‘global race’ 
in the way in which Sobyanin frames his discussion of social problems. The mayor 
states, 
 
Moscow is located in a competitive environment - both politically 
and economically. If we do not move forward as quickly as 
possible, we will not keep up with any of the other global cities. We 
are not in the first place as it is. And if we do not move quickly, then 
we shall die as a global city. We cannot afford this.55 
 
His bewildering but dramatic warning of Moscow ‘dying’ if it does not remain 
competitive is reminiscent of the unspecified disastrous fate that could befall an 
uncompetitive Russia according to Putin, and the vagueness of what the key 
concepts in this vision –  ‘competition’ and ‘moving forward’ – are seen to consist of, 
remain equally nebulous in Putin’s rhetoric. There are also frequent comparisons 
between Moscow and other capitals, either in specific terms of the way in which 
other metropolises deal with particular issues or in general terms about what 
Moscow’s ‘brand’ should be or which capital city is the mayor’s favourite (the answer 
was, of course, Moscow).56 Such references underline the ideology of competition 
among capital cities held by the mayor and demonstrate his ongoing rearticulation 
of federal-level discourses of the global race. 
Similarly, Sobyanin, like Putin, believes that citizens’ engagement should be 
motivated by a sense of patriotic duty. In response to a question asking for his views 
on ‘The biggest question for Russia’, a project run by the newspaper Argumenty i 
Fakty, the mayor stated that, for him the most important question is, ‘What have I 
done for my country?’. In his view, not only should citizens’ activity be directed 
towards assisting the state, but before asking something of the state, citizens should 
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question what they have done to deserve something from it. His elaboration of this 
question strongly echoes Putin’s discourse: iterating the importance of shaking off 
Soviet-era passivity, he states,  
 
We all came from the Soviet Union, where we were constantly 
saying to ourselves, we don’t have to take care of ourselves, it is 
the state’s responsibility. You just go to work, to the production line, 
do what you’re told, and nothing more.57 
 
According to the Mayor, after perestroika, which saw a brief increase in civic 
engagement, the precarious economic situation of the 1990s dampened public 
spirit: ‘Frightened of freedom and responsibility, we again shied away in the other 
direction; again we began to ask for help.’ However, while increased reliance on the 
state may have been an understandable response to the chaos, it is not one that 
will help Russia win the global race (although, unsurprisingly given his role as head 
of service provision for the city of Moscow, Sobyanin is much more delicate than 
Putin in addressing the relationship between welfare provision and the citizen). 
Rather than explicitly announcing that the era of the welfare state is over, he states 
obliquely, ‘but we are already living in other realities’, before conceding that ‘of 
course, a lot depends on the state: it should provide free education, sound health, 
good roads.’ However, in attempting gently to inculcate the idea of a reciprocal 
relationship between citizens and the state, he concludes,  
 
But before you demand something from someone still need to ask 
yourself the question: "What did I did to become successful? How 
can I help my country?”58  
 
The message here is that patriotic citizens should not rely too greatly on the state, 
but instead become active in service of the state, a representation of governance 
identical (though more subtly conveyed) to that of Putin. 
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 As the mayor elaborates on the specificities of participatory opportunities for 
citizens in Moscow, he admits that building the resources for on-going dialogue 
between state and society has been a challenge. He states,  
 
The larger the city, the more the authorities are isolated from the 
public and there are fewer opportunities for citizens to bring 
problems before the mayor and to demand change.59 
 
 Furthermore, the mayor recognises that local particularities play an important role 
in shaping opportunities for citizens to get involved. The particular dynamic of 
Moscow with its comparatively vibrant public sphere means that mechanisms that 
encourage civic engagement are especially important in the mayor’s view: ‘Moscow 
is a very special city, a democratic city. It is politicized. It is impossible not to take 
citizens’ opinions into account.’ 60 In his interviews, he presents three initiatives, 
which he claims are the result of much thought regarding the preferred style of 
relationship between the authorities and citizens in the capital61: first, he has given 
district authorities more powers to resolve local issues; second, he has overseen 
the creation of a website to which citizens can upload complaints, observations and 
questions; and, third, he has expanded the network of public councils to virtually all 
city-level government departments.62  
Sobyanin describes the first of these as a devolution of powers to district-
level government on issues relating to budget formation and housing maintenance. 
Devolution is a federal-level policy, promoted to virtually all regions as part of 
Medvedev’s modernisation programme to reform the Soviet-era administrative 
system. According to Sobyanin, the total amount of funds available to Moscow’s 
municipalities has never been greater. He describes his vision of local government 
in the following way: 
 
The executive authorities should be concentrated in the city 
administration, and at the local level we should build up rights 
associated with the distribution of the budget, monitoring activities 
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relating to construction and production, monitoring the authorities, 
and so on.63  
 
In other words, while the central city authorities should manage the ‘big picture’ in 
terms of city management and decision-making, locals in their particular district of 
Moscow should perform tasks relating to budget allocation, overseeing new building 
projects and the general monitoring of the activities of local government officials. 
Couching these tasks in a rhetoric of rights implies that they should be seen as a 
fundamental aspect of citizenship, something that the mayor has fought to provide 
for the citizens, and an opportunity that citizens should readily grasp.  
The second initiative promoted by the mayor in his interviews consists of an 
online governance portal, Nash Gorod (Our City), which allows every citizen to 
interact with the authorities by monitoring their surroundings and uploading 
evidence of irregularities to the site via their smartphones. Authorities may thereby 
gauge public opinion concerning topical issues and locals can highlight poor quality 
roads and inadequate public services. With the slogan ‘Let’s govern together’ 
(upravlayem vmeste)64, it forms a key part of Sobyanin’s discourse of civic 
engagement65 – he references the project in the majority of interviews in which civic 
involvement in governance is addressed, and it is clearly something of which 
Sobyanin is proud. He states, 
 
You know, I have seen many sites and city portals. Paris, New 
York, London... Some of them are very beautiful. But such a site 
where all citizens can ask the Mayor a question and be sure that 
they will be heard… exists nowhere else in the world. Nowhere! 
Our portal is the only one of its kind and I'm proud of it.66  
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The idea is that citizens can be the authorities’ ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground, 
alerting them to problems that need resolving. It is thus an apolitical participatory 
mechanism tailored for busy, urban citizens with access to smart phone technology, 
which can harness citizens’ energy to improve the local community without 
challenging decision-making. Advocating the Nash Gorod website, Sobyanin states, 
 
Thus, a city resident is transformed into an additional inspector 
and assistant in managing the city. The number of Muscovites who 
are willing and able actively to participate in these processes go 
into in the millions. And it is a great support for managing the city.67 
 
The mayor thereby presents a consensual relationship between the authorities and 
citizens, with the input of the latter limited to apolitical issues and channelled into 
non-confrontational fora. It recalls the federal-level discourse of citizens becoming 
active by assisting the state in the execution of tasks designed by the state. 
The third frequently mentioned mechanism to increase public participation in 
governance is the expansion of the system of public councils. These bodies are 
alluded to in several interviews, but are taken for granted as a good thing, with no 
justification given for them. This suggests that the idea of the PCB network has 
become so normalised in the authorities’ understanding of civic engagement in 
governance that they do not need a legitimating narrative. The mayor states,  
 
We have formed serious public councils in almost every field, with 
the assistance of independent experts. Some are better than 
others, but it is a general trend.68 
 
Why this general trend is necessary or laudable remains unspecified in his 
discourse. The following subsection explores the practices of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ operationalised by these and other Moscow PCBs. 
It is worth mentioning here that two other initiatives operating on the principle 
that every citizen can assist the authorities in matters of governance have also been 
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created in recent months: the ‘Active Citizens’ mobile phone app and the ‘Public 
Advisors’ initiative. The first of these was introduced at the end of May 2014 and 
allows citizens to access daily online polls initiated by the authorities that relate to 
transport, healthcare, education and other issues. In return, participants can win a 
variety of prizes such as free theatre tickets, an hour’s free parking or free bicycle 
rentals. According to a spokesperson, the app was developed in order ‘to maintain 
constant dialogue’ with citizens and ‘to motivate proactive residents.’69 Similarly, 
Decree No. 849 of 24 December 2013 created the ‘Public Advisors’ initiative ‘in 
order to involve citizens in governmental decision making’ as an extension of the 
network of public councils.70 According to the newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti, 
public advisors should be 
 
Moscow residents, who take part voluntarily in the implementation 
of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, creating a favourable living 
environment and improving the quality of interaction between the 
city authorities and the population.71 
 
In other words, they are envisaged as a go-between for district authorities and 
residents, bringing residents’ concerns to the attention of the authorities and feeding 
back details of the authorities’ activities to residents. To become an advisor, 
interested citizens must be appointed by the municipality and should be in contact 
with an array of local groups including the police, home-owners’ associations, 
service providers, NGOs and volunteer groups, keeping abreast of their activities 
and co-ordinating information flow between them.  They thus combine elements of 
the idea that every citizen can become involved in governance embodied the 
website and app, the logic of decentralisation behind the strengthening of district 
governments, and the mediating role intended of public councils. Although it is of 
course too early to comment on the practices of Public Advisors, critics have argued 
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that such a volunteer army is most likely to be populated by retired, socially 
conservative individuals and thus could be used by United Russia to campaign in 
the run-up to elections.72  
To summarise this discussion, Sobyanin has been much more vocal than his 
predecessor both in promoting the federal-level ideology of civic engagement and 
in developing mechanisms that he claims enable citizens to become more active in 
local governance. While on one hand, his call for more citizens to become active is 
based on the idea that Soviet-era dependence on the state is over, on the other, the 
conception of the citizen as an assistant to the state embodied in his discourse 
implies that participation in the political aspects of governance, such as decision-
making and policy formation is limited. In other words, it is a straightforward 
rearticulation of the discourse promulgated at the federal level, tailored for active, 
urban and technologically savvy Muscovites. The kind of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
it advocates conceives of the citizen as a willing assistant to state-designed projects, 
rather than a critical partner, holding the authorities to account. It thus echoes 
Putin’s conception discussed in the previous chapter. I now move on to discuss the 
operationalization of this discourse in Moscow’s myriad PCBs.  
 
Operationalisation 
 
In this section, I explore the practices of civic participation and 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ that take place inside PCBs in Moscow through an 
analysis of 15 interviews with current or former PCB members in the capital. Most 
of my respondents were cosmopolitan, professional members of the urban 
intellectual elite, used to giving interviews with the media or with foreign 
researchers. Many had studied abroad or had had significant dealings with Western 
funders, international NGOs, or intergovernmental bodies; they thus frequently held 
an international perspective, comparing Russian institutional development with the 
perceived Western experience and grounding their arguments in political theory. My 
Moscow respondents were therefore able to give a deeper analysis of PCBs than 
some of the provincial respondents and most were very clear in what they perceived 
the value and limits of these bodies to be.  
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In this subsection, I consider first the kind of practices PCB members feel the 
institutions ought to engender, before discussing what members feel they actually 
do. To answer the first question, I have employed the categories of ‘supporter’, 
‘reformer’ and ‘abolitionist’ presented in the introduction. To answer the second 
question, given the large number of PCBs and the diversity of practices they 
produce, I have chosen to explore two case studies, which demonstrate two 
contrasting social practices. These are the Moscow City Council under the 
Prosecutor’s Office, considered merely to enhance the Prosecutor’s image, and the 
Presidential Human Rights Council, considered to act as the Kremlin’s ‘conscience’. 
The discussion shows that while there is a large amount of variety among PCBs in 
Moscow in terms of their relationship to the authorities, the majority of my 
respondents believed that practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted from inside 
PCBs can and do make limited changes to state policy. Most argue, therefore, that 
these institutions should be used as sites of contestation with the state. 
No one among my Moscow interviewees could be classified as a supporter 
of the PCB project, since everyone was critical to varying degrees. Surprisingly, the 
reformers substantially outnumbered the abolitionists, with the latter totalling just 
four and tending to be either individuals who had spent a substantial amount of time 
studying or working in the West or Soviet-era dissidents who considered 
participation in PCBs a form of collusion with the state. It is impossible to generalise 
about the type of people who tended to advocate PCB reform, since they varied in 
age, occupation, political leanings and exposure to the West. 
Reformers considered PCBs effective when the following two criteria are 
present: first, the authorities should be ready to ‘take PCBs seriously’ by being open 
to criticism and willing to engage in joint projects. Second, respected and well-
known ‘independent’ individuals should work in them, who can stand up to the 
authorities when necessary and put forward a critical perspective. A common 
concern regarding the first point was that authorities do not demonstrate a desire to 
‘listen to society’73 with one member recalling of his experience, ‘it’s like a 
conversation between the deaf and the blind.’74  One respondent who had been part 
of the legislative process behind the development of public councils stated that the 
problem lay in the institutional dependence of public councils on the government 
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institution to which they are attached. In his view, public councils should be ‘real, 
serious structures, as independent as possible from the government departments 
to which they belong.’75 A popular opinion was that if only the authorities engaged 
with PCBs, they would become places in which the ‘civic position’ vis-à-vis various 
social issues could be defended and upheld.  
Regarding the second point, the most common concern was that 
‘independent’ activists were frequently being replaced in PCBs with former officials 
and with celebrities who knew little about the subjects dealt with by the PCB. 
Respondents in the ‘reformer camp’ tended to label PCBs that do not contain such 
individuals as ‘fake’,76 a ‘pseudo-civil society’77 or an ‘imitation of collaboration 
between society and the state.’78 When asked to explain the difference between 
‘fake’ and ‘real’ institutions, respondents referred to the fact that human rights 
activists were excluded from membership. Repeatedly, respondents bemoaned the 
uncritical position of the ‘loyal’ PCB members and few seemed to view ‘civil society’ 
as comprising a spectrum of views, with most appearing to believe that two 
categories of member existed: loyal or independent. Several respondents 
expressed the view that if the selection process could be somehow altered, the 
number of loyal individuals would reduce and PCBs would be able to function better 
as platforms for dialogue.79  
The abolitionists also had two main criticisms. First, it was felt that the 
expansion of PCBs inhibited the development of ‘genuine’ institutions of democracy; 
for instance, one respondent calls them ‘substitutes that replace the political 
institutions of a developed democracy.’80 As such, many respondents placed PCBs 
in the context of growing clampdowns on NGOs and the abolition of elected regional 
governors. They were seen as a recognition by the state of the need to gauge public 
mood, particularly in light of the lack of feedback mechanisms associated with 
Western democracies, such as an independent media and free elections.81 The 
second criticism was that constructive dialogue under President Putin is impossible 
and therefore PCBs will never be able to ‘work properly’. Respondents pointed to 
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the growing authoritarianism inside the country as an example of the fact that Putin 
does not want to engage with society and is only using PCBs as means to 
‘whitewash’ his image.82 For instance, one respondent stated ‘I think these 
institutions certainly have promise, but only under a change of power.’83 Holders of 
this view tended to be those who refused to join PCBs on principle or, if they had, 
had left when Putin returned to power. 
Virtually all PCB members, bar one staunch abolitionist, were able to mention 
an occasion when they had successfully influenced the authorities, either by directly 
changing state policy or by bringing an issue to the table not previously considered 
by the authorities. Examples of successful lobbying included the introduction of 
courts of appeal, improvements in prison conditions through Public Monitoring 
Commissions, changing the law on military service to exempt PhD students from 
conscription, reform of public council selection processes, and work on the 
liberalisation of NGO law in 2009. Moscow PCBs thus were able to influence issues 
of a higher level of significance for Russian politics than my other case studies, 
thanks to the fact that the city is the country’s political centre.  
However, members were under no illusions regarding the limitations of their 
influence, believing they had leverage in some areas but not in others. Issues 
relating to Pussy Riot, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Sergei Magnitsky and the law on 
Foreign Agents were named as areas where the government has refused to change 
position, despite significant levels of lobbying via PCBs. Several reasons were given 
for this. One respondent stated that genuine policy debate was only possible on 
areas that do not touch Putin’s power vertical.84 Another stated that if certain state 
departments were already areas of on-going reforms, PCBs would be more likely to 
influence outcomes.85 Some saw ‘small’ changes in the law such as that relating to 
PhD students and military service relatively easy to achieve, while bigger questions 
of departmental reform could only be achieved with ‘enormous work.’86 A member 
of a major PCB recalled that research conducted by the PCB had shown that only 
5% of their recommendations were adopted by the authorities.87  
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Despite their low levels of influence, many reformers believed the social 
benefits of PCB membership extended beyond occasional and limited instances of 
policy change. A commonly expressed view was that PCBs play a role in setting 
public agendas by speaking publically about controversial issues. PCB meetings 
and pronouncements can be newsworthy events covered by the media and both 
state officials and interested members of the public can access these opinions in 
PCB meetings, some of which at the regional level are open to the public, or on the 
PCB website, which generally contains transcripts of the discussions. One 
respondent felt that even though influence may not translate into direct policy 
change, it still has an ‘indirect’ influence through the fact that officials are required 
to listen to PCB members’ opinions.88 Another stated that since PCBs are enshrined 
in law and sanctioned by the authorities, the views elucidated from therein are more 
likely to be considered than those voiced from NGOs or in the opposition media.89  
Compared to my other case studies, Moscow has the most heterogeneous 
array of PCBs due to its unique institutional environment of hosting both federal and 
regional-level PCBs and many respondents were members of both. Opinions were 
divided regarding the level at which members were most likely to advance their 
agenda: at the federal level, they have direct access to the country’s top decision-
makers, including the President; at the regional level, they can help form concrete 
projects on the ground. Numerous respondents noted the rapid development of 
PCBs in the last few years, with some poorly functioning PCBs reformed or closed 
down. For instance, the Moscow City Public Council under Luzhkov was stated to 
have had an almost non-existent level of interaction and influence and was 
eventually replaced by the Moscow Public Chamber in 2012; indeed, after Luzhkov 
exited the post of mayor, city-level PCBs began to work more actively. However, a 
discussion of the full picture of PCBs in Moscow is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
as their number stretches into the thousands; I now devote the rest of this section 
to a discussion of two case study PCBs, the Presidential Human Rights Council and 
the Public Council under Moscow Prosecutor’s Office.  The first was founded by 
Vladimir Putin but is considered a site of genuine discussion and debate around 
some of the country’s most controversial issues while the second is a regional 
council founded by activists, which has since been co-opted by the prosecutor and 
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used as a means to enhance his image. Both councils contain a number of the same 
people, but the practices operationalised within them are very different. The 
discussion shows how highly dependent PCBs are on the state body to which they 
are attached, but that activists nonetheless view them as places in which 
government can be held to account. 
The Presidential Human Rights Council is a federal-level consultative body 
created by Presidential Decree in 2004 with the aim of assisting the President in 
matters relating to rights protection, informing the President of the situation 
regarding rights abuses at home and abroad, and preparing proposals on how to 
develop civil society and human rights in Russia.90 In 2011, the Council was given 
the additional task of ‘promoting processes of liberalisation and modernization in 
Russian society’ and was given the power to propose draft laws (and indeed was 
tasked with assisting in the drafting of the Law on Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ 
discussed in the previous chapter).91 It is thus one of the most well-known and 
influential PCBs in the country and, despite creeping attempts at co-optation by the 
authorities, is considered to remain relatively independent and vocal. The reason 
for this, according to my respondents, was due to Ella Panfilova, who headed the 
Council’s anterior organisation, the Presidential Commission for Human Rights, 
from 2002, remaining in the position until 2010. On her watch, many of the country’s 
most vocal critics of the government joined the body. According to one former 
member, Panfilova transformed the Council from something ‘really unimportant’ to 
‘a real, independent council’ by involving ‘independent activists’ in its work.92 
Another described her as a ‘very active, honest, decent and brave person’ with 
whom it was possible to do ‘real work.’93 Another member recalled the ‘very harsh 
speeches’ given by Council Members during meetings with Putin, which were 
posted the following day on the Council website. He stated, ‘there is openness, there 
is independence and the membership turned out to be very strong.’94 A respondent 
who at the time of interview was about to take up a post in the Council stated that 
the high number of human rights professionals in the organisation meant that it ‘has 
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a much better reputation than the [Public] Chamber.’95 Thus, the type of people who 
work there is considered an important factor in how far a PCB will advance a critical 
perspective. 
A second reason why the Presidential Council was considered a good 
example of a PCB was that the government was prepared to listen to them. One 
respondent described how during meetings with Medvedev, he would note down 
action points assiduously, which would then be turned into action.96 Even when 
recommendations are not adopted, the President is still required to respond by law, 
and this ensures that dialogue takes places. Several current members said that as 
soon as they feel that Putin does not listen to them, they will leave.97 
However, during my fieldwork, the Council underwent some large-scale 
changes, which led to the resignation of seventeen members. Two main reasons 
were given: eleven members left as Putin returned to the Presidency in May 2012, 
stating that it would be hypocritical to advise that same person against whom they 
organise in the opposition movement.98 A second wave of members left in June, 
declaring that the new selection method of members to the Council, based on a 
public consultation conducted via the internet, was non-transparent and could be 
easily manipulated.99 It was unclear to what extent the public consultation influenced 
the decision on whom to appoint and, after voting took place, the number of 
members was suddenly increased from forty to sixty-five. Bar a few ‘celebrities’, 
members of the Council’s new composition are not as well-known as those of the 
previous composition. Respondents felt that the expansion of the Council’s 
membership would mean that it would be much harder to gain consensus on specific 
issues and, indeed, the practice has begun to emerge of members splitting into 
factions, publishing recommendations that contradict one another, with one group 
advocating a critical position and the other adhering to the Kremlin’s line.100  
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Several of my respondents were members both of the Human Rights Council 
and of the Public Council under the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office, a fact that 
allowed for some interesting comparative discussion. Unlike the Human Rights 
Council, the initiative for this public council came from human rights activists 
themselves. In the late 2000s, civil society leaders, among them some of Russia’s 
most well-known activists, such as Lyudmila Alexeeva, Lev Ponomaryov and 
Svetlana Gannushkina, founded the body in order to ensure that the Prosecutor’s 
work was conducted transparently and because they felt that the city courts took 
the side of the prosecution as a matter of principle.101 The aim was to ensure that 
the Moscow prosecutor had the opportunity to hear ‘civil society’s voice’ in court 
cases conducted by the state.102 Human rights activists were allowed to choose the 
Council’s members and the composition has been described as ‘completely rights-
oriented’.103 However, according to its founder, it is ‘a lot less effective than we 
hoped when we founded it.’104 One member states that the Prosecutor does not 
take the Council’s recommendations on board: ‘Each time it is as if we are meeting 
for the first time, as if he hears all this for the first time.’105 Another member states 
that activists in the Council ‘can’t find common ground’ with the authorities.106 The 
implication is that the Prosecutor uses it to enhance the image of his institution, 
posting photos of Council sessions online on his website.107 In short, it has been co-
opted in service of the Prosecutors’ ends. Why do people remain? The most 
frequently cited response was that there are like-minded individuals there.108 People 
also stated that even the vaguest possibility of influencing an outcome and 
conducting a dialogue with the authorities on the subject of rights made it worth 
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staying there, even though the actual levels of influence were low.109 I came across 
this narrative repeatedly during my fieldwork in all three case study cities. 
In sum, although all my Moscow respondents were critical of PCBs, only four 
of fifteen advocated disengagement with them. For the majority, PCB membership 
allows social activists to present research for discussion with government officials 
during meetings and attempt to convince the authorities that their proposals should 
be adopted. This was considered a valuable opportunity that could be used in the 
service of society. While, given the diversity of PCBs themselves, there is no clear 
consensus among my Moscow respondents on the kind of practices being fomented 
within PCBs, a clear normative opinion is emerging as to which practices they 
should be fomenting. These include being able to stand up to authorities inside 
PCBs by presenting them with critical and independent views. However, such a 
practice is dependent primarily on the openness of authorities to take such views 
on board and, secondly, on the perspicacity of the PCB member in putting them 
forward. An absence of these criteria results in PCBs acting as mechanisms of 
endorsement for the authorities. Despite these contingencies, the majority of my 
Moscow respondents valued PCBs as platforms for much-needed dialogue 
between ‘civil society’ and the state and mechanisms through which policy 
outcomes could occasionally be affected. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This discussion has shown that there is a gap between the Mayor of 
Moscow’s portrayal of civic engagement in governance in his discourse and the 
practices that are enacted in the city’s PCBs, in terms of the self-perception of the 
‘active citizens’, the kind of relationship between citizens and the authorities 
produced by PCBs, and the role of PCBs in local governance. First, like the 
Presidential discourse, the mayor represents citizens as willing and patriotic 
assistants to the authorities; but PCB members themselves tended to see 
themselves as helping ‘society’ rather than the state through PCBs. Second, the 
mayor considered PCBs as a means to operationalise his conception of the 
harmonious relationship between citizens and the authorities; however, the 
practices that occur inside PCBs can be confrontational and can occasionally alter 
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state policy. Third, although he did not present a legitimating narrative for PCBs 
specifically, the mayor presented PCBs as a key part of his local governance 
agenda; the majority of respondents, meanwhile, felt that the authorities do not 
sufficiently engage with them. These differences suggests that PCB members take 
these bodies more seriously than the authorities, and use them as part of a broader 
strategy to advance the agendas of their interest groups. It indicates that the 
authorities do not have the amount of control over the bodies as is portrayed in state 
discourse and that PCBs can be a site for contentious politics and in some cases 
can shape state policy. 
Overall, there was a high level of conformity between the federal and regional 
discourse, but more variation as the discourse was turned into practice. This, of 
course is to be expected, since it is surely more straightforward to restate something 
in language than to enact what has been said. However, it also suggests that it is 
easier to maintain authoritarian control over government than over governance. 
While Sobyanin faithfully enacted the centre’s will, PCBs did not always fulfil the 
functions intended of them by the authorities and certain alternative, grassroots 
agendas are sometimes successfully advanced and the level of authoritarian control 
over these spaces is partial at best. This suggests that the greater diversity of actors 
included in governance structures, the less likely these structures will be to operate 
as intended by the authorities. 
 
St Petersburg 
 
In this section, I discuss St Petersburg’s local regime, the discourse of public 
participation in governance articulated by the Governor of St Petersburg, and the 
practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted through PCBs as described to me in 
semi-structured interviews with 11 current or former members. I show that tensions 
between the city’s historical authoritarian governance agenda and the high levels of 
opposition-minded intelligentsia remain to this day and shape the environment for 
civic participation in governance. For instance, the low level of engagement with 
citizens on the part of the authorities in St Petersburg means that citizens are less 
enthusiastic about state-driven mechanisms of civic participation, and the 
confrontational attitude of some groups discourages the city administration from 
reaching out.  
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The discourse articulated by current governor Georgy Poltavchenko is the 
most conservative and illiberal of all three regional leaders, a fact which correlates 
with the critical and dismissive attitude towards PCBs evidenced by my 
interviewees. Most PCBs are perceived to be ineffective, with neither the Governor’s 
administration nor St Petersburg’s activist community engaging with them to the 
level seen in Moscow. Through a discussion of one dysfunctional and two more 
active PCBs, I show that whether citizens can perform a more critical conception of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ depends to a great extent on whether the authorities are 
interested in the issues dealt with inside the PCB. If they are, PCB members can 
help shap policy; if not, they merely approve government decisions. Overall, the gap 
between discourse and action on civic engagement is therefore smaller than in 
Moscow, but this is due to a lack of effort to inculcate practices of civic engagement 
in governance altogether, rather than a greater level of state control over the 
activities of PCBs. 
 
Local Regime 
 
Built on the back of serf labour under Tsar Peter the Great on the marshy 
banks of the river Neva from 1703, St Petersburg was the capital of the Russian 
Empire until 1918 when the revolutionary Bolshevik government moved the capital 
to Moscow. Until the city's creation, Russia did not have sea access to the Baltic; 
thus, under Peter, the Russian navy was founded and the city became Russia's 
most important seaport as well as a focal point for merchants and businessmen.110 
From its inception, St Petersburg contained a high level of educated and intellectual 
individuals: inspired by the architecture of Venice, Amsterdam and Versailles, Peter 
brought engineers, architects and scientists from all over Europe in order to 
construct the city according to contemporary European trends.111 During the 
eighteenth century, the Academy of Sciences, the university, and Russia's most 
famous museums - the Kunstkammer and the Hermitage – were founded. Attracted 
by St Petersburg’s liberal reputation and wealthy inhabitants, writers, artists and 
composers continued to move to the city throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries. Literary journals and salons abounded, with some of Europe’s most 
progressive thinkers engaging in debate.112  
At the same time, St Petersburg was home to the opulence and orthodoxy of 
Russian Tsardom, a fact that made the city ripe for tension between forces of 
conservatism and enlightenment, such as were manifested in the Decembrist 
Uprising in December 1825 and, later, the Bolshevik Revolution. Thus, while the city 
gained the reputation as Russia's 'window on the West'113, an epithet it has retained 
to this day, the myriad palaces, as well as the resolutely autocratic monarchy, led 
others to view it simultaneously as 'the state incarnate'.114 Anton Fedyashin has 
described this duality as ‘enforced enlightenment where the forces of progress and 
conservatism, freethinking and censorship, education and ignorance were locked in 
struggle.’115 These two trends, at once liberal and authoritarian, have defined the 
city's local regime throughout its history, facilitating the tug of war between 
traditionalists, progressives and radicals, and continues to shape the city’s current 
relationship to the proliferation of PCBs, discussed below. 
 During the Soviet Union, despite efforts to suppress dissent, Leningrad 
remained a site of artistic and alternative political ideas, and was the city in which 
the anti-Stalin opposition was most active.116 Even a decade prior to the launch of 
perestroika, the city was a hotbed of informal anti-Communist groups, most notably 
Klub 81, which held unauthorised poetry readings and even published an 
uncensored journal that was begrudgingly tolerated by the authorities.117 In the first 
relatively democratic elections of the Russian Congress of People Deputies in 1990, 
the Leningrad delegation was the most radically anti-communist, and in Leningrad 
city Soviet, democratic forces dramatically outnumbered the Communists. In 1991, 
the city went to restore its pre-Communist name and voted one of the democratic 
reformers, Anatoly Sobchak, as Mayor.118 In the referendum of 1993, 78.2% of the 
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St Petersburg electorate expressed confidence in Yeltsin, compared with a national 
average of 58.7%.119 
Sobchak’s period as the first mayor of post-Soviet St Petersburg was 
troubled: the clashes between the executive and legislature that occurred at the 
federal level (and resulted in the 1993 constitutional crisis) were also mirrored in St 
Petersburg, with Sobchak’s government riven by infighting and the city Duma 
deeply mistrustful of Sobchak’s policies.120 (This fissure continued into the 2000s – 
leading Dininio and Orttung to label the St Petersburg local regime ‘fractured’.121) In 
the early 1990s, crime rates rose by 54%; daily life in the city was characterised by 
lawlessness, poverty and violence, and while much of this was clearly a result of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, short-term responsibility in the eyes of the 
population lay with Sobchak.122 Fewer democratic parties made it into the city 
administration, a fact for which Sobchak was sharply criticised by Yeltsin, once the 
mayor’s staunch supporter.123 In the next round of elections, Sobchak lost to his 
former deputy, Vladimir Yakovlev, who exploited the divisions between Sobchak and 
the federal centre,124  presenting himself as better able to overcome the tensions 
among the political elites.125 However, Yakovlev’s fate as governor was doomed 
from the start since Putin had been one of Sobchak’s protégés and Russia’s new 
President had remained very loyal to him. As a result, Putin took an intense dislike 
to Yakovlev, perceiving him as a traitor and calling him ‘Judas’.126 Thus, despite 
winning the 2000 elections with a landslide victory, the governor eventually resigned 
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ahead of schedule in 2003, reportedly under pressure from the federal centre.127 
According to Helge Blakkisrud, Putin had been keen to replace Yakovlev ‘with a 
member of his inner circle.'128 This demonstrated the extent of Putin’s control over 
the leadership of St Petersburg, which has remained to this day. 
St Petersburg’s third governor, Valentina Matviyenko, an experienced 
diplomat and federal-level politician, was strongly backed by the Kremlin as 
Yakovlev’s successor; however, she was far less popular with the electorate. After 
winning a dubious victory in the 2003 gubernatorial elections, marred by low turnout 
and forced into a second round due to no candidate initially gaining over 50%,129 
she remained in office for eight years before resigning in 2011 to take up the position 
of Chairman of the Federation Council, the third highest position in the country.130 
Matviyenko’s legacy in St Petersburg is a mixed one: while she managed to 
increase the city’s budget five-fold and improve living standards among the 
population, she was deeply criticised for ruining the neoclassical city centre with 
gaudy modern architecture, mishandling snow-clearing during several particularly 
harsh winters and suspected nepotism  vis-à-vis her son.131 Three months before 
her resignation, her approval ratings had dropped to 18%.132 Her appointed 
replacement was Georgii Poltavchenko, a former long-serving KGB officer.133 A self-
described ‘conservative’ and a former member of the Communist Party, his 
appointment caused surprise among Russian analysts, who noted his lack of colour 
and charisma, inappropriate for Russia’s vibrant second capital.134 He has openly 
admitted that he does not enjoy the public aspects of his work and closed down his 
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Twitter account a few months after becoming governor.135 Although he is no longer 
formally a member of any political party, he has stated that his sympathies lie with 
United Russia.136 
 While St Petersburg’s formal politics may be characterised by a high level of 
conformity with the federal centre, the much of the city’s relatively well-educated, 
Europe-facing population have a well-documented propensity for democratic 
politics. Following on from its Soviet-era history, there are a relatively large number 
of opposition-minded civic groups in St Petersburg, who seek not collaboration but 
confrontation with the authorities leading to a somewhat hostile environment 
between the state and ‘civil society’.137 In terms of material well-being, it has the 
second highest human development index after Moscow138 as well as the second 
highest GDP;139 this leads one to expect a higher level of public activity by citizens 
than less affluent regions. In sum, St Petersburg’s long history as a site for 
oppositional civic action on one hand and orthodox leadership on the other means 
that a certain amount of disconnect between the governor’s rhetoric on civic 
engagement and citizens’ experiences of it is to be expected. I now turn to a 
discussion of Poltavchenko’s representation of the role of the citizen in governance. 
 
Recontextualisation 
 
 In this section, I discuss the discourse of civic engagement in governance as 
articulated by Georgii Poltavchenko in his interviews with print and online media 
outlets between 1 March 2012 and 22 May 2014, archived on the St Petersburg 
Administration website.140 Unlike the self-presentation of the Moscow mayor as a 
public persona keen on engaging with citizens, Poltavchenko has professed a 
dislike for the public aspects of his work141 and appears rarely in the press, 
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articulating his views ‘only when there is a specific reason’.142 Given the personal 
history and political leanings of Poltavchenko described above, as well as the status 
of St Petersburg as Russia’s second city and Putin’s birthplace (and the place where 
he began his political career), one might expect a straightforward rearticulation of 
the federal-level discourse here. In fact, there is very little mention of civic 
engagement in governance in Poltavchenko’s interviews; instead, he devotes much 
of his rhetoric to economic matters such as investment, industry, privatisation 
projects and the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Other frequently occurring topics 
include traffic problems and the expansion of the metro, immigration, public events 
such and commemorations of the Siege of Leningrad and the World Cup, and the 
preservation of the historic city centre. References to civic engagement appear in 
one quarter of the 40 interviews on the website and only in response to questions 
from journalists; in a further contrast with his Moscow counterpart, the governor 
merely rearticulates the Kremlin’s general governance formulae without developing 
it for his constituency. I now build a picture of his discourse from these ten sources 
and show that it is at once more conservative and more vague than the discourses 
both of the Mayor of Moscow and the President. 
 Although, unlike Sobyanin, he does not articulate Putin’s legitimating 
narrative of the ‘global race’, he does evoke the conservative idea that Russia is 
facing threats from all sides. Drawing a parallel between the Thirteenth Century 
prince Alexander Nevsky, who faced Mongol threats from the East and Teutonic 
Knights from the West, Poltavchenko claims that ‘our culture is also facing danger 
from both sides’, in the form of the threat of globalisation from the West and 
immigration from the Central Asian republics.143 In contrast to the President, who 
advocates the development of an economy competitive at the international level as 
a means for national improvement, Poltavchenko’s vision is thus much more 
parochial and even seems to prefer a ‘withdrawal’ from globalisation. However, 
unlike Putin, he does not use this language of besiegement as a platform from which 
to call citizens to act in defence of the nation ; instead, he goes on to express 
concern regarding the perceived negative impact of immigration on St Petersburg’s 
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‘culture’, although he notes that it brings certain economic benefits. This equivocal 
stance on immigration is also present in discourses at the federal level and in 
Moscow; however, it is the only point of similarity in what is otherwise a conservative 
and reactionary view of Russia’s place in the world. 
Similarly, Poltavchenko employs dramatic rhetoric elsewhere to persuade 
citizens to unite behind the authorities. For instance, in the run-up to the 2012 
Presidential elections, Poltavchenko implied that if the Russian electorate did not 
vote for Putin, the country would collapse. Using short sentences to convey a sense 
of urgency in his rhetoric, he stated, 
 
Today our country faces a very serious dilemma. And there are two 
choices - not three, just two. Either it will go forward. Yes, there 
may be some problems, but it will move forward. This is the first 
option. Or it will collapse again. And, God forbid, like in the 
nineties. And under a certain scenario, it may collapse like in 1917-
1918.144 
 
Reducing the complex set of possible outcomes of the Presidential elections to a 
single dichotomy between Putin and national ruin implies that there is only one real 
option for people who do not want a repeat of the chaos of the 1990s. It 
demonstrates the governor’s high level of support for the President (and perhaps a 
low estimation of his readers’ analytical skills). He does not elaborate on what ‘going 
forward’ means in terms of concrete policies; rather, it is presented in residual terms 
as the alternative to collapsing and thus its merits are taken for granted. 
Unlike Putin and Sobyanin’s use of images of a bleak future to galvanize 
citizens, the two threats facing Russia discussed here seem to be motivated by a 
more generalised desire for continuity and the preservation of tradition. He portrays 
an international system blighted by foreign threats and a domestic system 
potentially destabilised by the opposition. For Poltavchenko, the best course of 
action is to prevent change. While Putin used the image of a grim future in order to 
mobilise citizens to advance the position of Russia internationally, Poltavchenko 
uses it to entreat citizens to preserve the status quo. This demonstrates the limited 
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vision of St Petersburg’s governor: for him, the level at which citizens may be active 
and affect political outcomes is the domestic, not the international, arena. 
 As one might expect, continuity exists between federal and St Petersburg 
discourses on the role of nationalism in encouraging citizens to help their local 
communities. Like Putin, public spiritedness and nationalism go hand in hand for St 
Petersburg’s governor: he links the two in response to a question about his views 
on the lack of a ‘national idea’ in Russia. With somewhat circular reasoning, he 
claims that Russia’s national idea is precisely Russia itself, before stating that inter-
generational volunteer activities provide a sense of ‘where we came from’. Without 
explaining his understanding of the connections between Russia as a ‘national idea’ 
and the practice of volunteering, he moves on to applaud St Petersburg’s 
community of volunteers, stating that such activities should receive government 
support: 
 
‘But today people have gone further, not only do they go to the 
official subbotniki145; they organize themselves and do things to 
improve the space in which they live. Here, of course, we should 
also help. I think in the long term, efforts connected with the 
improvement of living environments and initiated by residents 
should be supported by the government.’146 
 
Thus, while nature of the relationship between public service and nationalism is left 
unspecified, it is clear that the governor wants to encourage people to give their 
time freely in service of the state. This echoes the federal-level discourse, which 
also presented active citizenship as a patriotic virtue; however, unlike Moscow’s 
mayor, who has developed concrete ways in which citizens can help take care of 
their environment, Poltavchenko is vague and elusive on his ideas for public 
participation in this field. 
The tool for developing civic engagement in governance most frequently 
mentioned by the Governor is the devolution of powers to district governments. He 
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states that residents can become involved in decisions relating to improvements in 
the local area (blagoustroistva territorii), the organisation of leisure activities for local 
youth, management of ‘paid public work’ (oplachivayemaya obshchestvennaya 
rabota147), the temporary employment opportunities for minors and the prevention 
of drug addiction.148 Elsewhere, he states that he wants districts to deal with issues 
relating to smoking and some economic matters (though he does not specify 
which).149 Poltavchenko does not explain his rationale for devolution, most likely 
because it is a nationwide trend and the governor is merely executing federal 
recommendations. However, in contrast to Sobyanin who painted devolution as a  
means by which citizens can more effectively monitor the activities of the authorities, 
the ‘powers’ given to St Petersburg communities are distinctly apolitical and point 
towards a state logic of off-loading to citizens rather than engagement with them.  
Further, this disparate selection of policy areas and the absence of any justification 
or explanatory statements suggests that the governor does not have a coherent 
vision for the role that district governments should play in city governance, but rather 
is rearticulating policy formed from above.  
 There is just one interview in which the governor goes into detail regarding 
mechanisms through which citizens can take part in decision-making processes 
and, curiously, it is an article intended for a Chinese audience.150 Two mechanisms 
are mentioned. First, public councils are seen as the primary way in which to engage 
with the public. Poltavchenko states that they are used to make decisions relating 
to issues that ‘affect the interests of the whole city’ and thus have been created in 
‘critical areas for the city’s development’, such as economics, industry, investment, 
the development of small businesses and historical preservation. Such councils, he 
claims, allow the authorities to give ‘maximum consideration to the interests of the 
people’. Second, he states that important documents, such as the development 
strategy for St Petersburg until 2035, are posted online for public (vsenarodnyi) 
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discussion so that anyone who wishes can add comments, ‘which are summarised 
and taken into account by developers.’ The use of the old-fashioned term 
‘vsenarodnyi’ rather than the more contemporary ‘obshchestvennyi’ situates his 
discourse in the Soviet era, and evokes ideas of consensus and a collective will.  
His presentation of these two mechanisms, however, leave more questions than 
answers as to how citizens’ views will be taken into account: like Sobyanin, he does 
not explain how public councils enable authorities to consider the ‘interests’ of the 
population, nor does he highlight how developers will incorporate the views of the 
public on future projects. Again, this points to the fact that such mechanisms are 
simple rearticulations from the federal centre. 
Summarising his stance on civic engagement, he states, ‘we have tried to 
make sure that mechanisms of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ have kept pace with the 
times.’ In order to do this, he claims, the St Petersburg authorities have maintained 
close contact with certain independent social organisations (obshchestvennyye 
organizatsii)  
 
Who sincerely wish St Petersburg happiness and prosperity. Not 
with those who turn a pothole into a reason to make a political 
scandal, but with those who actually help people and who are 
themselves ready to work for people.151  
 
This is a divisive way of referring to St Petersburg’s heterogeneous NGO community 
and suggests that the Governor is fearful of groups that speak publically on social 
issues, preferring apolitical NGOs who are primarily engaged in service provision. 
The fact that he spells out the kind of people with which the authorities do not want 
to work in almost as much detail as those with which they do suggests that the 
governor believes there is a significant number of groups that do not share his vision 
a good life for the city. His understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ elucidated 
above implies an evolving process of harmonious collaboration between the 
authorities and civic groups and is presented as the modern way to ensure dialogue 
between state and society. The conception advanced here is thoroughly apolitical: 
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the state may work with like-minded groups to fulfil social work. Again, it rearticulates 
the federal discourse in general but also reactionary terms. 
The other articulations concerning Poltavchenko’s vision of civic engagement 
are very brief and often quickly deflect onto other topics. For instance, in response 
to a question about the effectiveness of feedback mechanisms between the 
governor and city residents, he proselytises on the complex character of the St 
Petersburg citizens, stating that they are opinionated and take very little on faith. 
Because of this, he states, ‘I try to listen very carefully to people when I 
communicate with them on Twitter, when I meet with citizens, as well as during my 
visits to businesses or during sightseeing.’152 However, shortly after stating this, he 
stopped using his Twitter account to engage with citizens, using it only to 
congratulate his followers at New Year and Easter.153 Similarly, when the governor 
is asked whether he feels the support of the citizens, to which he replies in the 
affirmative, stating ‘We strive to listen and to hear those who criticize us, we 
attentively deal with any constructive proposal.’154 However, short of his short-lived 
Twitter account and his unspecified ‘meetings’ with citizens, there are no indication 
of how criticisms and proposals are received or whether and how he encourages 
citizens to get involved. In response to a question about whether the government is 
in tune with the city’s social movements, the governor responds obliquely that active 
citizens are one step ahead of the government.155 
In sum, Poltavchenko’s articulations on civic participation in governance are 
conservative, vague and at times reactionary.  Unlike Sobyanin who frequently 
advocated his pet project, Nash Gorod, the St Petersburg Governor did not mention 
any innovative strategies for involving citizens and, in fact at times seems rather 
afraid of them. It is also telling that some of his most detailed pronouncements on 
civic engagement appear in publications not intended for a local readership. In local 
outlets, he simply rearticulates federal trends of devolution and public councils. The 
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analysis presented here suggests that the governor considers being a publically 
accountable politician to be less important than being a manager who attracts 
investment and maintains stability in the city. It also demonstrates how the individual 
governing style of regional leaders can produce sub-discourses that diverge from 
the master discourse. I now discuss the practices of civic participation in the city’s 
PCBs. 
 
Operationalisation 
 
In this section, I explore the practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ articulated 
by 11 respondents in St Petersburg. Like my Moscow respondents, those in St 
Petersburg were members of the intellectual elite, who were accustomed to giving 
interviews, had had frequent dealings with Western organisations, and were often 
able to present their arguments in a comparative context. Most identified as liberal 
reformers, having either been dissidents in the Soviet Union or pro-democracy 
activists during perestroika. As with Moscow, there were no unequivocal PCB 
supporters among my respondents but, in contrast to those in the capital, there were 
far more abolitionists than reformers, although most of those who described 
themselves as abolitionists were also PCB members. Overall, my St Petersburg 
respondents were less keen to discuss PCBs in detail, dismissing them instead as 
‘fake’ or ‘decorative’, and moving the conversation to topical political issues of the 
day such as the law on ‘Foreign Agents’, the Bolotnaya Affair or Pussy Riot. 
Therefore, while the evidence of social practices inside St Petersburg’s PCBs 
presented below is somewhat limited in relation to my discussions of Moscow and 
Samara, this in itself indicates the reality of civic participation in governance in St 
Petersburg. In what follows, I compare, first, the views of St Petersburg’s PCB 
reformers and abolitionists and, second, three examples of functional and 
dysfunctional PCBs in the city. I show that while respondents’ views on what makes 
a good PCB are largely the same as those in Moscow, the disaffection for civic 
participation in governance espoused by the governor in his discourse has 
significantly reduced the both the public desire and the ability for city PCBs to act 
as critical interlocutors with the authorities. Though a discussion of the practices 
inside in one poorly functioning PCB, the St Petersburg Public Council and two more 
active PCBs, The Council for the Protection of Cultural Heritage under the St 
Petersburg Government and St Petersburg Public Monitoring Commission, I show 
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that PCBs described positively by respondents either pertain to topics that already 
have a high level of support from the Governor or are concrete, clearly defined.  
Ultimately, however, practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in St Petersburg, as with 
Moscow, depend on the willingness of the authorities to engage with PCBs and to 
fill them with active members. 
It is difficult to categorise St Petersburg respondents as unequivocally reform 
or abolition oriented, since most people veered between the two viewpoints during 
the interview. Of the 11 respondents, four were largely for the abolition of PBCs, 
despite some being members in federal-level bodies. Most people pointed to the 
importance of dialogue between the authorities and the public and therefore 
supported the PCB concept in principle because they believed it could create useful 
sites for the discussion of the city or country’s problems, in the absence of ‘genuine’ 
platforms for discussion. One respondent described the format as ‘very important’, 
as officials are required to defend their decisions ‘in front of society’.156 If PCBs did 
not exist, another stated, the relationship between society and the state ‘would be 
much worse’.157 Others felt that, since PCB activities are enshrined in law, giving 
members the right to access government information and receive formal responses 
to their recommendations, these bodies were better placed to influence the 
authorities than civic organisations not connected to the state.158 Thus, in the 
country’s current authoritarian climate, PCBs were considered to represent one of 
the few avenues that activists could use to present their campaigns to the 
government and know that they are required to listen. 
 However, all respondents stated that most such fora in the city were highly 
dysfunctional, with the two concerns about PCBs mentioned by Moscow 
respondents also raised in St Petersburg. First, most PCB members comprised 
people whom respondents did not consider part of ‘civil society’, such as actors and 
businessmen, and would be unlikely to challenge the government. Several 
respondents relayed stories of how the authorities ignored their suggestions for new 
members, choosing instead people they considered conservative and apolitical.159 
One reformer stated that in order for PCBs to be useful, membership must comprise 
people who can speak out, namely vocal and critical members of human rights 
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organisations.160 Another stated that the more representatives of ‘really functioning’ 
organisations there are in a PCB’s composition, the more likely it will be that the 
PCB is ‘effective’.161 Second, respondents complained that the authorities did not 
evidence a desire to engage with PCBs and frequently ignored their 
recommendations.162 ‘Why do you ask for our proposals if you refuse them?’, asked 
one, rhetorically.163 No one, however, was clear on how these two issues could be 
resolved, other than changing the government. One respondent stated that such 
councils could be useful while Russia does not have a ‘normal’ President or 
parliament. In his words, ‘We don’t need to reform PCBs, but reform Putin!’164 This 
goes to the heart of the problem of PCBs’ dependency on the authorities. 
The St Petersburg abolitionists’ views were also similar to those voiced in 
Moscow. Most abolitionists felt that PCBs were created so that the authorities would 
not have to interact with independent organisations and, if they were abolished, 
collaboration between the authorities and ‘real’ NGOs could increase.165 One 
respondent believed that the government should not collaborate with such 
GONGOs but with institutions that are ‘not dependent on any government body.’166 
Another stated that PCBs represent a liberalisation of the form but not the content 
of state-society relations, consisting merely of an ‘image of dialogue’167 between 
society and the authorities.  Secondly, PCBs membership were seen as supporting 
the Putin regime. One abolitionist stated that he would refuse membership in the 
majors PCBs because he did not want to ‘help Putin.’168 Respondents felt that PCBs 
were a manifestation of the idea that citizens are there for the purposes of the 
authorities, not vice versa, as they thought it should be.169 Why did they choose to 
take part in PCBs if they felt they should be abolished? As with their Moscow 
counterparts, activists felt that this was the only opportunity they had to present the 
government with their issues. Although in principle they felt that such structures 
should not exist, they used them in the absence of anything better. I now move on 
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to examine the extent to which views are enacted in practice in St Petersburg’s 
PCBs. 
Numerous respondents stated that the governor does not listen to PCBs. 
According to one respondent, also a researcher of PCBs at the Higher School of 
Economics in St Petersburg, the city has more than seven hundred such bodies; 
however, most of them do not fulfil the tasks for which they were founded. Either 
members should represent the interests of their organisation or target group to the 
authorities or they should give policy advice in the capacity of public experts. 
Instead, the only function they perform is the legitimisation of state policy.170 My 
research partially confirms his view, since whether they successfully represent civic 
interests to the authorities fundamentally depends on whether the authorities are 
prepared to listen.  
St Petersburg Public Council, the city’s version of a public chamber (St 
Petersburg is one of the last federal subjects that does not have a Public Chamber), 
is held in very low regard by my respondents, and has been described as ‘sham’171 
that ‘imitates human rights protection’.172 Like the Moscow Public Council under the 
Prosecutor’s Office, it was initiated by a coalition of civil society activists but has 
since become co-opted by the state body to which it is attached. The activists were 
inspired by discussions of new institutional sites for collaboration between society 
and the state during the 2001 Kremlin-organised Moscow Civic Forum and, upon 
their return, formed the Council under the Governor’s Office, with the aim of 
monitoring the St Petersburg government’s activities. However, the governor can 
select the Council’s membership and, as such, he has filled it with famous St 
Petersburg citizens such as actors and sportspeople; not a single member was 
considered by my respondents to be critical or independent. It was perceived to be 
silent on human rights abuses in the city, instead merely approving the governor’s 
decisions. According to one respondent, its only activity consists of distributing 
awards to notable citizens.173 A similar fate occurred with the PCB considered for a 
long time to be the most effective in the city, the Co-ordinating Council for Co-
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operation with Public Associations.174 It was created by social activists alongside 
the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly and, according to one of its founders, for a 
time successfully promoted engagement between the city’s NGO community and 
government departments. However, in 2010, the council’s leadership changed; 
then, in 2011, the governor was changed, who, according to my respondent was 
highly critical of the Council. The Council has not met once since Poltavchenko 
came to power.175 
The only two PCBs discussed positively by respondents were The Council 
for the Protection of Cultural Heritage under the St Petersburg Government, which 
deals with the conservation of the historical city centre, and the St Petersburg Public 
Monitoring Commission (PMC). The first of these deals with a matter considered to 
lie close to the hearts of the majority of citizens,176 since protecting the historic city 
from encroaching business interests has been the subject of much civic activism in 
recent years, (a fact which no doubt contributes to the Council’s resonance).177 
Furthermore, it is comprised of genuine experts in the field of conservation, including 
respected architects, historians, sculptors and leaders of relevant civil society 
groups. According to one respondent, the Council’s recommendations are taken 
seriously by the governor and it is a ‘citywide event’ when its advice is ignored.178 
Meetings are open to the public and well attended by the press and, given the status 
of St Petersburg as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, the pronouncements made 
during meetings are broadcast well beyond the city. It is unsurprising that this 
Council is considered effective, since the governor also spoke frequently in his 
interviews about the importance of preserving St Petersburg’s cultural heritage. The 
issue thus has broad support both inside the government and among the population, 
and the Council’s expert membership, as well as the governor’s generally 
favourable reactions to its recommendations enables the Council to function 
effectively. Other city PCBs considered effective by respondents were the Maritime 
Council of St Petersburg and the Public Council for Small and Medium Businesses, 
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although this was only hearsay.179 It would be unsurprising if this rumour were true, 
since the two issues are also likely to be important for the city government, unlike 
the Co-ordinating Council for Co-operation with Public Associations, discussed 
above. 
The St Petersburg PMC, was also stated to have had a significant impact on 
the activities of the local prison authorities, forcing them to make substantial 
improvements to the city’s detention centres. Members stated that, among other 
things, the St Petersburg PMC has succeeding in closing two dilapidated pre-trial 
detention centres,180 reducing overcrowding in cells,181 instigating urgent repairs in 
various holding centres,182  and reporting beatings on prisoners (which resulted in 
the officers being sent to prison).183 Again, vital to the Commission’s work was the 
composition of it membership. One respondent stated that in the St Petersburg PMC 
there was a ‘real element of obshchestvennyi kontrol’’ because ‘good people’ were 
working there.184 In contrast to the other PCBs discussed here, my respondents 
unequivocally viewed the PMC as a human rights organisation, even though 
members are selected by the Federal Public Chamber.185 The common view was 
that if PCBs were formed from below and were filled with critical voices, they could 
be considered part of ‘civil society’. According to one, this was because its members 
were considered ‘people who are really fighting for human rights’.186 Another stated 
that the PMC was an example of ‘self-organisation of society’ because the initiative 
for the PMC law came about through ‘pressure from society’.187 However, as with 
many other ‘effective’ PCBs, respondents stated that there was also a growing 
attempt to co-opt the city’s PMC either by filling it with former officers or by 
intimidating members when they visit prisons. One respondent stated that the 
Penitentiary Service’s hostile attitude towards PCBs constitutes an ‘administrative 
war’188 on the Commission and that while the St Petersburg commission is still 
relatively independent, there are fears that the following composition will be less 
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radical. This highlights the ongoing attempts of the authorities to reduce the critical 
capacity of PCBs considered radical. 
In sum, as in Moscow, the extent to which St Petersburg PCBs may practice 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is determined by the government department responsible 
for them. However, in contrast to Moscow, the St Petersburg governor has not 
encouraged the development of mechanisms for engagement with the public and 
this is reflected in the varied fates of the PCBs discussed above. The governor’s 
Public Council is not considered a platform that enables civic participation, and the 
Coordinating Council for Cooperation with Public Associations has been ignored. 
Those that are deemed useful by participants pertain to policy areas in which the 
authorities are already interested and, arguably, do not threaten the regional power 
vertical; if they do, they may be subject to attempts at co-optation or will be ignored. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The relationship between discourse and action in St Petersburg is more 
complex than in Moscow. On the one hand, there is a level of conformity between 
the two since neither the regional authorities nor respondents are inclined to engage 
with state-driven mechanisms for civic participation in governance. The governor 
did not encourage citizens to join PCBs and many respondents reported that the 
city’s PCBs were impotent. On the other and, this lack of possibilities for 
collaboration has produced a more confrontational relationship between citizens 
and the authorities, with the governor stating that he only wanted to engage with 
certain civic groups and respondents stating that PCB membership merely 
whitewashes the regime. The present antagonistic relationship can be seen as a 
continuation of state-society relations in the city that has existed since its foundation 
and suggests that the role intended for PCBs by the Kremlin in diffusing tension 
between citizens and local authorities is correct. 
However, there is a large gap between federal-level discourse and the social 
practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in St Petersburg. This indicates that 
Poltavchenko has not sufficiently reproduced the Kremlin’s vision of citizens helping 
the state in the name of the country. As a result, PCBs are less active, citizens are 
less inclined to engage with them, (even, as with Moscow, in order to advance their 
own critical, grassroots agendas), and a relationship has set in that departs from 
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the image of the unified people conceived of by the President. This raises the 
question of why the Kremlin allows Poltavchenko to remain in office.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the local regime, the discourse of civic 
engagement in governance articulated by regional leaders, and the attitudes and 
experiences of PCB members in Russia’s main metropolises, Moscow and St 
Petersburg. I have shown how the socio-political context of the two federal cities 
shapes the discourse of the city leader and how, in turn, these discourses help to 
construct the limits and possibilities of the practice of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in 
the cities’ PCBs. The discussions have highlighted that, while irreducible to one 
another, the relationship between discourse and social practices is co-constitutive, 
in that one simulateously registers and affects the other. 
In each city, the local regime acts as a backdrop that shapes the relations 
between the authorities and citizens. This accounts for the substantial variance in 
the opportunities for civic participation in governance in Russia’s two federal cities, 
despite both sharing high levels of income and large numbers of active citizens. 
Moscow, as the federal centre, has a close relationship between President and 
mayor, but also contains the greatest diversity of local groups. St Petersburg 
exhibits a historic tension between the city management and civic groups. These 
specificities provide the basis for the significant divergence in practices of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ outlined in this chapter, in which the engaged and 
enthusiastic discourse of the Mayor of Moscow was accompanied by more positive 
experiences recounted by citizens in PCBs, while in St Petersburg, the 
disengagement of the governor mirrored the scepticism of my respondents. This 
demonstrates the importance of considering the local regime in the production of 
political practices in Russia and reinforces the dangers of extrapolating such 
practices from one region to another. 
While the two regions differ widely in terms of local regime, the leaders’ 
rearticulations of the federal-level discourse share a commitment, voiced in varying 
degrees, to improving local governance and the expansion of the PCB network. 
Civic engagement was portrayed as a means for citizens to support local 
government in the performance of certain apolitical tasks, particularly in matters 
relating to the upkeep of the local area. Public councils were considered by both 
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leaders as a central mechanism through which to increase civic engagement in 
governance, but neither explained the role these bodies were intended to play in 
public life. This suggests that they consider PCBs to have become such a normal 
part of local governance that they no longer need justification. In short, both leaders 
faithfully rearticulated the federal level conception of the relationship between 
citizens and the authorities in which the role of the citizen in governance is seen as 
a willing assistant in state-designed projects (although with great variance in the 
degree of enthusiasm). However, this relationship did not always materialise in the 
practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted through the PCBs. In both regions, 
examples were given of instances when PCB activities changed state policy, 
diverging from the Kremlin’s conception of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as citizens 
fulfilling tasks determined by the authorities. In the case of Moscow, I discussed the 
Presidential Human Rights Council, whose members reported a 5% take-up rate on 
their recommendations; in St Petersburg, I showed how the Council for Protection 
of Cultural Heritage successfully campaigns for the protection of the historic city 
centre and how the city’s PMC has improved conditions in local detention centres. 
It is therefore shortsighted to dismiss these bodies as ‘Potemkin Villages’ that 
merely enhance the reputations of politicians, since they can alter state behaviour.  
On the other hand, practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in both cases were 
limited by three criteria. First, and most importantly, the authorities must be prepared 
to engage with citizens; secondly, membership must contain individuals able to 
advance alternative viewpoints; and, thirdly, the object of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
must be of interest to the governance agenda and receive broad support on both 
sides of the state-society divide. When these criteria are present, collective shaping 
of policy can take place; when they are absent, the PCB becomes an uncritical 
assistant to the authorities. This means that although state discourse promoting 
PCBs tends to advocate them as a tool for empowering citizens, in practice the 
reverse is often true. Since the authorities can select PCB members and choose to 
take on board or dismiss their recommendations, whether or not a PCB provides a 
platform for citizens to take part in decision-making lies solely in the hands of the 
authorities. As such, if a policy area is not considered important by the authorities, 
such as the Public Council under the Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow or the 
Coordinating Council for Collaboration with NGOs in St Petersburg, PCBs operating 
in that policy area either will remain unused or will be used to feign genuine 
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collaboration. In the case of general PCBs that act as advisors to regional power-
holders, such as St Petersburg Public Council, if the official linked to them does not 
desire to interact with them, they will also fall silent. 
In sum, the limited plurality of voices inside PCBs is characteristic of practices 
of authoritarian neoliberal governance, which enable a controlled level of civic 
participation in governance. I have shown in this chapter that regional leaders, to 
various extents, advocate neoliberal policies of decentralisation, civic engagement 
and reform of the Soviet-era welfare state (particularly in the case of the Moscow 
Mayor). In this light, PBCs are seen as a ‘roll-out’ mechanism that responds to 
dangers of the modern era in which citizens must play a greater part in assisting 
and monitoring the authorities in order to help advance their country. However, 
although the authorities retain substantial control over the membership and agenda 
of these bodies, in some cases citizens can exploit the gap in full control enabled 
by limited pluralism to advance certain contentious agendas.
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Chapter Six: 
Recontextualisation and Operationalisation in the Regions: 
Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ from Discourse to Action in Samara 
 
This final chapter discusses the recontextualisation and operationalisation of 
the discourse of civic engagement in governance in my third case study, Samara. 
To recapitulate, by recontextualisation, I refer to the extent to which national level 
discourse has been reproduced at the regional level, and by operationalisation, to 
the practices that are inculcated as a result of this discourse. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, I have chosen Samara as a point of contrast to Moscow 
and St Petersburg because, as the administrative centre of Samara Oblast, the city 
has a large number of PCBs but at the same time is unequivocally a ‘provincial’ city. 
Located in the Volga District of European Russia, approximately 550 miles 
southeast of Moscow and 100 miles north of the border with Kazakhstan, it is the 
sixth most populous city in Russia. Yet, while it is likely to have relatively well-
developed PCB network as a result of the numerous government bodies in the city, 
it is less significant for national politics, is home to fewer opposition-minded activists, 
possesses a lower number of Western organisations, and a lower overall standard 
of living. It therefore enables a good comparison of the activities of PCBs in 
conditions that are less likely to foster public-spiritedness. Such a comparison raises 
the question of how far practices inside PCBs are shaped by cosmopolitanism and 
relative wealth. However, as noted in the previous chapter, Russian regions are 
extremely diverse; it would therefore be short-sighted to assume that Samara is 
representative of civic participation in governance in all Russia’s regions. Instead, 
this chapter is intended to present just one example of regional practices and to act 
as a point of contrast to practices in Russia’s political centre. 
This chapter follows the same structure as the previous one: I first discuss 
Samara’s local regime, in order to give some socio-political context; second, I 
examine the discourse of civic participation in governance articulated by Samara’s 
governor, Nikolai Merkushkin; and, third, I review experiences of local PCBs 
recounted to me in 10 interviews with city activists. I show that the governor’s 
enthusiastic rearticulation of federal level discourse attempts both to present himself 
as Putin’s faithful envoy and to distinguish himself from his corrupt and incompetent 
predecessor, who showed little regard for the views of the Samara public. His 
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presentation of PCBs as the central component of local governance also correlates 
with the more positive views regarding these bodies articulated in my interviews. 
Specifically, his enthusiasm for civic involvement in scrutiny of the local budget has 
resulted in practices perceived by many respondents to be highly successful. 
Overall, the practices relayed to me in interviews have a higher (though not 
absolute) level of correspondence to the discourse articulated by the governor; 
more citizens are enthusiastic about their role as assistants to the state than in 
Moscow and St Petersburg, with two respondents wholeheartedly supporting the 
PCB project. The smaller gap between the governor’s discourse and citizens’ 
practices suggests that there is a greater degree of authoritarianism in Samara than 
in Moscow and St Petersburg as there is a greater level of state control over PCB 
activities and consequently a lower level of pluralism in governance. 
 
Local Regime 
 
Samara has always been a regional city with relatively little import for national 
politics, compared to my other case studies. Its location at the confluence of the 
Volga and Samara rivers attracted pirates, merchants and state warships during the 
Middle Ages, and fostered a diverse, multi-ethnic population. It became part of the 
Russian Empire during the sixteenth century after Moscow acquired the Kazan and 
Astrakhan khanates, and its fertile lands attracted many migrants not only from 
across Asia but also from Europe, with Jews, Muslims and Christians living side by 
side.1 Those people who became known as Volga Germans migrated to the region 
after a call by Tsaritsa Catherine II, herself a native German. Tomila Lankina has 
shown how such European settlers used their connections to their native countries 
in order to ‘curb the imperial authorities’ interference with their promised self-
government.’2 This served to promote a culture of tolerance and quell repressive 
tendencies in the region. 
Samara Oblast has long been a centre for industry and agriculture in Russia, 
possessing a high level of peasants and farmers and a comparatively lower level of 
cultural figures and intellectuals.3 By the 19th Century, it had become the country's 
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top producer of grain, as well as an important centre for animal produce. As such, 
Samara Oblast made its name as one of the most important economic centres in 
the Russian regions, with good connections to Moscow.4 The standard of living and 
overall educational levels, therefore, while lower than in the two centres, were 
nonetheless higher than in other provinces. This demographic, with a large 
proportion of wealthier peasants, was to make Samara province susceptible to 
radical political trends. Indeed, Samara was one of the centres of non-Tsarist 
opposition to the Bolsheviks: after Moscow, Samara was the country's main 
stronghold for the anarchist movement after the 1905 Revolution. In fact, the 
Samara Anarchist Federation led the city in a major uprising against the Bolsheviks 
in May 1918.5 In addition, the People's Army of Komuch, an anti-Bolshevik army, 
found substantial support among the broadly Socialist Revolutionary peasant 
population and controlled the region for much of the Civil War.6 
By the end of 1918, however, the Bolsheviks had consolidated power in the 
area. Due to the high dependence on agriculture, the population was hit particularly 
hard by the triple deadly processes of famine, collectivisation and dekulakization 
that characterised the 1920s.7 In 1935, Samara was re-named Kuibyshev after the 
eponymous Bolshevik, who had become president of the local soviet during the 
Revolution and had overseen the defeat of the opposition. In 1941, faced with a 
rapidly advancing Nazi invasion, sections of the Russian government were 
evacuated to the city from Moscow and a bunker was dug there for Stalin, although 
it was never used. After the war, Kuibyshev became a centre for space rocket 
construction and hosted the country's missile defence shield, thus becoming a 
closed city, with no access to foreign news or produce. During this time, every third 
family worked in armaments for the space programme.8 Kuibyshev remained closed 
until 1991, at which point it was also given back its historical name. 
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Economist Konstantin Titov was voted head of the Kuibyshev City Council of 
People's Deputies in the first relatively free elections on 4th March 1990 and soon 
became its chairman. He quickly aligned himself with market reformers Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and Yegor Gaidar, publically supporting Boris Yeltsin in the wake of 
the 1991 putsch.9 In August 1993, he was appointed head of Samara Oblast 
administration, becoming known as one of the few 'relatively democratic' regional 
leaders.10 Titov changed his political colours frequently during his career: a member 
of the liberal party Nash Dom Rossiya, later Soyuz Pravykh Sil and, as was the case 
with many regional governors, only joined United Russia in 2005 as the political 
mood in the country changed.11 However, his comparatively liberal leanings did not 
stop him retaining his seat at the top of the regional administration: in 1996, he was 
elected to the post of governor of Samara Oblast, winning 63.4% of the vote,12 a 
position in which he remained until he took voluntary retirement in 2007. 
In 2005, President Putin abolished regional gubernatorial elections, and two 
years later Vladimir Artyakov, former head of Russia's biggest car manufacturer 
AvtoVAZ, was appointed as Titov's successor. In the five years Artyakov was 
governor, the Oblast's socio-economic situation deteriorated drastically, moving 
from the fifth wealthiest region and an Oblast that donated to the federal budget to 
twenty-seventh and one that received federal hand-outs.13 This, in large part, was 
due to the impact of the 2008 financial crash on the regional economy, which 
suffered particularly acutely due to its high dependence on manufacturing, but it was 
certainly not helped by Artyakov's nebulous political practices.14 He was implicated 
in numerous corruption scandals, including allegations of 1.5 billion rouble 
bonuses,15 spending 22.5 million roubles of the Oblast budget on an armoured 
Mercedes S600 Guard, making it the most expensive vehicle driven by a governor,16 
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and was complicit in a bribery scandal involving IKEA,17  to name but a few of the 
headlines. His relationship to Samara NGO community was equally bleak: he did 
not engage with non-governmental groups and either ignored or closed PCBs.18 
Overall, Vladimir Artyakov was rated lowest out of all regional governors in the 
Federation in terms of transparency.19 
The current governor, in the post since May 2012, is Nikolai Merkushkin, 
former head of the neighbouring Republic of Mordovia. This choice surprised all 
corners: until then, not a single governor had been moved from one region to 
another and, according to head of liberal party Yabloko, signalled deep divisions 
within the Oblast elite.20 However, at the time of my fieldwork during the summer 
and autumn of 2012, there was a generally optimistic consensus regarding 
Merkushkin's potential to deal with some of the key social problems facing Samara: 
Saransk, capital of Mordovia is cleaner, with fewer potholes and better functioning 
public services.21 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ability to provide public services 
and implement social projects in Samara has been constrained by administrative 
tension between the Oblast and the municipal authorities (a problem common to 
many Russian regions).22 This conflict has advanced and receded depending on 
the personal characteristics of the incumbents, reaching a peak in 2004 when the 
office of Mayor Grigorii Limanskii was reshuffled by the Governor in order to weaken 
his authority.23 Between October 2006 and October 2010, Just Russia member 
Viktor Tarkhov (the only regional Mayor not from United Russia) held the post; he 
was well known as a criminal businessman24 and was eventually forced to quit after 
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the IKEA scandal.25 The current mayor, United Russia member and Tarkhov's 
former deputy, Dmitry Azarov, has been in the post since October 2010 and had 
maintained a favourable relationship with Artyakov. However, with Merkushkin's 
appointment to the post, relations between the two power loci deteriorated rapidly, 
with the activities of the mayor curtailed by the bad relationship with the governor.26  
Today, Samara Oblast is one of the most urbanized and industrial regions of 
Russia, home to 2.2% of the country's population, over 380 oilfields and major car 
and space rocket manufacturing plants.27 However, despite the high levels of 
industry in the region, quality of life in Samara is much lower than in Moscow and 
St Petersburg: even the authorities have recognised that the region suffers from 
'chronic problems'.28 The city itself is in bad repair: its historic buildings are in a state 
of collapse, a plethora of sprawling malls have sprung up outside the city centre, 
and there are few well-maintained public spaces and amenities.29 One of the 
country's opposition leaders, Boris Nemtsov, during a recent visit to the city, 
expressed shock: 'What's happening here? Has the city been carpet bombed?'30 
Similarly, Valentina Matviyenko has called it 'dirty and unkempt'.31 Problems relating 
to the environment are widely viewed as serious concerns in the region, with poor 
air and road quality topping the list.32 Living in such conditions takes its toll on the 
populace: the number of drug abusers in the region also stands at twice the national 
average.33 According to the most recent statistics, 77.7% of Samara residents do 
not want to take part in civic initiatives, and the Oblast Public Chamber concedes 
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that attempts to engage them have failed.34 Furthermore, lending credence to the 
resource curse theory,35 the region has become blighted by corruption, and the 
wealth created by the numerous factories and plants in the region has not trickled 
into the hands of the regular citizen.36 The average wage now stands at just over 
8,500USD per annum,37 2,500 lower than the national average.38 Overall, it is 20th 
in the country in terms of human development.39 Nonetheless, it is relatively well 
placed nationally in terms of GDP, rating fifteenth out of Russia's eighty-three federal 
constituencies, but sinks to twenty-sixth place in GDP per capita.40  
This discussion has highlighted some of the factors likely to shape both the 
discourse and the practices of civic participation in governance in Samara Oblast. 
Like Sobyanin, Nikolai Merkushkin has the difficult tasks of regaining public trust in 
regional government and improving the standard of living in the wake of Artyakov’s 
legacies of corruption and disinterest. It is thus reasonable to expect a relatively 
strong focus on civic engagement in the new governor’s discourse. On the other 
hand, the status of Samara as a regional city, the lower levels of income and quality 
of life, compared to the other case studies and the reports of a disinterested citizenry 
by the regional Public Chamber lead one to suppose that practices of civic 
participation in governance are less likely to be operationalised in a critical fashion. 
  
Rearticulation 
 
In this section, I examine the discourse on civic engagement in governance 
as articulated by Samara Oblast’s current governor, Nikolai Merkushkin, in the 11 
interviews and public addresses dated between 7 August 2012 and 5 June 2014 
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listed on the website of the Samara Oblast government.41 I show that, of the three 
regional leaders, Merkushkin presents himself most faithfully both as a servant of 
the Oblast’s residents and as an envoy of Putin. The mechanisms for civic 
participation discussed below are direct reproductions of the central discourse, and 
are based on the notion of the active citizen assisting the authorities to fulfil tasks 
determined by the regional (and hence by the central) authorities.  
Merkushkin emphasises in the majority of the texts the importance of 
feedback between the authorities and citizens and states that everyone must work 
together in order to resolve the region’s numerous problems. The most likely reason 
for this is that the previous governor had proven both very unpopular with residents 
and inept at managing the regional economic situation. Thus, one of the most 
pressing tasks for the new governor was to restore citizens’ faith in the government 
by presenting himself as an engaged and sincere politician and by improving the 
population’s living standards. Consequently, alongside statements on improving the 
region’s industrial and agricultural output, building new roads and other social 
amenities, preparing for the 2018 World Cup (of which Samara is a host region), the 
standard of living in his previous constituency, Mordovia, much space is devoted to 
stating the importance of local government and exhorting citizens to work together.  
The self-presentation of Merkushkin as Putin’s regional ambassador occurs 
through numerous references to Putin throughout his interviews and addresses, in 
which he frequently justifies policy ideas with quotations from the President. A 
prominent United Russia member, the Samara governor presents himself as 
operating on a clear Presidential mandate:  
 
I went to Samara on the instructions of the President to solve a 
range of problems and I am solving them. It's my job.42  
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Similarly, his pronouncements on mechanisms for civic engagement, as well as on 
other governance mechanisms, are often direct reproductions of Kremlin policies. 
For instance, Merkushkin is the only regional leader to mention specific policies of 
the third wave of administrative reforms, such as co-operation among government 
departments and ‘multi-function’ centres where citizens can access a range of 
government services.43 He also states that Samara has been nationally recognised 
for successfully implementing the President’s ‘May Decrees’ (Maiskiye Ukazy), thus 
insinuating that governance in the region is the epitome of the national agenda.44  
Merkushkin’s legitimating narrative for increased civic engagement in 
governance is Samara’s many social problems. Similar to the presentation of the 
‘global race’ by Putin and Sobyanin, he uses the socio-economic situation in the 
Oblast to stress the need for unity among the authorities, political parties and NGOs 
and to call for the participation and assistance of active citizens. In both end-of-year 
addresses, he paints a dark picture of life in the region, starting his speeches with 
a list of problems before setting out his strategies for their resolution: ‘Yes, we have 
many problems. There are many more and they are much deeper than I had 
imagined when I took office.’45 In his first address as governor, he lists numerous 
bleak statistics to illustrate the governance challenges that lie ahead. He states that 
the region’s economic status has fallen from the top five to the ‘second or third 
dozen’ nationally, with ‘not only businesses but entire industries’ moving out of the 
region. He cites high levels of drug addiction and the fact that the number of people 
infected with the AIDS virus is more than twice the national average: ‘it is hard even 
to imagine: every seventieth person is infected with this terrible disease.’ He 
continues with the ‘tragic’ fact that in 2011 the number of people leaving the region 
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exceeded the number of people moving there. Having sketched his assessment of 
the challenges and, admitting that ‘not everyone will like what I have just said’, he 
calls upon everyone to ‘radically reconsider’ their attitudes to the situation and work 
together to improve the region.46 Two main strategies are presented: citizens should 
become active and state and society should unite. I now discuss each in turn. 
The idea of the active citizen is developed in the governor’s second address 
and features strongly in the majority of articles on the website. If citizens become 
more active and assist the authorities in the execution of their plans, the region’s 
economic downturn could be reversed. This is also Vladimir Putin’s argument, 
discussed in Chapter Three, and Merkushkin duly credits the premier:  
 
In his address, Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin 
said the main reason for the slowdown of development lies inside 
the country, within ourselves. This is doubly true for the Samara 
region. It means that the dynamics of development can only be 
instilled from within. Many people need to change their attitude. 
We must once and for all say goodbye to complacency, to the habit 
of living better than we work, to the irrepressible desire for easy, in 
fact for unearned, money, which is very typical for our region. Work 
and work alone, honest and fairly paid, will lead us to success and 
prosperity.47 
 
In other words, the concept of ‘active citizens’ is presented as a panacea for the 
region’s (and the country’s) problems. This locates the solution inside citizens 
themselves and thereby absolves the authorities from responsibility for bad 
decisions and poor governance; it depoliticises the social problems. The idea that 
people should wean themselves off their perceived reliance on the Soviet-era state 
and take greater responsibility for themselves also appears frequently in the federal-
level discourse and has been directly rearticulated here. 
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However, Merkushkin depicts a very limited role in governance for active 
citizens: numerous representations of the authorities as decision-makers who need 
to communicate their governance agenda more effectively suggests that the public 
are to be active only insofar as they carry out the authorities’ decisions. In an 
interview with a newspaper in the town of Togliatti, the Governor calls for the need 
to establish ‘constructive cooperation’ between the authorities, NGOs, political 
parties and citizens in order to implement the authorities’ plans. Such a consensus, 
he states, 
 
Will be good, especially for the residents of Togliatti, who need to 
understand what the authorities do and, most importantly, to see 
our actions and realise that everything that happens in the city 
depends on active citizens.48  
 
In other words, Togliatti citizens must become active in comprehending the 
authorities’ decisions and assisting them in their execution. Similarly, in an article 
discussing the forthcoming local elections, Merkushkin states,  
 
But without the active participation of the residents themselves, 
without their active citizenship, you can’t create order. The 
authorities should be the engine of these processes.49  
 
The use of the word ‘order’ (poryadok) implies a structured arrangement imposed 
from above, and seems in contrast to the idea of civic engagement as helping to 
shape public policy. Like the role of citizens in the federal-level discourse, it 
suggests that citizens assist the authorities in the implementation of pre-determined 
goals. Merkushkin’s stipulation that the authorities should take the lead also 
reinforces citizens’ subordinate relationship and is further articulated in his annual 
address: 
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Our common goal, both for the ministries and local government, is 
to do everything to make our people comprehend, realize, 
understand what the government wants, what it does and what 
part people can play in this can play in this themselves. And if we 
can form a single, close-knit society within 2-3 years, we will 
definitely be competitive, we will definitely beat many others, we 
will definitely succeed.50 
 
The use of three synonyms highlights the importance of enlightening the citizens as 
to the governance agenda: it is thus the government’s job to make citizens 
understand what it wants, not the government’s job to understand what citizens 
want. Further, the importance of demystifying government activities is linked to the 
idea that state and society can unite to overcome their problems. The idea of a 
‘single close-knit society’ does not suggest that either political contestation or a 
diversity of social agendas will be tolerated by the regional authorities in the 
formation of public policy. Furthermore, this image recalls the paternalistic 
relationship between the state and the population typical of Soviet-era governance 
discussed in Chapter Three. It is ironic that the governor calls for an end to the 
Soviet mentality when the relationship advocated in his discourse recalls the Soviet 
conception. 
Linked to this is the second strategy for improving life in the Oblast: the idea 
of unity between citizens and the authorities. Unity is an important aspect in the 
governor’s portrayal of civic participation and was also a key ideological component 
in Putin’s construction of state-society relations, as well as in the Soviet discourse. 
Thus, while Merkushkin promotes the individualisation of responsibility for 
overcoming the Oblast’s problems through the concept of active citizens, his use of 
the concept of unity suggests that citizens may take an individual approach only 
insofar as it coincides with the approach of the authorities. This emphasis on unity 
appears frequently in his 2013 address, in which he states that the task of turning 
the oblast around is ‘unique in its dimensions, difficulty and historical significance’ 
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and that it can only be resolved by ‘thinking and acting as one whole, as a single 
team’. Later on in the same speech, he states that the unity of society and 
government is ‘of great importance.’51 The idea that society is comprised of 
numerous competing and often contradictory interests is totally absent from the 
governor’s discourse. Unsurprisingly, then, civil society is also portrayed as an 
assistant to the authorities: ‘Local authorities and civil society must work in the same 
team. We must learn to listen to each other, and if we work as a team, we will solve 
our problems.’52 This also suggests that critical or politicised groups do not have a 
role to play in Merkushkin’s vision of governance (and this is borne out in my 
interviews, discussed below). The idea of unity depoliticises relations between the 
authorities and citizens, recalls the unity of state and society typical of Soviet times 
and excludes the possibility that there may be alternative paths of development. I 
now turn to the presentation of specific policies intended to encourage civic 
participation. 
 The governor mentions numerous policies to operationalise the agenda of 
fostering active citizens and creating unity between society and the authorities, the 
most frequently occurring and extensively elaborated of which is devolution of 
powers to local government. This is common across all leaders examined in this 
thesis; however, Merkushkin’s proposals are by far the most radical. He frequently 
attests to his commitment to the principles of decentralisation by recalling that the 
first Russian zemstvo was founded in Samara,53 stating that he is an active 
supporter of decentralisation,54 and calling centralised government ‘yesterday’s 
programme’.55 He devotes an entire interview to local government reform, in which 
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he calls for a depoliticised (i.e. non-party) system of local government bodies that 
would function much as public councils currently do, with city dumas comprising 
candidates representing local districts or NGOs, but not political parties. According 
to Merkushkin, this is a standard conceptualisation of local government: 
‘Throughout the world the system of local government is not politicised.’ It is also 
presented as Putin’s recommended policy, as well as the norm around the world 
(and thereby irrefutable):  
 
That is what the President said in his message – we have to bring 
local government closer to the people so that is within arm’s reach, 
so to speak. This is the global ideology of local government.56 
 
According to the governor, local communities should be handed responsibilities 
relating to utilities, improving the local area, monitoring the implementation of state 
programmes. Through this, people can become active, their children will grow up in 
active environments and will later become active themselves. It is clear that this 
proposal is intended to actualise the kind of depoliticised, unified community 
advocated in his general statements, in which the distinction between society and 
the state is no longer relevant. 
The two other policies that recur in the governor’s discourse are the 
development of public councils and the devolution of budget responsibility to local 
communities, both of which support his local government agenda. First, public 
councils are presented as a sort of revolution in governance, which can help 
increase the number of active citizens in service of the authorities. Of the three 
regional leaders, Merkushkin is the most ardent supporter of these bodies and 
presents them as a central component to the extension and depoliticisation of local 
government. For instance, he states, 
 
We already have a new form of government – district public 
councils. We have seen this in Togliatti; I saw it in 
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Novokuybishevsk. They work in the neighbourhoods, creating 
district associations that take up issues such as improving the local 
area, housing problems, non-payment of rent. This is a good 
beginning, and we need to do our best to support it, including 
financially.57 
 
His description of them is strikingly similar to his ideas on local government reform 
discussed above; it would thus seem that his intention is to expand the network of 
PCBs so that it replaces representation by political parties altogether. He speaks 
proudly of Samara Oblast Public Chamber, which he claims ‘is not only the largest 
in composition, but also one of the most active in the country.’58 Similarly, 
responsibility for increasing local budgets has been devolved from the regional 
administration to local communities. He states that grants now are given on the 
basis of ‘socio-economic indicators’59, though he does not elaborate on this concept. 
Elsewhere he states, 
 
Municipalities, from rural communities to major cities, must move 
away from a psychology of dependency and work actively to 
increase the revenues of their own local budgets.60 
 
Thus, the mechanisms for civic participation promoted in the governor’s discourse 
is an archetype of authoritarian neoliberal governance, calling on one had for active 
citizens to help increase budget revenue, but on the other a depoliticised system of  
councils that can be managed from above. 
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To conclude this section, Merkuskhin’s discourse of civic engagement is 
based on two principles: active citizens and unity between citizens and the 
authorities. These principles are manifested in concrete policies such as devolution 
of certain apolitical powers to local communities and the expansion of the PCB 
network. His presentation of local government reform, in which he suggests 
replacing competition among political parties with the public council system in 
particular highlights the intended operationalization of these two principles. These 
policies also straightforwardly rearticulate the Kremlin-level discourse, which also 
advocate active citizens in service of the state. His enthusiastic promotion of the 
public council system suggests that their operationalization is likely to be both active 
and orthodox. 
 
Operationalisation 
 
In this section, I explore the discourse of civic participation in governance 
articulated by 10 PCB members in Samara. As capital of the Oblast, Samara hosts 
both regional and municipal government structures and consequently there are 
many PCBs in the city. The majority of respondents were members of several 
consultative structures at once and often confused the names of the various bodies 
during the interviews, thus giving the impression that the city’s PCB network is 
tangled and incoherent. In contrast to Moscow and St Petersburg, Samara 
respondents displayed a wider range of views regarding the utility of PCBs, with two 
staunch supporters of the idea and several relatively uncritical reformers, alongside 
the familiar, harsher criticisms previously articulated in the other case study cities, 
including three abolitionists.  
Most respondents felt that levels of civic participation in the region are low 
due to the scarce numbers of activists and the high degree of control from the 
federal centre, factors which could also contribute to the increased overall support 
for PCBs among my respondents. However, unlike their Moscow and St Petersburg 
counterparts, the only people to voice oppositional political viewpoints were the 
abolitionists; the remaining respondents felt that the cause of PCBs’ inadequacies 
lay with the lack of competent citizens rather than disinterested government officials. 
Yet, while this overall more conservative understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
has led to less confrontational practices within many PCBs and to the co-optation 
of civic initiatives by the authorities, socially beneficial collaboration occurs in the 
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field of public budget hearings, an initiative also supported by the governor. As with 
other examples discussed above, it shows that positive collaboration is possible 
when there is support from the authorities. This section is split into three parts: first, 
I discuss respondents’ perceptions of Samara’s regional specificities; second, I 
examine their attitudes towards PCBs; third, I show how these attitudes are 
operationalised in two contrasting case study PCBs, Samara city Public Council and 
Samara Public Budget Experts.  
There was a strong sense of regional identity among my respondents, with 
the ‘regional factor’61 perceived to play an important role in what many described as 
dismal relations between the authorities and citizens. This ‘regional factor’ appeared 
to comprise two main features. First, several respondents noted a suspicious 
attitude on the part of the authorities towards independent social activity due to the 
relatively small number of activists in the region.62 One respondent stated that 
citizens enjoy a greater level of liberty in Moscow because there are many more 
public-spirited people and a diversity of political views is normal. In Samara, due to 
the passive nature of the majority of the population, if citizens want to get involved 
in public life, ‘we immediately get into the FSB records, police records…’.63 Another 
stated that the authorities systematically try to shut down independent or critical 
social groups by creating ‘intolerable conditions’ for their members. He claimed that 
he had been beaten by masked men with baseball bats as a result of his activism.64 
A third lamented, ‘I understand people who [do not speak up]. They just want to live 
comfortably.’65 As such, it was perceived to constitute a great personal risk to speak 
out against government decisions. The feeling was that civic passivity is sustained 
by the fact that citizens do not have the opportunities to express their political 
opinions in public or access the critical views of others, particularly since all media 
outlets beyond the internet are linked to the government.66 Samara citizens were 
therefore seen to remain disengaged through a fear of the dangers of public activism 
and a lack of access to alternative viewpoints that could develop political 
sensibilities. 
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The second aspect of the ‘regional factor’ was the inability of Samara citizens 
to determine social policy themselves. Decisions affecting the area were seen to be 
made in Moscow, with several respondents noting increasing pressure from the 
federal centre on regional politics in the last ten years.67 The view was that if there 
is change in Moscow, there will be change in Samara, but neither Samara citizens 
nor politicians can affect the power vertical in the region. In this context, many 
respondents bemoaned the cancellation of gubernatorial elections (although they 
have since been reinstated in limited form) because it meant that the regional leader 
no longer needed to consider citizens’ views in formulating and delivering policy. 
This was especially apparent in the case of Artyakov, who, according to one 
respondent, had been a ‘very corrupt chap, like all Muscovites… who did a lot of 
harm for the region.’68 Another respondent stated that he was a ‘closed’ person, who 
did not need to collaborate with society to solve his problems. Because he was not 
required to win an election to stay in power, the governor did not consider the 
population’s views in his decision-making and therefore closed or ignored all the 
PCBs.69 A third stated that even if experts developed ten or twenty new modes of 
collaboration between the authorities and the public, the level of public participation 
would not increase since ‘we do not have elected leaders here, they do not need 
anything from society.’70 One respondent stated that he had pinned ‘very great 
hopes’ on the new governor, Merkushkin, because ‘we don’t have anyone else to 
pin our hopes on, the last governor destroyed everything.’71 These two factors 
combined led to a general feeling of impotence and fatalism among many of my 
respondents regarding their abilities to effect social change in their municipality or 
the future of state-society relations more generally and almost certainly perpetuated 
less confrontational practices inside PCBs. 
Two of my ten respondents were unequivocal PCB supporters, both of whom 
were active both in welfare-providing NGOs, as well as in a large number of PCBs. 
Both supporters felt that PCB membership was advantageous for their cause and 
although they showed awareness of the limitations of PCBs, they did not feel that 
they needed to be reformed in any way. Despite both supporting the PCB concept, 
the respondents saw very different purposes for PCBs, a fact that highlights the lack 
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of consensus regarding the role these bodies are intended to play in public life, even 
among their enthusiastic members.  
The first respondent, an activist with a disabled persons’ charity, revealed a 
lower expectation of PCBs than some of the more critical respondents; for instance, 
instead of attempting to influence the city leader, in his view, PCBs should convey 
information and any problems arising ‘from below’ to the leadership in a timely 
manner. He saw them an aid for the leaders, rather than a tool for citizens. He was 
also aware of the dependence of PCBs on the authorities, stating that such bodies 
are likely to be effective when the leader is ‘intelligent, purposeful and 
knowledgeable’. This did not pose a problem for the respondent, since PCBs were 
created to serve the leader and it was up to him to make use of them. ‘If there is a 
leader, there will be work; if there is no leader, there will be no work’, he stated. He 
recounted numerous times when the authorities had taken his views on board, and 
stated that his membership in PCBs allowed him ‘to actively influence the situation 
in the city and the region as a whole.’ He felt that authorities not only listened to his 
opinions and recommendations, but also acted upon them, particularly during the 
public budget hearings, discussed below.72 In his view, this was because officials 
did not want to be told that they did not work well with the public. However, it also 
suggests that the views and interests of apolitical welfare organisations are more 
likely to be taken into consideration by authorities than those of critical lobbying or 
human rights groups. 
The second supporter was the founder of an organisation that helps regional 
welfare-providing NGOs with training and resources, and had been involved in 
setting up PCBs since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the majority 
of the respondents, she felt that regional authorities had begun to pay more attention 
to the recommendations of public experts in recent years because they had ‘begun 
to want to understand where the problems lie.’ She was aware of the structural 
problems faced by PCBs, stating that they can only work effectively ‘when there is 
interest on both sides’ but stated that in order to improve their competency, the PCB 
model does not need to be reformed but that there needs to be more ‘public experts’ 
able to take part in them. For her, PCBs are necessary because social systems 
have become so complex that the authorities can no longer single-handedly 
organise public life or distribute resources effectively. In this environment, citizens 
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contain an important source of skill and resources, which can be accessed through 
PCBs. Such bodies are important as ‘they give another perspective on the problems 
facing the community and, by consequence, a broader set of solutions.’73 Her view 
of PCBs was a straightforward rearticulation of the state’s discourse, envisaging 
citizens as important sources of expertise that should be mobilised in welfare and 
service provision. 
The reformers comprised the biggest group among my respondents, with five 
agreeing that PCBs can be useful but do need to be reformed. Within this group, 
however, there was a wide spectrum of opinions ranging from the belief that PCBs 
constitute the ‘creation of a civil society’74 to the idea that they are a ‘tool for 
manipulating public opinion.’75 In contrast to reformers in Moscow and St 
Petersburg, who saw the problems of ‘loyal’ PCB members and disinterested 
authorities as equally problematic for the creation of PCBs as useful discussion 
sites, respondents in Samara mentioned only the first problem in any detail. This 
suggests that they did not consider it possible to reform the authorities, perhaps 
because they felt too far removed from those who decided the region’s fate. Instead, 
their disappointment lay with the kind of people taking up membership in PCBs 
because they were to various extents affiliated with the authorities, either as former 
officials or as people with other conflicts of interest. As such, respondents felt that 
many PCB members did not have the courage to speak out against the authorities. 
One respondent claimed that often members are afraid even to mention their 
proposals and ideas for fear of repercussions. Recalling the paucity of social activity 
in the region, he stated, ‘That’s why we need people who are relatively independent 
and are able to speak out publically. There are very few such people in PCBs. This 
is the problem with public life in Samara in general.’76 In order to solve this problem, 
respondents felt that PCBs should be formed in a more democratic fashion, taking 
account of the public’s views, possibly via elections or internet voting.77 
Three of my respondents were abolitionists, two of whom ran independent 
online news publications and one running a local branch of a national oppositional 
NGO. Two of the three had been members of PCBs, but had either been sacked 
from the post or had chosen to leave. All three shared the criticisms of the 
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abolitionists in other regions. First, they considered PCBs to be mere window 
dressing for the government, and that under the current regime, which one 
respondent described as comprising of ‘war criminals’, it was impossible to have 
any genuine collaboration between the authorities and civic organisations.78 The 
second reason was that PCBs prevented the development of more legitimate forms 
of political participation. According to one respondent, ‘If we had direct elections and 
a transparent voting system, then questions of civic engagement would not be the 
agenda of the day neither for us, nor for British academics.’79 This suggests that 
abolitionists, regardless of their location, sympathised with the national opposition 
movement. 
Like several other regions, Samara began establishing mechanisms of co-
operation between state and non-state institutions significantly earlier than the 
federal level. The framework for collaboration between social organisations and the 
authorities was created for Samara Oblast in 2003, while federal legislation on 
public consultative bodies was adopted only as a result of the administrative reforms 
of 2006-2008.80  Samara's framework set up a legal basis for co-operation with the 
authorities, including the creation of the Social Assembly of Samara Oblast, the 
precursor to the regional public chamber, created in 2008.81 What kind of role did 
the 2003 framework create for civic participation? Non-governmental organisations 
were to be involved in the monitoring of regional government activities and the 
provision of support in carrying out welfare, cultural and environmental activities.82 
This legislation paved the way for the proliferation of public chambers and public 
councils in the following years, and inscribed the task of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
of government activities into government bodies themselves.83 However, as 
discussed above, during the Artyakov years, many PCBs were neglected or co-
opted by the authorities. Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the 
trajectories of all bodies during this time, I focus on one such institution created on 
the back of this framework, the Samara City Public Chamber, whose fate was similar 
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to that of several others84 before examining what has been described as a 
successful collaboration between citizens and authorities in the form of the Public 
Budget Experts. 
According to its website, the Samara City Public Chamber is an ‘advisory and 
consultative body’, created with the goal of facilitating collaboration between 
citizens, NGOs and the authorities.85 Its main tasks are to act as a feedback 
mechanism between citizens and the authorities, carry out public opinion surveys, 
support civic initiatives, analyse draft bills, perform public scrutiny of government 
authorities, and to support cultural programmes in the region.86 It was initiated by a 
local Yabloko activist, who felt that the mayor should have greater consultation with 
the public before making decisions. The activist stated he had believed that a public 
chamber would be a better form of consultation than referenda or internet voting, 
first, because both are open to manipulation and, second, because the mayor 
needed more than just a ‘yes-no’ input on decisions. He felt that members should 
comprise people with plenty of experience in public life and expertise in their chosen 
field, who could argue their point in front of the authorities regardless of whether it 
coincided with the official line or not.87 Furthermore, a public chamber would give 
weight to the mayor’s decisions vis-à-vis the governor, since the relationship 
between the two was marred by a conflict of interests, with Oblast and city 
administrative levels are constantly competing for funding. He thought that a public 
chamber would strengthen the mayor’s legitimacy. 
However, the Yabloko activist’s ambitions for the chamber were not fulfilled 
as its activities were sharply constrained by the personal qualities of the mayor 
himself. According to another respondent, while the body was ‘more or less 
competent’ for a while, when the occupier of the post of mayor was changed, so did 
the activities of the Chamber; the new mayor, Tarkhov, was described as ‘a Soviet-
era person who had no idea about collaboration with society.'88 He quickly went on 
to change the Chamber’s membership, removing many of the critical voices. The 
atmosphere under Tarkhov was such that ‘even those remaining from the first 
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composition could not afford to voice an independent viewpoint.’89 In the eyes of my 
respondent, the new Chamber comprises ‘a lot people who don’t want to publically 
contradict the mayor… but rather resolve their personal problems with unofficial 
means.’90 Because of this, he eventually resigned from the very organisation that 
he created. According to another respondent, 'Samara city Public Chamber only 
works when its leader is a sensible, goal-oriented person – the human factor plays 
a big role.'91 This discussion shows that although the desire to create platforms for 
discussion often comes from below and activists initially embrace the PCBs format, 
such bodies are very easily co-opted into the system of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance. 
Of all the PCBs discussed during my interviews, respondents spoke most 
positively of the Public Budget Experts. According to one, ‘It’s the only social 
structure which works – we really influence the budgetary process and the use of 
resources.’92 The Public Budget Experts are thirteen representatives of different 
NGOs or public councils who, according to the December 2005 regional law 'On the 
budget apparatus and budget process in Samara Oblast', are recognised as experts 
and are legally allowed to monitor the finances of any department in the region.93 
They were instituted after the passing of a federal law in 2005, which stipulated 
public hearings of regional budgets, but did not elaborate on the form they should 
take.94 As such, each region had a relatively free hand in designing the process in 
their jurisdiction.95 In the case of Samara, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of the budget 
took place in two stages: first, a public discussion (obshchestvennoye 
obsuzhdeniye) was held to discuss the planned budget distribution for the coming 
year and of the fulfilment of the budget of the previous year. Second, a concluding 
hearing (itogovoye slushaniye) took place on the budget for the coming year, as well 
as the yearly report on the budget of the previous year.96 According to my 
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respondents, the first such hearing attracted between one and two hundred people 
– a fact which initially surprised the authorities. According to one respondent, 
various citizens had even prepared presentations which,  
 
Enumerated the share of the budget, spending priorities, they gave 
their views on whether it was too much or not enough. Money is 
needed for this, for that... The authorities certainly were very 
surprised that people were trying to change the budget.97  
 
The second public hearing involved the Samara Oblast Public Assembly and a large 
number of members of the public gave their views. One respondent recalled, 
 
When the Minister saw and heard all this, he said, "Why did 
no one told us that people are interested? We would have 
done the report differently." I replied, "How can we tell you? 
Who should have told you and how? For people to be able to 
tell you something you need to have a Public Council and 
through that we tell you what we expect and we want." And 
there and then we began the process of creating the public 
council. A year and a half later we were there … 
 
Again, although there was a legal impetus for starting public scrutiny of the budget, 
a significant drive also came from 'below'. Citizens saw public councils as a 
legitimate mechanism through which to become involved in governance. 
 Public Budget Experts view themselves as having considerable influence on 
the budget. Although recommendations worked out during hearings and round 
tables are not always acted upon, ministers and Public Experts discuss the budget 
in detail at round tables and seminars, which are also attended by journalists who 
publicise the findings and the resolutions. This means, according to one member, 
that 'there is transparency; people can demand their rights.'98 According to one 
respondent, there have been three incidences in which the experts’ alterations to 
the budget have been accepted in full or in part.99 Another member recalled how the 
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public scrutiny of the budget revealed that millions of roubles of public money was 
being spent illegally on the restoration and building of local churches. Despite this 
discovery, it was not taken up by the regions courts: ‘the prosecutor should get 
involved but it has been silent for 3 years – closes its eyes, pretends it doesn’t know 
anything.'100 While this does not suggest a high level of influence, the enthusiasm 
for the body displayed by its members suggests that its importance for citizens lies 
in the process, rather than the result. Why is obchshestvennyi kontrol’ of the budget 
considered more effective than other PCBs? First, the budget is a concrete sum of 
money that is relatively straightforward to monitor, rather than the generic activities 
of various government bodies; it is easier to point out discrepancies on 
spreadsheets than to influence an official with argumentation. Second, the forms of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ are structured and delineated, with clear avenues for 
participation and roles for the public. Third, it is an area in which the governor has 
encouraged public involvement.  
Overall, in Samara, most respondents were relatively positive about PCBs, 
seeing them as an opportunity to present their views and campaigns to the 
authorities. If they needed reforming, it was to increase the amount of active 
citizens, not to reconfigure their relationship to the authorities. Those with negative 
views belonged to the opposition and considered themselves marginal in Samara’s 
public life. The different trajectories of the PCBs discussed above show that the 
Chamber founded by the opposition activist failed to enact obshchestvennyi kontrol’ 
while the Public Budget Experts were supported by the government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined Samara’s local regime, the discourse of civic 
engagement articulated by the governor and the social practices produced through 
PCBs in the city in order to understand how far the social practices conform to the 
discourse. With both the governor and most respondents supporting PCBs, the gap 
between rhetoric and reality is smaller than in Moscow and St Petersburg and 
suggests that civic participation in local governance is more tightly controlled in 
Samara, since PCBs less frequently become spaces that challenge state policy and 
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instead inculcate the consensual relationship between society and the state 
envisioned in the discourse.  
Like Moscow and St Petersburg, the local regime is a key factor in shaping 
the possibilities for civic engagement: in Samara, it is characterised by a high level 
of disappointment among citizens in the previous leader and a new governor 
attempting to please the President, galvanise citizens and address the city’s 
numerous social problems. His discourse of civic engagement thus faithfully 
rearticulated the federal level in terms of the legitimating narrative of the need to 
become more competitive and that state and society must unite to improve quality 
of life in the region. As elsewhere, an active citizenry was presented as a response 
to the challenges of the new post-Soviet era and was contrasted with state-society 
relations in the old Communist regime, in which citizens were depicted as passive 
and dependent on the state. Of the three regional leaders, the Samara governor 
most enthusiastically advocated the development of the PCB network, even 
appearing to view it as a substitute for representative democracy at the local level. 
For him, PCBs were the essence of what local governance should look like. 
This enthusiasm was largely, though not exclusively, mirrored in the 
discussions with respondents during interviews. Of the three case studies, Samara 
respondents were the least critical of both PCBs and the Putin regime in general, 
and the understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ as a process of assisting the 
authorities was common among members. Critical respondents attributed this to the 
fact that there were fewer people willing publically to contravene the state’s position 
on public policy and disillusionment with the fact that local affairs seemed to be 
controlled by the Kremlin. Critical respondents recalled how their attempts to 
instantiate a grassroots understanding of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in local 
governance structures were co-opted by local leaders, much in the same way as 
the pravozashchitniki’s efforts to enshrine this understanding of the concept into the 
law on obshchestvennyi kontrol’ of prisons. This suggests that, as with participation 
at the national level, input from citizens is welcomed in Samara up to a certain point, 
and is considered an important element of public sector reform, but is halted when 
it is perceived to challenge or threaten state power.  This is a key feature of 
authoritarian neoliberal governance.  
However, in Samara, too, PCBs could occasionally be used to hold 
authorities to account: I showed how the Public Budget Experts occasionally 
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exposed corruption and inculcated a sense of empowerment in their members. It is 
unsurprising that this initiative was successful because the governor also advocate 
greater involvement of citizens in the management of local budgets. It demonstrates 
that, as with the other case studies, successful civic engagement in governance 
occurs when local authorities are interested in the particular policy area.  
 In sum, obshchestvennyi kontrol’ in Samara’s PCBs most closely 
corresponded to the vision of state-society relations advanced by the federal and 
regional authorities, with fewer respondents detailing confrontational practices than 
in Moscow or St Petersburg. In contrast to Moscow, Samara respondents were 
more closely aligned with the governor’s discourse in their perception of the role of 
citizens in governance and, in contrast to St Petersburg, where both the governor 
and respondents articulated mistrust of one another, most respondents in Samara 
engaged uncritically with PCBs. This suggests that there is a tighter level of 
authoritarian control in Samara than in the other two case studies, since there is 
mininal enactment of practices that diverge from the state discourse. 
Finally, while, given the heterogeneity of local regimes across the Federation, 
it is imprudent to generalise about the ability of PCBs to help shape the local agenda 
in the Russian regions, the analysis presented here nonetheless suggests that 
regional PCBs may be less influential in local governance than those in the political 
centre due to, first, the strength of the authoritarian political power structures linking 
the region to the centre and, second, the lower numbers of active citizens. Despite 
these factors, Samara’s PCBs cannot be dismissed entirely as mechanisms for the 
co-optation of ‘civil society’ and must be examined on a case-by-case basis for their 
ability to affect the policy-making process. 
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Conclusion 
 
With this thesis, I have departed from the more common approach to studies 
of Russian institutional design, which, resting on the residual teleology of the 
transition paradigm, have tended to focus on the depletion and distortion of Russia’s 
democratic institutions as a means to understand how state power is maintained in 
the contemporary regime.1 Instead, through the inductive study of new avenues for 
public political participation, I have revealed practices of participation in governance 
through which state power is both maintained and contested, which would not be 
captured using the lens of democratisation (since they occur outside of typical 
democratic institutions). The analysis presented in this thesis has shown that these 
practices combine elements of the neoliberal ‘good governance’ agenda with the 
country’s own historic governing traditions in order to incorporate market principles 
into governance practices that retain a high, but not absolute, level of control over 
policy outcomes. It has thus demonstrated that PCBs exemplify new (limited) 
participatory mechanisms for Russian governance in the neoliberal era. With this, 
the thesis has demonstrated that the substantive study of novel institutional 
mechanisms is equally important to the study of power and control in authoritarian 
regimes as explorations of the manipulation of elections or the management of civil 
society and, consequently, has developed a concept that enables discussion of 
such mechanisms. The concept ‘authoritiarian neoliberal governance’ can enable a 
greater understanding of the means through which the Russian state retains power 
while also embracing market principles. This conclusion reviews the central 
arguments of each chapter before addressing the four questions set out in the 
introduction and showing how the thesis contributes to existing debates on the 
relationship between state and society in Putin’s Russia, the nature of participatory 
mechanisms in authoritarian regimes, and the relationship between capitalism and 
democracy more broadly. 
Chapter One placed the development of new participatory mechanisms in 
historical context and showed that although institutions with limited ability to affect 
state policy have been a feature of Russian governance for the past 150 years, 
contemporary mechanisms are unique in that they have emerged during the market 
                                                          
1 These works have been reviewed on pp. 95 – 98. 
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reform of the Communist state bureaucracy. Products of the state-driven processes 
of increasing authoritarianism and neoliberalisation, PCBs aim to provide local and 
federal government departments with enough information to produce effective 
public policy by enlisting citizens in the policy-making process in ways that do not 
challenge the ‘power vertical’. The concept obshchestvennyi kontrol’ has been 
employed to refer to the practices of assistance and oversight that post-Soviet 
participatory institutions are intended to produce.  
Chapter Two conceptualised the process of building public policy networks 
by the non-democratic market state as ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’, which 
it defined as the process by which the authoritarian regime allows limited 
participation in the public policy-making process as a means to offset its reduced 
monopoly on the requisite information brought about by the marketization of the 
state bureaucracy. It argued that the near-globally accepted public sector reform 
package comprising neoliberal policies of privatisation of state assets, outsourcing 
of state functions to NGOs and businesses, and the decentralisation of powers to 
local government have reduced the state’s ability to create effective public policy 
and have thus increased the need for states to create mechanisms that boost citizen 
input, including in authoritarian regimes such as Russia. However, it also stated that 
a key feature of authoritarian regimes was limited pluralism, which refers to the 
state’s ability to determine who can participate in public affairs and to set the public 
agenda. It therefore argued that PCBs are products of the hybridisation of global 
policies of neoliberal governance and Russia’s domestic authoritarian governing 
style. It also suggested that such processes are not limited to the case of Russia, 
but to any state in which the dual governing agendas of authoritarianism and 
neoliberalism are present. 
Adopting the Critical Discourse Analytic lens, Chapter Three addressed the 
emergence of the Kremlin’s contemporary conception of civic engagement in 
governance in order to reveal the roots of this discourse. It showed that 
contemporary portrayals of an active citizenry that assists the authorities in the 
execution of centrally determined tasks recall aspects of the Soviet-era discourses 
of rabochyi and narodnyi kontrol’, which also posited a consensual relationship 
between citizens and the state. However, the Putinist discourse expands the Soviet-
era discourse by presenting civic engagement not solely the monitoring the 
execution of centrally determined tasks, but also the actual performance of those 
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tasks. , Further, in contrast to Soviet discourses, which legitimated this relationship 
with reference to Marxist-Leninist theory (specifically, the collapse of the distinction 
between rulers and ruled), the Kremlin’s discourse is legitimated according to a logic 
of international competitiveness. The chapter showed that international discourses 
of ‘good governance’ stressed the importance of increasing civic participation in 
governance as a means to enhance economic prosperity. As a member of norm-
promoting international bodies, signatory of governance treaties and recipient of 
loans with conditionality, the chapter argued that Russia has been heavily 
influenced by this agenda and that the Kremlin’s narrative legitimating new 
mechanisms for civic engagement is drawn from here. 
Chapter Four explored the struggle between citizens’ groups and the 
government for hegemony over the meanings of the concept obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’. It showed that the concept as it is used by citizens’ groups refers to a 
process of holding the authorities accountable to the law and thus assumes a 
contentious, rather than consensual, relationship between society and the state. 
However, it also showed that citizens’ initiatives are frequently co-opted by the state 
by enshrining in legislation a version of obchshestvennyi kontrol’ that dovetails with 
the state’s broader discourse of civic engagement in governance. It argued that the 
recent law ‘On the Foundations of Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’ in the Russian 
Federation’ represents the latest attempt to fix the discourse, and therefore the 
practices, of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ by codifying modes of civic participation in 
governance and linking them to the growing network of authoritarian neoliberal 
governance. 
Chapter Five explored the extent to which a gap exists between the portrayal 
of civic engagement in governance in state discourse and practices of 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ enacted through PCBs in Russia’s two most affluent and 
populous cities, Moscow and St Petersburg. Through a comparison of the regional 
leaders’ articulations on the subject of civic participation and the experiences of 
PCB members articulated to me in interviews, I found that in both cities, while the 
authorities claim that mechanisms for civic engagement allow citizens to assist the 
authorities in matters of governance, PCBs could occasionally be used by citizens 
modestly to shape state behaviour. I also demonstrated that the local regime 
significantly shapes the scope for the social practices of obshchestvennyi kontrol’, 
by showing that the practices diverged significantly in Moscow and St Petersburg, 
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with the latter hampered by a historic tension between autocratic local government 
and a liberal, opposition-minded public sphere.  
Chapter Six explored this gap in the context of a regional case study, 
Samara, in which levels of income and civic activism were significantly lower. Here, 
I found that there was greater conformity between the discourse of the governor and 
the practices described by respondents, with the latter tending to recount practices 
of assisting the authorities in the fulfilment of tasks, rather than of attempting to 
shape the public agenda and influence policy outcomes. I argued that this indicates 
that there is a higher level of authoritarian control in Samara than in Moscow or St 
Petersburg since few alternative representations of state-society relations were 
expressed.  
What conclusions can be drawn from this and how do they speak to existing 
debates on state-society relations in Russia, civic participation in non-democratic 
countries and on public sector reform more generally? In order to structure this 
discussion, I return to the four questions posed in the introduction and consider each 
in turn. They are: 
- How does the Kremlin explain and legitimate the emergence of PCBs?  
- What practices are produced through PCBs and how do they correspond to 
those articulated by the Putin regime?  
- What can the development of PCBs tell us about the kind of bureaucracy 
emerging in Russia’s capitalist but non-democratic state?  
- What can the development of PCBs tell us about state-society relations in 
conditions of authoritarian neoliberalism? 
To consider the first question, I have shown that PCBs were introduced as 
part of a broader package of market reforms of the Soviet-era public sector. They 
have been promoted by the Kremlin as the most important of a number of new 
mechanisms that aim to increase civic engagement in governance. Civic 
engagement is deemed a central means by which to make the country more 
competitive internationally, and is conceived as the process by which citizens may 
assist the authorities in socially useful but essentially apolitical tasks. In order to 
create this new discourse, it has combined an expanded version of the Soviet-era 
concept of narodnyi kontrol’, which referred to a process of checking and reviewing 
the fulfilment of state policy, with international discourses of ‘good governance’, 
which posit increased civic participation in governance as key to a successful 
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marketized public sector. According to the Kremlin, and to the regional leaders 
rearticulating this discourse, civic participation in governance is key to the 
international competitiveness of Russia. 
 This finding builds on the approach taken by existing studies of public 
chambers, reviewed in the Introduction, which examined them in terms of their 
(negative) impact on the institutional components of Western democracy, namely 
civil society2 and representative institutions.3 While I have shown that the expansion 
of the PCB network has indeed accompanied the censure of certain (chiefly 
Western-funded) NGOs and the abolition or curtailment of opportunities for electoral 
participation, I have added to the explanations proffered in these studies by showing 
that the market reform of the public sector is also a key factor in the government’s 
motivation to create PCBs, a factor which has hitherto been excluded in analyses 
of these bodies. Indeed, studies of market reforms of local government in 
democracies have shown that mechanisms of civic participation constitute a key 
area of neoliberal public sector design; my analysis has shown that this is also the 
case in Russia and hints at their presence in other non-democracies too.4 Therefore, 
while PCBs certainly have implications for representative democracy in Russia, 
insofar as they reduce the need for the state to gain feedback from society via 
elections, they must be seen first of all as a Russian articulation of the global trend 
towards the marketization of state bureaucracy.  
A consideration of the second question, regarding the practices produced by 
PCBs and their correspondence to state discourse must be qualified with the proviso 
that there is a vast number of PCBs in Russia, most of which have been in operation 
for less than five years; PCB practices are therefore very much at the stage of 
emergence and consolidation. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions 
about the kinds of practices that are developing. First, practices themselves are 
                                                          
2 A. Evans, ‘The First Steps of Russia’s Public Chamber: Representation or Coordination?’, 
Demokratizatsiya, (Fall, 2008); J. Richter, ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 
25, No. 1, (January – March 2009); J. Richter, ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chamber 
and the Regions’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.56, No. 6, (November/December, 2009). 
3 R. Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev 
Seccession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); N. Petrov, M. Lipman and H. Hale, 
‘Over-managed Democracy in Russia: Governance Implications of Hybrid Regimes’, Carnegie 
Papers, Russia and Eurasia Program No. 106, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2010); B. Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after 
Communism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
4 B. Denters and L. Rose (eds.), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); M. Geddes, ‘Neoliberalism and Local Governance: 
Cross-National Perspectives and Speculations’, Policy Studies, Vol. 26, Nos. 3/4 (2005). 
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varied and range from active participation involving both confrontation and 
collaboration with authorities in matters relating to local governance to the passive 
acceptance of government decisions. Their ability to enable citizens to shape policy 
depends on three factors: whether there is a significant minority of vocal, 
independent-minded individuals willing to critique the decisions and activities of the 
authorities; whether the topic discussed by a particular PCB is of interest to the 
authorities; and whether the authorities are willing to adopt the recommendations 
made by the PCB. These factors are determined by the region’s local regime and 
vary significantly across the Federation. If these three factors are present, PCBs 
can act as vehicles for the promotion of citizens’ interests and allow members to 
help shape policy decisions; if they are absent, PCBs at best end up approving the 
decisions made by the authorities, at worst they do not convene at all. Furthermore, 
the types of issues that PCBs are able to influence tend to be relatively apolitical 
ones that do not threaten local regime stability. Thus, whether or not citizens can 
provide input into public policy-making through PCBs is completely dependent on 
the authorities. To make a tentative generalisation across regional PCBs, (qualified 
by the fact that the research presented here is certainly not representative of the 
network in its entirety), civic participation in governance as operationalised through 
PCBs, though extant, is limited and partial. This is a substantive contribution to 
understandings of the workings of regional governance mechanisms, and confirms 
the findings of recent studies of civic participation in public life in Russia, which have 
noted that Putin administration prioritises certain social actors over others in an 
attempt to operationalise a vision of state-society relations that is absent of social 
conflict.5  
However, this finding must be qualified by the fact that the expansion of the 
PCB network was considered by the majority of those I interviewed to be a generally 
positive step towards building a constructive relationship between citizens and the 
authorities, even if they considered them to be in need of reform. At the same time, 
almost no respondents shared the view of the role PCBs should play in the 
relationship between the authorities and citizens as that promulgated by the 
                                                          
5 J. Richter, ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chamber and the Regions’, Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol. 56, No. 6, (November/December, 2009); S. Henderson, ‘Civil Society in 
Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vo. 58, 
No. 3 (May/June 2011); Salmenniemi, S., ‘Struggling for Citizenship: Civic Participation and the 
State in Russia’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2010);  Chebankova, E., Civil Society in Putin’s 
Russia, (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
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Kremlin. For the majority of PCB members I interviewed, PCBs constituted a useful 
avenue through which to advance a ‘civic position’ and to make government fairer. 
Furthermore, most respondents were able to recall several occasions when a 
course of state action was modified as a result of a PCB’s activities. They thus saw 
PCB membership as a potentially contentious activity, perceiving such bodies as a 
legitimate locus from which to challenge the state.  
How to account for the divergence between state and societal perceptions of 
PCBs? My findings suggest, first, that in countries with a history of authoritarian 
tendencies, the greater the diversity of actors included in governance structures and 
processes, the less likely these structures will be to operate as intended by the state. 
(Indeed, I have shown that this has proven to be the case both of the zemstvos and 
of the Soviet-era mechanisms.) Second, it shows that this gap in the governing 
chain can enable citizens to advance alternative agendas and that, in a regime in 
which citizens have few opportunities to provide input into policy-making processes, 
even controlled and partial mechanisms, such as PCBs, are embraced by citizens. 
While this thesis focussed only on three case studies and more work needs to be 
done on the extent to which PCBs allow citizens to alter policy outcomes across the 
Federation, this insight adds to the body of work exploring practices of contentious 
politics in Russia.6 In contrast to these studies, which have focussed on more 
‘traditional’ forms of contention, such as street demonstrations, strikes and civil 
disobedience, my thesis shows that contentious agendas are also advanced 
through activities that do not engender an unequivocally adversarial relationship to 
the state. In this sense, it builds upon those works that examine practices of 
contention in non-democratic states that combine both consent in and resistance to 
the regime.7 Like these works, it shows that voicing contentious claims through 
institutions sanctioned by the state provides unique possibilities for citizens to make 
small but successful demands on the state because, first, successful claims voiced 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, M. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); G. Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid 
Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); K. Koesel and V. Bunce, ‘Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in Russia: A 
Comparative Perspective’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2012). See also S. Tarrow, Power in 
Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics, 3rd Edition, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press). 
7 K. O’Brien and L. Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); J. Straughn, ‘“Taking the State at its Word”: The Arts of Consentful 
Contention in the German Democratic Republic’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 110, No. 6, 
(2005). 
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using the state’s own apparatus cannot be wholly adversarial and, second, the 
activists making the claims are speaking from sites that have been formally 
endorsed by the government. Therefore, these claims are not always easy for 
authorities to ignore. In contrast to scholars of Russian politics that dismiss PCBs 
as ‘substitute’ institutions, I argue that they must be taken into account when 
considering state power and civic agency in contemporary Russia.8  
The use of PCBs to advance alternative agendas corresponded to the 
operationalisation of obshchestvennyi kontrol’ advanced by civic groups in the early 
stages of the development of the PMC law and enacted during the movement to 
monitor the parliamentary and Presidential elections. In the instances, 
obshchestvennyi kontrol’ became a process of holding government officials 
accountable before the law. The authorities, by contrast, viewed obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ as a process of checking and reviewing state activities and decisions. The 
practices inside PCBs corresponded to a softened version of both conceptions: 
authorities on the one hand could receive vital policy input and harness citizens’ 
expertise in the drafting of legislation, while citizens could sometimes respectfully 
challenge state decisions and bring issues they considered important to the 
discussion table. However, the structural dependency on the authorities meant that 
this more critical conception could only be operationalised with the consent of the 
authorities. The thesis has shown that the concept obshchestvennyi kontrol’ is 
central to understanding the activities of PCBs and the role of citizens in governance 
envisaged by the Kremlin more broadly. 
The third question addressed the changing architecture of the post-Soviet 
public sector. Here, I have shown that post-Soviet public sector reform is 
characterised by two logics: authoritarianism and neoliberalism. Its neoliberal logic 
is evidenced by policies such as the privatisation of certain state-owned assets, the 
decentralisation of budget responsibility to local governments, and the outsourcing 
of welfare provision to ‘socially-oriented NGOs’. The broader authoritarian logic is 
characterised by moves to control who can participate in political decision-making, 
such as the restriction of gubernatorial elections, the replacement of elected mayors 
with city managers, and the vilification of Western-funded NGOs. I have shown that 
these two logics interact with one another to produce novel and innovative 
                                                          
8 Petrov, Lipman, and Hale, ‘Over-managed Democracy in Russia: Governance Implications of 
Hybrid Regimes’; Taylor, State-Building in Putin’s Russia. 
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governing institutions, such as PCBs. This finding dovetails with studies pointing out 
that reform of the Soviet-era welfare state is being conducted according to certain 
neoliberal principles, but that these policies are being adapted to fit within the 
country’s existing governing norms.9 However, I have also built on these studies by 
focussing on civic participation in the activities of the public sector as a key element 
of the neoliberal welfare regime. This focus has required greater conversation 
between two discrete bodies of work on Russia: studies of civil society and studies 
of public sector reform. I have argued that, as the state reduces its role in direct 
welfare provision to citizens, NGOs, civil society groups and ordinary citizens have 
been encouraged by the state to assist in the fulfilment of those functions. In other 
words, reform of the public sector along market principles contributes to the 
expansion of the NGO sphere. It is commonly accepted among Western scholars 
that civil society is a key component in the institutional architecture of democratic 
states10 and consequently the development of Russian NGOs has most frequently 
been analysed through the prism of civil society and democratisation.11  My thesis 
adds to those works which argue that the expansion of NGO activity must be seen 
primarily in the context of the marketization of the state, rather than the consolidation 
of democracy, an insight which has yet to penetrate studies of Russian civil 
society.12  
In order to bring together the ideas of public sector reform and civic activism, 
I referred to the literature on public governance, which has conceptualised the ways 
in which a diversity of actors are steered by the state in the production and delivery 
of public policy. Public governance thus throws the intersections between civic 
activism and state arbitration into relief (whereas studies of civil society tend to 
                                                          
9 L. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2007); J. Hemment, ‘Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth 
Voluntarism and the Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia’, Problems of Post-Communism, 
Vol. 56, No. 6 (November/December 2009); A. Cerami, ‘Welfare State Developments in the 
Russian Federation: Oil-Led Social Policy and the “Russian Miracle”’, Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 43, No. 2, April 2009. 
10 See, for instance, J. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (New York: MIT 
Press, 1992).  
11 M. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); A. Evans, L. Henry, and L. Sundstrom (eds.), Russian Civil Society: A 
Critical Assessment (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006); L. Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society: 
Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); 
A. Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society: Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2006). 
12 D. Rieff, ‘The False Dawn of Civil Society’, The Nation, Vol. 268, 22 February 1999; M. Kaldor, 
Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 93; F. Powell, The 
Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007). 
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prioritise the former and studies of public sector reform focus on the latter). In order 
to capture the specifics of this nexus in Russia’s non-democratic, market state, I 
developed the concept ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’, which refers to 
practices that include civic voices in matters relating to public policy but that also 
attempt to limit and control such participation. The concept contrasts with the 
standard assumption held by free market advocates, that open trade and the forms 
of governance required to sustain it lead to the democratisation of the state over 
time.13 Instead, the thesis has shown that free markets do not always produce 
democracy and, in fact, innovative non-democractic mechanisms can be developed 
in order to bypass institutional democracy, obtaining feedback, resolving conflict, 
and distributing goods in ways that do not require elections. Here, the thesis 
contributes and builds upon the small body of research that explores non-electoral 
participatory mechanisms in non-democracies.14 These works have shown that 
such mechanisms have been proliferating in China and Southeast Asia and enable 
the state to receive feedback on policy proposals in the absence of feedback via 
elections. However, while these works cite market reforms as a general background 
factor to the proliferation of participatory mechanisms, they do not cite them as a 
causal factor in their production. I have argued that market reforms of the public 
sector are equally important in explaining the proliferation of these bodies as the 
absence of elections. 
Given that the concept ‘authoritarian neoliberal governance’ can be applied 
to any state exhibiting both authoritarian and neoliberal tendencies in public policy, 
there is much scope for the exploration of state-driven public participatory 
mechanisms in non-democratic market states. Although I have briefly mentioned 
                                                          
13 Chapter Three reviewed this assumption as advanced by intergovernmental organisations. In the 
academic world, building on the modernisation theorists discussed in the introduction to Chapter 
Two, more recent work has called not only for economic prosperity, but specifically for free markets 
in order to consolidate democracy. See M. Mousseau, ‘Market Prosperity, Democratic 
Consolidation and Democratic Peace, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 4, (August 2000); 
C. Coyne, After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 181; F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home 
and Abroad, 2nd Edition, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007); M. Mandelbaum, 
Democracy’s Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World’s Most Popular Form of Government, 
(New York: Perseus, PublicAffairs, Ltd., 2007), pp. 127; P. Levy, ‘Economic Integration and 
Incipient Democracy’, American Enterprise Institute, AIE Working Paper No. 142, 26 March 2008, 
http://www.aei.org/files/2008/03/26/20080327_IncipientDemocracy20Mar08.pdf (accessed 24 
August 2014); J. Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
14 K. Jayasuriya and G. Rodan, ‘Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in 
South-East Asia’, Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 5, (November 2007); B. He and M. Warren, 
‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development’, Perspectives 
on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2011). 
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the existence of PCB networks in other post-Soviet states, the extent to which 
authoritarian neoliberal governance is present as a mode of state behaviour beyond 
the Russian case is hypothetical at this stage. However, on the basis of this and 
other research into varieties of neoliberalism, ‘glocalisations’ and other approaches 
which view neoliberalisation as a process of hybridisation of global norms, it is 
reasonable to propose that a plethora of institutional mechanisms have been 
developed that reproduce the global norm of increased civic engagement in 
governance for domestic authoritarian settings.15 A comparative perspective on 
authoritarian neoliberal governance would raise such questions as ‘Do authoritarian 
states with a high rate of neoliberal public sector reform exibit more developed 
public consultative networks than those that retain a more traditional public sector?’ 
If so, how much influence do these bodies have in public policy-making? If not, how 
do authoritarian market states gather enough information to make effective public 
policy? The current surge in Eurasian regionalism is a potential breeding ground for 
the transferral of practices of authoritarian neoliberal governance. In particular, the 
case of Kazakhstan would make for an interesting starting point from which to 
deepen the analysis in this thesis, since the country’s regime is characterised by an 
unrestrained political executive16 that has embraced neoliberal public sector 
reforms.17 Indeed, Linda Cook’s work has shown that Kazakhstan adopted a more 
radical public sector reform programme than Russia.18 One might assume, then, 
that the Kazakh state bureaucracy would include a set of state-controlled public 
participatory mechanisms at least as well-developed as in Russia. This is certainly 
an area for further research. 
To consider the final question - what can the development of PCBs tell us 
about state-society relations in conditions of authoritarian neoliberalism? - the 
emergence and proliferation of PCBs suggests that, as in other countries espousing 
a neoliberal agenda, post-Soviet citizens are expected to be active, rational, self-
                                                          
15 See Chapter Two. 
16 See, for instance, M. Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2002); N. Melvin, ‘Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A 
Comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan’ in Y. Ro’i (ed.), Democracy and 
Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2004); S. Cummings, Kazakhstan: 
Power and the Elite (London: IB Taurus, 2005).  
17 L. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2007); S. Bhuiyan and F. Amagoh, ‘Public Sector Reform in 
Kazakhstan: Issues and Perspectives, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, (2011). 
18 Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States, pp. 239. 
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limiting and able to participate in performing the functions the state no longer 
considers itself able to perform. This is particularly evident in the Kremlin’s and the 
Moscow Mayor’s discourse discussed in Chapters Three and Five, in which citizens 
were urged to shake off their Soviet-era passivity and involve themselves in 
participatory governance.  However, Chapter One’s discussion of civic participation 
in governance during the Soviet Union suggests that the perception of the Soviet 
citizen as a passive recipient of state policy is somewhat inaccurate and that in fact 
millions of citizens were participating in groups that helped to shape the Soviet 
policy agenda. Indeed, the Soviet and neoliberal conceptions of the role of the 
citizen in governance are remarkably similar: both conceive of the citizen as a willing 
assistant to state-designed projects. This indicates that the image of the Soviet 
citizen as passive is an ideological tool employed by the Kremlin to create the image 
of a new era of governance and to legitimate cuts to welfare provision. The Kremlin 
implies that Soviet citizens were dependent on the state, which was what made the 
Soviet state unsustainable, and now, in the harsh climate of global capitalism, 
Russians must not rely on the state for welfare, but contribute towards the provision 
of local services instead. This steering of citizens’ behaviour towards self-
governance in conditions of neoliberalism has been termed ‘governmentality’ by 
Michel Foucault and has been analysed extensively in relation to Western 
countries.19 However, practices of governmentality in the case of Russia have 
hitherto only received scant treatment.20 While this thesis does not pretend to add 
to this nascent field of study, it does, however indicate that a deeper exploration of 
post-Soviet governmentality has great potential. 
Following on from this, while the post-Soviet citizen’s role in governance is 
constructed in Kremlin rhetoric as part of a decisive break from the past and a 
response to the unique contemporary political climate, the thesis has shown that 
the relationship between society and the state presented in Soviet and post-Soviet 
state discourse is virtually the same. Both conceive of a unified state and citizenry 
                                                          
19 The tendency neoliberalism to require self-governance has been conceptualised by Michael 
Foucault as neoliberal governmentality and has received extensive treatment in the context of 
liberal democratic states. See, for instance, T. Hamann, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality and 
Ethics’, Foucault Studies, No. 6, February 2009; N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 145. 
20 See A. Yurchak, ‘Russian Neoliberal: The Entrepreneurial Ethic and the Spirit of “True 
Careerism”’, The Russian Review, Vol. 62, (January 2003); T. Matza, ‘Moscow’s Echo: 
Technologies of the Self, Publics and Politics on the Russian Talk Show’, Cultural Anthropology, 
Vol. 24, No. 3 (2009); T. Matza, ‘“Good Individualism”? Psychology, Ethics and Neoliberalism in 
Postsocialist Russia’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 39, No. 4, (November 2012). 
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and seek to mobilise citizens in the fulfilment of tasks determined by the state.  The 
difference is that Soviet citizens were acting in the name of Communism and 
contemporary citizens are acting in the name of the economy. This points to the 
fundamental malleability of neoliberal norms: as Aihwa Ong has shown in her 
masterful contribution to the recontextualisation of neoliberal policies around the 
world, they are compatible with an enormous diversity of political and discursive 
regimes.21  
I will allow myself conclude the thesis with a brief, perhaps self-indulgent 
moment of speculation about the trajectory of the PCB network in Russia. This 
network has already entrenched itself as an important feature of local, regional and 
national governance, and recent legislation enshrining practices of obshchestvennyi 
kontrol’ into all government structure suggests that its importance is likely to grow. 
What, then, is the outlook for the PCB network? Will the practices of authoritarian 
neoliberal governance allow the regime to strengthen itself by continuing market 
reforms and simultaneously neutralising dissent? Conversely, will limited 
participation inculcate a sense of democratic entitlement in citizens and encourage 
them to challenge the regime?  Or will the Russian regime continue in much the 
same vein, that is, characterised by partial control, partial pluralism, weak institution-
building, and legitimised by a hybridised form of neoliberal ideology?  
Under the first scenario, the development of PCBs may grow into a new 
model of direct democracy, similar to workers’ councils during the Russian 
Revolution (also envisaged by the Samara Governor). PCBs could become the 
central sites for policy debate and public participation in the country, allowing the 
Russian state to continue the evisceration of representative democratic institutions, 
and signalling the foundation of a distinctly Russian form of democracy (or 
narodovlastie), such has been called for by Putin in the past. The recent adoption 
of the Law ‘On the Foundations of Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’’ suggests that steps 
are  already being taken in this direction.  
Under the second scenario, the growing role of PCBs in policy formation may 
provide an incubator for alternative political imaginaries and slowly breed dissent. 
Increasing numbers of citizens wanting to effect political life in their localities may 
join up and, as with zemstvo members, become frustrated with the partial and 
                                                          
21 A. Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, NC: 
Duke Univeristy Press, 2006). 
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limited influence accorded to them and may end up demanding a greater level of 
participation. This could prove a significant challenge to the regime. Indeed the 
expansion of limited participation in governance instigated the collapse of both the 
absolutist and Communist regimes.  
My view is that the second scenario is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, 
although the legislation on PCBs is fluctuating a great deal, the structural 
dependency of PCBs on authorities the means that were PCBs to demand a greater 
role in policy-making, they could immediately be disbanded by the authorities. 
Second, the present regime enjoys an extremely high level of support among 
citizens, particularly after the acquisition of Crimea, a fact which suggests there is 
little desire to challenge the regime either through PCBs or elsewhere. The first 
scenario is more likely, though ultimately still improbable since the contradictions 
and vague phrasing in the laws on PCBs lead one to presume that these bodies will 
remain institutionally weak and dependent on the authorities. PCBs would require a 
substantial amount of reform and promotion among citizens in order to become the 
alternative to representative democracy conceived by some of members of the 
government. My conclusion is that the emergence and proliferation of PCBs 
represent the consolidation, rather than the transformation of Russia’s existing 
regime.
276 
 
 
277 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adams, J., Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union, (New York: Praeger, 1978). 
 
Adelaja, T., ‘Vladimir Putin aims to Russia’s investment climate’, The Telegraph, 
15 June 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/business/9333604/vladimir-putin-
russia-investment.html (accessed 16 August 2014). 
 
Aksenova, E., Begtin, I., Burov, V., Itskovich, D., Kordonskii, S. and Oslon, A., 
‘Otkrytoye Gosudarstvo’, Polit.ru, 22 February 2012, 
http://polit.ru/article/2012/02/22/open/ (accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Aleksandrov, O., '”Shkala” Artyakova?', The Moscow News, 24 April 2012, 
http://www.moscow-post.ru/politics/shkala_artjakova8956/ (accessed 18 April 
2013). 
 
Amnesty International, ‘Rossiya: Bolotnoye Delo – Pokazatel’nyi politicheskyi 
protsess’, Amnesty International, http://amnesty.org.ru/node/2718 (accessed 29 
May 2014). 
 
Antonov, D., (ed.), Razgnevannyye Nablyudateli: Fal’sifikatsii Parlamentskikh 
Vyborov Glazami Ochevidtsev, (Moscow: Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye, 
2012). 
 
Argumenty i Fakty, ‘Sergei Sobyanin: “Chto ya sam sdelal dlya strany?”’, 
Argumenty i Fakty, 4 September 2014, http://www.aif.ru/politics/russia/46492 
(accessed 11 June 2014). 
 
Arndt, C., ‘The Politics of Governance Ratings’, International Public Management 
Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3, (2008). 
 
Auzan, A. and Bobylev, S., National Human Development Report for the Russian 
Federation: Modernization and Human Development, (Moscow, 2011). 
 
Babushkin, A., ‘SPCh obsudil zakon ob osnovakh obshchestvennogo kontrolya, 
delo M. Sabby i kosyaki pri formirovanii ONK’, Blog Andreya Babushkina, http://an-
babushkin.livejournal.com/72007.html (accessed 27 May 2014). 
  
Bader, M., ‘Crowd-Sourcing Election Monitoring in the 2011-2012 Russian 
Elections’, East European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2013). 
 
BBC News, ‘Business: The Economy: Russia: The IMF’s Biggest Failure’, BBC 
News, 23 September 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/455673.stm 
(accessed 12 April 2014). 
 
BBC News, ‘Putin Ally Sergei Sobyanin wins Moscow Mayor Election’, BBC News, 
9 September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24004840 (accessed 
15 June 2014). 
278 
 
 
BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, ‘Navalnyi predstavil proyekt dlya nabliudatelei 
“RosVybory”’, BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, 24 January 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2012/01/120124_navalny_rosvybory_observer
s.shtml (accessed 17 May 2014). 
 
BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, ‘Zakon ob inostrannykh agentakh vstupit v silu v Rossii’, 
BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, 20 November 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2012/11/121120_ngo_agents_law.shtml 
(accessed 29 May 2014). 
 
Beck, U., The Reinvention of Politics, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
 
Beissinger, M., Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
Belton, C., ‘Thousands Say Farewell to Sobchak’, The Moscow Times, 25 
February 2000, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/thousands-say-
farewell-to-sobchak/266254.html (accessed 16 June 2014). 
 
Bevir, M., Democratic Governance, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
  
Bhuiyan, S. and Amagoh, F., ‘Public Sector Reform in Kazakhstan: Issues and 
Perspectives, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 24, No. 3, 
(2011). 
 
Birch, K. and Mykhnenko, V., ‘Varieties of Neoliberalisms? Restructuring in Large 
Industrially Dependent Regions across Western and Eastern Europe’, Journal of 
Economic Geography, Vol. 9, (January 2009). 
 
Birch, K. and Mykhnenko, V. (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The 
Collapse of an Economic Order? (London: Z Books, 2010). 
 
Blakkisrud, H., 'Medvedev's New Governors', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3 
(May 2011). 
 
Bondareva, Yu., 'Srednyaya zarplata v Samarskoi Oblasti v oktyabrya sostavila 
22,5 tysyach rublei', Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 2 November 2012, 
http://spb.hh.ru/article.xml?articleId=12224 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
 
Bourdieu, P., ‘The Essence of Neoliberalism’, Le Monde Diplomatique, December 
1998, http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu, (accessed 17 March 2014). 
 
Box, R., Marshall, G., Reed, B., Reed, M., ‘New Public Management and 
Substantive Democracy’, Public Administration Review, Vol. 65, No. 5 
(September/October 2001). 
 
Bratersky, A., 'United Russia Set to Win in Samara', St Petersburg Times, 10 
October 2010, http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=32677 (accessed 
14 May 2013). 
 
279 
 
Brinton, M., The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control: The State and Counter 
Revolution, (London: Solidarity, 1970), available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/brinton/1970/workers-control/ (accessed 16 April 
2014). 
 
Brown, A. The Gorbachev Factor, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
Brown, A., ‘From Democratization to “Guided Democracy”’, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 12, No. 4, (October 2001). 
 
Brown, W., ‘Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’, Theory and Event, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, (2003). 
 
Browning, G., Women and Politics in the USSR, (London: Wheatsheaf, 1987). 
 
Brownlee, J., Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
Brooker, P., Non-Democratic Regimes, 2nd Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009). 
 
Bruff, I., ‘The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’, Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 26, 
No. 1, (2013). 
 
Burawoy, M. and Verdery, K., Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in 
the Post-Soviet World, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). 
 
Carothers, T., ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
13, No. 1 (January 2002). 
 
Cecil, C., 'Greed, Corruption and Impotence: Samara Battles for its Architecture', 
openDemocracy, 24 September 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
russia/clementine-cecil/greed-corruption-andimpotence (accessed 1 May 2013). 
 
Cecil, C. and Minchenok, E. (eds.), St Petersburg: Heritage at Risk, (London: 
Save Europe's Heritage, 2012). 
 
Cerami, A., ‘Welfare State Developments in the Russian Federation: Oil-Led 
Social Policy and the “Russian Miracle”’, Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 43, 
No. 2, April 2009. 
 
Chakrabarty, D., Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 
Chebankova, E., ‘State-sponsored Civic Associations in Russia: Systemic 
Integration or the “War of Position”?’, East European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2012). 
 
Chebankova, E., Civil Society in Putin’s Russia, (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
 
Chetverikova, I.V., 'Institutsionalizatsiya Obshchestvennogo Kontrolya Sobliudeniya 
Prav Cheloveka v Mestakh Prinuditel'nogo Soderzhaniya (V Ramkakh 
280 
 
Nabiudatel'nykh Kommissii)', Master's Thesis, European University at St 
Petersburg, 2011. 
 
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (eds.), Transcending New Public Management: 
The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007). 
 
Clarke, J., Newman, J., Smith, N., Vidler, E. and Westmarland, L., Creating Citizen 
Consumers: Changing Public and Changing Public Services, (London: Sage, 
2007). 
 
Cohen, J. and Arato, A., Civil Society and Political Theory, (New York: MIT Press, 
1992). 
 
Colton, T., Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
 
Colton, T. and Hale, H. ‘The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid 
Regime’, Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, (Fall 2009). 
 
Colton, T. and Hough, J. (eds.), Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the 
Election of 1993, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1998). 
 
Connelly, J., ‘Totalitarianism: Defunct Theory, Useful Word’, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 2010). 
 
Cook, L., Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern 
Europe, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
 
Council of Europe, 'Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the European Prison Rules', Council of Europe, 11 January 
2006, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747 (accessed 21 August 2013). 
 
Council of Europe, Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, Council of 
Europe, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Centre_Expertise/default_en.asp 
(accessed 11 April 2014). 
 
Council of Europe, Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for 
Spatial and Regional Planning (CEMAT), Council of Europe, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/cemat/default_en.asp (accessed 11 April 
2014). 
 
Council of Europe, Democracy, Institution-Building and Governance Department, 
The CDDG Secretariat, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Directorate_DI/default_en.asp 
(accessed 11 April 2014). 
 
Council of Europe, Terms of Reference, European Committee on Democracy and 
Governance, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CDDG- 
ToF&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=&BackColorInternet=B9BDEE&Ba
ckColorIntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=FFC679 (accessed 11 April 2014). 
281 
 
 
Council of Europe, ‘The Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance: A Short 
Presentation with Related Implementing Documents’, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2048945&Site=&BackColorInternet=B9BDEE&
BackColorIntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=FFC679 (accessed 11 April 
2014). 
 
Coyne, C., After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy, (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
 
Crouch, C., The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011). 
 
Cummings, S., Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, (London: IB Taurus, 2005).  
 
Denters, B. and Rose, L. (eds.), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and 
Developments, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
 
Deutscher, I., Stalin: A Political Biography, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1949). 
 
Diamond, L., ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 
2 (April 2002). 
 
Dininio, P. and Orttung, R., ‘Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian 
Regions’, World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 4, (July 2005). 
 
Dorokhov, R., ‘Videonabliudenie za vyborami oslozhnit slozhnit rabotu runeta’, 
Vedomosti, 20 December 2011, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1457576/bolshoj_brat_slishkom_velik 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
 
Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S. and Tinkler, J., ‘New Public Management is 
Dead – Long Live Digital-Era Governance’, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2006). 
 
Dunn, E., Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business and the Re-making of 
Labor, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
 
Earle, J., ‘Putin Dumps Presidential Rights Council’, The Moscow Times, 25 June 
2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/alexeyeva-dumps-
presidential-rights-council/460950.html (accessed 8 July 2014). 
 
Earle, J., ‘Bill to Limit Gubernatorial Elections Approved’, The Moscow Times, 23 
January 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/bill-to-limit-
gubernatorial-elections-approved/474464.html (accessed 27 March 2013). 
 
The Economist, ‘A Russian Awakening’, The Economist: Eastern Approaches 
Blog, 11 December 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/protest-russia-0 
(accessed 17 May 2014) 
282 
 
 
Edele, M., Soviet Veterans of World War II: A Popular Movement in an 
Authoritarian Society 1941-1991, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
Edinaya Rossiya Moskva, ‘Sobyanin Sergei Semenovich’, Edinaya Rossiya 
Moskva, http://moscow.er.ru/persons/346/ (accessed 18 July 2013). 
 
Eicher, P., ‘Good Governance: Some Thoughts on the OSCE Role’, Statement to 
the 9th Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum, 15 May 2001, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/18832?download=true (accessed 11 April 2014). 
 
Eikenberry, A. and Kluver, J., ‘The Marketization of the Non-Profit Sector: Civil 
Society at Risk?’, Public Administration Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, (March/April 2004). 
 
Ekho Moskvy, 'Razvorot: Yest' Li Prava Zaklyuchyonnykh?' Ekho Moskvy, 23 April 
2008, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/509516-echo/  (accessed 13 
April 2013). 
 
Emmons, T. and Vucinich, W., (eds.), The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in 
Local Self-Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Englund, W. and Lally, K., ‘Medvedev confirms he will step aside for Putin to return 
to Russia’s Presidency’, The Washington Post, 24 September 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-asks-putin-to-run-
for-president-of-russia/2011/09/24/gIQAXGwpsK_story.html (accessed 29 July 
2014). 
 
Epstein, D., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I. and O'Halloren, S., 
'Democratic Transitions,' American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 3 
(2006). 
 
Erlanger, S., ‘In St Petersburg, a Fight Over Power and Property’, New York 
Times, 27 April 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/27/world/in-st-petersburg-
a-fight-over-power-and-property.html (accessed 16 June 2014). 
 
Etling, B., Alexanyan, K., Kelly, J., Faris, R., and Palfrey, J., and Gasser, U., 
‘Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and 
Mobilization’, Berkman Center Research Publication, No. 2010-11, October 
2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698344, (accessed 20 May 2014). 
  
Evans, A., Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology, (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1993). 
 
Evans, A., ‘The First Steps of Russia’s Public Chamber: Representation or 
Coordination?’, Demokratizatsiya, (Fall, 2008). 
 
Evans, A., ‘The Public Chamber and Social Conflicts in Russia’, Paper prepared 
for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science 
Association, San Francisco, California, April 2010. 
 
283 
 
Evans, A., Henry, L., and Sundstrom, L., (eds.), Russian Civil Society: A Critical 
Assessment, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006). 
 
Fairclough, N., ‘Discourse in processes of social change: “Transition” in Central 
and Eastern Europe’, available at www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/paper1.doc 
(accessed 24 June 2014). 
 
Fairclough, N., New Labour, New Language, (London: Routledge, 2000). 
 
Fairclough, N., Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2003). 
 
Fairclough, N., Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, 
Second Edition, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2010). 
 
Featherstone, M., Lash, S. and Robertson, R., Global Modernities, (London: Sage, 
1995). 
 
Fedyashin, A., Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil Society in 
Russia 1866-1904, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012). 
 
Femia, J., Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the 
Revolutionary Process, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981). 
 
Fergana News, ‘Obshchestvennyye Palaty Kazakhstana i Rossii podpisali 
memorandum o vzaimoponimanii’, Fergana News, 27 May 2008, 
http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=9267 (accessed 8 August 2014). 
 
Ferlie, E., Ashburner, L., Fitzgerald, L. and Pettigrew, A., The New Public 
Management in Action, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
First News, 'Vladimir Putin vystupayet za obshchestvennyi kontrol' nad dorozhnym 
stroitel'stvom', First News, 8 November 2011, 
http://www.firstnews.ru/news/vladimir-putin-vystupaet-za obshchestvennyy kontrol 
nad dorozhnym-stroitelstvom/ (accessed 11 April 2013). 
 
Fish, Steven M., Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Fitzpatrick, S., Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village 
after Collectivisation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
Flynn, N., Public Sector Management, (5th Edition), (London: Sage, 2007). 
 
Fond “Obshchestvennyi Verdikt”, ‘Obshchestvennyi Kontrol’: Nepoliticheskaya 
Uchastiye Grazhdan v Publichnoye Politike’, Informatsionno-Analiticheskii 
Biulleten’, Fond “Obshchestvennyi Verdikt”, 2012, No. 1. 
 
Forrat, N., ‘Global Trends or Regime Survival? The Reforms in Russian Higher 
Education’, Comparative-Historical Social Science (CHSS) Working Paper Series, 
The Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, February 
284 
 
2012, available at: 
http://www.bcics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/CHSS-12-001-
Forrat.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014). 
 
Freeden, M., Ideologies and Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996). 
 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and their Global 
Repercussions,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20B
ooklet--Final.pdf (accessed 15 March 2012). 
 
Friedgut, T., Political Participation in the USSR, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979). 
 
Fukuyama, F., ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, 1989, 
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm#source (accessed 26 April 2010). 
 
Gallagher, J., ‘Yeltsin Camp Hardly Gloating over Rival’s Loss, The Chicago 
Tribune, 4 June 1996, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-
04/news/9606040262_1_sobchak-and-yeltsin-boris-yeltsin-anatoly-sobchak 
(accessed 16 June 2014). 
 
Garant.ru, ‘Obshchestvennyye Sovety pri ministerstvakh i vedomstvakh budut 
rabotat’ po yedinym standartam’, Garant, 13 September 2013, 
http://www.garant.ru/news/493965/ (accessed 17 September 2013). 
 
Gazeta.ru, ‘Saiti izdanii Slon.ru, “Bol’shoi Gorod”, i “The New Times” podverglis 
DDoS-Atakam, oni nedostupnyye’, Gazeta.ru, 4 Dember 2011, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/12/04/n_2121694.shtml (accessed 20 May 
2014). 
 
Geddes, M., ‘Neoliberalism and Local Governance: Cross-National Perspectives 
and Speculations’, Policy Studies, Vol. 26, Nos. 3/4 (2005). 
 
Gel’man, V., ‘Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral Authoritarianism in 
Russia’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 60, No. 2, (March-April 2013). 
 
Gel’man V. and Evans Jr., A. (eds.), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, 
(Washington, DC: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). 
 
Gel’man V. and Ross, C. (eds.) The Politics of Sub-National Authoritarianism in 
Russia, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 
 
Gel'man V. and Ryzhenkov, S., 'Local Regimes, Subnational Governance and the 
'Power Vertical' in Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3, 
(2011). 
 
Giroux, H., The Terror of Neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of 
Democracy, (Boulder, CA: Paradigm Publishers, 2004). 
 
285 
 
Glaser, D. and Walker D. (eds)., Twentieth Century Marxism: A Global 
Introduction, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 
 
Glumskov, D., ‘Zhivoi Gorod’, Ekspert Online, 18 June 2012, 
http://expert.ru/northwest/2012/25/zhivoj-gorod/ (accessed 14 June 2014). 
 
Golitsyna, A., ‘Gosduma odobrila fil’tratsiyu runeta’, Vedomosti, 9 July 2012, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/tech/news/2260500/proshel_bez_filtra (accessed 29 May 
2014). 
 
Golos Rossii, 'Putin planiruyet vvesti obshchestvennyi kontrol' za goszakupkami', 
Golos Rossii, 11 April 2012, http://rus.ruvr.ru/2012_04_11/71370057/ (accessed 
11 April 2013). 
 
Gorny, M., ‘Obshchestvennyye Konsul’tativnyye Struktury Pri Organakh Vlasti: 
Opyt Sankt Peterburga’ Teleskop, No. 2 (2011). 
 
Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Krym, ‘Parlament Kryma prinyal Deklaratsiyu o 
nezavisimosti ARK i g. Sevastopolya’, Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Respubliki Krym, 11 
March 2014, http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_03_2014_1 (accessed 14 August 
2014). 
 
Grani.ru, ‘Miting na Bolotnoi sobral ot 85 do 150 tysyach chelovek’, Grani.ru, 10 
December 2011, http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.193917.html (accessed 
17 May 2014). 
 
Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’, http://www.nabludatel.org/about/ (accessed 16 May 
2014).  
 
Grazhdanskoye Dostoinstvo, ‘Polozheniye o Konkurse’, Grazhdanskoye 
Dostoinstvo, 25 September 2013, http://www.civildignity.ru/ru/info-show/konkurs-
2013/polojenie_o_konkurse (accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Hahn, J., Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
 
Hahn, G., ‘Medvedev, Putin and Perestroika 2.0’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
(2010). 
 
Hamann, T., ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality and Ethics’, Foucault Studies, No. 6, 
February 2009. 
 
Hammersley, M., Ethnography: Principles in Practice, 3rd Edition, (London: 
Routledge, 2007). 
 
Haraway, D., ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Autumn, 1988). 
 
Hartley, J., ‘The Boards of Social Welfare and the Financing of Catherine II’s State 
Schools’, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1989). 
 
286 
 
Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
 
Harvey, D., ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 610, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative 
Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development, (March, 2007). 
 
He, B. and Warren, M., ‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in 
Chinese Political Development’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 
2011). 
 
Heath, J., 'IKEA in Russia: 'Now “Everything is Possible”... For a Price, 
openDemocracy, 22 February 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
russia/jesse-heath/ikea-in-russia-now-everything-is-possiblefor-price (accessed 18 
April 2013). 
 
Heath, N., 'The Anarchist and Maximalist Uprising in Samara 1918', Libcom.org, 2 
July 2010, 
http://libcom.org/history/anarchist-maximalist-uprising-samara-1918 (accessed 14 
May 2013). 
 
Hemment, J., ‘The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, International Aid and 
NGOs in Russia’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 2, (Spring 2004). 
 
Hemment, J., ‘Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism and the 
Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 56, 
No. 6 (November/December 2009). 
 
Henderson, S., ‘Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Non-Governmental 
Organization Sector in Russia’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, 
(March 2002). 
 
Henderson, S., ‘Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin 
Era’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vo. 58, No. 3 (May/June 2011). 
 
Heydemann, S., ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, The Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy and the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper No. 13, 
October 2007. 
 
Hood, C., ‘The “New Public Management” in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme’, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2-3, (1995). 
 
Hosking, G., A History of the Soviet Union, 2nd Edition, (London: Fontana Press, 
1990). 
 
Hosking, G., The Awakening of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). 
 
Howard, M., The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
287 
 
Hughes, O., Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, 3rd Edition, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). 
 
Human Rights Watch, An Uncivil Approach to Civil Society: Continuing State 
Curbs on Independent NGOs and Activists in Russia, (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). 
 
Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. and Stiglitz, J. (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse, 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 2007). 
 
Ilič, M., Reid, S. and Attwood, L., (eds.), Women in the Khrushchev Era, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). 
 
International Monetary Fund, ‘The IMF and Good Governance’, International 
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm (accessed 11 
April 2014). 
 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Good Governance: The IMF’s Role’, The 
International Monetary Fund, (Washington DC, 1997). 
 
Interfax, 'Srednemesyachnaya Zarplata V Moskve perevysla 45 tysyach rublei', 
Interfax, 1 December 2012, http://www.interfax.ru/moscow/news.asp?id=278586 
(accessed 17th April 2013). 
 
Interfax, ‘Monopolii i goskompanii budut otdavat’ malomu biznesu minimum 15% 
zakazov – Medvedev’, Interfax, 27 September 2013, http://www.interfax-
russia.ru/South/special.asp?id=437536&sec=1702 (accessed 28 July 2014). 
 
Ioffe, J., ‘She’s No. 3!’, Foreign Policy, 24 August 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/24/shes_number_3 (accessed 15 
June 2014). 
 
Itogi, ‘Gorsluzhashchii’, Itogi, 18 June 2012, 
http://www.itogi.ru/delo/2012/25/179096.html (accessed 14 June 2014). 
 
Jack, A., Inside Putin’s Russia: Can There Be Reform without Democracy?, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
Javeline, D. and Lindemann-Komarova, S., ‘A Balanced Assessment of Russian 
Civil Society’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 
2010). 
 
Jayasuriya, K. and Rodan, G., ‘Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less 
Contestation in South-East Asia’, Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 5, (November 
2007). 
 
Jessop, B., 'The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of 
Economic Development', International Social Science Journal, Vol. 50, Issue 155, 
(March 1998). 
 
288 
 
Jessop, B., ‘Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical 
Perspective’, Antipode, Vol. 34, No. 3, (July 2002). 
 
Kaftan, L., ‘Zamestitel’ Glavy Administratsii RF Vladislav Surkov: Putin Ukreplayet 
Gosudarstvo a Ne Sebya’, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 28 September 2004, 
http://www.kp.ru/daily/23370/32473/ (accessed 12 April 2013). 
 
Kaldor, M., Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003). 
 
Karta Narushenii Na Vyborakh, http://www.kartanarusheniy.org/2011-12-04 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
 
Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A., ‘Growth without Governance’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 2928, (November 2002); ‘The IMF and Good 
Governance’, International Monetary Fund, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm (accessed 11 April 2014). 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi M., ‘Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate 
and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 4978, (June 2009). 
 
Kavkazkii Uzel, ‘V Azerbaidjane uchrezhdeno dvizheniye “Obshchestvennaya 
Palata”, Kavkazskii Uzel, 28 December 2010, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/178994/ (accessed 8 August 2014). 
 
Keane, J., 'Monitory Democracy?', Paper prepared for the ESRC Seminar Series, 
‘Emergent Publics’, The Open University, Milton Keynes, 13th-14th March 2008, 
available at 
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/seminar1/keane_monitory_
democracy.pdf (accessed 23 February 2014). 
 
Keane, J., The Life and Death of Democracy, (London: Simon and Schuster, 
2009). 
 
Khachatryan, D., ‘Nabliudeniye za Nabliudatelyami’, Novaya Gazeta, 2 March 
2012, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/51366.html (accessed 18 May 2012). 
  
Kharkhordin, O., The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices, 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). 
 
Kharkordin, O. and Alapuro, R. (eds.), Political Theory and Community Building in 
Post-Soviet Russia, (Oxford: Routledge, 2011). 
 
Khrushchev, N., ‘O pazvitii ekonomiki SSSR i perestroike partiinogo rukovodstvo 
narodnym khozyaistvom’, Magnitogorskii Metall, 28 November 1962, 
http://magmetall.ru/pdf/1962-11-28_02.pdf (accessed 18 April 2014). 
 
Koesel, K. and Bunce, V., ‘Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in 
Russia: A Comparative Perspective’, Post-soviet Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, (2012). 
 
289 
 
Koliba, C., Meek, J. and Zia, A., Governance Networks in Public Administration 
and Public Policy, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011). 
 
Kommersant Vlast’, ‘Vsya eta politizatsiya nichego khoroshego ne dast’, 
Kommersant Vlast’, 21 October 2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2321493 
(accessed 10 June 2014). 
 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda, ‘Mer Moskvy Sergei Sobyanin v “KP”: O migrantakh, 
stroitel’stve mechetei i bor’be s korruptsiyei’, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 20 
December 2012, http://msk.kp.ru/daily/26005.4/2930456/ (accessed 11 June 
2014). 
 
Kontseptstiya Administrativnoi Reformy, ‘Kontseptsiya Administrativnoi Reformy v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2006-2010 Godakh’, 25 October 2005, 
http://www.arhcity.ru/data/564/1%20conc.pdf (accessed 31 March 2014). 
  
Kornya, A., ‘Yuri Kalinin: “Rebyata, Vy Provalilis’ Vo Vremeni’, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 3 August 2004, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2004-08-03/1_kalinin.html 
(accessed 22 August 2013). 
 
Koselleck, R., The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing 
Concepts, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
 
Koselleck, R., Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). 
 
Kovalev, V., ‘St Petersburg Vote Goes into a Runoff’, The Moscow Times, 23 
September 2003, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/st-petersburg-
vote-goes-into-a-runoff/235721.html (accessed 10 July 2014).  
 
Kozlov, V., ‘Eto pokkazatel’nyi protsess, poyetomu vsekh zakroyut’, Gazeta.ru, 4 
July 2012, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/07/04_a_4664381.shtml (accessed 
29 May 2014). 
 
Krainova, N., ‘Poll shows Sobyanin with huge lead in mayoral race’, The Moscow 
Times, 10 July 2013, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/poll-shows-sobyanin-with-huge 
lead-in-mayoralrace/483005.html (accessed 18 July 2013). 
 
Kravtsova, Y., ‘Tomsk Mayor Quits Amid Conflicts with Governor’, The Moscow 
Times, 22 July 2013, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/tomsk-mayor-quits-amid-conflict 
withgovernor/483450.html (accessed 14 July 2014). 
 
Kremlin.ru, ‘Podpisan Ukaz ob osnovnykh napravleniyakh sovershenstvovaniya 
sistemy gosupravleniya’, Prezident Rossii, http://kremlin.ru/news/15239 (accessed 
17 September 2013). 
 
Kudryashov, D., 'Voshli v krizis. Promyshlennoye proizvodstvo v Samarskoi 
Oblasti v 2008 godu vyroslo na 3,7%', Samru.ru, 2 March 2009, 
http://www.samru.ru/bisnes/news/44430.html (accessed 13 May 2013). 
290 
 
 
Lenin, V.I., Lenin: Selected Works: Vol. 6, (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 
1936). 
 
Lenin, V.I., Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. 7, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1937). 
 
Lenin, V.I., The State and Revolution, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984). 
 
Lenta.ru, 'Titov, Konstantin: Chlen Sovieta Federatsii ot Samarskoi Oblasti', 
Lenta.ru, http://lenta.ru/lib/14170693/ (accessed 13 May 2013). 
 
Lenta.ru, ‘Khronika Golosovaniya’, Lenta.ru, 5 December 2011, 
http://lenta.ru/articles/2011/12/04/chrono/ (accessed 20 May 2014). 
 
Lenta.ru, ‘Do Samykh do Okrain: Mitingi protesta 10 Dekabrya proshli v 99 
Gorodakh Rossii’, Lenta.ru, 11 December 2011, 
http://lenta.ru/articles/2011/12/10/worldprotest/ (accessed 17 May 2014). 
 
Lenta.ru, ‘“Levada Tsentr” sostavil portret uchastnikov mitinga na Prospekt 
Sakharova’, Lenta.ru, 27 December 2011, 
http://lenta.ru/news/2011/12/26/sakharovppl/ (accessed 22 May 2014). 
 
Leontovitsch, V., The History of Liberalism in Russia, (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 
 
Levada Center, ‘Moskvichi o svoyem nastroyenii, zhizni i S. Sobyanine’, Levada-
Tsentr, 22 October 2013, http://www.levada.ru/22-10-2013/moskvichi-o-svoem-
nastroenii-zhizni-i-s-sobyanine (accessed 23 June 2014). 
 
Levchenko, A., 'Gubernator Prezidentskogo Klassa', Gazeta.ru, 5 December 2009, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2009/12/05_a_3294847.shtml (accessed 13 May 
2013). 
 
Levi-Faur, D., (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
 
Levitsky, S. and Way, L., ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002). 
 
Levitsky, S. and Way, L., Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the 
Cold War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
Levy, P., ‘Economic Integration and Incipient Democracy’, American Enterprise 
Institute, AIE Working Paper No. 142, 26 March 2008, 
http://www.aei.org/files/2008/03/26/20080327_IncipientDemocracy20Mar08.pdf 
(accessed 24 August 2014) 
 
Linz, J., Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Ltd., 2000). 
 
291 
 
Linz, J. and Stepan, A., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
 
Lipset, S., ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy’ American Political Science Review, 53, 1 (1959). 
 
Mandelbaum, M., Democracy’s Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World’s 
Most Popular Form of Government, (New York: Perseus, PublicAffairs, Ltd., 2007). 
 
Manzetti, L., Neoliberalism, Accountability and Reform Failures in Emerging 
Markets: Eastern Europe, Russia, Argentina and Chile in Comparative 
Perspective, (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2009). 
 
March, L., ‘Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal 
Opposition’, Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, (Fall 2009). 
 
Marxists.org, ‘1918 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic’, Marxists.org, 
http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1918/ (accessed 24 
July 2014). 
 
Massey, A., and Pyper, R., Public Management and Modernisation in Britain 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan 2005). 
 
Matza, T., ‘Moscow’s Echo: Technologies of the Self, Publics and Politics on the 
Russian Talk Show’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 24, No. 3, (2009). 
 
Matza, T., ‘“Good Individualism”? Psychology, Ethics and Neoliberalism in 
Postsocialist Russia’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 39, No. 4, (November 2012). 
 
Mawdsley, E., The Russian Civil War, (New York: Pegasus Books, 2007). 
 
McMann, K., Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and 
Kyrgyzstan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
Medvedev, D., 'Poslaniye Federal'nomy Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 
Prezident Rossii, 12 November 2009, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979 
(accessed 10 September 2013). 
 
Melvin, N., ‘Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparison of Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan’ in Ro’i, Y. (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in 
Muslim Eurasia, (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2004). 
 
Memorial, 'Appeal to the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation', 
http://www.memo.ru/eng/news/2010/11/17/1711103.htm (accessed 13 April 2013). 
 
Ministerstvo Yustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, http://minjust.ru/ru/node/2715 
(accessed 8 August 2013). 
 
292 
 
Ministry of Economic Development, Investment and Trade of the Samara Region, 
The Samara Region, http://www.economy.samregion.ru/en/region/ (accessed 13 
May 2013). 
 
Moore, R., 'Samara: The Disappearing Wooden City on the Volga', The Observer, 
24 October 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/oct/24/samara-
wooden-city-architecture-review (accessed 13 May 2013). 
 
Moscow City Government, ‘Active Citizens app to engage Muscovites in city 
governance launched on Mayor Sobyanin’s orders’, Moscow City Government, 21 
May 2014, http://www.mos.ru/en/authority/activity/citygov/index.php?id_14=29245 
(accessed 23 June 2014). 
 
Moses, J., ‘Russian Local Politics in the Putin-Medvedev Era’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 62, No. 9, (November 2010). 
 
Moskva Nash Gorod, http://gorod.mos.ru/ (accessed 13 June 2014). 
 
Moskovskiye Novosti, ‘Moskvichi smogut stat’ obshchestvennymi sovetnikami 
raonnykh uprav’, Moskovskiye Novosti, 26 December 2013, 
http://www.mn.ru/moscow/20131226/366145899.html (accessed 13 June 2014). 
 
Mosmuller, H., ‘Moscow Population: Capital May Hold 17 Million People’, The 
Telegraph, 3 June 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/society/8555676/Moscow-17-million-
people.html (accessed 17 July 2013). 
 
Mousseau, M., ‘Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation and Democratic 
Peace, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 4, (August 2000). 
 
MVD Belarus’, Obshchestvennyi sovet pri MVD Belarus’, 
http://mvd.gov.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=15761 (accessed 8 August 2014). 
 
Nauchno-Informatsionnyi Tsentr Memorial, http://memorial-nic.org/, (accessed 20 
January 2014). 
 
Naval’nyi, A., ‘Kak Stat’ Nablyudatelem’, Navalnyi: LiveJournal, 8 November 2011, 
http://navalny.livejournal.com/641950.html (accessed 16 May 2014). 
 
Neumann, I., Russia and the Idea of Europe: a Study in Identity and International 
Relations, (London: Routledge, 1996). 
 
Newsru.com, 'Glava Samarskoi Oblasti ne vernul 1,5 mlrd rublei premial'nykh, 
poluchennykh vo vremya raboty na “AvtoVAZe”, Newsru.com, 21 September 
2009, http://www.newsru.com/finance/21sep2009/artyakov.html (accessed 13 May 
2013). 
 
Newsru.com, ‘Ideya Putina o “vyborakh onlain” ozadachila i pravitel’stvo i SMI: 
Internet v Rossii mozhet’ prosto rukhnut’, Newsru.com, 20 December 2011, 
http://www.newsru.com/russia/20dec2011/pollsonline.html (accessed 21 May 
2014). 
293 
 
 
New York Times, 'Prison Population around the Globe', The New York Times, 19 
July 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/04/22/us/20080423_PRISON_GRAPHI 
html?_r=0 (accessed 21 August 2013). 
 
Nikolaeva, A. and Bogomolov A., ‘Nuzhnie i Demokratii i Vlast’, Moskovskie 
Novosti, 30 May 2013, 
http://www.mn.ru/moscow_authority/20130530/347635870.html (accessed 11 
June 2014). 
 
Novaya Gazeta, ‘Vybory 4 Dekabrya 2011 Goda. Khronika Narushenii’, Novaya 
Gazeta, 4 December 2011, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/49811.html 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
 
O’Brien, K. and Li, L., Rightful Resistance in Rural China, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
 
‘Obshchestvennoye Obsuzhdeniye Zakonoproyektov’, http://zakonoproekt2012.ru/ 
(accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata pri gorodskogo okruga Samara, 
http://www.opsamara.ru/ (accessed 16 May 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, https://www.oprf.ru/ (accessed 19 
September 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Zaklyucheniye na proyekt 
Federal’nogo Zakona No. 11807-3 “Ob obshchestvennom kontrole za 
obespecheniyem prav cheloveka v mestakh prinuditel’nogo soderzhaniya i o 
sodeistvii obshchestvennykh obyedinenii ikh deyatel’nosti”’, Obshchestvennaya 
Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 27 April 2007, 
http://www.oprf.ru/documents/resolutions/newsitem/7505 (accessed 5 August 
2014).  
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Doklad o Sostoyanii 
Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva, Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 2009 God’, Moscow 2009, 
https://www.oprf.ru/documents/1151/1256/ (accessed 25 September 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Doklad o Sostoyanii 
Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva, Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 2010 God’, Moscow 2010, 
https://www.oprf.ru/files/Doklad-OPRF-2010.pdf (accessed 20 September 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Doklad ob effektivnosti 
provodimykh v Rossiiskoi Federatsii antikorruptsionnykh meropriyatii I uchastii 
institutov grazhdanskogo obshchestva v realizatsii antikorruptsionnoi politiki’ 
Obshchestvennaya Palata RF, Moscow 2011, 
http://oprf.ru/files/dokument2011/dokladantikorrupciya.pdf (accessed 27 May 
2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Doklad o Sostoyanii 
294 
 
Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva Federatsii za 2011 God’, Moscow 2011, 
https://www.oprf.ru/files/dok2012/dokladOPRF2011.pdf 
(accessed 22 September 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Informatsionnyi  Biulleten' No. 1, 
Koordinatsionnyi Komitet obshchestennykh Sovetov, Moscow: March 2011, 
http://www.oprf.ru/files/dokument2011/infbyullet27072011.doc (accessed 24 
September 2013). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Proekt Federal’nogo  Zakona 
“Ob obshchestvennom kontrole  v  Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’, Press Sluzhba 
Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 
http://www.oprf.ru/ru/discussions/1389/newsitem/18428?PHPSESSID=2g7g9jcpjjif
8j89kpqj23b6v7 (accessed 13 August 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Korruptsiya pod pritselom’, 
Press Sluzhba Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 3 November 2011, 
http://oprf.ru/1449/1471/newsitem/15857 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiikoi Federatsii, ‘Obshchestvennyi kontrol’ dolzhen 
priiti v armiyu’, Press Sluzhba Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 15 February 2012, 
http://oprf.ru/press/832/newsitem/16747 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Priyutskii Kontrol’’, Press 
Sluzhba Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 28 February 2012, 
http://oprf.ru/press/news/2012/newsitem/16851 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Chtoby ne korrumpirovalas’ 
bor’ba s korruptsiyei’, Press Sluzhba Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 28 March 2012, 
http://oprf.ru/press/news/2012/newsitem/17174 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Osnova Osnov’, Press Sluzhba 
Obshchestvennoi Palaty RF, 25 March 2014, 
http://oprf.ru/press/news/2014/newsitem/24272 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Samarskoi Oblasti, 'Yezhegodnyi Doklad 
Obshchestvennoi Palaty Samarskoi Oblasti: Sostoyaniye grazhdanskogo 
obshchestva v Samarskoi Oblasti v 2010', Samara 2010. 
 
Obshchestvennaya Palata Samarskoi Oblasti, 'Ezhegodnyi Doklad 
Obshchestvennoi Palaty Samarskoi Oblasti: Sostoyaniye grazhdanskogo 
obshchestva v Samarskoi Oblasti v 2012', Samara 2012. 
 
Odling-Smee, J., ‘The IMF and Russia in the 1990s’, IMF Working Paper, August 
2004, pp. 9, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04155.pdf (accessed 
12 April 2014). 
 
Offe, C., ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe’, Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Fall 2004).  
 
Offe, C., ‘Governance: An Empty Signifier?’, Constellations, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2009). 
295 
 
 
Ofitisal’nyi Sait Administratsii Sankt-Peterburga, ‘Interv’yu Gubernatora’, 
Ofitisal’nyi Sait Administratsii Sankt-Peterburga, 
http://gov.spb.ru/governor/interviews/?page=1 (accessed 14 June 2014). 
 
Olcott, M., Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise?, (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 
 
Oliphant, R., ‘Last Man Standing’, Russia Profile.org, 14 September 2010, 
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/a1284487040.html (accessed 17 July 2013). 
 
Ong, A., Neoliberalism as Exception, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
 
ONK.RF, http://onk.su/ (accessed 14th April 2013). 
 
openDemocracy Russia, ‘Russia: Raid on Memorial HQ’, openDemocracy Russia, 
5 December 2008, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russia-raid-on-
memorial-hq (accessed 11 November 2011). 
 
OSCE, ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’, OSCE, Paris, 19-21 November 1990, 
pp. 4, http://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true (accessed 13 April 2014). 
 
OSCE, ‘Russia’, OSCE, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia (accessed 11 
April 2014). 
 
Osbourne, S., (ed.), The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the 
Theory and Practice of Public Governance, (Oxford: Routledge, 2010). 
 
Otkrytyye Dannyye Ul’yanovskoi Oblasti, http://data.ulgov.ru/index/home/ 
(accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Otkrytoye Pravitel’stvo, http://xn--80abeamcuufxbhgound0h9cl.xn--p1ai/opengov/ 
(accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Ottaway, M., Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 
 
Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L., Social Theory and Postcommunism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005). 
 
Peck, J., Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
 
Perrins, M., ‘Rabkrin and Workers' Control in Russia 1917-34’, European History 
Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1980). 
 
Petrov, N., Lipman, M., and Hale, H., ‘Over-managed Democracy in Russia: 
Governance Implications of Hybrid Regimes’, Carnegie Papers, Russia and 
Eurasia Program No. 106, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2010). 
 
296 
 
Petrova, L. and Sungurov, A., ‘Instituty- Posredniki Mezhdu Organami Vlasti i 
Obshchestvom: Sluchai Sankt-Peterburga’, Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo i 
Munitsipal’nogo Upravleniya’, No. 2, (2012). 
 
Piancentini, L., Surviving Russian Prisons: Punishment, Economy and Politics in 
Transition, (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2004). 
 
Pierre, J. and Guy Peters, B., Governance, Politics and the State, (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Press, 2000). 
 
Pilorama 2012, http://www.pilorama.perm36.ru/pilorama-2012001.html, (accessed 
20 January 2014). 
 
Pipes, R., Russia Under the Old Regime, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1974). 
 
Pirani, S., Change in Putin’s Russia: Power, Money and People (London: Pluto 
Press, 2010). 
 
Plant, R., The Neo-Liberal State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
Polit.ru, ‘Kontrol’ Prav Cheloveka v Tyur’me Otdadut pod Ontvestvennost’ 
Obshchestvennoi Palate’, Polit.ru, 16 April 2008,  
http://polit.ru/news/2008/04/16/op/ (accessed 23 August 2013). 
 
Popova, O., ' Fenomen Merkushkina', Zasekin.ru, 14 May 2012, 
http://zasekin.ru/politika/2012/05/14/fenomenmerkushk/ (accessed 13 May 2013). 
 
Portal NKO, ‘Prezidentskie Granty 2013, 2012, 2011: Obzor’, Portal NKO, 
http://portal-nko.ru/finance/konkurs/16500/ (accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Portal Otkrytykh Dannykh Permskogo Kraiya, 
http://opendata.permkrai.ru/opendata/ (accessed 1 April 2014) 
 
Portal Otkrytykh Dannykh Pravitel’stva Moskvy, http://data.mos.ru/ (accessed 1 
April 2014). 
 
Porter, T., The Zemstvo and the Emergence of Civil Society in Late Imperial 
Russia 1864-1917, (New York: Mellen Research University Press, 1991). 
 
Powell, F., The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left?, (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 2007). 
 
‘Pravitel’stvo Moskvy: Postanovleniye ot 24 Dekabrya 2013 g. No. 894-PP’ 
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=MLAW;n=151244 
(accessed 13 June 2014). 
 
Pravitel’stvo Samarskoi Oblasti, ‘Publikatsii’, Pravitelstvo Samarskoi Oblasti: 
Ofitsial’nyi Sait, http://www.samregion.ru/press_center/publications (accessed 20 
June 2014). 
 
297 
 
Prezident Rossii, Poslaniya Federal’nomy Sobraniyu, Prezident Rossii, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/messages (accessed 30 April 2014). 
  
Prokuratura Goroda Moskvy, ‘V prokurature goroda sostoyalos’ zasedaniye 
Obshchestvennogo Soveta po vzaimodeistviyu s pravozashchitnymi i inymi 
obshchestvennymi organizatsiyami’, Prokuratura Goroda Moskvy, 24 October 
2013, 
http://www.mosproc.ru/news/moscow/v_prokurature_goroda_sostoyalos_zasedani
e_obshchestvennogo_soveta_po_vzaimodeystviyu_s_pravozashchit/ (accessed 4 
July 2014) 
 
Protsenko, L., ‘Mer dostupen v rezhim onlain’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 April 2014, 
http://m.rg.ru/2014/04/21/sobyanin-site.html (accessed 14 August 2014). 
 
Prozorov, S., The Ethics of Post-Communism: History and Social Praxis in Russia, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 
 
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub J., Limongi, F., Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Poslaniye Federal’nomy Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Prezident 
Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi Sait, 16 May 2003, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/05/44623.shtml (accessed 31 March 
2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: O Merakh po Provedeniyu 
Administrativnoi Reformy v 2003-2004 Godakh’, No. 824, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 23 
July 2003, http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/824-03.shtm (accessed 31 March 
2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Rossiya Sosredotachivayetsya: Vyzovy, Na Kotoryye My Dolzhny 
Otvetit’’, Izvestiya, 16 January 2012, http://izvestia.ru/news/511884 (accessed 25 
April 2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Rossiya: Natsional’nyi Vopros’, Nezvisimaya Gazeta, 23 January 2012, 
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html (accessed 25 April 2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Nam Nuzhna Novaya Ekonomika’, Vedomosti, 30 January 2012, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1488145/o_nashih_ekonomicheskih_zadac
hah (accessed 25 April 2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Demokratiya i Kachestvo Gosudarstva’, Kommersant, 6 February 2012, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866753 (accessed 25 April 2014). 
 
Putin, V., ‘Stroitel’stvo Spravedlivosti: Sotsial’naya Politika Dlya Rossii’, 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 13 February 2012, http://www.kp.ru/daily/3759/2807793/ 
(accessed 25 April 2014). 
 
298 
 
Putin, V., ‘Rossiya i Menyayushchiisya Mir’, Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 February 
2012, http://www.mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html (accessed 25 April 
2014). 
 
Radio Svoboda, ‘Obnarodovan Spisok NKO, Poluchivshikh Prezidentskiye 
Granty’, Radio Svoboda, 5 December 2013, 
http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25190550.html (accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
RBC Daily, Petrov, I., ‘Prokurory nashli 3 tysyachi narushenii na vyborakh, no ikh 
rezul’taty ne sporyat’, RBC Daily, 2 May 2012, 
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949983718914 (accessed 16 May 2014). 
 
RBK, ‘Ekspertam ne ponravilas’ Samarskaya Oblast’, RBK, 15 October 2010, 
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/15/10/2010/482424.shtml (accessed 21 August 2014). 
 
RBK, 'Srednyaya zarplata v Rossii vyrastyot do 28,8 tyshyach', RBK, 2 October 
2012, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/02/10/2012/672412.shtml (accessed 17 April 
2013). 
 
RBK Ukraina, ‘Kambin postanovil sozdat’ obshchestvennyye sovety’, RBK 
Ukraina, 4 November 2010, http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/kabmin-postanovil-
sozdat-obshchestvennye-sovety-04112010145900 (accessed 8 August 2014). 
 
Reddaway, P. and Glinski, D., The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market 
Bolshevism Against Democracy, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 
2001). 
 
Reddaway P. and Orttung.R. (eds.), Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform 
of Federal-Regional Relations, (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 
 
Reed, J., ‘The Origins of Workers’ Control of Industry in Russia’, 23 November 
1918, Marxists.org, http://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/1918/origins.htm 
(accessed 15 April 2014). 
 
Regulation.gov.ru, ‘O Portale’, Yedinyi Portal dlya razmeshcheniya informatsii o 
razrabotke federal’nymi organami ispolnitel’noi vlasti proyektov normativnykh 
pravovykh aktov i rezul’tatov ikh obshchestvennogo obsuzhdeniya’, 
http://regulation.gov.ru/about.html (accessed 29 July 2014). 
 
Rehbein, B. (ed.), Globalization and Inequality in Emerging Societies, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 
 
Reisinger, W., (ed.), Russia's Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics, 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W., ‘Understanding Governance: 10 Years On’, Organization Studies, 
Vol. 28, No. 8, (2007). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Glava soveta po pravam cheloveka teper’ mozhet predlagat’ 
zakonoproyekty’, RIA Novosti, 4 February 2011, 
http://ria.ru/society/20110204/330288360.html (accessed 8 July 2014). 
299 
 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Akunin i Parfyonov voshli v sostav uchrezhditelei Ligi Izbiratelei’, RIA 
Novosti, 16 January 2012, http://ria.ru/politics/20120116/540699336.html 
(accessed 17 May 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, Assotsiatsiya yuristov RF podgotovit 95 tysyach nablyudatelei na 
vybory’, RIA Novosti, 22 February 2012, 
http://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120222/572096419.html (accessed 18 
May 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Vybory-2012: Smozhet li kolichestvo nabliudatelei obespechit’ ikh 
kachestvo?’, RIA Novosti, 02 March 2012, 
http://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120302/584086910.html (accessed 18 
April 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Putin: Minfin budet idti po puti detsentralizatsii finansov’, RIA 
Novosti, 25 April 2013, http://ria.ru/economy/20130425/934503631.html (accessed 
17 August 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Putin pomenyal poryadok izbraniia chlenov obshchestvennoi palaty’, 
RIA Novosti, 24 July 2013, http://ria.ru/society/20130724/951771926.html 
(accessed 18 September 2013). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Putin vnes v Gosdumu zakonoproyekt ob obshchestvennom kontrole 
v RF’, RIA Novosti, 12 March 2014, http://ria.ru/society/20140312/999219608.html 
(accessed 26 May 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Sovet Federatsii odobril zakon ob obshchestvennom kontrole v 
Rossii’, RIA Novosti, 9 July 2014, http://ria.ru/society/20140709/1015284355.html 
(accessed 12 August 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti, ‘Putin podpisal zakon ob obshchestvennom kontrole v RF’, RIA 
Novosti, 22 July 2014, http://ria.ru/politics/20140722/1017012976.html (accessed 
12 August 2014). 
 
RIA Novosti (English), ‘Medvedev Approves Simpler Rules for NGOs’, RIA 
Novosti, 20 July 2009, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090720/155568787.html 
(accessed 8 August 2013). 
 
RIA Novosti (English), ‘Luzhkov Deputy Expects New Moscow Mayor by End of 
October’, RIA Novosti, 28 September 2010, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100928/160756575.html (accessed 18 July 2013). 
 
RIA Novosti (English), ‘Matviyenko takes Russian upper house speaker post’, RIA 
Novosti, 21 September 2011, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110921/167006509.html 
(accessed 15 June 2014). 
 
RIA  Novosti (English), ‘Putin Orders Allocating $75 Mln for Socially-Oriented 
NGOs’, RIA Novosti, 30 March 2013, 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130330/180346679/Putin-Orders-Allocating-75-Mln-for-
Socially-Oriented-NGOs.html (accessed 31 March 2014). 
300 
 
 
RIA Rating, Reiting Sotsial'no-Ekonomisticheskogo Polozheniya Subyektov RF: 
Itogi 2011 Goda, (Moscow, 2012). 
 
Richter, J., ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
(January – March 2009). 
 
Richter, J., ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chamber and the Regions’, 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.56, No. 6, (November/December, 2009). 
 
Richter, M., ‘Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) and Political Theory’, Political 
Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4 (November 1986). 
 
Rieff, D., ‘The False Dawn of Civil Society’, The Nation, Vol. 268, 22 February 1999. 
 
Rights in Russia, ‘24th Anniversary of Founding of Memorial Society’, Rights in 
Russia, 28 January 2013, 
http://hro.rightsinrussia.info/archive/ngos/ngos/memorial/24th-anniversary 
(accessed 14 August 2014). 
 
Robertson, G., ‘Russian Protesters: Not Optimistic But Here to Stay’, Russian 
Analytical Digest, No. 115, 20 June 2012. 
 
Robison, R., (ed.) The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 
 
Rogov, K., Kogo utopit Bolotnoye delo’, Novaya Gazeta, 23 June 2012, 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/53208.html (accessed 29 May 2014). 
 
Rosbalt, ‘V korpus nabliudatelei “Za Chistye Vybory” postupilo pochti 2 tys. 
obrashenii’, Rosbalt, 5 March 2012, 
http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2012/03/05/953575.html (accessed 18 May 2014). 
 
Rose, N., Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
  
Ross C. (ed.), Regional Politics in Russia, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002). 
 
Ross, C., Local Politics and Democratization in Russia, (Oxford: Routledge 2009). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 4 Aprelya g 2005. 
N 32 F3 Ob Obshchestennoi Palate Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
http://www.rg.ru/2005/04/07/obshestv-palata-dok.html (accessed 30 April 2012). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Federal’nyi Zakon ot 10.06.2008 No 76-F3 (Red ot 
06.12.11), Ob Obshchestvennom Kontrole za Obespecheniyem Prav Cheloveka v 
Mestakh Prinuditel’nogo Soderzhaniya i Sodeistvii Litsam Nakhodyashchimsya v 
Mestakh Prinuditel’nogo Soderzhaniya’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 18 June 2008, 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/06/18/prava-cheloveka-dok.html (accessed 30 July 2014). 
  
301 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Fevralya 2009 
g. No 8-FZ, “Ob obespechenii dostupa k informatsii o deyatel’nosti 
gosudarstvennykh organov i organov mestnogo upravleniya”’, Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, 13 February 2009, http://www.rg.ru/2009/02/13/dostup-dok.html 
(accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Federal’nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 5 Aprelya 2010g 
No. 40 F2: O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii po voprosu podderzhki sotsial’no orientirovannykh nekommercheskikh 
organizatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 April 2010, http://www.rg.ru/2010/04/07/nko-
dok.html (accessed 31 March 2014). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 'Federal'nyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 7 Fevralya 2011 
g. N3-F3, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 February 2011, 
http://www.rg.ru/2011/02/07/police-dok.html  (accessed 24 September 2013). 
   
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Federal’nyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 21 Iyulya 2014g. 
N 212-F3 “Ob Osnovakh obshchestvennogo kontrolya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 23 July 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/23/zakon-dok.html 
(accessed 12 August 2014).  
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Postanovleniye Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 2 Avgusta 2005 g. N 
481 g. Moskva’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 9 August 2005, 
http://www.rg.ru/2005/08/09/obsch-sovety-dok.html (accessed 11 September 
2013).  
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Postanovleniye Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 1 
Sentyabrya 2012 g. No. 877 g. Moskva’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 11 September 2012, 
http://www.rg.ru/2012/09/11/dokumenty-site-dok.html (accessed 17 September 
2013). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Postanovleniye Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 6 iyunya 2013 g. N 
480 g. Moskva’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 18 June 2013, 
http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/18/sovety-site-dok.html (accessed 11 September 2013). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Rasporyazheniye Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 10 
Iyunya 2011g No. 1021-r g. Moskva’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 June 2011, 
http://www.rg.ru/2011/06/28/koncepciya-site-dok.html (accessed 1 April 2014). 
  
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 'Rech' Prezidenta Vladimira Putina na zasedanii 
gosudarstvennoi dumy', Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 9 May 2012, 
http://www.rg.ru/2012/05/08/rech.html (accessed 11 April 2013). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 6 Noyabrya 2004g 
No. 1417’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, http://www.rg.ru/2004/11/12/sovet-prava.html 
(accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 4 Avgusta 2006 g. 
N 842’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 August 2006, 
http://www.rg.ru/2006/08/08/ministerstva-sovety-dok.html (accessed 11 
September 2013). 
302 
 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Fevralya 2011 g. 
N 167’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 11 February 2011, 
http://www.rg.ru/2011/02/11/obsuzhdenie-dok.html (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Rossiiskaya Gazata, 'Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 23 Maia 2011 g. N 
668', Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 27 May 2011, http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/27/ukaz-dok.html 
(accessed 24 September 2013).  
 
Ruble, B., Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
 
Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. and Stephens J., Capitalist Development and 
Democracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
 
The Russian Constitution, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm 
(accessed 30 April 2014). 
 
Rutland, P., ‘Neoliberalism and the Russian Transition’, Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2, (2013). 
 
Ryzhkov, V., ‘The Dirtiest Elections in Post-Soviet History’, The Moscow Times, 2 
December 2011, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-dirtiest-
elections-in-post-soviet-history/449079.html (accessed 29 July 2014). 
 
Sakwa, R., Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Routledge, 1998). 
 
Sakwa, R., Postcommunism, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999). 
 
Sakwa, R., Putin: Russia’s Choice, 2nd Edition, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
 
Sakwa, R., Russian Politics and Society, 4th Edition, (Oxford: Routledge, 2008). 
 
Sakwa, R., The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and 
the Medvedev Succession, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
Salmenniemi, S., ‘Struggling for Citizenship: Civic Participation and the State in 
Russia, Demokratizatsiya, Fall 2010. 
 
Samokhina, S., ‘Obshchetvennyi kontrol’ mozhet stat’ meneye obshchestvennym’, 
Kommersant, 7 February 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2401147 (accesse 
27 May 2014). 
 
Samru.ru, ‘Zarplaty v Samare odin iz samykh nizkikh sredi gorodov-millionnikov’, 
Samru.ru, 16 January 2013, 
http://www.samru.ru/society/novosti_samara/67002.html (accessed 22 August 
2014). 
 
Samsonova, T., ‘“Pervyi Kanal” i NTV rasskazali o mitingakh oppozitsi’, Slon.ru, 10 
December 2011, http://slon.ru/russia/chto_rasskazali_o_mitingakh_po_televizoru-
723936.xhtml (accessed 20 January 2014). 
303 
 
 
Sartori, G., ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’ American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1970). 
 
Selivanova, E., ‘Ot 6 do 5 let dlya “uznikov Bolotnoi”, The New Times, 21 January 
2014, http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/77603/ (accessed 29 May 2014). 
 
Semukhina, O. and Reynolds, K., Understanding the Modern Russian Police, 
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013). 
 
Shadrina, T., ‘Sistemu obsuzhdeniya zakonoproyektov ulushat’, Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, 24 July 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/24/portal-site.html (accessed 30 
July 2014). 
 
Schedler, A., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 
 
Shevtsova, L., ‘Russia’s Hybrid Regime’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4, 
(October 2001). 
 
Shevtsova, L., Putin’s Russia, 2nd Edition, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2005). 
 
Shevtsova, L., ‘Putinism Under Siege: Implosion, Atrophy or Revolution?’, Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 3, (July 2012). 
 
Schmidt, A., ‘The Restoration of Moscow after 1812’, Slavic Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 
(Spring 1981). 
 
Skilling, H. and Griffiths, F. (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973). 
 
Shapiro, L., Totalitarianism, (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1972). 
 
Shiryaevskaya A. and Henry, P., ‘Medvedev Chooses Sobyanin as Moscow Mayor 
after Firing Luzhkov’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-15/medvedev-names-putin-aide-
sobyanin-to-be-moscow-mayor-after-firing-luzhkov.html (accessed 15 June 2014). 
 
Snob.ru, ‘Yeshchyo 6 chelovek pokinuli Sovet po pravam cheloveka pri 
prezidente’, Snob.ru, 4 June 2012, http://www.snob.ru/selected/entry/49619 
(accessed 8 July 2014). 
 
Solnick, S., Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
 
Solopov, M., ‘Partii Otpravyat v Kolonii’, Gazeta.ru, 15th March 2013, 
http://m.gazeta.ru/social/2013/03/14/5057581.shtml (accessed 15th April 2013). 
 
Sotsial'no-Orientirovannyye Nekommercheskiye Organizatsii Samarskoi Oblasti, 
Obshchestvennyye Eksperty, 
304 
 
http://songo63.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52 (accessed 
18 May 2013). 
 
Sovet Federatsii, ‘V Sovet Federatsii podderzhivayut skoreisheye prinyatiye 
zakona ob obshchestvennom kontrole’, Press Tsentr Soveta Federatsii, 24 March 
2014, http://council.gov.ru/press-center/news/40656/ (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka, ‘Kontseptsia Proyekta Federal’nogo Zakona “Ob Obshchestvennom 
(Grazhdanskom) Kontrole v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sovet Pri Prezidente po 
Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam Cheloveka, 
http://www.president-
sovet.ru/chairman/materials/draft_federal_law/the_concept_of_the_draft_federal_l
aw.php (accessed 17 September 2013). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka, Postayannaya komissiya po zakonodatel’stvu ob obshchestvennom 
kontrole’, Sovet Pri Prezidente RF, http://president-sovet.ru/structure/group_14/ 
(accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka, ‘Zayavlenie Soveta pri Prezidente RF po razvitiyu grazhdanskogo 
obshchestva i pravam cheloveka napravlennoe na zashchitu interesov detei iz 
Rossii, usynovlennykh za rubezhom’, Sovet Pri Prezidente RF, 20 December 
2012, http://www.president-sovet.ru/news/3293/ (accessed 8 July 2014). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka, ‘Zayavleniye Soveta pri Prezidente RF po razvitiyu grazhdanskogo 
obshchestva I pravam cheloveka v svyazi s deistvyami deputatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumi, trebuyushchikh zapretit’ usynovleniye rossiiskikh sirot 
grazhdanam SShA’, Sovet Pri Prezidente RF, 23 December 2012, 
http://www.president-sovet.ru/news/3294/ (accessed 8 July 2014). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka,Administratsiya Prezidenta dorabotala Proyekt Zakona ob 
Obshchestvennom Kontrole. “Novaya Politika”’, Sovet Pri Prezidente RF, 6 March 
2014, http://www.president-sovet.ru/events/5668/ (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Sovet Pri Prezidente po Razvitiyu Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva i Pravam 
Cheloveka, ‘“Na obshchestvennom kontrole” – syuzhet telekana “Rossiya 1”, v 
kotorom Iosef Diskin rasskazal o zakone ob obshchestvennom kontrole’,  Sovet pri 
Prezidente RF, 20 May 2014, http://www.president-sovet.ru/news/6185/ (accessed 
26 May 2014). 
 
Stedman Jones, D., Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
Steinfeld, E., Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
305 
 
Strategiya 2020, ‘Predvaritel'nyye predlozheniya dlya obnovleniya Kontseptsii 
sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda (Strategiya-
2020) po napravleniyu “Sovershenstvovaniye institutsional'nykh usloviy 
funktsionirovaniya nekommercheskikh organizatsiy, privlecheniye 
nekommercheskikh organizatsiy k predostavleniyu gosudarstvennykh 
(munitsipal'nykh) uslug (rabot), razvitiye mekhanizmov uchastiya 
nekommercheskikh organizatsiy v upravlenii predostavleniyem obshchestvennykh 
uslug”, http://2020strategy.ru/g16/documents/32655464.html (accessed 1 April 
2014). 
 
Straughn, J., ‘“Taking the State at its Word”: The Arts of Consentful Contention in 
the German Democratic Republic’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 110, No. 6, 
(2005). 
 
Sundstrom, L., Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development 
in Russia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
 
Sungurov, A. ‘Instituty Mediatory v Sovermennoi Rossii: Sluchai Saratovsoi 
Oblasti’, Politeks, Vol. 8, No. 4, (2012). 
 
Sungurov, A., Zakharova, O., Petrova, L. and Raspopov, N., ‘Instituty Mediatory I 
ikh Razvitie v Sovermennoi Rossii: Obshchestvennyye Palaty i Konsul’tativnyye 
Sovety: Federal’nyi I Regional’nyi Opyt’, Politicheskiye Issledovaniya: POLIS, No. 
1, 2012. 
 
Swearer, H., ‘Who Controls Whom?’ Problems of Communism, July 1963, 
http://www.unz.org/Pub/ProblemsCommunism-1963jul-00046?View=PDF 
(accessed 18 April 2014). 
 
Swyngedouw, E., ‘Authoritarian Governance, Power, and the Politics of Rescaling’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 18, No. 1, (2000). 
 
Swyngedouw, E., ‘Globalisation or “Glocalisation”? Networks, Territories and 
Rescaling’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1. (2004). 
 
Swyngedouw, E., ‘Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Governance-Beyond-the-State’, Urban Studies, Vol. 42, No. 11, (October 2005). 
 
Sysoyev, A., ‘Put’ Nablyudatelya’, Russkyi Zhurnal, http://russ.ru/Mirovaya-
povestka/Put-nablyudatelya (accessed 16 May 2014). 
  
Tarasenko, A., Dubrovsky, D. and Starodubtsev, A., Navesti mosti mezhdu 
obshchestvom i gosudarstvom: Obshchestvennyye Konsul’tativnyye Struktury v 
Regionakh Severo-Zapada, (St Petersburg: Tsentr Nezavisimykh 
Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovanii, 2011). 
 
Tarrow, S., Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics, 3rd 
Edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Taylor, B., State-Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after 
Communism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
306 
 
 
Tikhomirov, Yu, ‘Zaklyucheniye Instituta pravovykh issledovanii NIU-VShE’, Sovet 
Pri Prezidente RF, 1 July 2011, http://www.president-
sovet.ru/chairman/materials/draft_federal_law/institute_of_legal_studies_niu_scho
ol_of_economics.php (accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
Titova, I., ‘Matviyenko: Her Legacy to the City’, St Petersburg Times, 24 August 
2011, http://sptimes.ru/story/34443?page=nopages (accessed 15 June 2014). 
 
Tomasi, J., Free Market Fairness, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
Torocheshnikova, M., ‘Zakon ob Obshchestvennom Kontrole’, Radio Svoboda, 9 
June 2003, http://www.index.org.ru/turma/ic/2003/106/632-3.htm (accessed 23 
August 2013). 
 
Trenin, D., ‘Responding to the Russian Awakening’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 31 
March 2013, http://carnegie.ru/2013/03/31/responding-to-russian-awakening/fzyu 
(accessed 16 May 2014). 
 
Trofimov, A., ‘Prezidentskiye vybory-2012 v 10 tsifrakh’, Forbes, 2 March 2012, 
http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya-photogallery/vlast/79651-prezidentskie-vybory-2012-
v-tsifrah/photo/1 (accessed 18 May 2014). 
 
Tyurma i Volya, ‘Rasporyazheniye: O vzaimodeistvii organov prokuratury g. 
Moskvy s pravozashchitnymi i inymi obshchestvennymi organizatsiyami’, Tyur’ma i 
Volya: Tsentr sodeistviya reforme ugolovnogo pravosudiya, 9 October 2006, 
http://www.prison.org/law/NKO9.shtml (accessed 4 July 2014). 
 
Twitter, Georgii Poltavchenko, https://twitter.com/G_Poltavchenko (accessed 18 
June 2014). 
 
Uhlin, A., Post-Soviet Civil Society: Democratization in Russia and the Baltic 
States, (Oxford: Routledge, 2006). 
  
United Nations, ‘Vision, Mission, Goals, 1998’, National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/vision.html, 
(accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 55/2: United 
Nations Millennium Declaration’, 18 September 2000, 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (accessed 8 April 2014). 
  
United Nations, Third Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 2001, Naples, 
Italy. See 
http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/3rdGlobalForum/tabid/607/Default.as
px (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, ‘World Public Sector Report: Globalization and the State’, 
Department for Economic and Social Affairs, (New York: United Nations, 2001), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan012761.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2014). 
307 
 
 
United Nations, Fourth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 2002, 
Marrakech, Morocco, 
http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/4thGlobalForum/tabid/604/Default.as
px (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, Fifth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 2003, Mexico 
City, Mexico, 
http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/5thGlobalForum/tabid/603/Default.as
px (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, ‘World Public Sector Report: e-Government at the Crossroads’, 
Department for Economic and Social Affairs, (New York: United Nations, 2003), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan012733.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 2005, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea, 
http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/6thGlobalForum/tabid/602/Default.as
px (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, ‘The Seoul Declaration on Participatory and Transparent 
Governance’, 27 May 2005, available at: http://www.i-p-o.org/GF6-
Seoul_Declaration-27May05.htm (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
United Nations, United Nations Project Office on Governance, 
http://www.unpog.org/about/about02.php (accessed 10 April 2014). 
 
Universal’naya Elektronnaya Karta, http://www.uecard.ru/for-citizens/ (accessed 1 
April 2014). 
 
Ustinova, T. and Rogozhina, I., 'Russkie Pisateli v Samare i Samarskoi Gubernii', 
Literaturnaya Guberniya: Mezhdunarodnyi Al'manakh, 
http://samaralit.ru/?p=10313 (accessed 14 May 2013). 
 
Vabina, E., 'Boris Nemtsov: “Ya v shoke ot sostayaniya Samary”', Zasekin.ru, 10 
April 2013, http://zasekin.ru/politika/2013/04/10/boris-nemczov-y/ (accessed 18 
April 2013). 
 
Vechernyaya Moskva, ‘Sergei Sobyanin: Khotelos by sdelat’ Moskvu pomyagche, 
podopreye. Gorodom komfortnym i udobnym’, Vechernyaya Moskva, 12 February 
2012, http://m.vm.ru/news/sergei-sobyanin-hotelos-bi-sdelat-moskvy-pomyagche-
podobree-gorodom-komfortnim-i-ydobnim--1329067259.html (accessed 12 June 
2014). 
 
Vechernyaya Mosvka, ‘Sergei Sobyanin:  Moskvichi pomogayut upravlyat’ 
gorodom’, Vechernyaya Moskva, 24 December 2012, http://vm.ru/news/sergej-
sobyanin-moskvichi-pomogayut-upravlyat-gorodom1356321918.html (accessed 
11 June 2014). 
 
308 
 
Vechernyaya Moskva, ‘Sergei Sobyanin: Moskvichi, bud’te aktivneye v 
obsuzhdenii gorodskikh problem, ne prokhodite mimo’, Vechernyaya Moskva, 9 
December 2013, http://vm.ru/news/2013/12/09/sergej-sobyanin-moskvichi-budte-
aktivnee-v-obsuzhdenii-gorodskih-problem-ne-prohodite-mimo-226291.html 
(accessed 10 June 2014). 
 
Vedomosti, ‘Interv’yu – Sergei Sobyanin, vrio Mera Moskvy’, Vedomosti, 6 August 
2013, http://www.vedomosti.ru/library/news/14969351/intervyu-sergej-sobyanin-
vrio-mera-moskvy?full#cut (accessed 11 June 2014). 
 
Vesti, 'Putin prizivayet usilit' obshchestvennyi kontrol' za provedeniem YeGE', 
Vesti, 31 May 2011, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=460924 (accessed 11 April 
2013). 
 
Vibert, F., The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of 
Powers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
Vinokurova, Ye., ‘Shtrafy povysyat so snizheniyem’, Gazeta.ru, 22 May 2012, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/05/22_a_4597217.shtml (accessed 29 May 
2014). 
 
Vinokurova, Ye., ‘Sobyaninu naidut tysyachi “obshchestvennyye sovetnikov”. Za 3 
mlrd rublei’, Znak.com, 16 January 2014, 
http://www.znak.com/moscow/articles/16-01-20-57/101773.html (accessed 13 
June 2014). 
 
V'yushkova, Ye., 'Nashi Otnosheniya s gubernatorom mogut tol'ko uluchat'sya, 
khuzhe uzhe byt' ne moglo', Kommersant Samara, 9 November 2012, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2062985 (accessed 14 May 2013). 
 
Walkin, J., The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and 
Social Institutions under the Last Three Czars (Westport: Praeger, 1962). 
 
Weigle, M., ‘On the Road to the Civic Forum: State and Society from Yeltsin to 
Putin’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 10, 2002. 
 
Wengle, S. and Rasell, M., ‘The Monetisation of L’goty: Changing Patterns of 
Welfare Provision and Politics in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 5, 
(July 2008). 
 
Weyland, K., The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, 
Peru, Brazil and Venezuela, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
 
Whitmore, B., ‘Meet the New Boss (Different from the Old Boss), Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 August 2011, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/st_petersburg_governor_poltavchenko_matviyenko_p
utin_medvedev/24314080.html (accessed 15 June 2014). 
 
Whitmore, B., ‘Did Russian Civil Society Wake Up in 2011?’, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 December 2011, 
309 
 
http://www.rferl.org/content/the_year_russian_civil_society_woke_up/24437163.ht
ml (accessed 16 May 2014). 
 
Whitmore, B., ‘In Moscow Election, the Fix is in – Or is it?’, Radio Free Europe 
Radio Liberty, 4 June 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/in-moscow-mayors-race-
the-fix-is-in-or-is-it/25007162.html (accessed 18 July 2013). 
 
Wiarda, H., ‘The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science: Implications for Research 
and Policy’ The Review of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Jul., 1981). 
 
Wiarda, H., ‘Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Comparative Politics: 
Transitology and the Need for New Theory’, Eastern European Politics and 
Societies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall, 2001). 
 
World Bank, ‘A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance 
Matters 2007: Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2006’, The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC, 
2007. 
 
World Bank, ‘Russia Overview’, The World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/overview (accessed 11 April 2014). 
 
World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (accessed 11 April 
2014). 
 
Worth, O., Hegemony, International Political Economy and Post-Communist 
Russia, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005). 
 
Yabloko, 'Pravozashchitniki “probyvayot bresh'” v penitentsiarnoi sisteme: Kogo 
budut kontrolirovat' obshchestvennyye inspektory?', Informatsionno-politicheskii 
Biulleten' Partii Yabloko, No. 11 (47), August 2003, 
http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/Bulletin/200308-11/gazeta1147020.html 
(accessed 20 August 2013). 
 
Yurchak, A., ‘Russian Neoliberal: The Entrepreneurial Ethic and the Spirit of “True 
Careerism”’, The Russian Review, Vol. 62, (January 2003). 
 
Yurchak, A., Everything was Forever Until it was No More, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
 
Yuristy za Grazhdanskoye Obshchestvo, Novosti, No. 57, Yuristy Za 
Grazhdanskoye Obshchestvo, 19 February 2010, 
http://www.lawcs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=374:12-
2010-&catid=24:-2010-&Itemid=90 (accessed 26 May 2014). 
 
Zakaria, F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, 2nd 
Edition, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007). 
 
Zakharvo, M., ‘St Petersburg Tower Vertical Defeated. For Now…’, 
openDemocracy Russia, 15 December 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
310 
 
russia/mikhail-zakharov/st-petersburgs-tower-vertical-defeated-for-now (accessed 
13 July 2014). 
 
Zakupki.gov.ru, ‘Glavnaya Portal Zakupok’, 
http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public/home.html (accessed 1 April 2014). 
 
Zlotnik, M., ‘Russia’s Governors: A Force to be Reckoned with’, Demokratizatsiya, 
Vol. 5, No. 2, (Spring 1997). 
 
Zubarevich, N., ‘Four Russias: Re-thinking the Post-Soviet Map’, openDemocracy 
Russia, 29 March 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/natalia-
zubarevich/four-russias-rethinking-post-soviet-map (accessed 15 August 2014). 
 
812 Online, ‘U nas ne dolzhno byt’ takoi vakkhanalii, kak v Moskve v novykh 
raionakh’, 812 Online, 20 August 2012, http://www.online812.ru/2012/08/20/001/ 
(accessed 14 June 2014). 
311 
 
Interview Details 
 
Moscow 
M1: Ryazan Memorial, Ryazan, 19 July 2012. 
M2: Za Prava Cheloveka, Moscow, 20 July 2012. 
M3: Grazhdanskoye Sodeistviye, Memorial, Moscow, 20 July 2012. 
M4: Grazhdanin i Armeya, Moscow, 23 July 2012. 
M5: Environmental Activist, Moscow, 25 July, 2012. 
M6: Memorial Pravozashchitnyi Tsentr, Pilorama Festival, Perm, 29 July 2012. 
M7: Nezavisimyi Ekspertno-pravovoi Sovet, Moscow, 28 August 2012. 
M8: Former Federal Human Rights Ombudsman, Moscow, 29 August 2012. 
M10: Fond “Obshchestvennyi Verdikt”, Moscow, 6 November 2012. 
M11: Tyur’ma i Volya, Moscow, 7 November 2012. 
M12: Tyur’ma i Volya, Moscow, 7 November 2012. 
M13: Economist, Moscow State University, Moscow, 9 November 2012. 
M14: Assotsiatsiya “Agora”, Moscow, 9 November 2012. 
M15: Institut Prav Cheloveka, Moscow, 9 November 2012. 
 
St Petersburg 
SPB1: Tsentr “Strategiya”, St Petersburg, 7 July 2012. 
SPB2: Nauchno-Informatsionnyi Tsentr “Memorial”, St Petersburg, 13 July 2012. 
SPB3: Grazhdanskii Kontrol’, St Petersburg, 21 August 2012. 
SPB4: Human Rights Ombudsman Bureau, St Petersburg, 21 August 2012. 
SPB5: Memorial, St Petersburg, 21 August 2012. 
SPB6: Grazhdanskii Kontrol’, St Petersburg, 21 August 2012. 
SPB7: Soldatskii Materi, St Petersburg, 22 August 2012. 
SPB8: Art-Tsentr “Pushkinskaya 10”, 23 August 2012. 
SPB9: Pravozashchitnyi Sovet Sankt-Peterburga, St Petersburg, 24 August 2012. 
SPB11: Memorial, St Petersburg, 7 September 2012. 
SPB12: Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki, St Petersburg, 29 October 2012. 
 
Samara 
S1: GOLOS, Samara, 9 August 2012. 
S2: Yabloko Samara, Samara, 11 August, 2012. 
312 
 
S3: Assotsiatsiya “Desnitsa”, Samara, 13 August 2012. 
S4: Zasekin.ru, Samara, 14 August 2012. 
S5: Assotsiatsiya “Povolzh’ye”, Samara, 14 August 2012. 
S6: Samarskaya Zelyonaya Liga, Samara, 31 October 2012. 
S7: Assambleiya Narodov Samarskoi Oblasti, Samara, 1 November 2012. 
S8: Freelance Journalist, Samara, 1 November 2012. 
S9: Lawyer, Samara, 2 November 2012. 
S10: Samara Human Rights Ombudsman Bureau, Samara, 2 November 2012. 
